Camara

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

OUSMANE CAMARA, : No. 3:26cv292

Petitioner :

: (Judge Munley)

V. :

CRAIG LOWE, in his official capacity :

as Warden, Pike County Correctional :

Facility; KRIST] NOEM, in her :

official capacity as Secretary, U.S. :

Department of Homeland Security; — :

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND :

SECURITY; and PAMELA BONDI, :

U.S. Attorney General, :

Respondents :

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the court is Ousmane Camara’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petition asserts that Camara has been

misclassified under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), that his due process rights have

been violated, and that he is entitled to immediate release. After reviewing

Camara’s circumstances on an individual basis, the court will reach the same

result as it has on several prior occasions with other petitioners. '

1 Federal district courts are authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 224°

where the petitioner is detained “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Camara filed the instant petition while he was detained within

the jurisdiction of this court, and he is still currently in ICE custody within this court’s

jurisdiction. Petitioner asserts that his continued detention violates his right to due process.

Petitioner left the Islamic Republic of Mauritania in June 2023 for the Unitec

States.2, He was a farmer in a small village with his family. During the dry

seasons he went to the capital city, Nouakchott, to find work. He worked many

jobs. In 2022, while in Nouakchott, a friend helped him to get a job as a security

agent at a hotel. While working security at a private event, the event was

interrupted by the police, who took all partygoers into custody, including security

staff. The police accused them all of homosexuality. For a two-hour shift,

Camara spent three days at a police station where he was brutally beaten.

In Mauritania, homosexuality is a capital offense. The Mauritanian

government believes that Camara is homosexual. Camara asserts that the

accusation is false. According to Camara, that fact no longer matters based on

the beliefs and norms in his home country.

Eventually, a relative paid off the jailers and petitioner was released from

the Nouakchott prison, but it was on conditions that he had to check in with police

every two weeks. Camara returned to his village. He subsequently experienced

issues with a white Arab neighbor—a Beidane—who accused the petitioner of

He also asserts that the wrong provision of the INA is being used to justify his potentially

indefinite detention. Thus, the court has habeas jurisdiction over Camara’s petition. Rumsfeld

v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004).

2 These facts are derived from Camara’s petition, (Doc. 1), his application for asylum and

withholding of removal, (Doc. 1-2), and from the administrative records provided by the

respondents in opposition to the petition, (Docs. 4-1 to 4-8).

killing his camel, also untrue. Camara believes his neighbors can now murder

him with impunity based on such false accusations.

These events caused Camara to leave his village and his family behind.

He flew to Turkey to Colombia to El Salvador and then to Nicaragua. He

travelled by bus from Nicaragua through Honduras and Guatemala before

reaching Mexico. Once inside Mexico, men that looked like police officers

boarded the bus and demanded to be paid; otherwise, Camara believes he

would have been killed. Consequently, it appears that petitioner entered the

United States by paying human traffickers.

On June 18, 2023, United States Border Patrol encountered Camara near

the border town of Lukeville, Arizona. He spent approximately 45 days in

custody at that time. On August 1, 2023, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”) released the petitioner on his own recognizance through a grant of parole

Camara made his way to New York and then to Philadelphia. On March 29,

2024, United States Customs and Immigration Services accepted the petitioner's

application for asylum and withholding of removal. Camara obtained

employment at a McDonalds inside a Walmart in the Philadelphia area. He was

also working as a food delivery driver through DoorDash.

During a routine check-in in August 2025, ICE agents re-detained Camara.

He was charged with being present in the United States without admission or

parole under Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and for not

being in possession of a valid entry document at the time of his application for

admission under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).°. United States Citizenship and

Immigration Services (“USCIS”) administratively closed his asylum application for

lack of jurisdiction because, as of now, his fear claim must be decided by an

immigration judge (“lJ”). Consequently, Camara has been in immigration

detention at the Pike County Correctional Facility (“PCCF”), a county jail, for just

over six months.4

In the United States of America, the root principle of the writ of habeas

corpus—the Great Writ—“is that in a civilized society, government must always

be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment

cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the

individual is entitled to his immediate release.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402,

(1963).

Camara’s detention is the product of a revised policy under which

individuals present in the United States without admission are treated as

applicants for admission subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §

3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), (a)(7)(A)(i)(I).

4 An lJ denied Camara’s request for a bond hearing, citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. &N.

Dec. 216, 228 (BIA 2025) and Matter of Q. Li, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025). (Doc. 4-7).

Although Camara has appealed that determination to the Board of Immigration Appeals,

(“BIA”), that appeal appears to be futile based on Hurtado. (Doc. 4, Resp. at 13).

