Madaio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-20300-RAR

CHRISTOPHER J. MADAIO,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant United States of America’s Motion

to Dismiss (“MTD”), [ECF No. 51]. Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff, Christopher J.

Madaio’s pro se “[Amended] Civil Action with Respect to Violations of the Privacy Protection

Act of 1980” (“Amended Complaint”), [ECF No. 19]. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant violated his rights “in seizing all [his] work product materials and other documents”

at Miami International Airport on July 11, 2024, which, he claims, entitles him to damages under

the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa. Am. Compl. at 1 (cleaned up). After careful

review of the governing law, the record, the parties’ arguments, and being otherwise fully advised,

the MTD is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

I. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

Plaintiff describes himself as an experienced “published photographer,” one whose

“original photos” appeared in a photobook titled Il Ritrato Giovanile, which sold 500 copies. Am.

Compl. at 4. He says that “several articles [have been] published on himself” and that his work

has been featured in “many photo exhibitions,” both in the United States and abroad. Id. But

Plaintiff’s career has not unfolded without incident. In 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(“FBI”) discovered 691 images classified as child pornography on his personal computers. See

Madaio v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. CV-06-BE-00904, 2008 WL 11392887, at *2 (N.D.

Ala. Mar. 31, 2008). Two years later, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to possessing and knowingly

receiving material containing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and

2252A(a)(2)(A), and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. See id.; see also Am. Compl.

at 5.

Nearly two decades later, Plaintiff attempted to rebuild both his career and his finances.

By June 2023, he had returned to Alabama, where his “financial situation worsened” over the

following year. Am. Compl. at 5. In March 2024, he “was contacted by an entrepreneur,” Brandon

Bello, who “offer[ed] to purchase [the] exclusive rights to all [of Plaintiff’s] photos” with the aim

of publishing and selling two photobooks. Id. After several months of discussions, the two entered

into “a contractual agreement.” Id. at 6. Under that agreement, Plaintiff “would work for an

indeterminate time as an engineer at [ ] Bello’s biofuel plant near Yopal, Colombia,” while also

delivering his photographic archive—“all his personal/scanned photos[ ] taken over the past fifty-

five years”—to facilitate “a final selection of photos” and “setting out a suitable layout of the two

photobooks.” Id. To that end, Plaintiff traveled with “a separate USB flashdrive containing photo

and contractual info[rmation] pertaining to the proposed photobooks.” Id.

The trip did not unfold as planned. Plaintiff never made it beyond Bogotá Airport.

Colombian authorities allegedly “denied [him] entry to Colombia,” and he “was immediately

returned on the next available flight to Miami International Airport[.]” Id. Upon his arrival in

Miami on July 11, 2024, Plaintiff claims that “U.S. Customs officials and agents from the

Dep[artment] of Homeland Security proceed[ed] to seize indiscriminately all of [his] digital

media,” including materials he says were necessary “to complete his contractual obligations[.]”

Id. at 6–7. Plaintiff returned to Alabama by September 20, 2024; there, he was arrested and later

denied bond. See id. at 7. He alleges that, as a result of the “search and seizure, arrest, and

continual incarceration [without] bond[,]” he “cannot fulfill his contractual obligations as a

publisher/published photographer” and that it is “unlikely he[ ] [will] be able to work as such in

the future.” Id.

II. Screening

On July 7, 2025, the Court screened Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. See Order Screening Amended Complaint, [ECF No. 21]. Plaintiff cleared the Act’s

threshold requirements at the pleading stage. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa(a), (b). He alleged that a

government officer conducted a search or seizure tied to a criminal investigation. See id.; see also

Am. Compl. at 2 (asserting that DHS officer Kenny Silva’s “primary responsibility” was the

“search and seizure of all Plaintiff’s digital media at Miami International Airport on the 11th of

July, 2024”). The seized materials fell within the Act’s definition of “documentary materials,” as

Plaintiff said officials “seize[d] indiscriminately all of [his] digital media,” including a “selection”

of photographs “taken over . . . [fifty-five] years.” Id. at 6 (cleaned up); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000aa-7(a).

He also alleged that he possessed those materials “in connection with a purpose to

disseminate [them] to the public” through a photobook or similar medium affecting interstate or

foreign commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b). And the Amended Complaint tied that purpose to a

publishing arrangement, asserting that the “search and seizure . . . means [Plaintiff] cannot fulfill

his contractual obligations as a publisher/published photographer[,]” and that his ability to work

in that capacity was in doubt. Am. Compl. at 7; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b). The Court

therefore found that Plaintiff plausibly stated a claim against the United States under the Privacy

Protection Act. See generally Order Screening Amended Complaint.

III. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

The Government advances several grounds for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). To start, it invokes the Act’s suspect exception, arguing that “the [Act] does

not apply when the materials are seized from a criminal suspect and the materials relate to the

crime,” and that Plaintiff “fails to state a claim under the PPA because he is the criminal suspect

and the materials seized related to the crime.” MTD at 1–2 (referencing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa(a)(1),

(b)(1)). It emphasizes that agents discovered “suspected child sexual abuse material (CSAM)”

during the border search and that forensic review revealed “over one thousand (1,000) images of

suspected child pornography”—facts that it says establish probable cause and bring Plaintiff’s case

squarely within the exception. Id. at 4–5. The Government also stresses that the Act protects

“innocent third parties,” not individuals “suspected of committing the crime under investigation,”

and that Plaintiff’s status as a suspect forecloses relief. Id. at 7–8.

Further, the Government relies on the border exception, arguing that the statute expressly

does “not impair or affect the ability of a government official or employee . . . to conduct searches

and seizures at the borders,” and that Plaintiff admits the seizure occurred while he was reentering

the United States. Id. at 9–10 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5). It also characterizes Plaintiff’s

allegations of government orchestration as “vague and conclusory” and “implausible,” noting his

failure to plead supporting facts or raise such claims in his criminal case. Id. at 10–11. Finally,

the Government adds that most of Plaintiff’s seized devices were forfeited following Plaintiff’s

conviction, further undermining any viable claim under the Act. Id. at 9.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint,

and the plaintiff receives the benefit of all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the facts

alleged. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. A dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a “judgment on the merits”

and is “presumed to operate as a dismissal with prejudice unless the district court specifies

otherwise.” Eiber Radiology, Inc. v. Toshiba Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 673 F. App’x 925, 929 (11th

Cir. 2016) (citing Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001)).

A court considering a 12(b)(6) motion is generally limited to the facts contained in the

complaint and attached exhibits—but may also consider documents referred to in the complaint

that are central to the claim and whose authenticity is undisputed. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons,

Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009). While the court is required to accept as true all allegations

contained in the complaint, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Dismissal pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) is not appropriate unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d

1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation omitted). And “determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Holland v. Carnival Corp., 50 F.4th

1088, 1093 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

ANALYSIS

As explained herein, Plaintiff’s claim under the Privacy Protection Act is barred by the

Act’s “border exception,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5. Accordingly, the Court need not address the

Government’s remaining arguments.1

I. The Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa et seq.

The Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (“PPA”) generally prohibits government officials, in

connection with a criminal investigation, from searching for or seizing certain materials held by a

person “reasonably believed” to intend to disseminate information to the public. 42 U.S.C. §

1 Alternatively, the Court grants the MTD by default. This District’s Local Rules required Plaintiff to “file

and serve an opposing memorandum of law no later than fourteen (14) days after service” of the MTD.

S.D. FLA. L.R. 7.1(c)(1). Defendant filed the MTD on January 23, 2026, meaning that Plaintiff’s Response

was due on February 6, 2026. On February 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file

a response—reflecting his awareness that the MTD had been filed against him—which the Court granted,

extending his deadline to March 4, 2026. See Motion for Extension of Time, [ECF No. 54]; see also

Omnibus Paperless Order, [ECF No. 55]. Though Plaintiff claimed not to have received the MTD,

Defendant certified that it sent the MTD to the same facility at which Plaintiff was confined when he filed

his Motion for Extension of Time. See MTD at 12; see also Motion for Extension of Time at 1. In any

event, although the Court granted his request for an extension, Plaintiff still failed to file his Response or

request additional time to do so, and, as Plaintiff further failed to file any Notice of Address Change on the

docket within seven days of an address change, the Court’s order was properly served. See generally

Docket; see also S.D. FLA. L.R. 11.1(g).

Consequently, Plaintiff’s failure to oppose Defendant’s MTD “may be deemed sufficient cause for granting

the [MTD] by default.” S.D. FLA. L.R. 7.1(c)(1). At the very least, he has waived any objection thereto

and has abandoned his claims against Defendant. See Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v.

City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The . . . failure to brief and argue this issue during

the proceedings before the district court is grounds for finding that the issue has been abandoned.”);

Fawcett v. Carnival Corp., 682 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1112 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (recognizing that “[t]he failure to

respond to arguments regarding claims addressed in a motion to dismiss is sufficient basis to dismiss such

claims as abandoned or by default” (citations omitted)); see also Claiborne v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l

Ass’n, No. 22-13676, 2024 WL 65398, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 5, 2024) (recognizing that “pro se litigants are

nevertheless required to follow procedural rules” (citing Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir.

2007))). Nevertheless, the Court will adjudicate the MTD, mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status and “the

strong preference that cases be heard on their merits.” Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1342

(11th Cir. 2014).

2000aa. The Act provides that “a person aggrieved by a search for or seizure of materials in

violation of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action for damages for such search or

seizure . . . against the United States[,] which shall be liable for violations of this chapter by their

officers or employees while acting within the scope or under color of their office or

employment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(a)(1) (alterations added).

Congress enacted the Act to reinforce the First and Fourth Amendment interests implicated

when the government conducts a “search and seizure of evidence belonging to those not under

investigation.” Henriquez v. Ga. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 21-12567, 2023 WL 4624473, at *10

(11th Cir. July 19, 2023); see also id. (“The purpose behind the PPA, as set forth in the Senate

Committee on the Judiciary’s report, was to afford additional statutory protection to the First and

Fourth Amendment rights of the press and related groups.” (citing S. Rep. No. 96-874, at 4–5));

see also Times Publ’g Co. v. United States, No. 23-MC-0014, 2023 WL 7411463, at *5 (M.D. Fla.

Sept. 22, 2023); Madaio v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. CV-06-BE-00904, 2008 WL

11392887, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2008) (“The [PPA] was intended to discourage law

enforcement officers from targeting publishers simply because they often gathered ‘mere

evidence’ of crime.” (alteration added)).

The catalyst for the Act, according to legislative history, was the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), which upheld a search of a

newspaper’s offices despite the obvious First Amendment concerns presented. See S. Rep. No.

96-874, at 4–5. In so holding, the Court declined to impose any constitutional requirement under

the Fourth Amendment that law enforcement proceed by subpoena or provide advance notice

before searching the press. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 567 (“[W]e decline to reinterpret the [Fourth]

Amendment to impose a general constitutional barrier against warrants to search newspaper

premises, to require resort to subpoenas as a general rule, or to demand prior notice and hearing in

connection with the issuance of search warrants.”). The Act, therefore, reflects Congress’s

response by extending statutory free-speech protections in the search-and-seizure context where

the Constitution, as explained in Zurcher, does not.

The Act draws distinctions between two protected categories of materials subject to search

and seizure. It first safeguards “work product materials,” meaning those materials “prepared,

produced, authored, or created” “in anticipation of communicating such materials to the public”;

which are “possessed for the purposes of communicating such materials to the public”; and which

“include mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories of the person who prepared,

produced, authored, or created such material.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7(b)(1)–(3). Separately, the

Act protects “documentary materials,” which it defines broadly to include “written or printed

materials, photographs, motion picture films, negatives, video tapes, audio tapes, and other” forms

of “mechanically, magnetically, or electronically recorded cards, tapes, or discs.” Id. § 2000aa-

7(a). Drawing a clear boundary, the Act provides that neither “work product materials” nor

“documentary materials” includes “contraband or the fruits of a crime or things otherwise

criminally possessed.” Id. § 2000aa-7(a)–(b). In this way, the Act protects both the process and

the inputs of public communication, while preserving the government’s authority to seize

inherently unlawful items.

Consistent with that framework, the Act channels law enforcement toward means less

intrusive than a traditional search and seizure—for instance, by use of a subpoena duces tecum for

certain protected materials. See id. § 2000aa(b)(3), (b)(4) (contemplating “subpoena duces tecum”

procedures as a default mechanism for producing “other documents”). But this prohibition isn’t

categorical. The Act permits searches or seizures in limited circumstances, including where: (1)

as for all protected materials, there is probable cause to believe that the possessor “has committed

or is committing the criminal offense to which the materials relate”;2 (2) as for all protected

materials, “immediate seizure is necessary to prevent” death or serious bodily injury; (3) as for

“other documents,” notice by subpoena would risk the “destruction, alteration, or concealment” of

the materials; or (4) as for “other documents,” the materials have not been produced despite a court

order enforcing a subpoena, and where either “all appellate remedies have been exhausted” or

further delay would “threaten the interests of justice.” Id. § 2000aa(a)–(b).

Of particular relevance to this case is another exception to the Act’s prohibitions—the

“border exception”—which reads as follows:

This chapter shall not impair or affect the ability of a government

officer or employee, pursuant to otherwise applicable law, to

conduct searches and seizures at the borders of, or at international

points of, entry into the United States in order to enforce the customs

laws of the United States.

42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5.

The Court is unaware of any precedent, binding or otherwise, on the border exception’s

scope, and secondary sources seem to disagree on whether it applies to all border searches and

seizures or only those conducted to enforce customs laws. Compare, e.g., ANDREW B. SWERIN,

THE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT, INFO. SECURITY & PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO FED & STATE LAW &

COMPLIANCE § 27:59 (speaking of the Act, “[t]his law explicitly does not apply in any way to

searches at any border of the United States” (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000aa-5)), with Cope et al.,

2 This exception contains its own caveat, such that even where the materials relate to the criminal offense,

an officer nevertheless “may not search for or seize such materials . . . if the offense to which the materials

relate consists of the receipt, possession, communication, or withholding of such materials or the

information contained therein.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa(a)(1), (b)(1) (emphasis added). This caveat is

inapplicable where the offense falls under any one of the statutorily listed offense categories, such as

“national defense,” “classified information,” or “the sexual exploitation of children,” id. §§ 2000aa(a)(1),

(b)(1)—meaning that an officer can search for and seize the subject materials provided they satisfy the

suspect exception.

