State of New Jersey v. M.G.R.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2572-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

M.G.R.,1

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Argued December 16, 2025 – Decided April 14, 2026

Before Judges Susswein and Augostini.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 19-11-

1465.

Colin Sheehan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti,

Public Defender, attorney; Colin Sheehan, of counsel

and on the brief).

Nicole Handy, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause

for respondent (LaChia L. Bradshaw, Burlington

1

We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the record and the privacy

interests of the parties. See R. 1:38-3(d)(10).

County Prosecutor, attorney; Nicole Handy, of counsel

and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Following a bench trial, the court convicted defendant M.G.R. of

murdering her mother, D.D., and related weapons offenses, having rejected

defendant's insanity defense. Defendant contends that her convictions should

be reversed for three reasons: (1) the trial court erred in admitting her statement

to the police without expert testimony; (2) the prosecutor's improper comment

in summation undermined defendant's right to remain silent and deprived her of

a fair trial; and (3) the trial court failed to find the required mental states for the

charged offenses. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we affirm

defendant's convictions.

I.

We summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history from the trial

record. On the morning of September 6, 2019, when D.D. did not log into her

computer for work as expected and did not respond to phone calls or texts from

co-workers, her manager and friend, L.L., drove to her home for a wellness

check. When D.D. did not answer the door, L.L. contacted 9-1-1.

Police responded, entered D.D.'s apartment, and found her dead on the

bathroom floor. D.D. had suffered multiple stab wounds and there was blood

A-2572-23

2

throughout the apartment. The living room television was blaring loudly. A

knife and blood-stained rag were found in the kitchen sink and other bloody

clothing items, later identified as belonging to defendant, were found in the

apartment.

Officers contacted D.D.'s former spouse and defendant's father, E.R., and

then began searching area hotels for defendant. Later in the evening on

September 6, defendant was located in a nearby hotel and brought to the local

police station.

Detective Nicholas Villano and Sergeant Thomas Corsanico interviewed

defendant. Before speaking with her, defendant's father advised Corsanico that

she had a history of mental illness and a prior hospitalization. Initially, the

detectives engaged in a general conversation with defendant, asking preliminary

questions such as "her name, date of birth, childhood, and education and

employment history." According to Corsanico, defendant responded

appropriately and "seemed lucid and gave coherent answers."

Villano then read defendant her Miranda2 rights and she signed the

Miranda card. After being advised of her rights, defendant initially stated she

did not want to speak with the officers, so they left the room. Upon their return,

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

A-2572-23

3

defendant stated that she changed her mind and was willing to speak with them.

Defendant continued to change her mind multiple times about speaking with

them. The officers again left the room. As the officers re-entered the room,

defendant spontaneously stated she was "ready to talk with them" if they still

wanted to talk with her. Villano advised defendant he would need to reread "that

card" to her, to which she agreed. He then readvised defendant of her Miranda

rights, she initialed a second Miranda card, acknowledging again that she

understood each of her rights.

During the interrogation, defendant was able to recall some information

but repeatedly responded that she could not recall or did not know the answer to

the officers' more specific questions. She also claimed to be confused at times

during the questioning. In response to a question regarding her medication, she

explained that she had been off her medication "for a while." Defendant's hands

had visible cuts on them for which she sought medical treatment at a nearby

hospital before she was detained. She told hospital staff that she was injured by

a sprinkler. During the interview, when asked about the explanation she had

given, defendant stated she "didn't know what happened" to her hands so she

"made something up." Defendant was asked to consider what her mother would

say if she were present, and she responded: "If it was me, I can't forgive myself.

A-2572-23

4

It was me, wasn't it?" As the officers pressed her to piece together what

happened involving her mother, she said she did not want to talk anymore and

the interrogation ended.

In November 2019, defendant was charged by indictment with murder,

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); third-degree possession of a weapon for an

unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and fourth-degree unlawful possession

of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). In December 2019, defendant was evaluated

for competency. Beginning in June 2020, defendant had resided at the Ann

Klein Forensic Center where she was evaluated, treated, and participated in

"competency restoration programming." Defendant was later deemed

competent to stand trial.

Defendant waived her right to a jury trial. Prior to trial, defendant moved

to suppress the statement she gave to police at the stationhouse on September 6,

2019. On October 11, 2023, the suppression hearing was held; Detective Villano

testified on behalf of the State, and the video recording of defendant's interview

was admitted into evidence.

Finding Detective Villano credible, the trial court concluded defendant

was properly advised of her Miranda rights prior to the interview and that she

"acknowledged her rights verbally and in writing." The court found:

A-2572-23

5

[D]efendant's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary in light of the other circumstances.

Defendant's waiver was not compromised by defendant

not taking her medication. Defendant demonstrated

sufficient clarity of mind to effectively communicate,

understand, and make decisions about whether to be

intervened by police or remain silent. Moreover, she

was fully able to participate in the interview. Her

answers, when she could recall, were logical and

responsive to the questions asked. She expressed no

issues with any of the interviewing officer's questions,

nor did she experience any difficulty understanding or

responding to the officers' questions.

Concluding that defendant's statement was "voluntary" and not the "product of

coercion or official misconduct," the court denied defendant's motion to

suppress.

A five-day bench trial began on October 12 and concluded on November

1, 2023. Defendant did not contest that she had killed her mother. Rather,

asserting an insanity defense, defendant contended she did not understand the

nature and quality of her actions. Defendant argued that the most significant

evidence was the psychiatric records from her 2018 psychiatric hospitalization

in Maine.

In June 2018, defendant disappeared for a month but was later found

admitted to a hospital in Maine. She called herself "Cat Zill," provided a false

A-2572-23

6

date of birth and claimed she could not recall how she got there. During this

episode she "complained of insect bites, but no such bites were found."

Defendant was admitted to a nearby psychiatric hospital. Her medical

records indicated that "she suffered from a psychotic episode, was 'extremely

disorganized and confused,' and could not remember what happened before

hospitalization." Her condition reportedly improved with medication, and she

subsequently moved into her mother's apartment in Mount Laurel two weeks

after she was discharged, where she remained until the present incident.

After returning to New Jersey, defendant began receiving treatment from

Dr. Edward Baruch. According to Dr. Baruch, defendant "suffers from a long

history of schizophrenia," with "aspects of paranoia and disorganization." Two

days before her death, D.D. called Dr. Baruch to report that defendant had

stopped taking her medication and was "off the walls." "Dr. Baruch advised

D.D. to contact law enforcement if defendant were a danger to herself or others."

However, D.D. believed defendant would "be ok [un]til Monday."

Defendant's father testified on her behalf and stated that he and D.D. had

confronted defendant on at least two occasions about not taking her medication.

He explained that when defendant took her medication, she was "okay" and

A-2572-23

7

"could have normal conversations." However, when she did not take her

medication, defendant's father described her as "off" and "incoherent."

D.D.'s neighbors testified that in the early morning hours of September 6,

they woke up to "a young girl yelling" and "lots of noises" for several minutes.

One of the neighbors testified he heard "banging, but not as loud, and like

muffled, like incoherent mumbling by []a very raspy female voice."

Detective Timothy Horne testified that during the investigation he learned

of a text message from TD Bank's fraud department on D.D.'s phone inquiring

if she attempted a $200 withdrawal at 4:57 a.m. on September 6. Horne

confirmed that one of the bank cards later found in defendant's hotel room was

a TD bank card in her mother's name.

Sometime between 4:30 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. on September 6, defendant

entered a nearby hotel requesting a room. According to the hotel employee, she

provided her driver's license, cash for payment, and her own credit card for

incidentals. When that card was declined, defendant used D.D.'s credit card,

telling the employee it was her mother's and she had permission to use it.

Hotel staff testified regarding their interaction with defendant that early

morning. Shortly after her arrival, defendant asked the night receptionist for

band aids because she "cut her hand . . . with her knife." The receptionist gave

A-2572-23

8

defendant a few bandages for her hands, but suggested she go to a hospital for

treatment because the cuts appeared "very deep."

The night receptionist testified that, although he did not notice anything

concerning about defendant's behavior, he let the day receptionist know that

defendant had checked in and seemed a bit "sketchy," and to "be on the lookout

for her." The day receptionist testified that later that morning, defendant asked

for more bandages and a room change because her room was

"dirty." Like her colleague, the day receptionist did not notice anything

concerning about defendant's behavior; she testified, however, that defendant

seemed "startled" and "looked a little [] paranoid."

At trial, it was established that the tread pattern of the blood-stained shoe

prints on the bathroom floor next to D.D.'s body matched the treads of

defendant's shoes worn at the time she was detained and interrogated. During

police questioning, defendant confirmed she had been wearing those same shoes

while at home that day. Moreover, testing established that defendant's DNA

matched the DNA profile taken from the knife located in the apartment's kitchen

sink and the blood stain inside D.D.'s purse found in her bedroom.

Two forensic psychologists testified as experts: the defense called Dr.

Peter Oropeza and Dr. Elliot Atkins testified on behalf of the State as a rebuttal

A-2572-23

9

expert. These experts evaluated defendant's mental state at the time of the

alleged offenses and agreed that defendant "qualifies for a diagnosis of

schizophrenia." Neither expert, however, evaluated defendant's competency to

waive her Miranda rights.

In his supplemental report, Dr. Oropeza concluded to a reasonable degree

of psychological certainty that:

. . . as a result of active symptoms of schizophrenia at

the time of the offense[s] . . . she was not aware of her

behavior, did not knowingly engage in reality based

behavior, and was significantly impaired on the day in

question such that she was laboring under such a

disease of defect from reason of the mind so as not to

know the nature or quality of what she was doing . . .

and specifically, it was my opinion that she met the

criteria for insanity.

In his professional opinion, he explained that defendant "was suffering from

significant symptoms of . . . []schizophrenia[] rendering her to be laboring under

such a defective reason from disease of the mind as to not know the nature and

quality of the act she was doing."

Dr. Oropeza testified that defendant's symptoms were worsening in the

weeks leading up to the offense. Specifically, he noted that defendant was not

taking her medication, was experiencing paranoid delusions, and was

experiencing amnesia about the violent episode with the pillow two weeks prior.

A-2572-23

10

While acknowledging that defendant was able to engage in "some goal directed

behavior," such as packing a bag, taking D.D.'s credit card, withdrawing cash

from an ATM, and checking into a hotel after D.D.'s death, Dr. Oropeza

emphasized that organized behavior does not necessarily equate with an

individual, suffering from schizophrenia, appreciating the nature or wrongness

of her actions.

Although he did not evaluate defendant's competency to waive her

Miranda rights, Dr. Oropeza viewed and commented briefly on defendant's

video recorded interrogation. In his initial report, he noted:

Officers questioned [defendant] in a lengthy interview

(note that [defendant] was hesitant to waive Miranda

rights and be interviewed but ultimately agreed).

[Defendant's] affect was flat, she exhibited poor

memory recall and eventually discontinued the

interview.

According to Dr. Oropeza, the other "notable" observation regarding defendant's

interview was that defendant was "able to respond to a number of questions,"

and then at other times, "she can't recall or has no memory" of certain things.

Dr. Atkins, the State's rebuttal expert, agreed with the majority of Dr.

Oropeza's findings, however, disagreed with his conclusion. Dr. Atkin concurred

that defendant was suffering from schizophrenia and that her behavior was

"significantly impaired by her mental illness." Specifically, Dr. Atkin disagreed

A-2572-23

11

that defendant "would have met the requirements for . . . an [insanity] defense."

He explained:

Any opinion regarding a defendant's appreciation of the

nature and quality (or the wrongfulness) of their actions

would require an understanding of that defendant's

perceptions and beliefs at the time of the offense. As

[defendant] was amnestic regarding what took place

immediately prior to, during, and subsequent to, the

instant offense, we are not in the position to form an

opinion regarding her knowledge or awareness of the

nature and quality of the act that she was doing.

He testified that because "[w]e don't have any [] information as to what was

taking place at the time of the commission of the offense, we cannot render an

opinion [to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty] about her state of

mind at that time." Because defendant could not remember the incident itself,

"what she was thinking at the time [she] committed the crime," this lack of

information as to her cognitive process resulted in Dr. Atkin concluding that

"we are not in a position to offer an opinion within a reasonable degree of

psychological certainty as to whether she knew what she was doing at the time

or whether she knew that what she was doing was wrong."

Nonetheless, Dr. Atkins testified that defendant's behavior following the

murder implied an awareness of the wrongfulness of her conduct. Specifically,

he testified that defendant "knew what she was doing" after D.D.'s death

A-2572-23

12

demonstrated by defendant packing a bag, taking D.D.'s credit card,

withdrawing "money out of [an] ATM machine," and check[ing] into a hotel."

According to Dr. Atkins, the "implication" was that defendant "recognized the

wrongfulness of her behavior," because "[s]he was leaving the scene." He

further explained that "very, very shortly after she committed the crime, she was

acting in a way that was consistent with her knowing that what she had just done

was wrong."

Dr. Atkins also reviewed defendant's video recorded stationhouse

interrogation, although he did not evaluate her competency to waive her Miranda

rights. He agreed with Dr. Oropeza that defendant's affect was flat and that

"there were a lot of things [] she didn't remember." However, he found it

"extremely clear that she was in touch with reality." He further explained that:

[S]he knew what she was doing when she was

responding to the interrogators' questions. In fact, she

even knew what she was doing when she stopped the

interrogation process when the questions started to

become a little bit more aggressive. There was no

indication whatsoever during that interrogation that she

was actively psychotic. She still was schizophrenic, but

it wasn't interfering with her ability to understand what

she was doing.

Following the close of the evidence and summations, the trial court

rendered a verdict, finding defendant guilty on all counts. Stating its reasons on

A-2572-23

13

the record, it found all fact witnesses credible, but "afford[ed] less weight" to

defendant's father's testimony because it was "colored by his care and concern

for his daughter" and "his testimony on cross-examination testimony took on a

different tone than on direct examination."

The trial court found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

defendant caused D.D.'s death and that she did so purposely or knowingly. "The

primary issue" before the trial court was "whether [] defendant ha[d] proven by

preponderance of the evidence that [defendant] was insane at the time she

committed these offenses." In other words, "at the time of committing the act,

[was] defendant [] laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the

mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act, or if defendant did know

it, that she did not know that what she . . . was doing was wrong[?]"

In evaluating the experts, the trial court found both witnesses credible but

afforded greater weight to the testimony of Dr. Atkins. It stated:

[Dr. Atkins] offered a more cogent, plausible and

logical assessment of the evidence regarding

defendant's mental state at the time of the offense,

whereas Dr. Oropeza's assessment of defendant's

mental state at the time of the offense is primarily based

on inferences he drew from defendant's psychological

history.

A-2572-23

14

The court found that "[w]hile defendant has proven that she suffered from a

disease of the mind, there is insufficient direct or indirect evidence that at the

time of the offense, that defendant did not know the nature and quality of her

actions." Thus, the court determined "there [was] no preponderance of the

evidence of insanity[,]" and found defendant guilty on all counts.

On March 8, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant to thirty years for

murder, with no parole eligibility, and concurrent terms of three years for

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and eighteen months for

unlawful possession of a weapon." This appeal followed.

Defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

[DEFENDANT'S] STATEMENT TO POLICE MUST

BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE, WITHOUT EXPERT

TESTIMONY, THE STATE CANNOT MEETS ITS

HEAVY BURDEN TO PROVE THAT

[DEFENDANT] KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY,

AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HER MIRANDA

RIGHTS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

DESPITE HER SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS.

POINT II

THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER ARGUMENT IN

SUMMATION THAT [DEFENDANT'S] INSANITY

DEFENSE WAS UNDERMINDED BY HER

EXERCISING HER CONSTUTITIONAL RIGHT TO

REMAIN SILENT DEPRIVED [DEFENDANT] OF

HER RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR

TRIAL.

A-2572-23

15

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FIND THE

REQUIRED MENTAL STATES FOR THE

CHARGED

OFFENSES.

II.

Motion to Suppress

We first consider defendant's argument that the trial court should have

granted the motion to suppress her statements in the video recorded stationhouse

interrogation because, without expert testimony, the State failed to meet its

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently waived her Miranda rights. Defendant claims that

because she was suffering from "unmedicated schizophrenia with a recent

history of delusions, hallucinations, and amnesia," without expert testimony, the

State did not meet its "heavy burden" of proving a valid Miranda waiver.

Relying solely on lay opinions, defendant claims the State failed to prove, and

the trial court erred in finding, that her "serious mental illness did not inhibit her

ability to properly waive her [Miranda] rights beyond a reasonable doubt."

We defer to the factual findings of the trial court on a suppression motion

when those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.

State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 210 (2022); State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 379-80

(2017). We do so because they "are substantially influenced by [an] opportunity

A-2572-23

16

to hear and see the witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which a reviewing

court cannot enjoy." State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 (2015) (internal

quotations omitted) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)). We

review legal conclusions drawn from the facts de novo. State v. Radel, 249 N.J.

469, 493 (2022); State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).

"When a defendant moves to suppress custodial statements made to police,

the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that []

defendant's waiver of his [or her] Miranda rights was knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily given the totality of the circumstances." State v. Erazo, 254 N.J.

277, 301 (2023) (citing State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 382-83 (2014)). In

examining the totality of the circumstances, "the court considers all the facts

surrounding the interrogation, including '[] defendant's age, education and

intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of [the] detention, whether

the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and whether physical

punishment or mental exhaustion was involved.'" Ibid. (alteration in original)

(citing State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 402 (2009) (quoting State v. Presha,

163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000))). These factors "are assessed 'qualitatively, not

quantitatively.'" Hreha, 217 N.J. at 384.

