Opinion

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United States District Court

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Central District of California

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11 H.L., Case № 2:25-cv-05642-ODW (SKx)

12 Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

13 v.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

14 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, DISMISS [26]

15 Defendants.

16

17 I. INTRODUCTION

18 This action arises from the overdose death of Decedent Daejon Morgan while in

19 custody. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), Dkt. No. 22.) Plaintiffs H.L., D.L.1, Cleavotta

20 Morgan, and David Morgan, all Morgan’s family members, now bring this action

21 against Defendants the County of Los Angeles, Kazeem Abass, Nchegem Orji, Salma

22 Zubair, and several Does, alleging Constitutional and statutory violations. (Id.)

23 Defendants move to dismiss. (Mot. Dismiss (“Motion” or “Mot.”), Dkt. No. 26.) For

24 the reasons below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ Motion.2

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26 1 H.L. and D.L. are Morgan’s minor children and bring this action both individually and

representatives of Morgan’s estate. (FAC ¶¶ 14–16.) They are represented by their court-appointed

27

guardian ad litem (“GAL”), Tiiesha Lane. (Order GAL, Dkt. No. 17.)

28 2 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the

matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.

1 II. BACKGROUND3

2 The County of Los Angeles, through non-party Los Angeles County Sheriff’s

3 Department, runs Twin Towers Correctional Facility and other jails in its system. (FAC

4 ¶¶ 19–20.) In 2023, twelve inmates died of drug overdoses in the County’s jail system.

5 (Id. ¶ 28.) In June 2024, six inmates at Twin Towers alone were taken to the hospital

6 after being exposed to fentanyl. (Id. ¶ 29.) On April 30, 2024, a Sheriff’s deputy was

7 arrested and charged with smuggling drugs into the County’s jails. (Id. ¶ 32.) And on

8 October 8, 2024, eight inmates in a County jail suffered drug overdoses, leading to the

9 County’s jail staff administering Narcan—an anti-opioid drug—to 187 people. (Id.

10 ¶¶ 30–31.)

11 On October 14, 2024, Morgan, who was in custody at Twin Towers Correctional

12 Facility, ingested a pill that he obtained from another inmate. (Id. ¶¶ 36–37.) Deputies

13 later found Morgan exhibiting signs of opioid overdose and administered Narcan before

14 contacting jail medical staff. (Id. ¶ 38.) Abass, a nurse employed by the County at

15 Twin Towers, provided Morgan with medical care and sent him to Los Angeles County

16 Medical Center for further medical care. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 39.) The same day, Abass

17 re-evaluated Morgan and deemed him fit to go back to his jail cell. (Id. ¶ 40.) However,

18 Abass recognized that Morgan needed additional medical follow-up and noted that

19 Morgan should follow up with the “jail MD.” (Id. ¶ 41.) Abass did not actually set a

20 follow-up appointment with a medical doctor and instead set an appointment with a

21 mental health provider for the following day. (Id. ¶ 42.)

22 On October 15, 2024, Orji, a nurse practitioner employed by the County at Twin

23 Towers, evaluated Morgan for ongoing mental health treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 43.)

24 However, there is no documentation of whether Morgan and Orji discussed the overdose

25 or whether Orji provided any treatment related to the overdose. (Id. ¶ 45.)

26

27

3 All factual references derive from H.L.’s First Amended Complaint unless otherwise noted. H.L.’s

28 well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of resolving the Motion. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

1 On October 16, 2024, Morgan complained to jail staff about ongoing headaches.

2 (Id. ¶ 47.) A nurse sent Morgan to jail urgent care, where Dr. Zubair, a doctor employed

3 by the County at Twin Towers, evaluated him. (Id. ¶¶ 47–48.) Dr. Zubair noted

4 Morgan complained about neck pain stemming from a fall on the same day as Morgan’s

5 overdose, but otherwise did not mention Morgan’s overdose in her notes. (Id. ¶ 48.)

6 When Dr. Zubair recommended Morgan undergo a CT scan of his neck, Morgan

7 refused. (Id.)

8 On October 30, 2024, at around 7:15 p.m., Morgan was on a phone call with his

9 mother when he suddenly went silent. (Id. ¶ 56.) Morgan’s cellmates attempted to

10 administer Narcan and signaled to Sheriff’s deputies that Morgan needed medical

11 assistance. (Id. ¶ 57.) At approximately 7:22 p.m., the first Sheriff’s deputy arrived

12 and began medical treatment. (Id. ¶ 58.) Morgan was pronounced dead at 7:42 p.m.

13 (Id. ¶ 64.)

14 Based on these allegations, Morgan’s children, Plaintiffs H.L. and D.L., and

15 Morgan’s parents, Plaintiffs Cleavotta and David Morgan, assert nine causes of action

16 against Abass, Orji, and Zubair (the “Individual Defendants”); the County of Los

17 Angeles; and ten Doe Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 65–148.) Plaintiffs bring six causes of action

18 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) deliberate indifference to dangerous conditions of

19 confinement; (2) failure to provide medical care; (3) failure to train under Monell v.

20 New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (4) unconstitutional

21 custom, practice, or policy under Monell; (5) ratification under Monell; and

22 (6) interference with familial relations. (Id. ¶¶ 65–121.) Plaintiffs also assert three state

23 law causes of action: (7) negligence; (8) violation of the Bane Act; and (9) failure to

24 summon medical care under California Government Code section 845.6. (Id. ¶¶ 122–

25 48.) Defendants now move to dismiss all claims. (Mot.)

26 III. LEGAL STANDARD

27 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable

28 theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable theory.

1 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To survive a

2 motion to dismiss, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading

3 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones,

4 319 F.3d 482, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual allegations in the complaint “must be

5 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

6 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Stated differently, the complaint must “contain sufficient

7 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”

8 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).

9 Determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief is a “context-specific

10 task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common

11 sense.” Id. at 679. Generally, a court limits its review to the pleadings and must

12 construe all factual allegations in the complaint “as true and . . . in the light most

13 favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir.

14 2001), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara,

15 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002). However, a court need not blindly accept

16 conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.

17 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

18 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide

19 leave to amend, unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.

20 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025,

21 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court determines that

22 the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly

23 cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393,

24 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, leave to amend “is properly denied . . . if amendment

25 would be futile.” Carrico v. City & County of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008

26 (9th Cir. 2011).

27 IV. DISCUSSION

28 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. (Mot.)

1 A. Section 1983 Causes of Action

2 Plaintiffs bring six causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim

3 under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that (1) they were “deprived of a right secured by

4 the Constitution or laws of the United States,” and (2) “the alleged deprivation was

5 committed under color of state law.” March v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148,

6 1152 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50

7 (1999)).

8 The issue of whether Defendants acted under color of state law is not at issue.

9 (See generally Mot.; Opp’n.) Therefore, the Court focuses its analysis on whether

10 Plaintiffs plausibly alleges that Defendants deprived them of any particular

11 constitutional guaranty.

12 1. Deliberate Indifference (Counts 1–2)

13 Plaintiffs bring two separate claims deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth

14 Amendment: (1) deliberate indifference to dangerous conditions of confinement, and

15 (2) deliberate indifference to the need for medical care. (FAC ¶¶ 65–90.) “Deliberate

16 indifference requires a substantial showing.” Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t,

17 16 F.4th 613, 636 (9th Cir. 2021). The four elements of a deliberate indifference claim

18 are:

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i. the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the

20 conditions under which the plaintiff was confined;

ii. those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious

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harm;

22 iii. the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that

risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have

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appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the

24 consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and

25 iv. by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s

injuries.

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27 Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). “With respect to

28 the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable, a test that

1 will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Castro v.

2 County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation modified).

3 “[M]ere lack of due care by a state official does not deprive an individual of life, liberty,

4 or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (citation modified). “Thus, the

5 plaintiff must prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something

6 akin to reckless disregard,” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (citation modified), and the

7 “reckless disregard standard is a formidable one,” Fraihat, 16 F.4th at 636 (citation

8 modified).

9 (a) Dangerous conditions (Count 1)

10 In their first cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that several Doe Defendants were

11 deliberately indifferent to the dangerous conditions of Morgan’s confinement. (FAC

12 ¶¶ 65–72.) Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the Doe Defendants knew of the

13 proliferation of smuggled and dangerous drugs in Twin Towers but failed to take

14 reasonable measures to abate this risk, causing Morgan’s overdose. (Id. ¶¶ 66–69, 71.)

15 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts, taken as true, to

16 plausibly establish a claim for deliberate indifference to dangerous conditions.

17 Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Doe Defendants knew, or at least should have known, of

18 the proliferation of dangerous drugs in their jail system. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege

19 a pattern of drug overdoses in the County’s jail system while Morgan was incarcerated

20 at Twin Towers. (See id. ¶¶ 28–32.) Plaintiffs also plausibly allege that there were

21 reasonable measures, such as screening jail deputies or utilizing body scanners, that Doe

22 Defendants could have taken but failed to do. (Id. ¶ 34.)

23 As Plaintiffs note in their opposition brief, (Opp’n 4, Dkt. No. 29), Defendants

24 do not substantively address this specific cause of action and instead devote most of

25 their argument to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding deliberate indifference to medical

26 care, (Mot. 7–8). The only argument that Defendants make regarding this cause of

27 action is that “[t]here are no facts alleged that show that there were preventable

28 measures, or actions by County Defendants that show knowledge of the claimed

1 dangerous conditions.” (Id. at 7.) However, this is plainly belied by the record. It is

2 more than reasonable to infer, based on the pattern of drug incidents alleged in the First

3 Amended Complaint, that Doe Defendants knew of the dangerous conditions in their

4 jails and failed to prevent them. (See FAC ¶¶ 28–32.) Indeed, this alleged pattern—

5 including one sheriff arrested for smuggling the drugs himself—plausibly paints a

6 picture of jailers that have abdicated their duty to keep conditions of confinement safe

7 for their inmates.

8 Thus, the Court DENIES the Motion as to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action.

9 (b) Medical care (Count 2)

10 In their second cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that Individual Defendants were

11 deliberately indifferent to Morgan’s need for medical care. (FAC ¶¶ 73–90.) In the

12 context of medical care, “neither mere lack of due care, nor an inadvertent failure to

13 provide adequate medical care, nor even medical malpractice, without more, is

14 sufficient to meet” the reckless disregard standard. Fraihat, 16 F.4th at 636 (citation

15 modified). “Instead, a plaintiff must show that the defendant ‘disregard[ed] an

16 excessive risk’ to the plaintiff’s health and safety by failing to take ‘reasonable and

17 available measures’ that could have eliminated that risk.” Id. (quoting Castro, 888 F.3d

18 at 1071–71).

19 Plaintiffs’ allegations against Individual Defendants do not meet this formidable

20 standard. First, Plaintiffs’ allegations against Abass do not amount to “lack of due

21 care,” much less “reckless disregard.” Fraihat, 16 F.4th at 636. Plaintiffs allege that

22 Abass, a nurse, dutifully sent Morgan to a hospital for higher level care after evaluating

23 him immediately post-overdose. (FAC ¶ 39.) Once Morgan returned from the hospital

24 where Morgan was presumably evaluated by doctors, Abass not only re-evaluated

25 Morgan a second time, but also “recognized the need for additional follow-up” and

26 referred Morgan for a visit with the jail doctor. (Id. ¶¶ 40–41.) And while Plaintiffs

27 allege that Abass “failed to make any follow-up appointment” for Morgan, Morgan

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1 nonetheless saw both a nurse practitioner and a doctor in the coming days. (See id.

2 ¶¶ 43, 48.)

3 Second, Plaintiffs’ allegations against Orji also fall short. Plaintiffs allege that

4 Orji evaluated Morgan’s mental health, but that Orji failed to document any discussion

5 about the overdose or provide any opiate withdrawal treatment. (FAC ¶ 45.) Even

6 taken as true, these facts do not sufficiently state a claim for deliberate indifference.

7 These facts do not demonstrate how Orji treated Morgan, and thus, the Court is unable

8 to evaluate whether Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Orji’s treatment meet the reckless

9 disregard standard and raise “a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,

10 550 U.S. at 555.

11 Finally, Plaintiffs’ allegations against Zubair also do not even amount to “lack of

12 due care,” much less reckless disregard. Fraihat, 16 F.4th at 636. Plaintiffs allege that

13 Morgan went to urgent care complaining of neck pain. (FAC ¶ 47.) Zubair, who was

14 the physician in the jail urgent care, “noted complaints of neck pain resulting from a fall

15 from bed on October 14” and “recommended a[] CT scan of Morgan’s neck,” which

16 Morgan refused. (Id. ¶ 48.) These facts, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,

17 demonstrate only that Zubair attempted to treat Morgan’s complaint, and that Morgan

18 rebuffed Zubair’s attempts. While Zubair “made no other recommendations or referrals

19 for follow up treatment,” that failure to do so does not approach reckless disregard,

20 especially considering that Morgan refused the treatment that Zubair did recommend.

21 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’

22 second cause of action. The Court dismisses the cause of action as to Abass and Zubair

23 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND because Plaintiffs’ own allegations demonstrate

24 that Abass’s and Zubair’s actions do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. See

25 Schreiber Distrib., 806 F.2d at 1401 (finding denial of leave to amend proper when “the

26 court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged

27 pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency”). The Court dismisses the cause of

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1 action as to Orji WITH LEAVE TO AMEND because dismissal is due to lack of

2 factual sufficiency.

3 2. Monell Claims (Counts 3–5)

4 Plaintiffs claim the County is liable for Morgan’s death under Monell because the

5 County (1) failed to adequately train Individual and Doe Defendants as to the risk of

6 dangerous drugs, (2) maintained “unconstitutional policies, practices, and customs,”

7 and (3) ratified the Doe Defendants’ conduct. (FAC ¶¶ 91–121.)

8 As a general matter, municipal liability is not available in § 1983 actions under a

9 respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Liability attaches to a

10 municipality only when the “execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts

11 the [constitutional] injury.” Id. at 694. A plaintiff may establish municipal liability

12 only if they plausibly show: (1) a city employee committed a constitutional violation

13 “pursuant to a formal governmental policy” or a “longstanding practice or custom”;

14 (2) the city employee who committed the violation was an official with “final

15 policy-making authority”; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority “ratified

16 a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Gillette v.

17 Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations modified); see City of

18 Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (recognizing that a municipality’s failure

19 to train its employees can be actionable as an improper “policy”). “[T]o withstand a

20 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a Monell claim must consist of more than

21 mere formulaic recitations of the existence of unlawful policies, conducts or habits.”

22 Doe #1 M.L. v. San Bernardino Sheriff Dep’t, 753 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1029–30 (C.D. Cal.

23 2024).

24 (a) Failure to Train (Count 3)

25 Plaintiffs claim the County is liable under Monell, first, for failing to train its

26 employees regarding preventing the proliferation of drugs in the jails and treating

27 overdoses. (FAC ¶¶ 91–102.)

28

1 A municipality’s failure to train can serve as the basis for § 1983 liability in

2 “limited circumstances,” such as where its failure amounts to deliberate indifference.

3 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387. Absent circumstances where a failure to train is

4 expressed in actual written or oral policy, see Bd. of Cnty. Cmm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.

5 397, 407 (1997), a plaintiff ordinarily must demonstrate “[a] pattern of similar

6 constitutional violations by untrained employees,” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,

7 62 (2011).

8 Plaintiffs seem to advance two theories under this cause of action. First, Plaintiffs

9 allege that the County failed to adequately train its jailers to keep drugs out of its jail

10 system. (FAC ¶¶ 93, 96.) This, Plaintiffs have adequately pled. As the Court notes

11 above, Plaintiffs have alleged a systemic drug problem in the County’s jail system that

12 plausibly infringes on constitutional rights. (See id. ¶¶ 28–32.) Every drug incident

13 and overdose is another notch in a “pattern of similar constitutional violations,”

14 plausibly by employees that have not been adequately trained to keep drugs out of the

15 County’s jail system. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62.

16 Second, Plaintiffs allege that the County failed to train its medical staff to treat

17 drug abuse. (FAC ¶ 97.) This, Plaintiffs have not adequately pled. As noted above,

18 the Court finds no plausible constitutional violation in the way Morgan was medically

19 treated. Thus, there is no “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained

20 employees.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. Moreover, Plaintiffs allegations supporting this

21 theory are both conclusory and contradictory. Plaintiffs allege that medical staff require

22 specialized medical training and list the skills the County’s medical staff should learn.

23 (Id. ¶ 97.) However, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that the County’s medical staff lack

24 these skills. Instead, Plaintiffs allege only that the County failed to train its medical

25 staff to “ensure that an inmate that suffers an overdose receives any follow-up treatment

26 to minimize the risk of a future overdose.” (Id. ¶ 99.) But Plaintiffs’ own facts plainly

27 controvert that allegation, considering Plaintiffs admit that Abass did treat Morgan

28 regarding the overdose by sending him to the hospital. (Id. ¶ 39–42.)

1 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion

2 as to Plaintiffs’ third cause of action. Specifically, the Court DISMISSES the third

3 cause of action as to Plaintiffs’ allegations that the County failed to train its medical

4 staff to treat drug abuse WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. However, the third cause

5 of action survives to the extent that it alleges that the County failed to train its employees

6 to prevent drug proliferation in jails.

7 (b) Unconstitutional Custom, Practice, or Policy (Count 4)

8 Plaintiffs next claim the County is liable under Monell because it knowingly

9 maintained, enforced, and applied “an official recognized county custom, policy, and

10 practice of acting deliberately indifferent to” serious medical needs and widespread

11 availability of illegal drugs in” County jails. (FAC ¶ 104.) Specifically, Plaintiffs

12 identify eight alleged Monell violations.4

13 A municipality may be liable under Monell for express policies, informal

14 policies, and policies of inaction. For a municipality to be liable for an improper express

15 policy or custom under Monell, a plaintiff must show that the municipality has an

16 express “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

17 promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; see Waggy v. Spokane

18 County, 594 F.3d 707, 713–14 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that a plaintiff must allege and

19 prove an express policy exists to challenge an express municipal policy or custom).

20

4 The eight alleged policies and practices are: (a) Failing to implement policies and procedures on

21

basic symptom recognitions and assessment of inmates who are in medical distress and suffering from

22 severe opiate withdrawals including symptoms of shortness of breath, fever, and compromise lung

functioning; (b) Routinely failing to train detention and medical staff to ensure needed follow-up care

23 is provided for life threatening medical conditions including prior drug overdoses; (c) Inadequately

supervising, training, controlling, assigning, and disciplining employees including County Jail staff;

24

(d) Routinely neglecting and ignoring gravely ill inmates and enabling the custom and practice of

25 medically distressed inmates to rely upon themselves to seek emergency medical treatment;

(e) Engaging in the custom and practice of discriminating against chronically ill inmates and

26 withholding emergency medical treatment until an inmate is at a near-death condition; (f) Routinely

preventing inmates access to medical doctors, due to a custom and practice of a failed booking policy;

27

(g) Routinely denying to treat more severe co-morbid medical conditions due to a “one condition at a

28 time” medical policy; and (h) Routinely failing to train correctional staff to take appropriate measures

to ensure drugs are not smuggled into jail facilities. (Id.)

1 Although an official policy need not have “received formal approval through the body’s

2 official decisionmaking channels,” a municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 unless

3 an action taken under that express policy caused a constitutional tort. Monell, 436 U.S.

4 at 691.

5 Of the eight policies and practices that Plaintiffs identify, only two describe

6 express policies: “[r]outinely preventing inmates access to medical doctors, due to a

7 custom and practice of a failed booking policy” and [r]outinely denying to treat more

8 severe co-morbid medical conditions due to a ‘one condition at a time’ medical policy.”

9 (FAC ¶¶ 104(f)–(g).) These two policies are not sufficiently alleged. Plaintiffs do not

10 explain what the “failed booking policy” is; the assertion that it is a Monell violation is

11 the only mention of a failed booking policy in the entire First Amended Complaint.

12 (FAC ¶ 104(f).) Thus, Plaintiffs fail to prove that the “failed booking policy” exists.

13 See Waggy, 594 F.3d at 713–14. Plaintiffs also fail to explain the “one condition at a

14 time” medical policy or how it amounts to deliberate indifference, and thus,

15 constitutional deficiency. Herd v. County of San Bernardino, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1157,

16 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (dismissing Monell claim because plaintiffs did “not explain how

17 the alleged policies are deficient or reflect on how the custom or policy amounted to

18 deliberate indifference”). For these reasons, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim based on an

19 improper express policy.

20 Next, one of Plaintiffs’ remaining six policies and practices describes a

21 non-formal policy of action: “[e]ngaging in the custom and practice of discriminating

22 against chronically ill inmates and withholding emergency medical treatment until an

23 inmate is at a near-death condition.” (FAC ¶ 104(e).) Absent a formal governmental

24 policy, a plaintiff must show a longstanding practice or custom that is “so permanent

25 and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” City of St.

26 Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). An improper custom or practice claim

27 “may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents” but must instead “be founded

28 upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency[,] and consistency that the conduct has

1 become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911,

2 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, however, Plaintiffs do not allege any facts to support a

3 “custom and practice of discriminating against chronically ill inmates,” (FAC ¶ 104(e)),

4 much less any that come close to alleging that the “conduct has become a traditional

5 method of carrying out policy,” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. The factual allegations only

6 discuss Morgan’s medical care and the circumstances surrounding his death. This

7 single instance does not give rise to a plausible inference that a pattern of discrimination

8 against chronically ill inmates exists. See Saved Mag. v. Spokane Police Dep’t, 19 F.4th

9 1193, 1201 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that a single incident of constitutional violation is

10 not sufficient to establish improper custom). Thus, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim based

11 on an improper non-formal policy of action.

12 Finally, Plaintiffs’ remaining five “policies and practices” describe policies of

13 inaction, rather than policies of action. (FAC ¶¶ 104(a)–(d), (h).) “[A] policy of

14 inaction is based on a government body’s ‘failure to implement procedural safeguards

15 to prevent constitutional violations.’” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir.

16 2014) (quoting Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012)).

17 Plaintiffs must first show that the “policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the

18 plaintiff’s constitutional right.” Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1143 (quoting Oviatt v. Pearce,

19 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992)). Similar to a deliberate indifference cause of

20 action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant “was on actual or constructive

21 notice that its omission would likely result in a constitutional violation.” Jackson,

22 749 F.3d at 763 (quoting Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1145). Plaintiffs must then show that “the

23 policy caused the violation in the sense that the municipality could have prevented the

24 violation with an appropriate policy.” Id. (quoting Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1143).

25 Of the five policies and practices describing policies of inaction, three allege that

26 the County failed to implement appropriate procedures regarding medical care. (FAC

27 ¶¶ 104(a)–(b), (d).) The Court already found that Plaintiffs’ allegations of deliberate

28 indifference with regards to Morgan’s medical care are deficient. Instead, the factual

1 allegations demonstrate that, even in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the County’s

2 medical staff exercised due care. As Plaintiffs provide no other allegations relating to

3 the County’s medical staff providing care, the Court also finds that Plaintiffs fail to state

4 a claim that the County was deliberately indifferent to the risk of overdose.

5 This leaves two remaining policies of inaction. The first, alleging that the County

6 failed to supervise, train, control, assign, and discipline employees, is too vague to state

7 a claim. (FAC ¶ 104(c).) It is unclear what specifically the County failed to do, and

8 how it led to a violation of Morgan’s constitutional rights. Thus, it fails due to lack of

9 specificity. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

10 However, the last remaining policy of inaction—that the County “[r]outinely

11 fail[ed] to train correctional staff to take appropriate measures to ensure drugs are not

12 smuggled into jail facilities”—is sufficiently pleaded for the same reasons that Plaintiff

13 sufficiently pleaded the third cause of action, failure to train. (FAC ¶ 104(h).)

14 Specifically, the factual allegations detail a pattern of drug incidents and overdoses, lead

15 to the plausible inference that the County had “actual or constructive notice” that its

16 failure to address the issue of drug proliferation “would likely result in a constitutional

17 violation.” Jackson, 749 F.3d at 763. Further, as noted earlier, Plaintiffs adequately

18 allege that the County “could have prevented the violation” through further training and

19 oversight of its jailers. Id. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs plausibly allege this

20 policy of inaction as a potential Monell violation.

21 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the

22 Motion as to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action. Specifically, the Court DISMISSES the

23 fourth cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, except to the extent Plaintiffs

24 premise it on the County’s routine failure to train jail staff to stop drug proliferation,

25 which survives dismissal. (FAC ¶ 104(h).)

26 (c) Ratification (Count 5)

27 Plaintiffs’ last Monell claim is based on ratification. A municipality may be liable

28 under § 1983 when “an official with final policy-making authority ratified a

1 subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Gillette, 979 F.2d

2 at 1346–47.

3 Here, Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action fails because it is vague and conclusory.

4 First, Plaintiffs allege that the County and Doe Defendants ratified improper policies

5 through an “Inter-Disciplinary Mortality Review.” (FAC ¶ 111.) However, Plaintiffs

6 provide no facts alleging what this Review is. Thus, the Court cannot ascertain how the

7 County and Doe Defendants allegedly ratified improper policies. Second, Plaintiffs

8 allege that several Doe Defendants “ratified the defendants’ conduct.” (Id.) However,

9 it is unclear what exact conduct Doe Defendants ratified. Further, Plaintiffs allege that

10 Doe Defendants acted with “the complete authority and ratification of their principal,”

11 the County, (id. ¶ 26), which means that they necessarily lack “final policy-making

12 authority” sufficient for ratification liability, Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346–47.

13 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’

14 fifth cause of action. The Court dismisses the cause of action WITH LEAVE TO

15 AMEND only as to the claim against the County, and WITHOUT LEAVE TO

16 AMEND as to the claim against the Doe Defendants.

17 3. Interference with Familial Relations (Count 6)

18 Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action asserts interference with familial relations under

19 the Fourteenth Amendment. (FAC ¶¶ 114–21.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that

20 Individual and Doe Defendants’ actions interfered in Plaintiffs’ familial relationship

21 with Morgan. (Id.)

22 The Fourteenth Amendment confers a “substantive due process right to family

23 integrity or to familial association.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 663 F.3d 1071,

24 1079 (9th Cir. 2011). To state a claim for interference with familial relations, a plaintiff

25 must allege that state actors engaged in conduct that “shocks the conscience.” Porter

26 v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008). Where “actual deliberation is

27 practical,” a state actor’s conduct is conscience-shocking when they act with deliberate

28 indifference. Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010). A state actor acts

1 with deliberate indifference when they “recognize[] the unreasonable risk and actually

2 intend[] to expose the plaintiff to such risks without regard to the consequences to the

3 plaintiff.” Herrera v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 18 F.4th 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 2021)

4 (alterations in original).

5 First, as the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not adequately allege deliberate

6 indifference against Individual Defendants in Plaintiffs’ second cause of action, the

7 Court also finds that Plaintiffs do not adequately allege that Individual Defendants

8 engaged in conscience-shocking conduct. Second, as the Court finds that Plaintiffs do

9 adequately allege deliberate indifference against Doe Defendants in Plaintiffs’ first

10 cause of action, the Court also finds that Plaintiffs adequately allege that Doe

11 Defendants engaged in conscience-shocking conduct. Specifically, Plaintiffs’

12 allegations, which support that Doe Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the issue

13 of the proliferation of dangerous drugs, also support the inference that Doe Defendants

14 actually knew of and consciously disregarded the risk that proliferation of dangerous

15 drugs posed to Morgan’s familial rights. See Herrera, 18 F.4th at 1158–59 (“[A] state

16 actor needs to know that something is going to happen but ignore the risk and expose

17 the plaintiff to it.” (citation modified)).

18 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the

19 Motion as to the sixth cause of action. Specifically, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’

20 sixth cause of action as to Orji WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, and as to Abass and

21 Zubair WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. However, the sixth cause of action

22 survives against Doe Defendants.

23 B. State Causes of Action

24 Plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action are brought under state law.

25 1. Negligence (Count 7)

26 Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action asserts negligence against Doe Defendants and

27 the County. (FAC ¶¶ 122–30.) Defendants only move to dismiss the cause of action as

28 brought against the County. (Mot. 11–12.)

1 California Government Code section 815(a) “bars all nonstatutory, common-law

2 tort causes of action against public entities.” Courts have noted that there is “no

3 statutory basis under California law for declaring [a governmental] entity directly liable

4 for negligence.” Johnson v. Shasta County, 83 F. Supp. 3d 918, 936 (E.D. Cal. 2015).

5 Indeed, Plaintiffs concede that their direct-liability negligence claims against the

6 County are not cognizable under California law absent statutory authorization.

7 (Opp’n 9.) Thus, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ seventh

8 cause of action WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to only the County. The cause

9 of action survives against Doe Defendants.

10 2. Bane Act (Count 8)

11 To state a Bane Act cause of action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant

12 interfered with their constitutional rights “by threat, intimidation, or coercion.” Cal.

13 Civ. Code § 52.1(b). Unlike a § 1983 cause of action, the Bane Act requires a plaintiff

14 to prove the defendant acted with specific intent to interfere with the plaintiff’s rights.

15 Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018). Specific intent

16 may be shown through evidence that the defendant acted in “reckless disregard” of the

17 plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at 1045.

18 Plaintiffs fail to state a Bane Act cause of action. The crux of Plaintiffs’ claim is

19 that Individual and Doe Defendants recklessly disregarded Morgan’s potential medical

20 needs. The Court has explained how Plaintiffs fail to plead that Morgan’s medical care

21 was deficient and that Individual Defendants recklessly disregarded Morgan’s medical

22 needs. For the same reasons, Plaintiffs fail to plead that Defendants specifically

23 intended, through reckless disregard or otherwise, to deprive Morgan of his

24 constitutional rights by disregarding his potential medical needs.

25 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’

26 eighth cause of action as to Doe Defendants and Orji WITH LEAVE TO AMEND,

27 and as to Abass and Zubair WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

28

1 3. Failure to Summon Medical Care (Count 9)

2 Plaintiffs bring their ninth cause of action under California Government Code

3 section 845.6. (FAC ¶¶ 144–48.) This section authorizes suits against public

4 employees or entities if a public employee “knows or has reason to know that the

5 prisoner is in need of immediate medical care” and “fails to take reasonable action to

6 summon such medical care.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6. Plaintiff asserts this cause of

7 action against Individual and Doe Defendants and also contends that the County is

8 vicariously liable. (FAC ¶ 147.)

9 In their Motion, Defendants assert they are immune because California

10 Government Code section 815(a) “bars all nonstatutory, common-law tort causes of

11 action against public entities.” (Mot. 11–12.) However, section 845.6 clearly carves

12 out an exception for a public entity’s failure to summon medical care “where the

13 [tortfeasor] employee is acting within the scope of his employment.” Defendants’

14 citation to California Government Code section 844.6 fares no better. (Mot. 11–12.)

15 While section 844.6 states that a public entity is not liable for a prisoner’s injuries, it is

16 expressly subject to the exception quoted above from section 845.6. See Cal. Gov’t

17 Code § 844.6(a) (“[E]xcept as provided in . . . [section] 845.6 . . . a public entity is not

18 liable for” a prisoner’s injuries.). Thus, neither section Defendant cites forecloses

19 Plaintiffs’ failure to summon medical care claim.

20 Seemingly recognizing this, in their Reply brief, Defendants appear to convert

21 their immunity argument into a lack of factual sufficiency argument. (Reply 6, Dkt.

22 No. 30.) As Defendants did not raise this argument in their Motion, the Court declines

23 to consider it. See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district

24 court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).

25 For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiffs’ ninth

26 cause of action.

27

28

1 V. CONCLUSION

2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES

3 IN PART Defendants’ Motion. (Dkt. No. 26.) Specifically, the Court:

4  DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ second cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

5 as to Orji and WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to Abass and Zubair;

6  DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ third cause of action WITHOUT LEAVE TO

7 AMEND only as to allegations that the County failed to train its medical staff

8 to treat drug abuse;

9  DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

10 as to every policy alleged except the alleged policy of inaction that the County

11 failed to “train correctional staff to take appropriate measures to ensure drugs

12 are not smuggled into jail facilities,” which survives Defendants’ Motion

13 (FAC ¶ 104(h));

14  DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

15 as to the County and WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to Doe

16 Defendants;

17  DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

18 as to Orji and WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to Abass and Zubair, but

19 not as to Doe Defendants, against whom the cause of action survives

20 Defendants’ Motion;

21  DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action WITHOUT LEAVE TO

22 AMEND only as to the County;

23  DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

24 as to Doe Defendants and Orji and WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to

25 Abass and Zubair; and

26  DENIES Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiffs’ first and ninth causes of action.

27 The following causes of action survive the Motion: (1) Count 1 for deliberate

28 indifference to dangerous conditions against Doe Defendants; (2) Count 3 for failure to

1 || train to prevent proliferation of drugs in jails against Doe Defendants; (3) Count 4 for

2 || an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy, specifically, as to the County and its

3 || alleged failure to train correctional staff to prevent drug proliferation; (4) Count 6 for

interference with familial relations against Doe Defendants; (5) Count 7 for negligence

5 || against Doe Defendants; and (6) Count 9 for failure to summon medical care against

6 || Individual and Doe Defendants.

7 Plaintiffs must file an amended complaint by FEBRUARY 3, 2026, in which

8 | case Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond within fourteen (14) days of

9 | Plaintiffs’ filing. If Plaintiffs do not timely amend, then the causes of action and claims

10 || the Court dismisses with leave to amend shall be deemed dismissed with prejudice as

11 | of the lapse of Plaintiffs’ filing deadline. In that event, Defendants shall answer the

12 || surviving claims in the First Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of the lapse

13 | of Plaintiffs’ filing deadline.

14

15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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17 January 20, 2026 oe

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20 OTIS D. GHT, II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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