Digital Privacy at the U.S. Border: Protecting the Data on Your Devices and in the Cloud,

ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, at 29 n.47, Mar. 8, 2017,

https://www.eff.org/files/2017/03/10/digital-privacy-border-2017-guide3.10.17.pdf (“While the

statute exempts border searches for the purpose of enforcing the customs laws, it does not exempt

border searches for other purposes.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5)), and Scott Memmel, Crossing

Constitutional Boundaries: Searches and Seizures of Electronic Devices at U.S. Borders, 25

COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 49 (2020) (“EFF noted, however, that the exemption only applies to the

enforcement of customs laws, rather than exempting border searches for other purposes,

suggesting that the statute may still be a viable defense for journalists against warrantless searches

and seizures of their electronic devices at U.S. borders.” (citing Cope et al., supra)).

II. The Privacy Protection Act’s “Border Exception” Bars Plaintiff’s Claim

The parties dispute whether the Act’s border exception bars Plaintiff’s damages claim.

Plaintiff insists that the exception “do[es] not apply here” because, he says, the Government

planted “a ‘questionable’ photo . . . from a remote location on his smartphone, contact[ed]

Colombian officials beforehand to have [it] sent to Miami International without delay, and

alert[ed] U.S. Customs to be ready.”3 Am. Compl. at 8. The Government thereby “forc[ed] him

to Miami International, where the search and seizure by U.S. Customs couldn’t be avoided.” Id.

He thus maintains that he was “intentionally maneuvered into a situation, against his will, where

he would be deprived of the protections afforded to him under the [Fourth] Amendment to the U.S.

3 A plaintiff is not permitted to advance legal arguments in their complaint. But given Plaintiff’s pro se

status, the lack of a response, and the need to reach the merits, the Court will consider those facts that

Plaintiff says bear on whether the border exception applies to him. In doing so, the Court keeps in mind

that its review “is not limited to whatever legal pronouncements that [Plaintiff] makes,” Roberts v. McBrier,

No. 22-CV-0191, 2023 WL 11969956, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2023), and that it may only “exercise

jurisdiction on the basis of the factual circumstances involved,” Helms v. Blackwell, 367 F.2d 149, 150 (5th

Cir. 1966).

Constitution.” Id. at 9. The Government responds that these allegations are “implausible” and

that, regardless, the Act’s border exception “applies in this case.” MTD at 11. In its view, Plaintiff

voluntarily “le[ft] the country with criminal materials” and “return[ed] with those materials,”

placing him squarely within the exception. Id. The Government adds that it “must be able to

search persons and property attempting to enter—or reenter—the United States to ensure that the

person is not transporting visual depictions involving the sexual exploitation of minors.” Id.

These competing positions present a question no other court appears to have addressed:

What does it mean for a government officer to conduct a search or seizure “in order to enforce the

customs laws of the United States” under § 2000aa-5? Does the provision extend to all searches

and seizures at the border, or is it limited by whether the search is undertaken, intentionally or

otherwise, for a specific law-enforcement purpose? For the reasons that follow, the Court

concludes that the border exception bars Plaintiff’s claim.

To begin, some points are straightforward. No one disagrees that Plaintiff was subjected

to a “search” or “seizure” carried out by a “government officer or employee” within the meaning

of the Act. And Miami International Airport—where the materials4 were allegedly seized—

qualifies as an “international point[ ] of[ ] entry into the United States[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5.

The parties’ arguments, however, bring into focus the clause “in order to enforce the customs laws

of the United States”—and, in particular, the phrase “in order to enforce.” Plaintiff’s theory rests

on the Government’s alleged subjective motive in orchestrating his presence at the border, while

the Government’s view rests on its asserted law-enforcement purpose of the search. Therefore,

4 The Court assumes, and the parties do not dispute, that Plaintiff’s seized digital photographs constitute

“documentary materials” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7(a), which explicitly lists

“photographs” as a form of “documentary materials.”

while neither party has framed the issue in these terms, resolving the meaning of that clause is

dispositive here.

To interpret the meaning of “in order to enforce the customs laws of the United States,”

the Court begins with the plain text. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (“As

with any question of statutory interpretation, our analysis begins with the plain language of the

statute.” (citing Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004))); BellSouth

Telecomm’ns, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001) (“When

interpreting a statute, ‘it is axiomatic that a court must begin with the plain language of the

statute.’” (quoting United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 2000))). “And [courts]

interpret the words of a statute based on their meaning at the time of enactment.” Regions Bank v.

Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586

U.S. 105 (2019)); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE

INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS § 7, at 78 (2012) (“Words must be given the meaning they had

when the text was adopted.”).

At the outset, the Court observes that § 2000aa-5 likely does not sweep in all searches and

seizures at the border. If it did, the provision would end after “entry into the United States[.]” But

it does not. Instead, it continues, appearing to confine the exception to those searches and seizures

conducted “in order to enforce the customs laws of the United States.” Reading the provision to

cover all border activity would strip that limiting phrase of any work to do. And “[a]bsent clear

evidence that Congress intended this surplusage,” the Court “is ‘obligated to give effect, if

possible, to every word Congress used.’” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 583 U.S. 109, 128

(2018) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)).

Beginning with the phrase “in order to,” its ordinary meaning—both before and after

1980—is one that “express[es] purpose: so as to do or achieve” an “end or outcome.” OXFORD

ENGLISH DICTIONARY (last visited Mar. 26, 2026), https://www.oed.com/dictionary/order_n?

tab=meaning_and_use#33290604 (collecting uses of the phrase “in order to” from 1609 to 1994);

see also Oilfield Equip. Mktg., Inc. v. New Tech Sys., Inc., No. MO-02-CA-183, 2005 WL

6258387, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2005) (recognizing that “in order to” means “for the purpose

of; as a means to” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 227 F. App’x 925 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, before

and after the Act’s enactment, “to enforce” was understood to mean “to compel obedience to.”

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 474 (5th ed. 1979); see also Schnell v. State Farm Lloyds, 98 F.4th

150, 157 (5th Cir. 2024) (“To ‘enforce’ means ‘[t]o give force or effect to (a law, etc.); to compel

obedience to.’” (listing sources)). Taken together, the phrase “in order to enforce” denotes action

undertaken with the aim of giving effect to law—that is, conduct carried out for the purpose of

compelling compliance with the “customs laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5.

Nothing in this construction suggests that the Court must look at the searching officer’s

subjective motives. But Plaintiff sees it differently: he contends that the border exception cannot

apply in his case because the Government conducted a search at an international port of entry that

it knew it could not perform elsewhere, rendering any asserted border-related purpose pretextual.

But even if § 2000aa-5’s plain text supported Plaintiff’s reading, its broader context does not. See

King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (recognizing that courts must read statutory provisions

“in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme” (cleaned up)).

The phrase “in order to” as written in § 2000aa-5 modifies the act of conducting “searches

and seizures”5—three words plainly drawn from the Fourth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. AMEND

5 It is a “fundamental canon of statutory construction that a qualifying phrase refers solely to its immediate

antecedent.” Nat'l Coal. For Students With Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def. Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283,

IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). Congress’s “choice to follow the

[Fourth] Amendment’s terminology is most naturally read as carrying the meaning of the

constitutional terms into the statute.” Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 358 (2000)

(Souter, J., concurring in part) (citing United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 945 (1988) (“By

employing the constitutional language, Congress apparently was focusing on the prohibition of

comparable conditions.”); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[W]here

Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of

centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to

each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will

convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.”)). Given this express language,

combined with the events leading up to the Act’s enactment, the Court treats the Act as a

codification of traditional Fourth Amendment principles. See Citicasters v. McCaskill, 89 F.3d

1350, 1359 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996) (Bright, J., concurring) (speaking of the Privacy Protection Act,

“[t]he language of the statute implies that the Act was intended to be a statutory extension of the

Fourth Amendment” (citation omitted)).

Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer’s subjective motivation is not relevant to the

legality of a search or to whether a search has occurred. It is well settled that “the fact that the

officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the

legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the

circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138

288 n.6 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Though not immediately preceding “in order to,” it is

nevertheless unambiguous that “to conduct searches and seizures” is the antecedent phrase that it modifies;

in other words, the border exception applies only to those searches and seizures conducted “in order to

enforce” the United States customs laws.

(1978); see also 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT, § 9.2(e) (5th ed. 2014) (stating that it “is irrelevant” whether the officers possessed

an uncommunicated intention to make a full-fledged arrest (footnotes omitted)). In short, the

Fourth Amendment adopts an objective framework: what matters is what the officer did, not what

the officer thought.

That objective framework is at its apex at the border. “Routine searches of the persons and

effects of entrants (at the border) are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion,

probable cause, or warrant.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)

(emphasis added). Indeed, “a secondary customs search following the initial inspection is proper

even absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” United States v. Oluigbo-Bernards, 638

F. App’x 868, 871 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th

Cir. 1988)). To be sure, the legality of border searches is governed by a “reasonableness

requirement . . . which adjusts the strength of suspicion required for a particular search to the

intrusiveness of that search.” United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 1984).

But that standard, too, is objective, and, relevantly, facts leading up to the search—besides that it

occurred at the border—usually do not play a role in the analysis. See United States v. Touset, 890

F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Ordinarily, searches at the border are reasonable without

suspicion ‘simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.’” (quoting United States v.

Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 728 (11th Cir. 2010))).

This doctrinal backdrop governs the Court’s reading of “in order to,” which must be read

in light of what it modifies—conducting “searches and seizures.” In this light, Plaintiff’s effort to

inject subjectivity would narrow the constitutionally permitted scope of searches and seizures in a

way that § 2000aa-5 cannot bear. As explained, at the border, and elsewhere, the officer’s

subjective impressions do not determine whether a search or seizure is valid. Although “nothing

prevents Congress from enacting laws that provide greater protections” than the Constitution

requires, Touset, 890 F.3d at 1236—and the Act embodies that principle—§ 2000aa-5 contains no

indication that Congress intended to abandon the objective framework governing searches and

seizures.

The purpose of the Act’s border exception buttresses the Court’s conclusion, and “[courts]

must favor the ‘textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs’ the statute’s

purposes.” United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1256 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting SCALIA &

GARNER, § 4, at 63). The border exception is one of the Act’s several provisions in which

“Congress took pains to limit the [Privacy Protection] Act’s chilling effect on law enforcement.”

Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1355 n.8. Plaintiff’s reading would have that effect. Officers at the border

have long relied on an objective reasonableness standard that permits searches regardless of any

quantum of suspicion or improper state of mind. The Court thus reads “in order to enforce” as an

objective, purpose-based limitation that covers only those searches and seizures that are

objectively undertaken to enforce the customs laws.

That conclusion raises the next question: what are “the customs laws of the United States”

within the meaning of § 2000aa-5? The Government contends that § 2000aa-5 bars Plaintiff’s

claim because, through the search and seizure, it was advancing its interest in ensuring that

someone was “not transporting” into the country “visual depictions involving the sexual

exploitation of minors.” MTD at 11. But based on Plaintiff’s well-pled allegations, to which the

Court must apply the exception, it remains unclear what DHS agents were looking for with any

specificity, other than that they seized all of Plaintiff’s “digital media.” Am. Compl. at 6–7. The

Government would nevertheless be correct if a search and seizure that is conducted to prevent a

person from transporting digital contraband, such as the depictions it describes, falls under the

“customs laws of the United States” within the meaning of the Act.

Again, the Court starts with the plain text. The Act does not define “customs laws of the

United States.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa et seq. Although the phrase “customs laws of the United

States” appears across various statutes, Congress has defined the phrase merely twice within the

last twenty-six years. In 2000, Congress passed the Dog and Cat Protection Act, which introduced

a new section in the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibiting the importation, exportation, sale, manufacture,

offer for sale, transportation, and distribution in the United States of products made with dog and

cat fur. See 19 U.S.C. § 1308(b)(1). In that section, “customs laws of the United States” was

defined as “any other law or regulation enforced or administered by the United States Customs

Service.” Id. § 1308(a)(3). Eight years later, Congress enacted the Food, Conservation, and

Energy Act of 2008, which added a new subtitle to the Tariff Act of 1930 with respect to imports

of softwood lumber. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1683–1683(g). That subtitle defines “customs laws of the

United States” as “any law or regulation enforced or administered by U.S. Customs and Border

Protection.” Id. § 1683(3). History can explain the difference between these two definitions.

Before 2003, the United States Customs Service was a bureau within the Department of the

Treasury; however, it was reorganized as the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and

transferred to the Department of Homeland Security upon passage of the Homeland Security Act

of 2002.6 See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1502 (2002).

6 Before the U.S. Customs Service was reorganized, customs agents and immigration inspectors had distinct

roles and powers. As the Eighth Circuit once explained, immigration inspectors, acting under the

immigration laws, “[did] not have the authority to search bags, containers, or compartments too small to

conceal persons.” United States v. Popow, 821 F.2d 483, 487 (8th Cir. 1987). That authority instead

belonged to customs officers. But the two roles could overlap through formal designation: by “proper

delegations,” an immigration inspector could be designated to perform the duties of a customs inspector by

the Secretary of the Treasury, such that “any officer of the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury

Department . . . or any agent or other person authorized by law or designated by the Secretary of the

But § 2000aa-5 was enacted in 1980 and has not been amended since. What, then, can the

Court do with these later definitions? It is well settled that “later enacted laws . . . do not declare

the meaning of earlier law.” Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998); see

also id. at 269–70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This later amendment can of course not cause [the

statute] to have meant, at the time of petitioner’s conviction, something different from what it then

said.”). Still, since those statutes use the same phrase—“customs laws of the United States”—

they at least bear on the analysis here. Under the rule of in pari materia, “a later act can . . . be

regarded as a legislative interpretation of [an] earlier act . . . in the sense that it aids in ascertaining

the meaning of the words as used in their contemporary setting” and “is therefore entitled to great

weight in resolving any ambiguities and doubts.” United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64–65

(1940). The rule “necessarily assumes that whenever Congress passes a new statute, it acts aware

of all previous statutes on the same subject[.]” Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243–44

(1972) (citing Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 541–52 (1954)); see also SCALIA

& GARNER, § 54, at 323 (“[W]hen a statute uses the very same terminology as an earlier statute—

especially in the very same field—it is reasonable to believe that the terminology bears a consistent

meaning.”). Here, in light of the 2002 agency reorganization, the only later statutory definition of

“customs laws of the United States” that bears on this question is 19 U.S.C. § 1308(a)(3), enacted

twenty years after the Act. That provision defines “customs laws” as “any other law or regulation

enforced or administered by the United States Customs Service.” 19 U.S.C. § 1308(a)(3).

Treasury to perform duties of an officer of the Customs Service” served as a customs inspector. Id. The

reverse was also true. A customs officer could be designated to act as an immigration inspector, meaning

“any employee . . . designated by the Attorney General . . . to perform the functions of an immigration

officer” served in that role. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(18) (1982). So, while one person could wear

both hats through delegation, the baseline rule was clear that customs and immigration officers began as

separate authorities with different powers, and the two roles could only become interchangeable when

formal designation occurred.

