Rotolo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LANCE ROTOLO CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 25-2213

ENERGY ERECTORS, INC. ET AL. SECTION “H”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. 10).

For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Lance Rotolo worked as a safety coordinator for Defendants

Mastec North America, Inc. (“Mastec”) and Energy Erectors, Inc. (“EEI”) from

October 2024 until he was terminated in August 2025. Plaintiff alleges that he

consistently worked in excess of 40 hours per week during his employment with

Defendants, but he was not paid overtime. He further alleges that he was

terminated in retaliation for raising concerns regarding overtime pay. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants Mastec, EEI, and his supervisor Miguel Gonzalez

violated his rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendants have moved to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims

pursuant to a mutual arbitration agreement that he executed in connection

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with his employment with Defendants (“the Arbitration Agreement”). Plaintiff

opposes.

LEGAL STANDARD

The question of arbitrability is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act

(“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., which broadly applies to any written provision in

“a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by

arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or

transaction.”1 A two-step analysis governs whether parties should be

compelled to arbitrate a dispute.2 The Court must first determine whether the

parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute.3 This determination involves two

separate inquiries: (1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between

the parties, and, if so, (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope

of that agreement.4 Both inquiries are generally guided by ordinary principles

of state contract law.5 The strong federal policy favoring arbitration applies

“when addressing ambiguities regarding whether a question falls within an

arbitration agreement’s scope,” but it does not apply “when determining

whether a valid agreement exists.”6 If the Court finds the parties agreed to

arbitrate, it must then proceed to the second step of the analysis and consider

whether any federal statute or policy renders the claims non-arbitrable.7

1 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

2 JP Morgan Chase & Co. v. Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596, 598 (5th Cir. 2007).

3 Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 2004).

4 Sherer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 548 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2008).

5 See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).

6 Sherer, 548 F.3d at 381.

7 Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 2002).

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LAW AND ANALYSIS

The parties do not dispute that there is a valid agreement to arbitrate

and that Plaintiff’s claims fall within the Arbitration Agreement’s scope.

Rather, Plaintiff opposes arbitration on two grounds: (1) Defendants are not

parties to the Arbitration Agreement; and (2) Plaintiff is exempt from

arbitration under the FAA’s transportation worker exemption. This Court will

consider each argument in turn

A. The Arbitration Agreement Binds Defendants

Plaintiff argues that Mastec and EEI cannot enforce the Arbitration

Agreement where they are not expressly identified therein and where they

have denied that Plaintiff has an employment relationship with MasTec, Inc.,

the only entity named in the Agreement. He further argues that Defendants

have failed to identify any theory by which they, as non-signatories, can enforce

the Arbitration Agreement. The Court finds these arguments to be unavailing

in light of the plain terms of the Agreement.

“[T]he question of ‘[w]ho is actually bound by an arbitration agreement

is [ultimately] a function of the intent of the parties, as expressed in the terms

of the agreement.’”8 Here, the Arbitration Agreement expressly states that it

“is between Employee and MasTec, Inc., including all MasTec, Inc. subsidiaries

(the “Company”).”9 Only Plaintiff signed the agreement, however, the

agreement states that “BY ISSUANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE

COMPANY AGREES TO BE BOUND TO ITS TERMS WITHOUT ANY

8 Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., 921 F.3d 522, 530–

31 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 355 (5th

Cir. 2003)).

9 Doc. 10-2.

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REQUIREMENT TO SIGN THIS AGREEMENT.”10 Accordingly, by the

Agreement’s plain terms, both Plaintiff and Defendants, who are subsidiaries

of MasTec, Inc., agreed to be bound by the Arbitration Agreement. Plaintiff has

not cited to any case law supporting his theory that EEI and Mastec cannot

enforce the Agreement because they are not specifically identified therein.

Further, the Agreement expressly binds Defendants, and therefore, they are

not non-signatories as Plaintiff suggests. Accordingly, the Court finds that

Defendants are parties to the Arbitration Agreement and can enforce its

terms.11

B. FAA Transportation Worker Exemption

Next, Plaintiff argues that he is exempt from arbitration under Section

1 of the FAA, which provides that the FAA does not “apply to contracts of

employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers

engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”12 The Supreme Court has

interpreted the residual clause to exempt only contracts of employment of

transportation workers.13 The Court has defined “a transportation worker” as

one who is “actively ‘engaged in transportation’ of . . . goods across borders via

10 Doc. 10-2. In addition, “[t]he FAA does not expressly impose a signature

requirement.” Soni v. Solera Holdings, L.L.C., No. 21-10428, 2022 WL 1402046, at *4 (5th

Cir. May 4, 2022); see Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir.

2005) (“[N]o signature is needed to satisfy the FAA’s written agreement requirement.”).

11 See Carrillo v. ROICOM USA, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1062 (W.D. Tex. 2020)

(holding that an arbitration agreement “binds ROICOM as an affiliated company of

ReadyOne” where the agreement defined “‘Company’ as ReadyOne as well as ‘affiliates or

related companies’ of ReadyOne”); Siefke v. Toyota Motor N. Am., Inc., No. 4:25-CV-406, 2025

WL 3461549, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2025) (holding CAS could compel arbitration where

terms of use expressly provided that “Toyota and its affiliates—including CAS—can compel

any dispute” to arbitration).

12 9 U.S.C. § 1.

13 Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).

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the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.”14 “To decide whether a worker

falls within Section 1’s residual category, the Supreme Court has instructed

that courts” to first identify the relevant “class of workers” to which the

plaintiff belongs and then determine “whether that class of workers is engaged

in foreign or interstate commerce.”15 An exempt worker “must at least play a

direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders.”16 The Court

has advised that the inquiry should focus on the work performed by the

employee rather than the industry of the employer.17

Plaintiff argues that his work with Defendants qualifies him as a

transportation worker. Plaintiff contends that as a Safety Coordinator, he

traveled between job sites across several states. As part of his job, he was

tasked with ensuring that the worksites were fully stocked with necessary

supplies, such as PPE. In doing so, he ordered supplies, received the ordered

goods, and then transported them across state lines in his vehicle to the

worksites he visited. Plaintiff argues that because he both initiated the flow of

goods in interstate commerce and transported those goods himself across state

lines, he is in the class of workers exempted by Section 1 of the FAA.

Defendants, on the other hand, cast Plaintiff’s work duties in a different

light. They argue that his primary duty was to conduct safety inspections at

their electric substation and construction sites and ensure that their

contractors were following safety protocols. They argue that his delivery of

14 Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U.S. 246, 256 (2024) (quoting

Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450, 458 (2022)).

15 George v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, No. CV 4:24-CV-1063-SDJ, 2025 WL 3143598,

at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2025) (quoting Saxon, 596 U.S. at 455).

16 Bissonnette, 601 U.S. at 56 (internal quotations omitted).

17 Saxon, 596 U.S. at 455.

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safety equipment when he visited worksites was incidental to his position and

was more in line with delivering the tools needed for a job. They point out that

Defendants are not in the business of selling PPE, and Plaintiff was therefore

not delivering to customers.

The Court finds that Plaintiff takes too broad a view of the

transportation worker exemption. The Supreme Court has advised that

Section 1 be afforded a narrow construction.18 While it is true that Plaintiff

moved goods across state borders, the Court cannot say that he played a direct

and necessary role in interstate commerce, like a railroad employee or

seaman.19 Plaintiff is in a class of workers who transports safety equipment

across state lines to their employer’s worksites. The goods are then used at

those worksites and do not continue to move through commerce. In Southwest

Airlines Co. v. Saxon, the Supreme Court found that workers “who load cargo

on and off airplanes” are transportation workers under Section 1 of the FAA.20

In so holding, the Court considered the employees involvement with the cargo

as it moved through interstate commerce and took into consideration “the

overall processes of the movement of goods.”21 Here, Plaintiff orders goods on

18 Bissonnette, 601 U.S. at 256.

19 See Rojas v. TK Commc'ns, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he exclusionary

clause of § 1 of the Arbitration Act should be narrowly construed to apply to employment

contracts of seamen, railroad workers, and any other class of workers actually engaged in the

movement of goods in interstate commerce in the same way that seamen and railroad

workers are.”) (quoting Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995);

George, 2025 WL 3143598, at *3 (“[T]he residual provision is restricted to a transportation

worker who performs work analogous to that of seamen and railroad employees, whose

occupations are centered on the transport of goods in interstate or foreign commerce.”)

(internal quotations omitted).

20 Saxon, 596 U.S. at 459.

21 Wolford v. United Coal Co. LLC, 764 F. Supp. 3d 329, 338 (W.D. Va. 2025).

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Defendants’ behalf for use by other employees of Defendants, transports those

goods to the employees, and they are utilized by the employees and cease to

reenter commerce. Under these facts, Defendants’ employees are the end

consumers of the goods, and Plaintiff is therefore not playing a role in the “free

flow of goods across borders.”22 Plaintiff’s work is easily distinguishable from

the cases in which courts found workers exempt. There, the workers were

actively involved in the transportation of merchandise, cargo, or people across

state lines.23 This Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s work was more

in line with transporting tools and supplies, which other courts have found

insufficient to qualify as a transportation worker under Section 1 of the FAA.24

22 Bissonnette, 601 U.S. at 256; see Immediato v. Postmates, Inc., 54 F.4th 67, 78 (1st

Cir. 2022) (“[T]he interstate movement terminated when the goods arrived at local

restaurants and grocery stores.”); Lopez v. Cintas Corp., 47 F.4th 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2022)

(“Once the goods arrived at the Houston warehouse and were unloaded, anyone interacting

with those goods was no longer engaged in interstate commerce.”).

23 See Saxon, 596 U.S. at 459 (holding that workers loading and unloading cargo on

airplanes were transportation workers); Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 916

(9th Cir. 2020) (holding that last leg delivery drivers were transportation workers despite not

crossing state lines where they complete the delivery of goods that Amazon has shipped

across state lines); Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 26 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[L]ast-

mile delivery workers who haul goods on the final legs of interstate journeys are

transportation workers ‘engaged in . . . interstate commerce,’ regardless of whether the

workers themselves physically cross state lines.”).

24 See Wolford, 764 F. Supp. 3d at 341 (“But Wolford’s crossing of the state line with

tools needed for his shift is not the same thing as an electrician delivering out-of-state light

fixtures to consumers. The repair parts and protective equipment are not goods to be

delivered to the purchasers of defendants’ coal products. They are incidental to his work as

an electrician ensuring the machinery is in working order.”); Reed v. LTN Glob. Commc’ns,

Inc., No. 1:24-CV-03649-JRR, 2025 WL 2653196, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 16, 2025) (holding that

Audio Specialist was not a transportation worker when he transported his own equipment

across state lines).

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Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff does not belong to a class of

transportation workers and is not exempt from arbitration under section 1 of

the FAA.

Plaintiff has not set forth any other arguments against compelling

arbitration of this matter. Accordingly, the Court finds arbitration is

appropriate where the parties had an Arbitration Agreement, Plaintiffs claims

fall within the Agreement’s scope, and Plaintiff has not identified any federal

statute or policy rendering the claims non-arbitrable. Defendant has asked the

Court to stay this matter pending arbitration. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3, the

Court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until

such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”

Accordingly, this matter must be stayed pending resolution of the arbitration

proceedings.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED, and this matter is

STAYED and ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED pending arbitration.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 2nd day of April, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE