Gholam Reza Safaeih v. Reza Alizadegan

04/10/2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs October 1, 2025

GHOLAM REZA SAFAEIH v. REZA ALIZADEGAN

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Dyer County

No. 23-CV-113 Tony Childress, Chancellor

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No. W2024-01154-COA-R3-CV

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The parties entered into an agreement in which the defendant provided funds and the

plaintiff used those funds to trade stocks. At one point, the defendant agreed to make a

$50,000 loan to the plaintiff so that the trading could continue. The agreement was

evidenced by a promissory note in which the plaintiff agreed to repay the loan and to share

any losses incurred. The loan was secured by a deed of trust executed on the plaintiff’s

residence. Subsequently, the parties lost approximately $210,342. The plaintiff then filed

a declaratory judgment action in which he claimed that the deed of trust was void because

the loan funds had never been disbursed. The defendant filed an answer and counterclaim

alleging that the plaintiff owed him the balance of the loan plus interest. He also sought

reimbursement for a portion of the losses that the parties had incurred. The chancery court

determined that the defendant had never disbursed the loan funds. Accordingly, it held that

the deed of trust and the portion of the promissory note which required repayment of the

loan balance were void due to a lack of consideration. However, the chancery court also

held that the portion of the promissory note in which the plaintiff agreed to share losses

was effective and left the defendant entitled to damages. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS R.

FRIERSON, II, and JEFFREY USMAN, JJ., joined.

Gholam Reza Safaeih, Dyersburg, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Melinda Meador, Martin, Tennessee and Charles S. Kelly Sr., Dyersburg, Tennessee, for

the appellee, Reza Alizadegan.

OPINION

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In February 2015, Gholam Reza Safaeih and Reza Alizadegan entered into a stock

trading agreement. Mr. Alizadegan provided the trading account and seed money that Mr.

Safaeih used to buy and sell stocks in an attempt to generate profits, which the parties

would then share. The parties initially enjoyed success in this enterprise. Subsequently,

Mr. Alizadegan agreed to loan Mr. Safaeih an additional $50,000 with which to trade. Mr.

Safaeih signed a promissory note in which he agreed to repay the loan plus interest at a rate

of 10% per year. The promissory note also provided that Mr. Safaeih would be responsible

for 20% of any losses the parties sustained. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Safaeih executed a deed

of trust and put forth his residence as security for the loan. Mr. Joseph Livesay was named

the trustee. The parties continued their trading arrangement for several years, but their

endeavors appear to have been largely unsuccessful. Between the years 2016 and 2020,

the parties lost approximately $210,342.

On March 10, 2023, Mr. Safaeih filed a “complaint for declaratory action” in the

Dyer County chancery court. Mr. Safaeih claimed that he never received the $50,000 loan

contemplated in the promissory note and sought to have the deed of trust set aside as void.

Mr. Alizadegan filed an answer in which he denied having failed to disburse the loan funds

and asserted a counterclaim seeking payment of the loan amount plus interest. He also

sought payment for 20% of the losses the parties sustained between 2016 and 2020.

A hearing was held on the matter on June 17, 2024, in which both parties were

represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the chancery court made oral

findings of fact and conclusions of law.1 The chancery court found that the promissory

note “was intended to be a loan so that the plaintiff could continue to play the stock

market.” The chancery court noted that this finding was “based on the testimony of . . .

Mr. Livesay.” The chancery court also found that Mr. Safaeih never received the loan funds

contemplated in the promissory note. Accordingly, it held the portion of the promissory

note that required repayment and interest was void due to a lack of consideration.

Likewise, the chancery court held that because “[t]he Deed of Trust [was] based on th[e]

part of the note that [was] not supported by consideration,” it was also void. However, the

chancery court found the portion of the promissory note that provided Mr. Safaeih “would

be responsible for 20 percent of any future stock market losses” was binding. Therefore,

as the evidence demonstrated that the parties had lost approximately $210,342 between

2016 and 2020, the chancery court held Mr. Safaeih owed Mr. Alizadegan $42,068.40.

The chancery court entered an order incorporating its oral findings of fact and conclusions

of law into its final order on July 2, 2024. The chancery court subsequently entered a

1

A full transcript of the hearing is not included in the record on appeal. However, a transcript of

the portion of the hearing during which the chancery court made its oral findings of fact and conclusions of

law is included in the technical record.

