Ringel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------------------------------------X

In re: MEMORANDUM &

ORDER

BENJAMIN O. RINGEL, CV 25-0270 (GRB)

FILED

Debtor, CLERK

------------------------------------------------------------------X 2/11/2026   11:53 am

BENJAMIN O. RINGEL,

Appellant, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-against-

LONG ISLAND OFFICE

ALLAN B. MENDELSOHN, United States Trustee,

JDWC, LLC, ATALAYA ASSET INCOME FUND II LP,

LMEZZ 250 W90 LLC,

Appellees.

------------------------------------------------------------------X

GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:

The instant case is an appeal of debtor/appellant Benjamin O. Ringel (“Ringel” or

“debtor”) from an order entered by the Honorable Louis A. Scarcella, United States Bankruptcy

Judge for the Eastern District of New York, approving a stipulation of settlement between the

Trustee1 and appellees JDWC, LLC (“JDWC”), Atalaya Asset Income Fund II, LP (“Atalya”),

and LMezz 250 W90 LLC (“LMezz”) (collectively the “Settling Creditors”), in the Chapter 7

bankruptcy proceeding captioned In re Benjamin O. Ringel, No. 24-71468-las. The Trustee now

moves to dismiss the instant appeal on the basis that the debtor lacks standing to bring this

appeal. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Trustee’s motion to dismiss the

appeal.

1 Appellee Allan B. Mendelsohn was appointed by the Bankruptcy Court as the trustee

(“Mendelsohn” or “Trustee”).

BACKGROUND

On April 15, 2024, Ringel, represented by counsel, filed a voluntary petition pursuant to

Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “petition date’). Bankr. DE 1. On the same

day, Mendelsohn was appointed the interim Chapter 7 Trustee and thereafter duly qualified as the

permanent case Trustee.2 Bankr. DE 1. In the debtor’s case, (i) JDWC filed a proof of claim in

the amount of $10,457,266.16, Bankr. DE 107 ¶ 21; (ii) Atalya filed a proof of claim in the

amount of $6,049,999.90, id. ¶ 22; and (iii) LMezz filed a proof of claim in the amount of

$16,753,726.51, id. ¶ 23.

(1) Pre-Petition Background

Ringel was an active real estate investor whose companies were landlords to national

tenants that encountered financial distress. DE 12 at 1. Prior to the petition date, Ringel was the

sole member of BR Lakewood. Bankr. DE 107 ¶ 7. In turn, BR Lakewood held 50% interest in

BCR Lakewood Holdings LLC (“BCR Lakewood”). Id. BCR Lakewood was the sole member

of BCR Pinewood Realty, LLC (“BCR Pinewood”). Id. BR Lakewood also held 100% interest

in BCR 12th Carey Realty, LLC (“BCR Carey”) and 100% interest in BCR Gertners Realty, LLC

(“BCR Gertners”). Id.

BCR Carey and BCR Gertners were fee owners of real property in Lakewood, New

Jersey, known as Block 62, Lots 8 and 9 and Block 52, Lot 3 respectively (the” Carey and

Gertners Properties”). Id. ¶¶ 9, 10. BCR Pinewood was the fee owner of real property in

Lakewood, New Jersey, known as Block 104, Lot 2 (the “Pinewood Property”). Id. ¶ 8.

2 Section 704 of the Bankruptcy Code establishes the duties of a trustee which include his

obligations to collect and reduce to money the property of the estate for which such trustee

serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of the

parties in interest.

In 2016, JDWC obtained a judgment against the debtor in the amount of $9,484,241.02

which continues to accrue interest (the “JDWC Judgment”).3 Id. ¶ 11.

On October 25, 2019, JDWC obtained a charging order from the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Ocean County (the “New Jersey Court”) against Ringel’s interests in BR Lakewood,

BCR Pinewood, BCR Gertners and BCR Carey (the “JDWC charging order”). Id. ¶ 14. On

March 8, 2023, Atalaya obtained a charging order from the Supreme Court of the State of New

York (the “New York Court”) against the debtor’s interests in BR Lakewood, BCR Pinewood,

BCR Gertners and BCR Carey, which was also recognized by the New Jersey Court (the

“Atalaya charging order”). Id. ¶ 15. LMezz also obtained a charging order from the New Jersey

Court against Ringel’s interests in BR Lakewood, BCR Pinewood, BCR Gertners and BCR

Carey (the “LMezz charging order”). Id. ¶ 16. The JDWC, Atalaya and LMezz charging orders

perfected the security positions of the Settling Creditors in the debtor’s various interests. Id. ¶

17.

On December 11, 2023, the New York Court entered an Order directing the turnover of

100% of Ringel’s membership interests in BR Lakewood to Atalaya, as receiver (the “Turnover

Order”). Id. ¶ 18. On January 9, 2024, the debtor filed a notice of appeal to vacate the Turnover

Order. Id. Separately, by Order dated January 25, 2024, the New Jersey Court granted JDWC’s

application to update the calculations on its Judgment. Id. ¶ 12. On March 11, 2024, Ringel

filed a motion for reconsideration of the January 25, 2024 Order (the “Reconsideration Motion”)

(and together with the Turnover Order, “the Litigation Claims”). Id.

3 The JDWC Judgment was affirmed on appeal by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate

Division in August 2023. Id. ¶ 11.

The Pinewood Property was sold on March 28, 2024 and BR Lakewood’s 50% interest in

the net proceeds from the sale (approximately $19.4 million) were placed in escrow.

(2) Post-Petition Background

On July 16, 2024, Atalaya obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court confirming the

absence of a stay regarding the proceeds from the Pinewood Property sale and permitting the

New Jersey Court to approve the distribution of the proceeds to the creditors of BR Lakewood.

The released funds satisfied various creditor’s interests and claims against BR Lakewood and

Ringel (the “Distribution Order”). Id. ¶ 20. Pursuant to the Distribution Order, the JDWC,

Atalaya and LMezz claims were reduced, but the Settling Creditors had amounts that remained,

which were secured by the remaining assets of BR Lakewood, BCR Gertner and BCR Carey.4

Id. ¶ 24.

Ringel’s attorney moved to withdraw as counsel on September 24, 2024. Bankr. DE 87.

The Bankruptcy Court granted the motion on October 22, 2024. Bankr. DE 105.

On October 23, 2024, the Trustee filed a motion to compromise a controversy with

JDWC, Atalya and LMezz pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,5

which was amended on October 24, 2024 (the “Rule 9019 Motion”). Bankr. DE 106-07. The

proposed settlement agreement would (i) resolve the bankruptcy estate’s interest in certain real

property in New Jersey (the Carey and Gertners Properties), (ii) satisfy the balance due on the

respective JDWC, Atalaya and LMezz Judgments, (iii) provide a mechanism to allow for the sale

of the properties with a financial benefit being realized by the bankruptcy estate, (iv) dismiss the

4 As of July 19, 2024, (i) JDWC was owed $818,856.24 (as well as $680,685.00 in attorney’s

fees); (ii) Atalaya was owed the sum of $296,741.02 (as well as $543,266.08); and (iii) LMezz

was owed the sum of $14,729,753.81. Id. ¶ 24.

5 Rule 9019 provides “[o]n the trustee’s motion and after notice and a hearing, the court may

approve a compromise or settlement. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a).

pending appeal of the Turnover Order with prejudice; and (v) withdraw the pending

Reconsideration Motion with prejudice. Bankr. DE 107. Judge Scarcella scheduled a hearing on

the Rule 9019 Motion for November 19, 2024.

Proceeding pro se, Ringel sought an adjournment of the hearing on the grounds that his

counsel had declined to represent him. Bankr. DE 114. In addition, Ringel filed an untimely

opposition to the Rule 9109 Motion and requested that the Court accept his supplemental

documents. Bankr. DE 116-18. The Bankruptcy Court denied the debtor’s request for an

adjournment but granted his request for consideration of his supplemental opposition papers at

the hearing. Bankr. DE 119.

On November 19, 2024, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing to address the Trustee’s

Rule 9019 Motion. DE 2-11. The Trustee and JDWC, Atalays and LMezz appeared by counsel,

and the debtor appeared pro se. Id. After considering the record evidence, motion papers and

opposition, arguments of counsel and Ringel, Judge Scarcella granted the motion approving the

settlement agreement between the Trustee and the Settling Creditors. Bankr. DE 120-21. On

November 22, 2024, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order approving the Stipulation of

Settlement (the “Settlement Order”), finding the factors set forth in Mototola, Inc. v. Official

Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 462 (2d Cir. 2007)

6 weighed in favor of approving the motion to compromise and that the relief sought was in the

best interests of the debtor’s estate, its creditors and other parties in interest and was supported

by good business reasons in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 9019. Bankr. DE 127.

6 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotations, footnotes and

alterations.

Thereafter, Ringel retained new counsel, and on December 6, 2024, the debtor filed a

motion to reconsider the Bankruptcy Court’s Order approving the Trustee’s settlement with

creditors JDWC, Atalays and LMezz. Bankr. DE 138. The Bankruptcy Court scheduled an

expedited hearing on December 19, 2024 to address the debtor’s motion for reconsideration.

Bankr. DE 142. The Trustee and JDWC filed their respective responses to the debtor’s motion.

Bankr. DE 143-44. Ringel, represented by counsel, filed a reply in support of his motion for

reconsideration. Bankr. DE 147. The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on December 19, 2024

and all parties were represented by counsel. Bankr. DE 149. After considering the arguments

and representations of counsel, Judge Scarcella denied the motion for reconsideration on January

2, 2025. Id.

On January 14, 2025, Ringel filed a notice of appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s Order

dated November 22, 2024, approving the Stipulation of Settlement, and the Order dated January

2, 2025, denying the motion for reconsideration (collectively the “Bankruptcy Court’s Orders”).

Bankr. DE 153-54; DE 1. The Trustee subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the

grounds that the debtor lacked standing to challenge the Bankruptcy Court’s Settlement Order.

DE 7.

Familiarity with the factual background, procedural history in both the Bankruptcy Court

and this Court, and the parties’ arguments are assumed. As discussed below, the Trustee’s motion

is granted, and the appeal is dismissed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has jurisdiction to review appeals from decisions of a bankruptcy court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), which provides in relevant part that “[t]he district courts of the

United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals . . . from final judgments, orders, and

decrees; . . . [and] with leave of the court, from other interlocutory orders and decrees . . . of

bankruptcy judges.” 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3). “An appeal under subsections (a) and (b) of this

section shall be taken in the same manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to

the courts of appeals from district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2). On an appeal the Court may

“affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy court’s judgment, order, or decree” or it may remand

with instructions for further proceedings. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013.

A district court reviews a bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings

of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. See In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 582 F.3d 422, 426

(2d Cir. 2009). A finding is “clearly erroneous” when the reviewing court is left with the

“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” District Lodge 26, Int’l Ass’n of

Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. United Techs. Corp., 610 F.3d 44, 51 (2d Cir.

2010). The clearly erroneous standard requires “strong deference” to “findings of fact based on

credibility assessments of witnesses [the court] has heard testify.” In re Pisculli, 426 B.R. 52, 59

(E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 408 F. App’x 477 (2d Cir. 2011). Moreover, “[a]n appellate court cannot

substitute its interpretation of the evidence for that of the trial court simply because the reviewing

court might give the facts another construction [and] resolve the ambiguities differently.” Id. at

68.

Finally, discretionary rulings of a bankruptcy court are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

In re Tingling, 990 F.3d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 2021). “A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when

its ruling (1) rests on an error of law . . . or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) cannot be

located within the range of permissible decisions.” In re Fletcher Int’l, Ltd., 661 F. App’x 124,

126 (2d Cir. 2016).

DISCUSSION

The Trustee contends that the Ringel lacks standing7 to appeal the Bankruptcy

Court Orders because the Trustee, upon his appointment, assumed the sole authority to litigate an

appeal affecting the property of the estate on behalf of the debtor. DE 7. The debtor argues that

he has standing to appeal the bankruptcy orders approving the settlement because he has a

pecuniary interest in the disposition of the Litigation Claims. DE 12. Specifically, Ringel

maintains that a potential surplus would have remained in the estate had the Trustee conducted an

auction sale of the Litigation Claims and obtained the maximum value for the claims. The

debtor’s argument is unpersuasive.

“Because standing is jurisdictional under Article III of the United States Constitution . . .

it is a threshold issue in all cases since putative [individuals] lacking standing are not entitled to

have their claims litigated in federal court.” Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d

114, 117 (2d Cir. 1991); see Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (Standing is a “threshold

question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit”). Thus, if

a debtor lacks standing to bring an appeal, the court lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits of the

appeal. See Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 944 F.2d at 117. In addition to the requirements

imposed by Article III, to have standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order, “an appellant must

be a person aggrieved - a person directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the challenged

order of the bankruptcy court.” In re Barnet, 737 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 2013). An appellant

must show “not only injury in fact under Article III but also that the injury is direct and

7 Under Article III of the United States Constitution, “[t]he judicial Power of the Untied States

extends only to certain Cases and Controversies.” Lacewell v. Off. Of Comptroller of Currency,

999 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2021). “One element of the case-or-controversy requirement is that

plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.

398, 408 (2013).

financial.” In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2011). “This test is stricter than

Article III’s injury in fact test, and its stringency is rooted in a concern that freely granting open-

ended appeals to those persons affected by bankruptcy court orders will sound the death knell of

the orderly disposition of bankruptcy matters.” In re Barnet, 737 F.3d at 242.

“The general rule is that, unlike creditors, Chapter 7 debtors lack standing to object to or

appeal from orders of the bankruptcy court because the commencement of liquidation

proceedings extinguishes any pecuniary interests that they formally held in the property of the

estate.” Licata v. Coan, No. 14-CV-1754, 2015 WL 9699304, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2015),

aff’d sub nom. In re Licata, 659 F. App’x 704 (2d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “[d]ebtors

generally lack standing because bankruptcy proceedings absolve the debtor of any liability to the

creditors and the debtor has no interest in the distribution of the estate’s property since the

property has passed to the trustee”); see Quest Ventures, Ltd. v. IPA Management IV, LLC, No.

17-CV-4016 (JMA), 2018 WL 922145, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) (noting that the Second

Circuit has not addressed the issue of who can appeal on behalf of the debtor but concluding that

“the general principles of bankruptcy law and the Supreme Court precedent dictate that once

appointed, the trustee controls the debtor’s actions, including the power to prosecute an appeal”).

This principle is “based on the assumption that the success of the debtor’s objection cannot affect

him because the debtor receives a distribution only after all creditors have been paid in full, and

an estate will rarely have enough assets to do even that.” Drake v. United States, No. 1:13-CV-

1136 (LEK), 2014 WL 6883104, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2014), aff’d 622 F. App’x 42 (2d Cir.

2015).

However, the Second Circuit has recognized an exception to the general rule and has held

that a Chapter 7 debtor “has standing to object to a sale of the assets or otherwise participate in

litigation surrounding the assets of the estate, only if there could be a surplus after all creditors’

claims are paid.” In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2000); see In re

Osborne, 594 F. App’x 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding a Chapter 7 debtor has standing to object

“only where there is a reasonable possibility that the value of the bankruptcy estate assets

exceeds estate debts”). “To establish standing, the Chapter 7 debtor has the burden of showing

that there is at least a reasonable possibility of a surplus.” In re Licata, 659 F. App’x at 70; see

In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d at 116 (holding where there is no evidence that a

surplus is a reasonable possibility, the debtor lacks standing).

Moreover, some courts have found a pecuniary interest and granted a Chapter 7 debtor

standing “even in the absence of a reasonable possibility of a surplus,” where the debt is non-

dischargeable, see 11 U.S.C. § 727, “because the debtor is not absolved of liability at the

conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings.” Drake, 2014 WL 6883104, at *2; cf. In re

Yerushalmi, No. 8:07-72816-las, 2019 WL 2385188, at *11 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. June 5, 2019)

(noting that lower courts within the Second Circuit and other jurisdictions have found that the

non-dischargeability of a debt could confer standing upon a debtor where a successful objection

to a proof of claim may reduce the debtor’s personal liability on the alleged debt, and finding a

pecuniary interest that would confer standing where there was no evidence that the estate was

administratively insolvent and “a successful objection to the IRS’ proof of claim [would] reduce

[the debtor’s] personal liability for his deficient taxes post-bankruptcy”); In re Chaitan, 517 B.R.

419, 426 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2014).

In this case, the debtor has not demonstrated that he has standing to pursue this appeal. It

is clear from the record that the bankruptcy estate is insolvent. In his voluntary Chapter 7

bankruptcy petition and schedules, Ringel set forth assets in the amount of $9,673,400 and

liabilities in the amount of $53,220,385, thus indicating that his liabilities far exceed his assets.

Bankr. DE 23. Nowhere in any of his submissions to this Court does Ringel establish even a

reasonable possibility that the Trustee could produce a surplus for the estate.

The debtor’s assertions regarding the Litigation Claims’ maximum value are conclusory

and speculative. Although the debtor listed the Litigation Claims in Schedule “B” under [other

contingent and unliquidated claims] of his bankruptcy petition, Ringel represented that each

claim had been concluded. The Trustee, therefore, considered the value of the claims in

connection with the settlement approved by the Bankruptcy Court. Notably, the Trustee made a

business judgment that the estate had no funds to engage special council to prosecute the claims

that the debtor alleged had value to the estate. The Trustee concluded that the prosecution of the

claims would not be beneficial to the estate as the debtor had litigated, relitigated and

consistently argued in numerous courts issues that had been resolved, all against Ringel.

The sole pieces of evidence cited by Ringel to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of a

surplus in his opposition brief are: (1) a letter dated March 27, 2024 from the debtor’s counsel to

Justice Cohen in the Supreme Court of the State of New York; and (2) a letter dated March 11,

2024 from the debtor’s counsel to Judge Hodgson in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Bankr.

DE 138-4, Ex. C. According to Ringel, the letters highlight the potential underlying value of the

Litigation Claims. DE 12 at 10-11. The Court considers each letter in turn.

In the March 27, 2024 letter, counsel (and his firm Meister Seelig & Fein PLLC, “MLF”),

who were recently retained by Ringel, sought a pre-motion conference to clarify whether Ringel

and the firm MSF violated the Turnover Order. Bankr. DE 138-4, Ex. C at 1. Counsel stated

that, “Mr. Ringel believes, that after Judge Hodgson determines what his creditors are owed (if

anything), there may be a remaining surplus of millions of dollars.” Id. at 2. Counsel also

references “Mr. Ringel’s belief that net proceeds from the sale of the Pinewood Property may run

five times the judgment Atalaya claims to be owed.” Id. at 3. Apart from the debtor’s opinion,

there are no other figures listed in the document nor additional information or context given for

the potential valuation of the claims. Hence, Ringel’s subjective belief regarding the potential

value of the Litigation Claims set forth in the March 7, 2024 letter, without more, is remote and

speculative.

The March 27, 2024 letter also references the March 11, 2024 letter, stating that the sole

relief in the March 11, 2024 letter was that “[i]f any surplus proceeds become available, Mr.

Ringel seeks solely to protect his interests in such surplus proceeds (if any) by ensuring that such

proceeds are eligible for certain tax efficient sale structures.” Id. In the March 11, 2024 letter to

Judge Hodgson, counsel requested that the court modify its November 2016 Order “because of

the potential for easily avoidable negative adverse tax consequences to Mr. Ringel” that could

result from the net proceeds from the sale of the Pinewood Property (approximately $20 million)

being held in escrow in a particular account. Id. at 2, 4-5. However, this letter is similarly

unilluminating because the document says nothing regarding an appraisal of the Litigation

Claims but instead seeks tax protection for an uncertain potential surplus from the sale. See id.

Moreover, Ringel’s claim that he’s reserving the right to refile a motion to convert the

case to a Chapter 11 proceeding “as a further means to advance standing,” DE 12 at 7, is

conjectural.8 Judge Scarcella addressed this argument at the Rule 9019 hearing and carefully

explained to Ringel that the Bankruptcy Court “could not deal in a hypothetical and say, if this

were a Chapter 11 case we would . . . .” DE 2-11 at 42-43. Judge Scarcella assured Ringel “if

8 Notably, the debtor, through his original counsel, previously filed a motion to convert the

instant Chapter 7 case to a Chapter 11 proceeding, but the motion was withdrawn. DE 2-11 at

20-21.

the case is ultimately converted to Chapter 11and there is an adversary proceeding brought

before the Court, everyone would have a full and fair opportunity with respect to that adversary

proceeding.” Id.

Finally, apart from the debtor’s argument that the valuation of the Litigation Claims was

not maximized, Ringel has not shown how the Settlement Order adversely affects the non-

dischargeability of debt. The debtor’s reliance on In re Mandel, 641 App’x 400, 403 (5th Cir.

2016), where the Fifth Circuit found that a Chapter 7 debtor had standing to appeal a claim

allowance where the claimants had filed an adversary proceeding to except the debt underlying

their claim from discharge, is misplaced. Here, Ringel has not yet been granted a discharge in

bankruptcy and unlike the debtor in In re Mandel, the creditors have not filed an adversary

proceeding to except a debt from discharge. Although Ringel maintains that “he has no way” to

reduce his personal liability without the Litigation Claims, as discussed above, the debtor failed

to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the sale of the Litigation Claims at an auction would

generate a surplus of nonexempt assets to distribute to Ringel for the estate. On the contrary, the

estate is administratively insolvent and the possibility that reversal of the Settlement Order

would result in a reduction in the debtor’s post-bankruptcy liability on a potential non-

dischargeable debt is at most indirect and speculative and as such would impede the efficient and

expeditious administration of the bankruptcy estate. See In re Speer, No. 3:16-cv-141-RNC,

2018 WL 1582516, at *2 (D. Conn. March 31, 2018) (observing that “[g]ranting standing to

every debtor who happens to be subject to some non-dischargeable claim would interfere with

the administration of [C]hapter 7 cases. Many debtors are subject to non-dischargeable claims.

If every such debtor were suddenly entitled to take an active role in the trustee’s administration

of the case, the result would slow down the bankruptcy system and make it more costly”).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that under the circumstances presented in this case,

Ringel did not suffer a direct, financial injury from the Bankruptcy Court’s Order dated

November 22, 2024, approving the Stipulation of Settlement, and the Order dated January 2,

2025, denying the motion for reconsideration, and therefore lacks standing to appeal them.

Having determined that Ringel lacks standing, the Court does not reach the merits of his

appeal. See Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. Merck-

Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that where a party

lacks standing, “a federal court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the merits of the

[party’s] . . . claim”); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)

(“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to

declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of

announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”). Inasmuch as the debtor lacks standing to

appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the action, and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court dismisses the appeal of the Bankruptcy Orders. The

Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Central Islip, New York

February 11, 2026

/s/ Gary R. Brown

GARY R. BROWN

United States District Judge

-