Assuming arguendo that “customs laws of the United States” in § 2000aa-5 refers only to

laws or regulations enforced or administered by the now-defunct United States Customs Service,

the Court finds that it still applies and thus bars Plaintiff’s claim, provided that the object of the

search and seizure was the possible entry of digital contraband into the country.7 At the time of

the Act’s enactment, “[c]ustoms agents [were] authorized to prevent the importation

of . . . contraband into the United States.” United States v. Rivera, 595 F.2d 1095, 1098 (5th

Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971)

(“Customs officers characteristically inspect luggage and their power to do so is not questioned[;]

it is an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the country.”);

United States v. Soria, 519 F.2d 1060, 1062 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Customs agents are charged with

preventing the importation of contraband into the United States. Congress has granted the agents

broad statutory authority to stop and search for contraband.” (citations omitted)).

Congress has rendered child sexual abuse material (“CSAM”) contraband by criminalizing

its importation, transportation, receipt, and possession. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A. Such

contraband falls squarely within the scope of customs enforcement,8 consistent with the historical

7 “At the motion-to-dismiss stage, courts consider only the complaint and the reasonable inferences they

can draw from it.” Singleton v. Allen, 740 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1152 (N.D. Ala. 2024) (citations omitted).

Applying that standard, the Court finds that the seizure of Plaintiff’s digital media by DHS agents at an

international point of entry is best understood as serving a customs-law enforcement purpose. Plaintiff

alleges that (1) DHS agents conducted the search at an international port of entry; (2) they seized his phone

and other digital media; (3) the search was prompted by a “questionable photo” on his device, Am. Compl.

at 8; and (4) the seized images, in his view, would not be considered “child pornography” or “CSAM,” id.

at 9. Taken together, these allegations indicate that the seizure was directed at suspected illicit digital

material, i.e., contraband, within the scope of customs laws. An alternative inference—that DHS agents

acted as general-purpose criminal investigators pursuing a targeted matter unrelated to the entry of

contraband—is not supported by any plausible factual allegations in the Amended Complaint and thus

cannot be drawn at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

8 Customs law permits officers to “examine, inspect, and search . . . any . . . package or cargo” entering the

United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), and to seize “merchandise which is introduced or attempted to be

introduced into the United States contrary to law,” including merchandise that “is stolen, smuggled, or

clandestinely imported or introduced,” id. § 1595a(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A).

authority of customs officials. Notably, when the Act was passed, customs agents were permitted

to conduct searches to prevent the importation of obscene and pornographic materials. See Thirty-

Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 375–76 (construing 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a)); see also id. at 376

(“[W]e have today held that Congress may constitutionally prevent the mails from being used for

distributing pornography.” (citing United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971))).9 Moreover, that

Plaintiff’s suspected contraband was in digital form certainly does not bring it outside the bounds

of the Act; “[i]f anything, the advent of sophisticated technological means for concealing

contraband only heightens the need of the government to search property at the border.” Touset,

890 F.3d at 1235; see also id. at 1231 (holding that “the Fourth Amendment does not require any

suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border” where an officer of the Customs

and Border Protection Agency inspected the defendant’s iPhones and camera); United States v.

Mendez, 103 F.4th 1303, 1309 (7th Cir. 2024) (“The government’s interest in detecting child

pornography at the border is just as strong as its interest in intercepting firearms, narcotics, or any

other prohibited item.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1014 (9th Cir.

2019) (“The best example [of digital contraband] is child pornography.”).

The Court need not rely on the doctrine of in pari materia to resolve this case, as it would

be unworkable to limit § 2000aa-5’s reference to “customs laws of the United States” to those laws

9 It is true that, in Thirty-Seven Photographs, the Supreme Court “construe[d] [19 U.S.C.] § 1305(a) to

require intervals of no more than 14 days from seizure of the goods to the institution of judicial proceedings

for their forfeiture and no longer than 60 days from the filing of the action to final decision in the district

court.” 402 U.S. at 373. The Court imposed those limits to avoid First Amendment concerns that arise

when potentially protected expressive material is seized and not promptly adjudicated. See id.; see also

Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1965) (striking down a state film-licensing scheme that

required prior approval before exhibition and holding that there must be assurance that the censor will,

“within a brief period,” “either issue a license or go to court”). But this limitation announced in Thirty-

Seven Photographs does not extend to § 2000aa-5. The case governed the timing of forfeiture proceedings

for expressive materials in criminal cases to prevent prolonged suppression of speech. The Privacy

Protection Act, by contrast, creates a civil damages remedy—not a forfeiture scheme—and § 2000aa-5

simply defines when liability does not attach. So the First Amendment concerns that drove the outcome in

Thirty-Seven Photographs are not implicated in the same way here.

as they existed before the creation of Customs and Border Protection. What of all customs laws

enacted decades later? Nothing in the Act suggests that, by referring to “customs laws,” Congress

meant to fix those terms to a closed set of statutes. Rather, the phrase clearly references a body of

law, ostensibly enforced by the relevant agency, which supports a general reference reading.

Under the general reference doctrine, which is applied “[w]hen a statute adopts the general law on

a given subject, the reference is construed to mean that the law is as it reads thereafter at any given

time including amendments subsequent to the time of adoption.” Managed Care Advisory Grp.,

LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 F.3d 1145, 1157 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Longmire v. Sea

Drilling Corp., 610 F.2d 1342, 1352 (5th Cir. 1980)); New Prime Inc., 586 U.S. at 113 (discussing

the general reference canon and recognizing that, “[o]f course, statutes may sometimes refer to an

external source of law and fairly warn readers that they must abide that external source of law,

later amendments and modifications included”).

Read this way, § 2000aa-5 incorporates a body of customs law that evolves over time and

is enforced and construed as it exists at the time of application. See, e.g., El Encanto, Inc. v. Hatch

Chile Co., Inc., 825 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 2016) (“The fact is that the plain language of [35

U.S.C.] § 24 doesn’t suggest that a reader must look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as

they were back when the statute was enacted. To the contrary, as written the language suggests

that a reader may look to the rules as they are found on any given day, today included.”). This

reading is reinforced by the fact that, on the two occasions Congress has defined the phrase

“customs laws of the United States,” it has done so by reference to the agency charged with

enforcing those laws, rather than by providing any substantive description of them. And it is of

no moment that the United States Customs Service no longer exists. It has not disappeared; it has

been reorganized, and those same laws now operate within a new agency with expanded powers.

At the time of the Act’s enactment, Congress knew that it could later enlarge, limit, or modify the

enforcement powers of that agency. See Office of Consumers’ Counsel v. Federal Energy

Regulatory Comm’n, 655 F.2d 1132, 1149, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (suggesting that Congress could

have altered the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s authority by passing new legislation);

Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1437 (9th Cir. 1989) (“It is fully within Congress’[s]

prerogative legislatively to alter the reach of the laws it passes . . . .”); First Gibraltar Bank, FSB

v. Morales, 42 F.3d 895, 901 (5th Cir. 1995) (“As part of its legislative powers, Congress

designates the scope of agency authority, and if Congress so chooses, it can subsequently restrict

or limit that delegation of power to the agency.”).

The general reference doctrine thus forecloses a reading of “customs laws of the United

States” that is fixed only to those laws in place at enactment. The Court instead treats the provision

as referring to those laws enforced or administered by the modern agency—Customs and Border

Protection.10 And this reading, the Court finds, fairly recognizes “the balance struck by Congress

between preserving the ability of government officials” to search the nation’s borders and

“protecting those engaged in the dissemination of information from government intrusion.”

Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1355 n.8.

10 Legislative history may support a reading of § 2000aa-5 that limits “customs laws” to those governing

the interdiction of contraband or unlawful materials entering the country. See S. Rep. No. 96-874, at 13–14

(1980) (explaining that “the limitations on governmental search and seizure provided by this statute are not

to apply to searches at the borders or at international ports of entry into the United States pursuant to the

enforcement of the customs laws of the United States,” and that “these searches are generally of a routine,

nonintrusive nature and are designed to prohibit the introduction of contraband or unlawful materials into

the United States, and to facilitate the assessment and collection of duties and tariffs”). But reliance on

legislative history would cut against applying the general reference doctrine, which is compelled by the

text. The Court therefore does not consider legislative history. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,

Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“[I]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns

of our legislators by which we are governed.”); cf. CRI-Leslie, LLC v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 882

F.3d 1026, 1033 (11th Cir. 2018) (“In a contest such as we have here, between clear statutory text and (even

compelling) evidence of sub- or extra-textual ‘intent,’ the former must prevail.”).

To summarize, the Court interprets “searches and seizures” conducted at the border “in

order to enforce the customs laws of the United States” to mean those searches and seizures that

are objectively undertaken to enforce the laws and regulations enforced and administered by

Customs and Border Protection.!! That reading compels dismissal of this case. Plaintiff

affirmatively alleges that “U.S. Customs officials and agents from the Dep[artment] of Homeland

Security proceeded to seize indiscriminately all of [his] digital media” at an international port of

entry. Am. Compl. at 6-7. Based on his allegations, that search was objectively undertaken to

serve a customs-law enforcement purpose. Because the Act’s creation of a civil right to damages

“shall not impair or affect the ability of a government officer or employee” to conduct such

searches, Plaintiffs claim is barred under § 2000aa-S.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss, [ECF No. 51], is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, [ECF No.

19], is DISMISSED. All pending motions are DENIED as moot and all deadlines, if any, are

TERMINATED. This case is CLOSED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 26th day of March, 2026.

On A. RUIZ I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

To give effect to § 2000aa-5’s “in order to” clause as a meaningful limitation on “searches and seizures,”

the Court can envision searches undertaken to enforce laws unrelated to Customs and Border Protection’s

functions, such as searches conducted solely to obtain evidence of tax evasion, securities fraud, public

corruption, or other purely domestic offenses untethered to the entry of goods or persons into the United

States. Under the Court’s reading, such searches could not be subject to § 2000aa-5 because they would

not be objectively undertaken to enforce any law enforced or administered by Customs and Border

Protection.

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