Jasper

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALLISON BRIDGET JASPER CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-401

PLAQUEMINES PARISH SECTION “B” (3)

GOVERNMENT, ET AL

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are defendant Plaquemines Parish Government’s (“PPG”) Motion for

Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 14), plaintiff Allison Bridget Jasper’s (“Jasper”) Opposition (Rec.

Doc. 15), and PPG’s Reply (Rec. Doc. 16). Also before the Court are Jasper’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 26), PPG’s Opposition (Rec. Doc. 31), and Jasper’s Reply (Rec.

Doc. 32). For the following reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 14) on Jasper’s

federal claims be GRANTED and that Jasper’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 26) on

her federal claims be DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that remaining state law claims are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, by declining supplemental jurisdiction over same. See 28 U.S.C. §

1367 (c)(3) (stating that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction); see also Parker

& Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Our general rule

is to dismiss state law claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed.”).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2020, PPG’s financial resources were strained by the COVID-19 pandemic. Rec. Doc.

14-2 at 1. Facing a backlog of $3,029,522 in outstanding state court judgments and the need to

address the operational expenses of parish government, in October 2020, PPG passed Ordinance

20-105 which instituted a program called the Judgment Settlement Process (“JSP”) to pay and

resolve judgments against it. Id. The program allows claimants to receive a quicker payout if they

accept a 50% reduction of the value of their judgment against PPG. Rec. Doc. 14-4 at 2. A claimant

can choose to opt out of the JSP and instead insist on full payment of their judgments; however,

PPG will prioritize claimants who participate in the JSP while still acknowledging the existence

of the debt owed to claimants who choose not to participate. Rec. Doc. 14-2.

On April 13, 2022, the 25th Judicial District Court rendered a judgment against PPG in

favor of Jasper in the amount of $782,237.29. Rec. Doc. 14-2 at 2. PPG invited Jasper to participate

in the JSP in order to expedite the payment of her judgment. Id. Jasper has declined this offer

repeatedly. Id. Jasper states that she has outstanding medical bills in excess of $250,000.000 and

is contracted to give her attorneys no less than 40% of the judgment award pursuant to a

contingency fee agreement. Rec. Doc. 1 at 5. Because of these facts, Jasper states that accepting

the JSP offer is an impossibility because the amount she would be entitled to under the JSP is

significantly less than her litigation expenses and the mechanics liens she has on the award. Id.

Jasper also states that the Parish has not specified a timeframe for when the balance of her

judgment would be paid. Id. She claims that “[i]t is only recently that [she] learnt that her wait was

in vain and that she had zero chance of getting paid unless she participated in the Judgment

Settlement Process.” Id. at 6. She further claims that PPG has a policy and practice of paying only

those claimants that participate in the JSP. Id. at 6–7. However, as discussed during oral argument

held on March 26, 2026, plaintiff’s judgment does not expire or become uncollectible, subject

perhaps only to certification under state law every 10 years.

PPG states that JSP participants have been paid for the calendar years 2022–2025,

diminishing the number of outstanding judgment creditors since 2020 from 36 to 11. Rec. Doc.

14-2 at 2.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jasper sued PPG on February 26, 2025. Rec. Doc. 1. She alleges that PPG’s policy “is to

have people participate in the Judgement Settlement Process or not pay them at all.” Id. at 6. She

notes that she has not been paid and that she has “zero chance” of being paid unless she becomes

a JSP participant. Id. She brings several claims against PPG and unnamed government defendants,

including taking her property without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment; inflicting

cruel and unusual punishment for refusing to pay the state court judgment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment; subjecting her to disparate treatment by refusing to pay non-JSP participants in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; a “color of law” claim pursuant to Section 1983; a civil

conspiracy claim against PPG and unnamed government employees; negligence in their handling

of the JSP process; tortious conduct for violating a duty to pay her. Id. at 9–27. She also requests

punitive damages and expenses of litigation and attorneys’ fees. Id.