1225(b)(2)(A) rather than discretionary detention under § 1226(a). Because

Camara is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), according to the

respondents, he is ineligible for a bond hearing.

This case, like many others before it, turns on whether 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) applies to the petitioner. There is no decision of the

Supreme Court or the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to guide the analysis.° Most

district court decisions to address the issue hold that individuals like Camara are

not subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A), including by the

jurists in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.® The issues have been

approached from just about every angle possible. Most reach the same

conclusion, and the undersigned will not deviate from that majority view.

Camara’s detention under that statute violates the INA and due process.

Therefore, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be granted. Camara will

be ordered released.

Briefly, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides: “in the case of an alien who is an

applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an

5 A split panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with the respondents’ view of

Section 1225. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). The dissentinc

opinion is more persuasive. ia. at 508-21 (Douglas, J.).

6 See Meeran v. Rose, No. 3:26CV187, 2026 WL 540379, at *2 n.3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2026)

(collecting cases); Chaudhari v. Rose, No. 3:26-CV-242, 2026 WL 540378, at *4n.4 (M.D. Pa

Feb. 26, 2026) (collecting cases).

alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted

the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Individuals detained under Section 1225 are not entitled

to a bond hearing. See Jennings v. Rodriquez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018) (Alito,

J., plurality op.) (“And neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything

whatsoever about bond hearings.”).

“Applicant for Admission” — Section 1225(a)(1) provides that “[a]n alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted (whether or not at a

designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United

States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters)

shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 8

U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Definitionally, all unadmitted persons, including Camara,

are “applicants for admission.”

“Alien Seeking Admission” — Unlike “applicant for admission,” the phrase

“alien seeking admission” is not defined in Section 1225. Under the view

adopted by the government every “applicant for admission” is an “alien seeking

admission.” This would subject all unadmitted aliens to mandatory detention

without bond whether they are located at the border or have spent months or

years living in the interior. Under that reading, “for purposes of immigration

detention, the border is now everywhere.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 520

(Douglas, J., dissenting op.).

In contrast, the consensus district court view is that the phrase “alien

seeking admission” does independent work and requires “active and ongoing

conduct, such as physically attempting to come into the United States at a border

or port of entry[,]” Quispe v. Rose, No. 3:25-CV-2276, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025

WL 3537279, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025) (Mehalchick, J.) (citations omitted),

and does not apply to “noncitizens like [p]etitioner who have resided in the Unitec

States for years[,]’ Patel v. O’Neil, No. 3:25-CV-2185, 2025 WL 3516865 at *5

(Mariani, J.) (citations omitted).

As these district court cases and the Buenrostro-Mendez dissent have

recognized, to adopt the government’s position would, inter alia, negate the plain

meaning of the text, ignore context and history, violate the rule against

surplusage, and render the mandatory detention of “criminal aliens” under

Section 1226(c) (as expanded last year by the Laken Riley Act) as arising from a

redundant statutory provision. See Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *5 (citing Centenc

lbarra v. Warden of the Fed. Det. Ctr. Philadelphia, No. CV 25-6312, 2025 WL

3294726, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025) (Rufe, J.)); Busenrostro-Mendez, 166

F.4th at 509-16 (Douglas, J., dissenting op.).

Here, Camara was residing in the United States for approximately two

years when he was re-arrested and re-detained. Consequently, a reading of

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) against petitioner's circumstances reflects that this statute

does not apply to him. “[T]he difference in treatment between a noncitizen at the

border and one already in the United States fits within the broader context of our

immigration law.” Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th

1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025).

At this point, Camara’s detention would be governed by Section 1226(a).

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (Alito, J., plurality op.). Section 1226(a) “sets out the

default rule: The Attorney General may issue a warrant for the arrest and

detention of an alien ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed

from the United States.’ ” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). Pending such

decision, the Attorney General may: 1) “continue to detain the arrested alien’;

and 2) “may release the alien on...bond of at least $1,500 with security approved

by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General;

or...conditional parolef.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2); see also 8 C.F.R. §§

1003.19, 1236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(d)(1). “At a bond hearing, a noncitizen ‘may

secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he

poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.’ ” Quispe, 2025 WL

3537279, at *6 (quoting Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397-98 (2019)).

Camara, however, will be released. He enjoys the protections of the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673

(2025). Whether Camara’s continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)

violates procedural due process requires a consideration of: 1) the private

interest that will be affected by the official action; 2) the risk of an erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if

any, of additional procedural safeguards; and 3) the government's interest,

including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute

procedures would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

Each factor favors Camara. First, his private interest is the interest in not

being physically detained by the government, which “is the most elemental of

liberty interests[.]” Hamdiv. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). “The restrictior

of liberty is particularly acute here where, absent a bond hearing, he would be

detained for months or even years while his case proceeds.” Cunin v. McShane,

No. 3:25-CV-1887, 2025 WL 3542999, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025) (Neary, J.)

(citation omitted). Second, he has been detained erroneously under Section

1225(b) without any apparent procedural safeguards, including the ability to

obtain a bond hearing. See id. (“There is a certainty—not merely a risk—that the

failure to grant [petitioner] a bond hearing would unlawfully deprive him of the

opportunity to make the case for his release and incarcerate him indefinitely.”);

see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *6 (citing Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, No. 25-

CV-16200, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2976572, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025);

Quispe, 2025 WL 3537279, at *7 (citations omitted). Third, the government's

interest in detaining noncitizens “to ensure the appearance of aliens at future

immigration proceedings and to prevent danger to the community” ts important,

but there is no indication that Camara is a convicted criminal or engaged in any

criminal activity. See Quispe, 2025 WL 3537279, at *7. In response to the

petition, the government has not provided any information suggesting that

Camara is a danger to the community or a flight risk. Upon entry to this country,

the government released the petitioner on his own recognizance. That will

happen again today.

Habeas courts “have the power to order the conditional release of an

individual unlawfully detained—though release need not be the exclusive remedy

and is not the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted.”

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008). Camara’s continued detention

without bond under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) violates his due process rights.

Therefore, respondents shall immediately release Camara from their custody

because he was unlawfully detained without the opportunity for a bond hearing.’

’ To the extent that Craig Lowe, Warden of Pike CCF is the only proper respondent in this

matter, Lowe is acting as an agent of ICE and the government will be bound by the order. See

Vadel v. Lowe, No. 3:25-CV-02452, 2025 WL 3772059, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2025).

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See Kashranov v. Jamison, No. 2:25-CV-05555-JDW, 2025 WL 3188399, at *8

(E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (Wolson, J).

Furthermore, the respondents, including DHS and ICE will be permanently

enjoined from re-detaining Camara under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id.

Respondents will be temporarily enjoined from re-arresting Camara for a period

of 14 days to ensure that this habeas remedy is effective. Id. Respondents,

including ICE, may not impose any other restrictions on Camara’s release,

including any form of body-worn electronic monitoring. Camara may move to

reopen this matter if the government later seeks to detain him under Section

1226(a) and fails to schedule ae hearing.®

Accordingly, on this ) day of March 2026, it is hereby ORDERED

that:

1) Ousmane Camara’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, (Doc. 1), Is

GRANTED;

8 Camara request for attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2412 is not yet ripe for disposition. The Third Circuit recently confirmed that a habea

proceeding challenging immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is a “civil action” for

purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), and that the

EAJA “unambiguously applies to habeas challenges to immigration detention under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241.” Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Cor, Ci, No. 24-2990, 2026 WL 263483, at

*1-2, *10 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2026). Camara will tnus ‘be permitted to file a motion for costs and

fees pursuant to the EAJA within 30 days of the entry of judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B);

Villa Hernandez v. Kunes, No. 1:25-CV-01847, 2026 WL 411726, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13,

2026) (Wilson, J.).

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2) Respondents shall immediately release Camara from their custody;

3) Within 48 hours, respondents shall file a declaration or affidavit pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1746 confirming that Camara has been released;

4) Respondents shall release Camara under the same conditions that existed

prior to his detention, including, release: (1) within the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania; (2) without the imposition of additional conditions (Such as

ankle monitors or electronic tracking devices); (3) with all clothing and

outerwear worn at the time of the detention or other appropriate attire; and

(4) with all personal property, including, but not limited to, any driver's

license, passport, immigration documents, currency, or cell phone that was

seized at the time of detention and that is currently in their custody,

possession, or control, whether maintained directly by respondents or by

any contracted or affiliated facility;

5) Respondents are permanently enjoined from re-detaining Camara under 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A);

6) Respondents are temporarily enjoined from re-arresting Camara for a

period of 14 days to ensure that this habeas remedy is effective;

7) Should respondents detain Camara pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),

petitioner may move to reopen this matter if the government fails to

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schedule a timely bond hearing in which an IJ assesses whether he poses

a flight risk or a danger to the community;

8) Camara may file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal

Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 within thirty (30) days of the date

of this order; and

9) The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

BY THE GOURT: (7

A 2 \

JUDGEJUYLIA K. MU □

United States Distri

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