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written order in which it again held that the deed of trust and the portion of the promissory

note requiring repayment of the loan were “void and null” because the loan funds had never

been disbursed.2 It also held that the portion of the promissory note requiring Mr. Safaeih

to pay for 20% of any losses was binding, and Mr. Safaeih therefore owed Mr. Alizadegan

$42,068.40. Mr. Safaeih filed this appeal pro se.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

The appellant has presented a litany of issues on appeal. However, we have

condensed the appellant’s various arguments into the following two issues:

1. Whether the chancery court erred by admitting the testimony of Mr. Livesay as

evidence and by permitting him to review an unidentified document.

2. Whether the chancery court erred by holding that the promissory note applied to the

terms of the parties’ stock trading agreement.

For the following reasons, the judgment of the chancery court is affirmed.

III. DISCUSSION

To begin, we acknowledge that Mr. Safaeih is proceeding pro se in this appeal. A

pro se litigant is “entitled to fair and equal treatment by the courts.” Hessmer v. Hessmer,

138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Courts are to consider “that many pro se

litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial system.” Id.

Accordingly, a pro se litigant who is untrained in the law is granted “a certain amount of

leeway in drafting [his or her] pleadings and briefs.” Id. Therefore, we will scrutinize the

documents submitted by Mr. Safaeih “less stringent[ly]” than had they been submitted by

an attorney. Id. Courts are to “give effect to the substance, rather than the form or

terminology, of a pro se litigant’s papers.” Id. at 904. However, the balance of fairness

to the pro se litigant and the pro se litigant’s adversary must be maintained. Id. at 903.

These rules do not permit a pro se litigant “to shift the burden of the litigation to the courts

or to their adversaries.” Id. at 904. Further, “courts must not excuse pro se litigants from

complying with the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are

expected to observe.” Id. at 903.

2

When this appeal was filed, we determined that the written order did not comply with Tennessee

Rule of Procedure 58 because it was not signed by all parties and, instead, contained a hand-written

addendum, which appeared to be signed by Mr. Alizadegan’s counsel, stating it had been served upon Mr.

Safaeih’s counsel. It did not include a certificate of the clerk stating that it had been served on all parties

or counsel who did not sign the order. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58. We remanded the matter for entry of an

order compliant with Rule 58. Such an order was entered on February 24, 2025. It retained the same

substantive language as the initial version of the order but corrected the hearing date and included a

certificate of service demonstrating it had been served upon the parties and/or their attorneys.

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As this is a non-jury case, we review any findings of fact “de novo upon the record

of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless

the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); see In re Est. of

Fletcher, 538 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Tenn. 2017). “However, our review of the court’s legal

conclusions is de novo with no presumption of correctness.” Harris for Richey v. Richey,

No. M2021-00331-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 6054819, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2021)

(citing In re Est. of Fletcher, 538 S.W.3d at 448). Notably, “[w]e review the trial court’s

decision to admit or exclude evidence by an abuse of discretion standard.” Biscan v.

Brown, 160 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tenn. 2005). “A trial court abuses its discretion only when

it ‘applie[s] an incorrect legal standard, or reache[s] a decision which is against logic or

reasoning that cause[s] an injustice to the party complaining.’” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42

S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999))

(alterations present in original).

First, we consider Mr. Safaeih’s claim that the chancery court should not have

permitted Mr. Livesay to testify or review an unidentified document while doing so. He

claims that Mr. Livesay was a “surprise witness” and cites various federal criminal cases

in arguing his testimony was inadmissible. Unfortunately, our ability to address this issue

is hindered by Mr. Safaeih’s failure to include a transcript or statement of the evidence in

the record on appeal. As we have previously explained, Tennessee Rule of Appellate

Procedure 24(b) “provides that it is the duty of the appellant to prepare ‘a transcript of such

part of the evidence or proceedings as is necessary to convey a fair, accurate and complete

account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.’” Allen

v. Allen, No. W2010-00920-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 198516, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan.

12, 2011) (quoting Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b)). A transcript or statement of the evidence is

intended to set forth “a narrative record, prepared ‘from the best available means,’ of what

transpired in the lower court proceedings.” Id. (quoting Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c)). Tennessee

Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) provides “that where a transcript is not available, ‘the

appellant shall prepare a statement of the evidence’ which ‘should convey a fair, accurate

and complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of

appeal.’” Id. (quoting Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c)). “Consequently, in cases where no

transcript or statement of the evidence is filed, the appellate court is required to presume

that the record, had it been properly preserved, would have supported the action of the trial

court.” Id. (citing Reinhardt v. Neal, 241 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); Sherrod

v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 783, (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)).

“Moreover, in the absence of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we are left

with no means to review the trial court’s discretionary decisions regarding which witnesses

should be permitted to testify and on what topics, and which documents should be admitted

into evidence at trial.” Chandler v. Chandler, No. W2010-01503-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL

2393698, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2012). Accordingly, “[t]he failure of the appellant

to ensure that an adequate transcript or record on appeal is filed in the appellate court

constitutes an effective waiver of the appellant’s right to appeal.” Chiozza v. Chiozza, 315

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S.W.3d 482, 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). Here, Mr. Safaeih’s failure to include a statement

or transcript of evidence leaves us without the means necessary to review the chancery

court’s decisions to permit Mr. Livesay to testify and to read from an allegedly unidentified

document. Therefore, we must presume that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion,

and these decisions are affirmed.

Likewise, we are unable to conduct an effective review of Mr. Safaeih’s second

issue on appeal regarding the application of the promissory note. The chancery court’s

determination that the promissory note applied to the parties’ stock trading agreement was

based specifically “on the testimony of . . . Mr. Livesay.” As stated above, Mr. Safaeih has

not provided us with a transcript or statement of the evidence. As such, we cannot review

the testimony upon which the chancery court explicitly based this finding of fact. See

Sherrod, 849 S.W.2d at 783 (explaining that appellate courts “cannot review the facts de

novo without an appellate record containing the facts, and therefore,” the court was

required to “assume that the record, had it been preserved, would have contained sufficient

evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings”). Accordingly, Mr. Safaeih has

effectively waived this issue as well. See Chiozza, 315 S.W.3d at 492.

Mr. Safaeih attempted to explain his failure to include a transcript of the evidence.

He noted that Mr. Alizadegan hired a court reporter who recorded the proceedings. He

claimed that, after the proceedings had concluded, he attempted to purchase a copy of the

transcript from the reporting service but was informed that counsel for Mr. Alizadegan had

“den[ied] the purchase of a copy of the transcript.” While we recognize the inconvenience

that this caused Mr. Safaeih, it did not excuse him from filing a transcript or statement of

the evidence. His decision to not hire a court reporter or to seek to split the costs of one

prior to the hearing left him exposed to the risk that he would not have a verbatim record

of the proceedings. See Miller v. United Automax, 166 S.W.3d 692, 698 (Tenn. 2005) (“A

party who does not share in the per diem expense of a court reporter runs the risk of not

having a verbatim record available. This risk stems from the contractual relationship

created between the reporter and the payee.”) Likewise, Mr. Alizadegan was not obligated

to provide him with a transcript of the proceedings after the fact. See Beef N’ Bird of Am.,

Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 803 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (explaining that a party

who fails to aid in the hiring or payment of a court reporter has no contractual right to a

transcript of the record “which is therefore unavailable to him unless and until made

available to him on terms satisfactory to the stenographer and the party or parties who

engaged the stenographer”). Notably, the unavailability of a verbatim transcript did not

prevent Mr. Safaeih from instead filing a statement of the evidence. As explained above,

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) provides that:

[i]f no stenographic report, substantially verbatim recital or transcript of the

evidence or proceedings is available . . . and a statement of the evidence or

proceedings is a reasonable alternative to a stenographic report, the appellant

shall prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best

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available means, including the appellant’s recollection.

Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c). Accordingly, Mr. Safaeih could have created a statement of the

evidence based upon his own recollection of the hearing. He could have then filed the

statement with the chancery court and served Mr. Alizadegan with notice of the filing. Id.

Mr. Alizadegan would then have been free to raise any objections. Id. Instead, he filed a

notice of no transcript or statement of the evidence. As stated above, Mr. Safaeih’s failure

to submit a transcript or statement of the evidence leaves us unable to review his issues on

appeal. Therefore, we affirm.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the chancery court is affirmed. Costs of this

appeal are taxed to the appellant, Gholam Reza Safaeih, for which execution may issue if

necessary.

s/ Carma Dennis McGee

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE

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