On February 12, 2026, the parties attended a scheduling conference to discuss ongoing

legal issues and prepare for trial. Rec. Doc. 23. Pursuant to that pretrial conference, the Court

ordered Jasper to file a cross motion for summary judgment addressing only her federal

constitutional issues rather than her state law claims. Id. Defendants were ordered to respond to

Jasper’s motion for summary judgment, as well as to attach to their opposition affidavits

addressing (1) settled claims, if any, that are paid without being subjected to the JSP and (2) all

payments, if any, to non-participants of the JSP since the effective day of the ordinance

establishing that program. Id. The Court also ordered the parties to attend an oral argument about

the cross motions for summary judgment on March 11, 2026, which the Court later moved to

March 26, 2026. Id; see also Rec. Doc. 30. Jasper has filed her motion for summary judgment.

Rec. Dc. 26. PPG has responded and attached to its response the requested affidavits. See Rec.

Doc. 31.

At the oral argument, the Court asked plaintiff’s counsel to distinguish several cases

identified as applicable here, including the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in

Cooper v. Orleans Parish School Board, 99-0050 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/9/99), 742 So.2d 55, in which

the court found no Equal Protection violation in a school board program that established a

hierarchy or priority system for the payment of state court tort judgments because of insufficient

funding; and the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Ariyan v. Sewarage & Water Board of New Orleans,

29 F.4th 226 (5th Cir. 2022), in which the court, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Folsom v.

City of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883), held that a government entity’s failure to timely pay a

state court judgment does not constitute a Fifth Amendment violation. Plaintiff’s counsel argued

that the challenged discounts in Cooper were in increments of five or ten percent and that claimants

had the option to choose by how much they wanted to discount their state court judgment, as

opposed to the categorical fifty percent reduction challenged in the above-captioned matter.

Plaintiff’s counsel also attempted to distinguish the above-captioned matter from Ariyan by aruing

that the ordinance creating the JSP is “completely silent” as to creditors who do not opt in and

provides no mechanism or plan that would make payment foreseeable to that class of claimants.

Plaintiff’s counsel also acknowledged during oral argument that no summary judgment

evidence was introduced supporting Jasper’s causes of action or disputing PPG’s arguments. When

confronted with PPG’s affidavits, plaintiff’s counsel could not contest the information contained

therein or show that such information was fasle. Plaintiff’s counsel also conceded that Jasper’s

Eighth Amendment claim should have been framed as a First Amendment retaliation claim

and argued that the basis for that claim was that PPG was in effect punishing claimants who

exercised their First Amendment rights by refusing to pay them without participating in the JSP.

During their argument, defense counsel highlighted that Jasper is seeking to expand the

litigation by adding federal claims that were not included in her complaint. Defense counsel also

argued that the point of amendment had passed and that Jasper had not shown good cause for filing

an amended complaint. Further, defense counsel continued to highlight that Jasper had not

introduced any evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact.

In response to whether PPG could have considered other payment plans, defense counsel

stated that there was no evidence in the record about this topic, n o r a n y suggestion that

PPG chose not to accept more reasonable alternatives. Counsel added that Ordinance

20-105 is silent about the COVID-19 pandemic and that the reasons justifying the JSP continue

to be financial inability to pay full value of claims in relevant years after the pandemic’s end.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers,

and admissions, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Material in support or opposition of a

motion for summary judgment may be considered if it is “capable of being ‘presented in a form

that would be admissible in evidence.’” LSR Consulting, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 835 F.3d

530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). Courts view all

facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but “refrain from making

credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide

Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008).

Where the movant bears the burden of proof, it must “demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact” using competent summary judgment evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

However, “where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point

to an absence of evidence.” Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994).

Should the movant meet its burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must show by

“competent summary judgment evidence” that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Lindsey, 16

F.3d at 618. Accordingly, conclusory rebuttals of the pleadings are insufficient to avoid summary

judgment. Bargher v. White, 928 F.3d 439, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2019). Additionally, “conclusory

allegations, denials, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, speculation, and legalistic

argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine factual issue for

trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). There is no genuine issue of

material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no

reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-moving party, thus entitling the moving party to

judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Amedisys, 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002).

B. Analysis

i. PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment

It should be noted at the outset that there are no genuine disputes of material fact. Jasper

has not introduced into the record any evidence in support of her claims or to create a material

factual dispute. As established at the February 2026 pretrial conference and March 2026 oral

argument, Jasper had not engaged in any discovery in furtherance of her claims against PPG.

Jasper raises the following claims: (1) an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth

Amendment; (2) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (3)

discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Rec. Doc. 1. The Court can

immediately dispose of Jasper’s Eighth Amendment claim. The Eighth Amendment applies to

punishments, and typically punishments inflicted pursuant to the criminal process. See, e.g.,

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664–668 (1977). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part

test for determining whether a legislative act constitutes punishment: (1) whether the intention of

the legislature was to impose punishment and, if not (2) whether the statutory scheme is so punitive

either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it ‘civil.’” Smith v. Doe,

538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). Jasper posits in her complaint that “requiring her to give up half the face

value of her judgment as well as waive statutory additions is a form of punishment subject to

scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards” but does not develop this argument in her

opposition to PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in her own Motion for Summary

Judgment. See Rec. Docs. 15, 26. In fact, Further, the Eighth Amendment claim does not relate to

a First Amendment violation. As such, PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment in seeking

dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim is GRANTED.

Jasper further claims a deprivation of property, in violation of the Fifth Amendment,

because of PPG’s refusal to pay her money pursuant to the state court judgment she received.

Rec. Doc. 1 at 9. She clarifies that PPG deliberately withheld all payments to force her to

relinquish half the value of her state court judgment, rather than for neutral reasons. Rec. Doc.

15 at 5. But Jasper does not provide evidence counter to PPG's financial instability. She

conclusively states that whether PPG’s actions were “rational, arbitrary, or coercive presents a

classic factual dispute” but does not develop that argument with evidentiary support. Id.

Moreover, Jasper’s arguments are foreclosed by existing precedent. Over a century ago,

the Supreme Court decided a similar case in Folsom v. City of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883).

In that case, relators who had obtained state court judgments against the City of New Orleans were

prevented from collecting on their judgments because of a new state constitution which restricted

New Orleans’ ability to impose taxes and limited funds to the city’s existing expenses. 109 U.S.

at 287. In rejecting the relators’ Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court held that

though the relators’ state court judgments were property, they “cannot be said to be deprived of

them so long as they continue an existing liability against the city” rather than an immediate right

to payment. Id. at 289. That principle has been consistently maintained in subsequent decisions,

see, e.g., Minton v. St. Bernard Par. Sch. Bd., 803 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that a

school board’s failure to timely pay plaintiff’s judgment is not a denial of due process because

Folsom recognized that “the property right created by a judgment against a government entity is not

a right to payment at a particular time” but merely recognition of existing debt); see also Ariyan,

Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2022) (rejecting

plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for similar reasons). Similarly, while Jasper has an

outstanding and valid state court judgment, she does not have a right to force PPG to

immediately pay that judgment, but only for PPG to continue to recognize its existing debt to

her—which it has. As such, PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Jasper’s Fifth Amendment

claim is GRANTED.

Jasper also appears to assert Equal Protection claims in violation of the Fouteenth

Amendment. Rec. Doc. 1. She challenges the classification that the Ordinance creates between

persons who participate in the JSP, and receive payment, and those who refuse to participate in the

JSP, and do not receive any payment or a payment schedule. Id. at 6, 27. She argues that her claim

is not about delay but instead intentional discrimination. Rec. Doc. 15 at 5. However, in opposing

PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Jasper has not identified a suspect class or explained

whether the JSP or its administration infringes upon a fundamental right. Id. As such, the

appropriate standard for reviewing discriminatory conduct is “rational basis review” which is more

deferential to government classifications. See, e.g., Cooper v. Orleans Parish School Board, 99-

0050 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/8/99), 742 So. 2d 55.

Jasper acknowledges that rational basis review applies, see Rec. Doc. 15 at 5, but states

that rational basis does not permit summary judgment where “evidence supports a finding of

intentional and disparate treatment lacking a legitimate governmental justification.” Id. However,

there is no factual or legal support for a finding of “intentional and disparate treatment lacking a

legitimate governmental justification.” She relies on an allegation that she was treated differently

without legitimate justification. But merely pointing to allegations is not sufficient in opposing

summary judgment. See, e.g., Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 85 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007)

(“The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a genuine fact issue for trial;

however, the nonmovant may not rest upon allegations in the pleadings to make such a showing.”).

She has not introduced evidence—and therefore has not created a genuine dispute of material

fact—that PPG’s enactment of the Ordinance and reliance on classifications between participants

and non-participants in the program, is not rationally related to its fiscal goals .

In fact, the program challenged here is like the one in Cooper v. Orleans Parish School

Board, 99-0050 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/8/99), 742 So. 2d 55, in which the court denied plaintiffs’ Equal

Protection challenge to the Orleans Parish School Board’s program to delay payments to certain

state court judgment creditors because of insufficient funding. That court noted that legislation “is

presumed to be valid, and will be sustained as long as the classification drawn by the statute is

rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” 742 So. 3d at 59. The Cooper court held that it

could not “say that there is no rational basis for the discount categorizations related to legitimate

government objectives.” Id. at 62. Subsequent decisions have continually relied on Cooper in

rejecting challenges wherein plaintiff demands a quicker payout of their state court judgment. See,

e.g., Bennett v. City of New Orleans, No. CIV.A 03-912, 2004 WL 60316, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 9.

2004) (applying Cooper in stating that the City of New Orleans had a rational basis for paying

federal court judgments before state court judgments); see also Davis v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd.,

No. CIV.A 04-3511, 2005 WL 2037369 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2005) (applying Cooper in rejecting

plaintiff’s assertion that the school board’s refusal to pay negotiated settlement amount unless

plaintiff agrees to a substantial reduction of the negotiated amount violated the Equal Protection

Clause). Given these precedents, Jasper’s Equal Protection claim is unavailing.

Jasper argues that reliance on Cooper is “misplaced” because there was evidence

showing that the defendant municipality had insufficient funds to satisfy state tort

judgments. Rec. Doc. 26-1 at 14. However, PPG's position is based on un-rebutted relevant

evidentiary support. See Rec. Docs. 14-3 thru 4 and 31-1 thru 3. No support is offered to “negate

every conceivable basis which might support” the Ordinance. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas

Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 945 F.3d 206, 225 (5th Cir. 2019). Though rational basis is “fact

intensive,” it “places no affirmative evidentiary burden on the government, [but] plaintiffs may

nonetheless negate a seemingly plausible basis for the law by adducing evidence of irrationality.”

Id. at 225. Jasper has not shown such evidence outside of her general allegations. See, e.g., Triple

Tee Golf, 85 F.3d at 261 (noting that the non-movant may not rest upon their own allegations in

showing a genuine fact issue for trial).

Per above-noted evidentiary support for reducing a backlog of outstanding state court

judgment and meet the operational needs of the parish, the Court finds that PPG’s means of doing

so—the JSP program—at the very least satisfies rational basis review. Plaintiff has not shown

that PPG’s current program is irrational or unconstitutionally discriminatory, a s

explained by Ordinance 20-105 and PPG’s affidavits establishing why settlements are

treated differently than state court judgments as well as differential treatment between

participants and non-participants, see Rec. Docs. 31-1; 31-2, .

For the reasons provided, PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Jasper’s Fourteenth

Amendment Equal Protection claim is GRANTED.

ii. Jasper’s Motion for Summary Judgment

At best, rather than addressing the claims in the complaint, Jasper basically seeks

summary judgment on claims that were not raised in the complaint, including (1) a First

Amendment claim for denial of access to court or for retaliation for exercising her right;1 (2) a

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim based on distinction between judgment

creditors who choose not to participate in the JSP and claimants who settle with PPG without

obtaining a judgment; (3) any Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim based on

infringement of her First Amendment rights; (4) a claim for unconstitutional vagueness; and (5)

a separation of powers claim that the Ordinance usurps judicial power because it prevents the

courts from providing enforceable judgments. See Rec. Doc. 26-1 at 3, 8, 16, 19, and 22.

Despite Jaspers arguments to the contrary, see Rec. Doc. 32, none of these claims were

included in her complaint. Jasper argues that PPG had notice of these claims because the parties

1 Jasper mentions the First Amendment once in her complaint and does not put any party on notice about the specific

claim being asserted.

participated in a pretrial conference wherein the Court “explicitly identified, explored, and

expanded upon the legal and factual issues that now form the basis of [Jasper’s] Motion for

Summary Judgment.” Rec. Doc. 32 at 4. Jasper continues that “the Court ordered cross-motions

for summary judgment on these very issues.” But to the extent that Jasper argues that the Court

expanded her legal claims and directed her to file a summary judgment motion on new claims, she

is mistaken. In its Minute Entry for the pretrial conference, the Court “instructed the parties that

the legal issues will be focused on plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims and not related state law

claims.” Rec. Doc. 23. That was not an invitation to expand the legal issues under consideration,

but to get full briefing on the federal constitutional claims that Jasper had already introduced.

PPG argues that the newly asserted claims should be dismissed. Rec. Doc. 31 at 5. In

support, it cites case law, including Grant v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, No. CV 22-66, 2024

WL 4216041 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2024), which held that a represented plaintiff, failing to move

earlier to amend her complaint to assert new causes of action, forfeited the newly raised claims.

Jasper responds that she should be allowed to amend her complaint and reurge her motion. Rec.

Doc. 32 at 9. She cites Lewis v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 996 F. Supp. 2d 450. 458 (M.D. La.

2014), which held that under Fifth Circuit precedent, a “district court should construe [a newly

raised] claim as a motion to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a).” Lewis, however, cited Riley

v.Sch. Bd. Union Par., 379 F. App’x 335, 341 (5th Cir. 2010), which recognizes that construing a

newly added claim as a motion to amend is “particularly true where, as here, the litigant is pro se

and has not yet made any amendments to her complaint.” Other courts within this circuit have

recognized that courts have discretion to decline to consider a claim first asserted in a motion for

summary judgment. See, e.g., Garza v. City of La Porte, 160 F. Supp. 3d 986, 993 (S.D. Tex. 2016)

(holding that newly added state law claims raised for first time in plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment were not properly before the Court since “a party cannot use a motion for summary

judgment to raise new claims”).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend pleadings “shall be

freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Rule 15 “evinces a bias in favor of

granting leave to amend.” Matter of Southmark Corp., 88 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1996). However,

the decision to grant leave to amend is within the decision of the district court and is not automatic.

Id. In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, the court may consider factors such as undue

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies

by amendments previously allowed undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of

amendment. Id. at 314–15. In determining undue delay, a court may look to “whether the movant

has explained the delay, and whether the movant knew the facts underlying the amended complaint

at the time the complaint was filed.” Id. at 315–16.

Jasper argues that she should be allowed to amend her complaint because “there has been

no prior request to amend, no bad faith, and the proposed amendment is not futile, as it would

clarify and expand factual allegations already discussed in the pretrial conference.” Rec. Doc. 32

at 10. Notably, Jasper does not address another basis upon which a court can deny a motion for

leave to amend: undue inexcusable delay. As stated, when rejecting a request for leave to amend,

a court can consider whether a movant has explained its delay in moving and whether the movant

knew of the facts underlying its amended complaint at the time its original complaint was filed.

Matter of Southmark Corp., 88 F.3d at 315–16. The facts of this case remain as they were when

Jasper first filed her complaint on February 26, 2025. Rec. Doc. 1. Jasper has known that

amendment to pleadings were due no later than July 3, 2025. Rec. Doc. 11. Oral argument was

held on March 26, 2026, and Jasper requested leave to file an amended complaint only three days

prior. Rec. Docs. 30, 32. Because Jasper is represented and has had ample time to file an amended

complaint, but has not, her late request to do so constitutes undue delay and will be rejected.

Moreover, and notwithstanding our wishes for a fairer result, it would be futile to allow the

amendment in view of express authorities cited above that rejected similar attacks on

governmental efforts to achieve reasonable balance between fiscal responsibilities to maintain

operations and yet achieve satisfaction, albeit partially, with valid claims against it.

The lateness and futility of newly asserted federal claims require denial of plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment over such claims. As noted earlier, supplemental jurisdiction

over remaining state law claims is rejected, leading to dismissal without prejudice of the state

based claims.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 31st day of March 2026

_______________________________________

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE