Opinion

Oslavic

Court
District Court, N.D. Ohio
Filed
Mar 19, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.1%

“Any report and recommendation by a magistrate judge that is dispositive of a claim or defense of a party shall be subject to de novo review by the district court in light of specific objections filed by any party.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Any report and recommendation by a magistrate judge that is dispositive of a claim or defense of a party shall be subject to de novo review by the district court in light of specific objections filed by any party.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

NICOLE M. OSLAVIC, ) CASE NO. 4:25-cv-00039

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

)

v. )

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

SECURITY, ) AND ORDER

)

Defendant. )

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Darrell A. Clay’s Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) recommending the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision be affirmed. (Doc. 13.)

Plaintiff Nicole M. Oslavic (“Oslavic”) timely filed an objection (Doc. 14), and Defendant

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) responded. (Doc. 15.)

For the reasons stated herein, Oslavic’s objection is OVERRULED, the R&R is

ACCEPTED and ADOPTED, and the Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Oslavic’s Medical History

Oslavic does not object to the factual record and procedural history in the R&R. (See

Doc. 14.)1 Notwithstanding, the Court summarizes the facts pertinent to her objection.

On September 14, 2018, Oslavic underwent an exam prior to a medical appointment.

(Doc. 7 at 404.) She claimed her back pain began 15 years ago, starting as “bulging discs and

has progressed to . . . 3 known herniations.” (Id.) She also stated visits to a chiropractor would

1 For ease and consistency, briefing citations reflect the electronically stamped CM/ECF

document and PageID# rather than any internal pagination.

alleviate the pain, and the exam noted a normal posture, gait, no musculoskeletal tenderness, and

full motion in the cervical spine. (Id. at 404, 407.)

On February 7, 2020, Oslavic visited Community Medical Associates complaining of

knee pain. (Id. at 394.) No swelling or instability was noted, and an x-ray noted no fractures,

dislocations, or joint effusions. (Id. at 396, 428.) The soft tissue of her knee was noted as

unremarkable. (Id.)

On February 24, 2022, Oslavic visited her primary care physician to address sinus pain.

(Id. at 385.) She denied any back pain, tingling, or numbness. (Id. at 387.) On May 10, 2022,

she again complained of back pain. (Id. at 366.) She also complained of left ankle pain and a

popping sensation in both her left ankle and wrists. (Id.) At a follow up on June 16, 2022,

Oslavic stated she continued to have back pain and pain in her hips, knees, and legs. (Id. at 362.)

The exam noted her spine was normal to inspection and she experienced some paraspinal muscle

tenderness, tenderness of the bilateral greater trochanteric bursa, and bilateral knee crepitus. (Id.

at 364.)

On June 23, 2022, Oslavic began physical therapy. (Id. at 472.) At her intake, she

complained of worsening back pain and pain at her tailbone if she sat for long periods of time.

(Id.) This pain prevented her from sitting for more than one hour, standing more than 10

minutes, and was manageable without pain medication. (Id. at 475.) Oslavic also received

physical therapy for hip and knee pain. (Id. at 456.) On September 7, 2022, Oslavic had

attended 17 physical therapy sessions and reported that she could “walk comfortably for about

20-30 min[utes] but is unable to walk for more than 1 hour.” (Id. at 531.) She could also lift up

to 15 pounds comfortably. (Id.) Additional physical therapy sessions were scheduled. (Id.)

On November 8, 2022, Oslavic noted limited mobility and pain in her back, legs, hips,

and knees. (Id. at 551.) While an exam showed limited spinal motion, she also had a normal

gait and range of motion. (Id.)

On December 14, 2022, Oslavic underwent a consultative examination which revealed no

tenderness of the cervical spine and tenderness in the dorsolumbar spine. (Id. at 541.) An x-ray

revealed no fracture or dislocation of the left hip and no “fracture or destructive process” in the

lumbar spine. (Id. at 548.) The x-ray did reveal some narrowing of the L5-S1 intervertebral

discs. (Id.) The exam noted her “ability to perform work-related activities such as bending,

stooping, lifting, walking, crawling, stairs, grasping, squatting, carrying, and traveling is at least

moderately impaired based on the above diagnoses.” (Id. at 542.)

On April 26, 2023, Oslavic had pain in her right leg and lower abdomen. (Id. at 556.)

She denied any joint swelling or limited range of motion and the exam noted limited spinal

motion with a normal gait. (Id. at 558, 560.)

On July 19, 2023, Oslavic complained of pain in her right knee, right ankle, right elbow,

and back. (Id. at 563.) An MRI showed her meniscus was “within normal limits without

evidence of meniscal tear” and there was trace joint fluid and a small Baker’s cyst. (Id. at 571.)

On September 7, 2023, Oslavic was examined for foot pain. (Id. at 573.) The exam

noted right knee tenderness and limited spinal motion. (Id. at 577.) On October 12, 2023,

Oslavic was examined for back pain. (Id. at 581.) The exam noted she had pain when doing

straight leg raises on her right side. (Id.) “She has pain with both flexion and extension.” (Id.)

An x-ray revealed no fractures or dislocations, degenerative changes at L5-S1, and “[n]o

malignment or abnormal change positioning on various projections.” (Id. at 585.) A lumbar

spine MRI showed “[m]ild lower lumbar spondylosis with a disc bulge and left facet hypertrophy

L5-S1 resulting in mild left foraminal narrowing.” (Id. at 586.)

B. State Agency Review

On February 2, 2023, a state agency medical consultant found Oslavic’s “[a]llegations of

[a] limitation to only stand or walk for 20 min at a time exceeds objective findings on imaging

and at physical exams and is not consistent with [the] level of treatment claimant is receiving.”

(Id. at 94-95.) In addition, the report found Oslavic could frequently climb ramps and stairs, and

occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Id. at 96.)

On April 12, 2023, a separate state agency medical consultant determined Oslavic’s

allegations of limitations for standing and walking exceeded objective findings from her imaging

and physical exams. (Id. at 123.) Their report also found she could frequently climb ramps and

stairs, occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch,

and crawl. (Id. at 123-24.)

C. Applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security

Income

On July 7, 2022, Oslavic applied for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and

supplemental security income (“SSI”). (Id. at 42.) For both her DIB and SSI applications,

Oslavic alleged a disability onset date of September 30, 2018. (Id.) She alleged disability based

on a herniated disc, bone spurs, and degenerative disc disease. (Id. at 91.) On February 2, 2023,

both claims were denied. (Id. at 42.) Reconsideration was denied on April 12, 2023. (Id.) On

May 12, 2023, Oslavic submitted a written request for a hearing. (Id.)

On November 28, 2023, a telephonic hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) took place. (Id.) Oslavic was represented by counsel and Thomas Nimberger, a

Vocational Expert, was also present. (Id.)

Oslavic testified her knees prevent her from using the stairs, that driving for a period

greater than 20 minutes became painful, and she was able to shop for groceries, cook, shower,

and dress herself. (Id. at 64-65.) She also testified she took ibuprofen to relieve her pain,

physical therapy provided her minimal relief, and she used a therapeutic electrical stimulator to

relieve her back pain. (Id. at 72-73.)

On December 15, 2023, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Oslavic was not

entitled to DIB or SSI. (Id. at 42-50.) The ALJ made the following findings of fact:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

through December 31, 2024.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 30,

2018, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: Lumbar degenerative disc

disease/spondylosis/disc bulge/left facet hypertrophy with radiculopathy;

Sacroiliitis; Greater trochanteric bursitis of both hips; Right knee meniscus tear and

prepatellar bursitis of both knees; Osteoarthritis of multiple joints including

bilateral hands; and Obesity. (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the

residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.

She can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs. The

claimant can frequently handle and finger with the bilateral upper extremities. She

can have occasional exposure to vibrations and extreme cold. The claimant must

avoid all exposure to hazards, such as unprotected heights, dangerous moving

mechanical parts, and commercial driving.

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a retail

cashier/stocker/ storekeeper (DOT 290.477-014). This work does not require the

performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual

functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security

Act, from September 30, 2018, through the date of this decision (20 CFR

404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)).

(Id. at 44-50.) On November 26, 2024, the Appeals Council denied review. (Id. at 28-

30.)

D. Procedural History

On January 10, 2025, Oslavic filed the instant case. (Doc. 1.) She raised one assignment

of error. (Doc. 9.) On September 26, 2025, the R&R recommended affirming the

Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. 13.) Oslavic timely submitted one specific objection.

(Doc. 14.) The Commissioner responded. (Doc. 15.)

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

A district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions or specified

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)

(flush language); see Powell v. United States, 37 F.3d 1499 (Table), 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS

35044, 1994 WL 532926, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1994) (“Any report and recommendation by a

magistrate judge that is dispositive of a claim or defense of a party shall be subject to de novo

review by the district court in light of specific objections filed by any party.”) (citations omitted).

“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (flush language).

The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits is limited to

determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings are

supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d

847, 854 (6th Cir. 2010). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than

a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.’” McGlothin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 299 F. App’x 516, 521 (6th Cir.

2008) (quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal

citation omitted)). “The standard ‘presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the

decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.’” Edwards v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., No. 23-5490, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315, 2024 WL 2705000, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 12,

2024) (quoting Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (citation omitted)).

If substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s finding that the claimant is not disabled, that

finding must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently. Cutlip

v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).

A reviewing court is not permitted to resolve conflicts in evidence or to decide questions

of credibility. Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The

Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed even if the claimant’s position is also supported by

substantial evidence. Wallace v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 221 F.3d 1337 (Table), 2000 U.S. App.

LEXIS 24244, 2000 WL 799749, at *1 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Yet, even if supported by substantial evidence, ‘a

decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own

regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a

substantial right.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)).

B. Objection: The R&R Properly Evaluated the ALJ’s Assessment of Record

Evidence Particular to Oslavic’s Subjective Complaints

Evaluation of a claimant’s subjective complaints rests with the ALJ. See Siterlet v. Sec’y

of HHS, 823 F.2d 918, 920 (6th Cir. 1987); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 248. “There is no question that

subjective complaints of a claimant can support a claim for disability, if there is also objective

medical evidence of an underlying medical condition in the record.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2003); see also SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *4

(explaining that “[w]e will not find an individual disabled on alleged symptoms alone”).

“Nevertheless, an ALJ is not required to accept a claimant’s subjective complaints.” Jones, 336

F.3d at 476. Rather, an ALJ must evaluate a claimant’s symptoms and provide an explanation

that is “sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the

weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.”

Rogers, 486 F.3d at 248. This analysis cannot be disturbed “absent compelling reason.” Smith v.

Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001).

ALJ’s undertake a two-step process to assess the limiting effects of a claimant’s

symptoms. See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304. At step one, “the ALJ will ask whether [] there

is an underlying medically determinable physical impairment that could reasonably be expected

to produce the claimant’s symptoms.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a));

SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3. At step two, if such an impairment exists, the ALJ “must

evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms on the individual’s

ability to do basic work activities.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247; SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at

*4.

At the second step, the ALJ “will not reject your statements about the intensity and

persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your

ability to work solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate

your statements.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2). Rather, “[b]ecause symptoms

sometimes suggest a greater severity of impairment than can be shown by objective medical

evidence alone, [the ALJ] will carefully consider any other information you may submit about

your symptoms.” Id. at §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). In addition, SSR 16-3p states:

[I]f an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects

of symptoms are inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and the other

evidence, we will determine that the individual’s symptoms are less likely to reduce

his or her capacities to perform work-related activities or abilities to function

independently, appropriately, and effectively in an age-appropriate manner.

2017 WL 5180304, at *8. Consistent with these regulations, the ALJ “will consider various

factors in assessing a claimant’s pain to determine her residual functional capacity.” Wilson v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 783 F. App’x 489, 502 (6th Cir. 2019). These factors include:

(i) Your daily activities;

(ii) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of your pain or other symptoms;

(iii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;

(iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication you take or

have taken to alleviate your pain or other symptoms;

(v) Treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your

pain or other symptoms;

(vi) Any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or other symptoms

(e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on

a board, etc.); and

(vii) Other factors concerning your functional limitations and restrictions due to

pain or other symptoms.

SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7-8; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). “The ALJ

need not analyze all seven factors identified in the regulation but should provide enough

assessment to assure a reviewing court that he or she considered all relevant evidence.” Cross v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 373 F. Supp. 2d 724, 733 (N.D. Ohio 2005). This analysis “should be

specific enough to permit the court to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning.” Id.

“Courts are not at liberty to speculate on the basis of an administrative agency’s order.”

Hyatt Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 939 F.2d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1991). “When an ALJ fails to make a

determinative and necessary finding of fact in a sequential step, a reviewing court should not ‘fill

that gap.’” Harvey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-2366, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19788, 2017

WL 4216585, at *7 (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 2017) (citation omitted). As such, courts “shall not ‘accept

post hoc rationalizations for agency action in lieu of [accurate] reasons and findings enunciated

by the Board.’” Keeton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 583 F. App’x 515, 524 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Hyatt Corp., 939 F.2d at 367). Post-hoc rationalization occurs when a court provides a “revised

rationale” for the ALJ’s decision. Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:23 CV 979, 2024 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 113105, 2024 WL 3197570, at *3 (N.D. Ohio June 27, 2024); Cashin v. Colvin, No.

1:12 CV 909, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101307, 2013 WL 3791439, at *6 (N.D. Ohio July 18,

2013) (“the ALJ did not include these assertions in his decision and the Court cannot engage in

post hoc rationalizations.”).

The R&R recommended affirmance on the grounds the ALJ made sufficient findings as

to Oslavic’s subjective statements about the severity of her pain. (Doc. 13 at 636-39.) Her sole

objection is to the R&R’s alleged post-hoc rationalizations. (Doc. 14 at 641-42.) To Oslavic,

these rationalizations cannot correct the underlying record, namely that the ALJ failed to explain

his conclusion as required by SSR 16-3p. (Id.) In response, the Commissioner argued the ALJ’s

decision was supported by substantial evidence, negating any post-hoc rationalization objection.

(Doc. 15 at 644.)

Here, the ALJ found “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence[,]

and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and

other evidence in the record . . . .” (Doc. 7 at 46.) Over the next several paragraphs, the ALJ

discussed findings from Oslavic’s physical examinations and treatment from 2018 to 2023 and

the opinion evidence. (Id. at 46-48.) After laying out the relevant evidence, the ALJ concluded

her alleged symptoms and limitations were “only partially consistent with the evidence.” (Id. at

48.) While noting Oslavic complained of back, hand, knee, and foot pain, had degeneration of

her knees and back, and was obese during the relevant period, the ALJ reasoned “she had

relatively conservative treatment with medication and physical therapy.” (Id.) The ALJ further

observed “the treatment notes documented generally intact sensation and reflexes with a normal

gait.” (Id.) For those reasons, the ALJ found Oslavic could perform the reduced range of work

described in the RFC. (Id.)

The ALJ credited some of Oslavic’s subjective symptoms to a degree, but did not accept

them to the extent alleged by Oslavic because of factors to be considered under the applicable

regulations and findings on examinations. Specifically, two of the applicable regulatory factors

under SSR 16-3p include the type, effectiveness, and side effects of the claimant’s medication,

and the claimant’s non-medication treatments. See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8; 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v), 416.929(c)(3)(iv)-(v). The ALJ noted Oslavic attended

physical therapy for back, hip, and knee pain, which helped manage her pain. (Doc. 7 at 47.)

The ALJ further noted Oslavic took Ibuprofen for her joint and back pain. (Id.) Thus, the ALJ

considered the applicable regulatory factors by highlighting Oslavic’s “relatively conservative

treatment with medication and physical therapy.” (Id. at 48.) Additionally, the ALJ discussed

how the treatment notes from 2018-2023 demonstrated “generally intact sensation and reflexes

with a normal gait.” (Id. at 46-48.) Such findings on examinations were inconsistent with

Oslavic’s subjective complaints. Under SSR 16-3p, the ALJ must consider whether a claimant’s

“statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are inconsistent

with the objective medical evidence and the other evidence.” 2017 WL 5180304, at *8.

Oslavic relies on Cox v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 254, 260 (6th Cir. 2015), to

assert that boilerplate statements concerning application of the regulations are insufficient. (See

Doc. 14 at 642.) But this reliance is overstated. As discussed above, the ALJ’s decision

highlighted physical examination findings from 2018 to 2023 and conservative treatment that

was inconsistent with Oslavic’s alleged symptoms and limitations. (See Doc. 7 at 46-48.) This

evidence led to the ALJ’s conclusion that Oslavic’s assertions were “only partially consistent

with the evidence.” (Id. at 48.)

The R&R did not provide a revised rationale for the ALJ’s decision. The R&R outlined

the regulatory framework the ALJ used in making sufficient findings regarding Oslavic’s

statements about her limitations. (See Doc. 13 at 639.) It pointed out how the ALJ was required,

pursuant to SSR 16-3p and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2), to evaluate her

statements alongside her medical history. (Id.) The R&R noted the ALJ’s consideration of

Oslavic’s “relatively conservative treatment with medication and physical therapy” was

consistent with two of the applicable regulatory factors. (Id. at 635-39 (citing SSR 16-3p, 2017

WL 5180304, at *8; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v), 416.929(c)(3)(iv)-(v)).) Additionally,

the R&R pointed out how the ALJ met his requirement under SSR 16-3p to evaluate Oslavic’s

statements alongside her medical history. (Id.) The R&R reasoned the ALJ accomplished this

by discussing her “generally intact sensation and reflexes with a normal gait” during

examinations from 2018-2023, which contradicted her testimony regarding pain and mobility.

(Id.)

While the R&R noted the ALJ did not explain all of the cited evidence, the ALJ was not

required to analyze all seven factors identified in SSR 16-3p. Cross, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 733.

Instead, the ALJ must provide enough of an assessment to show they considered all relevant

evidence. Id. Here, the R&R correctly laid out the paragraphs of the ALJ’s decision that allow

the Court to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning. The R&R “highlighted parts of the record as

a whole that supported the ALJ’s conclusion discounting [Oslavic’s] subjective symptom

statements.” Moore, 2024 WL 3197570, at *3. This is not post-hoc rationalization. The R&R

reviewed the record as a whole, and this Court has as well.

“[I]f a district court finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it need

not consider a post-hoc rationalization objection.” Id. at *3 (citing Pasco v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

137 F. App’x 828, 847 (6th Cir. 2005)). Substantial evidence exists when the “existing

administrative record . . . contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual

determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 203 L. Ed. 2d 504

(2019) (citations omitted).

The ALJ’s finding that Oslavic’s statements were inconsistent with the medical record is

supported by substantial evidence. As discussed herein, the ALJ’s decision highlighted

inconsistencies regarding Oslavic’s reflexes, pain, and mobility. (Doc. 7 at 46-48.) The ALJ

also discussed how Oslavic’s pain was treated through medication and physical therapy. (Id. at

47.) Although Oslavic testified to only being able to walk for 5 to 10 minutes at a time, the ALJ

also noted that physical therapy extended this time to nearly 1 hour. (Id. at 46, 47.) Other

medical opinions cited by the ALJ noted “normal strength and gait.” (Id. at 46.) “As long as the

ALJ cited substantial, legitimate evidence to support his factual conclusions, we are not to

second-guess.” Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the

ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Oslavic’s objection is OVERRULED.

I. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff Nicole M. Oslavic’s objection is OVERRULED,

the R&R is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED, and the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 19, 2026 le GM BRENNAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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