A-2572-23

17

Defendant contends that her serious mental illness "posed a significant

barrier" to proving that she properly waived her Miranda rights—a barrier which

without expert testimony—the State could not and did not overcome. We are

not persuaded under the totality of these circumstances that the substantial,

credible evidence, including defendant's video recorded police interview,

establishes defendant's waiver was involuntary because her will was

"overborne" and her "capacity for self-determination critically impaired" by her

mental illness. State v. Burney, 471 N.J. Super. 297, 315 (App. Div. 2022),

rev'd on other grounds, 255 N.J. 1 (2023) (citing State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 113

(1997) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973))).

The totality of the circumstances analysis requires the court to consider

all relevant factors and "qualitatively" evaluate those relative factors. Cf.

Presha, 163 N.J. at 323. This inquiry encompasses "characteristics of []

defendant and the nature of the interrogation." Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383 (quoting

State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993)). Although "the presence of one

[relevant] factor may permit the conclusion that a confession was involuntary,"

there is no per se rule under the totality of the circumstances analysis that a

defendant's mental health issues will automatically negate the voluntariness of

their Miranda waiver. Ibid.; see State v. Smith, 307 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div.

A-2572-23

18

1997) ("The fact that defendant was suffering from a mental illness at the time

of the questioning did not render his waiver or his statement involuntary ."); see

also State v. Glover, 230 N.J. Super. 333, 342 (App. Div. 1988) ("[T]he record

clearly demonstrate[d] that defendant's ability to make free and rational choices

when interrogated by the police was not 'overborne by defendant's severe mental

illness.'").

Defendant relies on our decision in Burney to support her contention that

expert testimony was required concerning her mental state at the time she

waived her Miranda rights. This reliance is misplaced.

In Burney, police located defendant in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU)

"preparing to receive kidney dialysis." 471 N.J. Super. at 310. He was

"connected to an intravenous line and an electrocardiogram" but had not begun

dialysis at the time the officers arrived and began questioning him. Ibid. The

officers verbally administered the Miranda warnings and did not obtain a written

record or notation of defendant's waiver. Ibid. No audio or video recording of

the interrogation was made. Ibid.

The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress his hospital-bed

statements, concluding the State failed to prove that he was properly advised of

all his Miranda rights. Id. at 312. The trial court found that his statements could

A-2572-23

19

be used at trial for impeachment purposes should defendant testify because it

concluded the statements were made voluntarily. Ibid. Defendant chose not to

testify, however. We reversed the trial court's determination that the statements

were voluntary because it did not "adequately consider all of the information in

the record concerning defendant's medical condition." Id. at 316. For instance,

a hospital report showed that defendant suffered from "shortness of breath . . .

and [localized] right side chest pain," "[f]luid overload," "[a]nemia, electrolyte

abnormality[,] and . . . toxic/metabolic derangement." Ibid. The trial judge

candidly acknowledged that he did not have the benefit of an expert medical

witness to explain the medical terms in the hospital report. Ibid. The judge

stated:

I'm not a medical doctor and I—I don't know—medical

terminology, [and] very often, [it] means things very

different than—than legal or layman terminology, so

I don't place any strong emphasis on the word toxic . . .

metabolic derangement. It could mean something very

different from this.

[Id. at 316-17.]

In the present case, unlike in Burney, the same concerns regarding

defendant's medical condition were not present. Id. at 310-12. Defendant here

was not hospitalized, not experiencing any medical crisis or acute symptoms of

A-2572-23

20

her schizophrenia diagnosis, nor was she unaware of her circumstances and

consequences of her decision to speak with law enforcement.

Moreover, the stationhouse interrogation was recorded, which the trial

court had the opportunity to review. On the contrary, in Burney, the gurney-

side interrogation was not recorded. Defendant answers were responsive to the

officers' questions, and unlike while she was hospitalized in Maine in 2018,

defendant provide accurate pedigree information to the officers. The evidence

does not support the assertion that defendant's cognition was impaired or that

her mental health issues "impacted [her] capacity for self-determination." Id. at

318. None of the same concerning facts found in Burney existed here.

Furthermore, defendant, twenty-three years of age, with several years of

college experience, understood the officer's questions and the focus of their

inquiry. The interrogation lasted approximately one and a half hours with breaks

and water provided to defendant. She was read her Miranda rights twice and

was provided the Miranda card to read and sign. She was advised she could end

the interrogation at any time, and in fact, exercised that right.

We are satisfied that the trial court's finding defendant voluntarily waived

her Miranda rights is based on consideration of the totality of the circumstances

and supported by sufficient evidence in the record. State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384,

A-2572-23

21

398 (2019). As the court concluded, "[d]efendant's waiver was not compromised

by [her] not taking her medication[,]" and she "demonstrated sufficient clarity

of mind to effectively communicate, understand, and make decisions about

whether to be interviewed by police or remain silent." Defendant's mental

competence is a relevant consideration in determining voluntariness of her

Miranda waiver; however, it is only one factor to be considered in the totality

of the circumstances analysis.

The record is devoid of evidence that defendant's mental illness interfered

with her decision to voluntarily waive her Miranda rights and speak with the

officers. Without more, the State was under no obligation to present expert

testimony regarding defendant's mental health and its potential impact on the

voluntariness of her statement. We therefore affirm the court's denial of

defendant's motion to suppress her statements during the interrogation.

III.

Prosecutor's Comment During Summation

We turn next to defendant's contention that the prosecutor's comment in

summation concerning defendant's decision to exercise her right to remain silent

undermined her insanity defense and deprived her of a fair trial. In summation,

the prosecutor commented, "what does [defendant] do when [the officers] push

A-2572-23

22

just a little bit harder, she doesn't want to talk about it any further[] . . . defendant

had the wherewithal to exercise her right to terminate that interview."

Because no objection was made regarding this comment, we review it for

plain error. State v. Tilghman, 345 N.J. Super. 571, 575 (App. Div. 2001); R.

2:10-2. "Under that standard, an unchallenged error constitutes plain error if it

was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'" State v. Clark, 251 N.J.

266, 287 (2022) (quoting R. 2:10-2). "The mere possibility of an unjust result

is not enough." State v. Butler, 263 N.J. 2, 22 (2026) (quoting State v.

Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016)). Rather, an unjust result that warrants

reversal must be "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error

led [the factfinder] to a result it otherwise might not have reached." Ibid.

(quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)). Moreover, the error must be

"evaluated 'in light of the overall strength of the State's case.'" Ibid.

"Prosecutors are afforded considerable leeway in closing arguments as

long as their comments are reasonably related to the scope of the evidence

presented." State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82 (1999). "[T]heir comments [should

be] reasonably related to the scope of the evidence presented." Ibid. "[E]ven

when a prosecutor's remarks stray over the line of permissible commentary, our

inquiry does not end." State v. Williams, 244 N.J. 592, 608 (2021) (quoting

A-2572-23

23

McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 275 (2005) (internal quotations omitted)). We

"reverse a conviction on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if 'the

conduct was so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial," State v.

Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 437 (2007) (quoting State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565,

625 (2000)).

We begin by assessing whether the prosecutor's comment was improper.

Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comment improperly undermined her

right to remain silent by referring to her decision to terminate the police

interrogation as evidence of her sanity. At the outset, we note that the

defendant's "failure to object suggests that defense counsel did not believe the

remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made . . . [and] deprive[d] the

court of an opportunity to take curative action." Frost, 158 N.J. at 84.

Nonetheless, a prosecutor may not "suggest explicitly or implicitly that

defendant's silence evidenced [her] sanity at the time of the homicide." State v.

Oglesby, 122 N.J. 522, 535 (1991). "It is well-settled that the constitutional

right against self-incrimination precludes the State from any trial tactic designed

to suggest to the jury that defendant's guilt may be inferred from hi s [or her]

silence." State v. Hyde, 292 N.J. Super. 159, 164 (App. Div. 1996). Such error,

while significant, has not been deemed prejudicial per se. See Ibid. We do not

A-2572-23

24

condone the prosecutor's remark because it ventured too closely to

impermissibly commenting on defendant's invocation of the right to remain

silent as proof of her sanity. However, we disagree that the prosecutor's

comment here constitutes plain error warranting reversal of defendant's

convictions.

Defendant relies on federal and state case law precedent in Wainwright v.

Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986); Oglesby, 122 N.J. at 534-35; and Hyde,

292 N.J. Super. at 166, to support her contention that the prosecutor's

impermissible comment deprived her of a fair trial warranting reversal. In

contrast to Wainwright, Oglesby, and Hyde, this was a bench trial. The potential

for prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's comment in a bench trial is far less

because a judge is aware of the restrictions on and improper use of such

evidence. See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.H.C., 415 N.J.

Super. 551, 576 (App. Div. 2010) ("A judge, trained and experienced in using

evidence only for its purposes . . . is much less likely to be prejudiced against a

defendant"). Further, a judge knows that the arguments of counsel are not

evidence. See also State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 276 (1990) ("judges are

presumed to know the law").

A-2572-23

25

Moreover, in each of these cases, defendants invoked their right to remain

silent immediately after being advised of their Miranda rights. In the present

case, following the suppression hearing, the trial court determined that

defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her Miranda rights

before making any statements to the police. And, only after being questioned

for over an hour, did defendant revoke her waiver.

In addition to the video recording of defendant's interrogation, the State

offered a video recording and other evidence of a variety of other actions

defendant took after the murder but before the interrogation, such as

withdrawing money from her mother's bank account at a local ATM and

surveillance video from defendant's hotel check-in. Therefore, the State's

comment regarding defendant's revocation of her willingness to speak to the

officers must be considered in the context with other evidence offered to

demonstrate defendant's awareness of her actions.

Defendant, while noting this was a bench trial, urges us to find plain error

nonetheless because "the court's verdict reflect[ed] its consideration of this

improper argument." We disagree. During its summary of the trial evidence

and testimony, the court noted, "[w]hen pressed by Detective Villano about her

mother's death, defendant informed officers that she no longer wanted to speak

A-2572-23

26

with them." The court made no further comment or drew any further conclusion

from this fact. The comment was fleeting and not repeated or emphasized

further.

After considering "all the evidence," the court delineated its findings, and

addressed "whether [] defendant ha[d] proven by a preponderance of the

evidence that [she] was insane at the time she committed these offenses." In

addressing this issue, the court focused on the testimony of the two experts, Dr.

Oropeza and Dr. Atkins. The only other mention of defendant's exercise of her

right to remain silent occurred when the court summarized, in part, Dr. Atkins'

findings:

Dr. Atkins highlighted the stringent requirements to

meet the definition of insanity. He noted how difficult

it is to prove that a person did not know what they were

doing. Dr. Atkins pointed out how defendant clearly

knew what she was doing when she packed a bag and

put her clothing in it and her passport in it, that

defendant knew what she was doing when she put her

PIN number in the ATM to withdraw money and that

she knew what she was doing when she checked herself

into the Wyndham Hotel and when she stopped the

police interrogation when the questioning became more

aggressive. [3]

3

Defendant did not object during Dr. Atkins testimony when asked on direct

about the import of defendant's actions, including stopping the police

interrogation when the questioning became more aggressive.

A-2572-23

27

The court found both doctors credible but gave greater weight to the testimony

of Dr. Atkins because his testimony was "more cogent, plausible and logical . .

. regarding defendant's mental state at the time of the offense." As for Dr.

Oropeza's testimony, the court found that his opinion was "primarily based on

inferences he drew from defendant's psychological history." The court primarily

relied upon the expert testimony in rendering its verdict. Thus, the record does

not support defendant's contention that the court improperly considered and

relied upon defendant's invocation of her Miranda rights in rendering its verdict.

"[W]e do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial

judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or

inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence so

as to offend the interests of justice[.]" Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A.,

205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (citations omitted). Here, the prosecutor's comment,

when "evaluated in light of the overall strength of the State's case," State v.

Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 468 (2018) (internal quotations omitted)

(citations omitted), does not rise to the level of plain error. The record does not

support the conclusion that a "reasonable doubt has been raised whether [the

judge] came to a result that it otherwise might not have reached" but for the

A-2572-23

28

prosecutor's comment. State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting State v.

R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 456 (2015)).

IV.

Trial Court's Factual Findings and Legal Conclusions

We next address defendant's final issue: whether the trial court erred by

not making adequate findings regarding defendant's mental states for the

charged offenses. Defendant argues that because of this error in the court's

factual findings her convictions must be vacated and the matter remanded for a

new trial.

In a bench trial, "[t]he court shall . . . find the facts and state its

conclusions of law." R. 1:7-4; see also Locurto, 157 N.J. at474-75. "A judge

should [] make specific findings of fact regarding the elements of the offense ."

State ex rel. L.W., 333 N.J. Super. 492, 498 (App. Div. 2000). However, "the

judge need not articulate detailed, subjective analyses of factors such as

demeanor and appearance to support credibility on each and every witness ."

Ibid. (citing Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474-75).

Moreover, "[a]ppellate courts should defer to trial courts' credibility

findings," Locurto, at 474, and not disturb those factual findings "where 'there

is substantial evidence to support [its] implicit finding[s],'" id. at 471 (quoting

A-2572-23

29

Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 110 N.J. 464, 475 (1988)). Thus, we

"review a 'trial court's determinations, premised on the testimony of witnesses

and written evidence at a bench trial, in accordance with a deferential standard.'"

Nelson v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 466 N.J. Super. 325, 336 (App. Div. 2021)

(quoting D'Agostino v. Maldondado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013)).

To begin, the court correctly stated the elements of each offense and the

state's burden of proof as to each element beyond a reasonable doubt. For the

offenses charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) as for the charge of murder, that defendant caused D.D.'s death or serious

bodily injury purposely or knowingly; (2) as for the charge of unlawful

possession of a weapon, that "there was a weapon, that defendant possessed the

weapon knowingly and that [] defendant's possession of the weapon was under

circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful use;" and (3) as for the

charge of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, "that there was a

weapon, that defendant possessed the weapon with the purpose to use it against

the person or property of another, and that defendant's purpose was to use the

weapon unlawfully." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2), :39-4(d), :39-5(d). The

court set forth the elements of each offense, including the mental state required

to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

A-2572-23

30

The court summarized the testimony of the witnesses and assessed their

credibility. It also referenced photographic and video evidence pertaining to the

scene of the crime and defendant's actions after she left the apartment . These

findings supported the court's conclusion given after detailing the evidence

presented:

There's no doubt that the State has proven beyond a

reasonable doubt that [defendant] caused [D.D.]'s death

and that she did so purposely or knowingly as set forth

in count [one] of the [i]ndictment. The record contains

ample evidence to support this finding. Moreover[,]

this count is not disputed.

The state has also proven beyond a reasonable

doubt each element of unlawful possession of a weapon

and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.

[D.D.] was killed by a knife that only contained the

DNA of the decedent as well as defendant [].

A reasonable inference could be drawn from the conclusion that defendant

caused D.D.'s death by stabbing her with a knife and that defendant did so

purposely or knowingly as the court found. We discern no basis to disturb the

court's findings as to the murder charge.

To sustain the possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose offense,

the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a

weapon, defendant possessed it, she possessed it with the purpose to use it

against the person or property of another, and that her purpose was to use it

A-2572-23

31

unlawfully. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d). The photographic evidence highlighted by

the court showed "bloody handprints on the victim's purse as well as a [fifteen]-

inch knife in the kitchen sink." The court summarized the testimony of the

medical examiner, Dr. Peter Mazari, who explained that D.D. died "from

multiple sharp-force injuries and that the manner of death [was] homicide."

According to Dr. Mazari, the autopsy revealed D.D. "had [eighty-four] sharp

force injuries caused by a blade or other sharp instrument, [forty-seven] cutting

wounds and [thirty-seven] stab wounds." The court found the testimony of Dr.

Mazari credible.

The evidence clearly showed there was a bloody knife which had both

defendant and D.D.'s DNA on it. D.D. died as a result of multiple stab wounds

caused by a sharp instrument, such as a knife, and she did not inflict those deadly

wounds upon herself. "Circumstantial evidence can suffice to establish an

unlawful purpose." State v. Petties, 139 N.J. 310, 318 (1995). These well-

grounded facts are sufficient to support an inference that the knife was possessed

by defendant for the unlawful purpose of killing her mother.

Likewise, these facts were sufficient to prove that defendant possessed the

knife knowingly and under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful

use. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). The credible and substantial evidence in the record

A-2572-23

32

supports a reasonable, legitimate inference that defendant possessed the knife

knowingly and for the unlawful purpose of killing her mother. "Of course,

defendant had no duty to offer an explanation of a lawful purpose" for

possession of the knife, Petties, 139 N.J. at 318; yet there is no scintilla of

evidence suggesting any lawful purpose or explanation for the bloody knife left

in the kitchen sink at the scene of the crime.

The court then focused on the "primary issue"—whether defendant had

proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she was insane at the time she

committed these offenses. The court explained why it rejected defendant's

insanity defense after detailing the testimony of the experts and making

credibility findings. Finding Dr. Atkins' opinion more "cogent, plausible and

[offering a more] logical assessment of defendant's mental state at the time of

the offense," the court placed greater weight and relied upon Dr. Atkins' opinion

over that of Dr. Oropeza.

Rule 1:7-4(a) requires trial courts to make sufficient findings of fact and

to "correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J.

414, 428 (2015) (quoting Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980)). The

purpose of this rule is to avoid "[n]aked conclusions." Rutgers Univ. Student

Assembly (RUSA) v. Middlesex Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 438 N.J. Super. 93, 107

A-2572-23

33

(App. Div. 2014) (quoting Curtis, 83 N.J. at 569-70). We reject defendant's

assertion that the court failed to make adequate factual findings as to her mental

states for each offense. Instead, we are satisfied that the court's factual findings

and conclusions comply sufficiently with Rule 1:7-4(a)'s requirements.

Affirmed.

A-2572-23

34