Singh

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAPINDER SINGH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 6:26-cv-3171-MDH

)

CASS MARTIN, et. al., )

)

Respondents. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner has been detained by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and parole

has been terminated without prior written notice. Pending is his Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in which he argues federal statutes and the Due Process Clause require that he be released

or granted a hearing. The Court agrees with Petitioner’s Constitutional arguments, and on that

basis, it concludes the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Japinder Singh was born on August 29, 1998, in Kapurthala, Punjab, and is a native and

citizen of India. A member of the Sikh faith, he came to the United States on or about February 20,

2023, entering near Lukeville, Arizona. He was apprehended immediately, issued a Notice to

Appear, and released on his own recognizance that same day. Afterward, he settled in Avon,

Indiana, living with his uncle and trying to build a stable life. He has no criminal convictions, no

pending charges, and no history that would suggest he posed any criminal threat.

On April 11, 2023, Mr. Singh filed his Form I-589 Application for Asylum and for

Withholding of Removal. His claim stemmed from his political involvement in the Indian farmers’

protest movement and his membership in a particular social group, as well as his fear of torture if

returned. After the required waiting period, he received employment authorization and began

working as an Uber driver in an effort to support himself while his case moved through the system.

On April 23, 2025, the Indianapolis Immigration Judge denied his applications and issued

an order of removal. Mr. Singh appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, where the case

remains pending. No briefs have been filed by either side. The order is not final, and there is no

indication that his removal is imminent.

Despite the status of his appeal and prior release on his own recognizance, ICE agents

arrested him again — this time while he was simply working, driving for Uber in Indiana. He is

now detained in the Ozark County Jail in Gainesville, Missouri.

No bond hearing has ever been held. His appeal is pending. At the time of his arrest, he

was released on his own recognizance. He has not been advised of any change in his status by any

judge since that date. No immigration judge has evaluated whether he poses any danger or whether

he is likely to flee. For someone with a clean record, a pending appeal, and previous release, the

absence of even a basic individualized assessment leaves him in a system that has not afforded

him the fairness he should have been able to expect. Petitioner bases this writ on statutory and

Constitutional grounds under the Fifth Amendment.

While the statutory grounds upon which Petitioner relies has, for the past 29 years and five

presidential administrations, been interpreted to mean that he was entitled to a bond hearing during

his removal proceedings, the new presidential administration has adopted a novel interpretation of

that statutory scheme.

A divided panel of the 8th Circuit recently agreed with this administration’s interpretation,

in a decision still subject to rehearing, en banc rehearing, or appeal. At this time, however, this

Court is bound by the panel’s interpretation of the statutory scheme. So, given this change in long

standing statutory interpretation, this Court is left to analyze the writ on Constitutional grounds.

While on these facts, it is apparent to the Court that no process has been afforded to

Petitioner and he has been deprived of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, courts have typically

relied on a more detailed and contextualized analysis, and the Court will do so below.

DISCUSSION

“No person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

U.S. Const. amend. V. First, Japinder Singh is person. He is a person who was exercising the full

civil liberties awarded to him over three years ago. Those liberties were stripped by government

action. What is left for this Court to decide is whether he received due process of law in those

actions. Respondents claim issuance of a Notice to Appear satisfied Petitioner’s Due Process

rights.

Respondents claim Petitioner is treated as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2)(A), and therefore he is entitled to no process beyond the issuance of a Notice to Appear.

They contend they can detain him for an indefinite period of time without any opportunity for a

hearing. Respondents rely heavily on Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103

(2020) and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1714, 155 L. Ed. 2d 724 (2003).

However, these cases recognize limited procedural rights in the admission context, not the

detention context, and are factually distinct from the case at hand.

The petitioner in Thuraissigiam did not seek release from custody; he sought additional

review of his asylum claim. The Court expressly noted that “the legality of his detention is not in

question.” Id. at 122. Petitioner here does not ask this Court to admit him or to alter his immigration

status, so the only holding in Thuraissigiam is inapposite. Here, Petitioner seeks only what due

process requires: an opportunity to have his custody reviewed.

The facts in Thuraissigiam are distinct from the facts of the present case. The petitioner

there was apprehended “25 yards” inside the United States, effectively at the border. Id. at 139. By

contrast, Mr. Singh has lived in the United States for three years after release on his own

recognizance by DHS. He was arrested while working under his employment authorization as an

Uber driver in Indiana.

These distinctions are dispositive and Thuraissigiam is inapposite. A lengthy discussion of

the plenary power to control which individuals outside the United States may be permitted to enter

is not the relevant question here. The issue here is whether the United States can suddenly and

indefinitely detain a three-year resident with a valid employment authorization that was previously

released on his own recognizance and pursuing asylum.

The court in Demore did not discuss detention of all noncitizens, it explicitly discussed

“detention during removal proceedings for a limited class of deportable aliens” who had committed

serious crimes. Id. at 518. It found that mandatory detention under §1226(c) was constitutionally

permissible for the specific subset of people Congress listed including aggravated felons who had

already had their Due Process rights during their criminal proceedings. Id. at 510. The court in

Demore did not rule out Constitutional challenges for people like Petitioner who have no criminal

convictions or other factors which mandate classification under §1226(c). Demore does not

preclude Petitioner’s Due Process claim.

Due Process Analysis

"Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of

physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Due Process] Clause protects." Zadvydas

v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001). Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental

decisions which deprive individuals of “liberty” or “property” interests within the meaning of the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

The Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s Due Process rights are

limited solely to the issuance of a Notice to Appear. Under Mathews, Due Process is “flexible”

and:

identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires

consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected

by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest

through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including

the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional

or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 (emphasis added).

Private Interest

Undoubtedly, the private interest at stake here “is the most elemental of liberty interests—

the interest in being free from physical detention[.]” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124

S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004). Petitioner has been held in a county jail—in conditions

indistinguishable from criminal incarceration. He is unable to return to his family and the life he

has created over the last 3 years. Every day that passes under this unlawful detention is a day that

cannot be recovered. See Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (first Mathews

factor strongly satisfied where petitioner was "locked up in jail" and "could not maintain

employment or see his family or friends or others outside normal visiting hours").

Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

After the Fifth Circuit’s ruling on interpretation of the statutory arguments in this case, the

court in Alfonzo-Mujiuca v. Thompson, Case No. SA-26-CA-00457-XR (W.D. Tx. 03/13/2026)

found that the risk of erroneous deprivation of petitioners’ rights in these cases is high. The Court

found:

Our immigration law has long recognized that noncitizens have an interest in an

individualized hearing prior to detention in connection with immigration

proceedings. See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101. And the Supreme Court has

required individualized hearings for deprivations of interests less fundamental

than Petitioner's interest in freedom from detention. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397

U.S. 254, 268 (1970) (requiring an individualized hearing prior to the

termination of welfare benefits). Here, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of

Petitioner's rights is high. Without an individualized hearing, there is substantial

risk that noncitizens with a substantial presence in the United States who pose

neither flight risk nor danger to the community will be detained. An

individualized assessment before an immigration judge substantially reduces

this risk. Cf Demore, 538 U.S. at 531-32 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reasoning

that "due process requires individualized procedures to ensure there is at least

some merit to the" charge and detention). An individualized analysis ensures the

purpose of detention is not punitive.

Alfonzo-Mujiuca at 23.

“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews at 333. Petitioner’s continued detention

without an opportunity to be heard is the type of erroneous deprivation Mathews intends to stop.

The basis for his detention and sudden unexplained revocation of his prior release requires, and

deserve, a hearing. Nothing in the record shows Petitioner poses a danger or flight risk. He has

lived in the United States for over 3 years and has complied with his employment authorization

and prior release. He has no criminal convictions, no pending criminal charges, and no criminal

history of any kind.

Balancing of Interests

The final factor directs the Court to weigh the private interests at stake and the risk of

erroneous deprivation of those interests against Respondents’ interests in persisting with the

regulation, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of an additional or substitute procedural

requirement. Mathews at 335. The government identifies no interest in detaining Petitioner based

on danger, flight risk, or obstruction of removal. A bond hearing would not undermine immigration

enforcement; it would ensure that detention is exercised lawfully and in accordance with the

Constitution. Here, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without Due Process is

minimal.

In sum, the Mathews factors weigh in favor of Petitioner, and the court finds that his

continued detention violates his Due Process rights. Petitioner shall be immediately released.

Release is the customary remedy in habeas proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (the habeas shall

"dispose of the matter as law and justice require."); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,484 (1973)

(finding "that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody").

Additionally, ordering a bond hearing under these circumstances would require the Immigration

Judge to do that which he believes he lacks authority to do following Matter of Yajure Hurtado,

29 I&N Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 2025), and would be futile.

No bond hearing has ever been held. The immigration courts have concluded that there is

no jurisdiction to conduct a bond hearing in these cases. DHS provides no alternative mechanism

for individualized custody review. Petitioner has no forum, administrative or judicial, through

which he may seek release based on his circumstances. This is not minimal process. It is zero

process. Respondents’ position, that no such process is required, cannot be reconciled with the

Fifth Amendment.

Attorneys’ Fees

Petitioner requests an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Pursuant to the EAJA,

a court shall award to a prevailing party fees and other expenses incurred by that party in any civil

action, brought by or against the United States, unless the court finds that the position of the United

States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C §

2412(d)(1)(A). To be eligible for fees under the EAJA, a petitioner must submit an application

within thirty days of final judgment, and the petitioner's net worth must be less than two million

dollars at the time the civil action was filed. See id. §§ (d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(B)(i). The EAJA was

enacted with the purpose of removing the financial disincentive for individuals challenging or

defending against government action and encouraging challenges to improper government action

as a means of helping formulate better public policy. See, e.g., Comm'r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S.

154, 163 (1990) (“[T]he specific purpose of the EAJA is to eliminate for the average person the

financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions.” (citation omitted));

Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1114 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The EAJA was passed partly to encourage

challenges to improper actions by government agencies. The drafters perceived legal actions as

helping to formulate public policy.” (citations omitted)).

As explained throughout, the Court finds the position of the United States is not

substantially justified. Respondents’ assertion that Petitioner’s procedural Due Process rights are

limited solely to the issuance of a Notice to Appear is misguided. Thus, Petitioner may pursue an

award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act.

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes Petitioner’s right to procedural due process has been violated, and he

is entitled to immediate release. Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is

GRANTED as follows.

1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody.

2. Respondents shall make accommodations available for Petitioner until such time as

arrangements can be made for Petitioner to be returned to the location of arrest or other

location agreed by the parties.

3. Petitioner shall promptly report to the Court any failure to comply with this Order by

Respondent.

4. Petitioner may submit an application for fees under the EAJA within thirty days of the

entry of final judgment.

5. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are enjoined from relocating Petitioner

outside the jurisdiction of this Court prior to compliance with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 9, 2026

/s/ Douglas Harpool

DOUGLAS HARPOOL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE