The opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
OMAR RICHARD DEEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
S092615
Imperial County Superior Court
CF-5338
April 6, 2026
Acting Chief Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the
Court, in which Justices Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans,
Weingart,* and Rubin** concurred.
Justice Groban filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices
Liu and Evans concurred.
__________________________
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division One, assigned pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
** Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District, Division One, assigned pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
PEOPLE v. DEEN
S092615
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
Omar Richard Deen was convicted of the murder of his
mother, Rachel Deen, and of Police Chief J. Leonard Speer,
using a firearm. The jury found true special circumstance
allegations that the murder of Ms. Deen was committed for
financial gain and that of Chief Speer during the performance of
his official duties.1 It set the penalty at death, and that
judgment was entered. The trial proceeded in four phases:
competency, guilt, sanity, and penalty. The first phase, which
resulted in a finding of competency, was heard by a separate
jury and before a different judge from the phases that followed.
We conclude that the court committed reversible error in ruling
on a defense challenge of a panelist for cause. As a result, the
judgment in its entirety is reversed and the matter remanded
for further proceedings.2
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This summary is based on the evidence presented at the
post-competency phases and limited to the context needed to
evaluate the challenge for cause question. It is undisputed on
1
See Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a), former
sections 189, 12022.53, subdivision (d).
2
Defendant has raised a number of challenges involving all
four trial phases. In light of our holding, we need not address
the majority of them and express no view as to those
unaddressed assertions.
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appeal that, on the afternoon of April 10, 1998, defendant killed
his mother, Rachel Deen (Rachel), and Chief Speer at Rachel’s
equipment yard in Calipatria. He fled to Mexico, was
apprehended that same day, and confessed.
A. Guilt Phase
1. Prosecution Guilt Phase Evidence
Defendant’s father died in 1995, leaving his wife an estate
worth a minimum of several hundred thousand dollars. Upon
Rachel’s death, the estate was to pass to the couple’s children,
with defendant receiving the largest share.
On March 28, 1998, Rachel and her brother Ruben Dozal
went to the Calipatria equipment yard. Defendant emerged
from a room on the property where he lived, began yelling at
them, and asked why Dozal was there. After a brief physical
skirmish, Rachel and Dozal drove to the police station where
Rachel reported the incident.
After Rachel’s report, Officer James Belcher went to the
yard and arrested defendant who unsuccessfully tried to “head
butt” Belcher and bite him in the face. During booking,
defendant threatened Belcher, saying: “[Y]ou better watch out
for your family,” and “I know where you live.”
On April 2, Dozal and defendant spoke by phone.
Defendant asked why Dozal was “going between” him and his
mother. When Dozal did not respond, defendant said: “Don’t
worry about it because I already have a funeral home and
cemetery picked out for her. . . . So don’t worry about it.” He
then hung up. After the call, Rachel’s attorney obtained a
temporary restraining order (TRO) directing defendant to stay
100 yards away from the equipment yard. Defendant was seen
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driving around town in a tractor that may have been taken from
the yard.
On April 8, defendant visited Mario Magallanes in his auto
repair shop, which was housed in a building Rachel owned.
Using the shop phone, defendant spoke with his mother.
Defendant was upset after the call and said “[H]e was going to
execute his mother.” Magallanes asked, “Why would you want
to do something like that?” Defendant replied: “I just have to
do this. I am fed up with all this.” Defendant then offered to
sell Magallanes the building in which his shop was located
noting, “Well, look at it this way, I can even sell you the business
really cheap.” Magallanes said, “[W]hatever your plans are,
don’t include me in ‘em.” When defendant left, Magallanes
called Rachel. The next day a motel room for defendant was
booked for four nights on Rachel’s credit card.
The murders happened on a Friday. Because Rachel’s
counsel had difficulty serving defendant with the temporary
restraining order, Chief Speer had agreed to help effect service.
The following Monday was the date set for the restraining order
hearing.
Frank Mendez lived across the street from the yard. From
his property, Mendez and his daughter Elizabeth saw the
murders take place. Chief Speer was in uniform, talking to
Rachel. Defendant arrived at the yard on foot and argued with
the pair for about five minutes. Defendant yelled that he would
not leave his room until Rachel provided him with a “30-day
notice.” His room was located behind a metal fence with an iron
gate. Defendant went through the gate, closing it behind him.
Chief Speer approached the gate and appeared to speak
through it for several minutes. He stood about two feet away
from defendant and held nothing in his hands. When Speer
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raised his hands with his palms up, defendant opened the gate
and punched Speer repeatedly in the face. Speer held his hands
at his sides during the attack. When Speer fell to the ground,
defendant straddled him and continued punching him in the
face. Again, Speer’s hands remained at his sides. Rachel
unsuccessfully tried to pull defendant away but fell to the
ground. Defendant stood up holding Speer’s gun. Using both
hands with his arms extended, defendant shot Rachel twice then
turned and shot Speer once. After the shooting defendant fled
in Rachel’s pickup truck, which had been parked in the yard.
Chief Speer called 911 at about 2:00 p.m., and reported he
was “down.” He identified “Omar Deen” as a suspect and said
he was on foot. The Chief’s wife, Evelyn Speer, also worked for
the Calipatria Police department. She went to the yard and was
soon joined by another officer. Chief Speer was in his car,
conscious but barely able to speak. His Glock handgun was
found on the ground. In his car, there was a police form used to
document stolen vehicles that had been signed by Rachel at 1:30
p.m. that day.
Later that day, defendant was apprehended in Mexico and
interviewed by Mexicali Police Officer Jose Juan Hirales.
Defendant recounted that he had argued with his mother and
the police had arrived. An officer placed his hand on defendant’s
back and told him to “leave the scene.” Defendant said he
punched the officer in the face knocking him to the ground. He
then sat on the officer’s stomach and continued to hit him in the
face. When defendant’s mother grabbed him and asked him to
let the officer go, he knocked her to the ground as well.
Defendant grabbed the officer’s weapon, shot him twice, then
shot his mother once. He said he “grabbed a pickup truck,” knew
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he “was involved in a lot of problems,” and thought he could
cross the Mexican border.
2. Defense Guilt Phase Evidence
Several days before the murders defendant had come with
a friend to a behavioral health clinic. He had a “mask-like
expression,” appeared unresponsive to his surroundings, and
did not make eye contact. The clinic’s records did not reflect that
he was professionally assessed.
Nine months after the killings, while in custody awaiting
trial, defendant became agitated when he was handcuffed before
being taken to another cell. When they arrived at the cell, and
the transporting officer unsnapped keys from his belt, defendant
yelled, “Go ahead and shoot me, go ahead and kill me.”
Dr. Kirsten Fleming, Chief of Neuropsychology at UC
Irvine, testified that defendant’s IQ testing yielded a score of 86.
Dr. Fleming diagnosed him as manifesting a severe thought
disorder with frontal lobe dysfunction, which would diminish his
impulse control, affect his judgment and planning capacity, and
impair his ability to consider the consequences of his actions.
She concluded he was functioning at a severely impaired level
that could fairly be described as brain damage. She agreed on
cross-examination that those with frontal lobe dysfunction are
capable of planning, albeit poorly.
Psychiatrist Clark Smith diagnosed defendant with
childhood-onset paranoid schizophrenia with psychotic
delusions, brain damage and a history of methamphetamine
abuse. People who knew him reported that defendant spoke in
a bizarre fashion and appeared delusional, which Smith
believed reflected a thought disorder. Neither Smith, nor any
other evaluator whose notes he had reviewed, concluded
defendant was malingering. Dr. Smith related that those with
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schizophrenia are often unable to plan very well and that
defendant’s conditions would severely impair his ability to
weigh considerations regarding a course of action. The
unexpected and forcible removal from a residence would cause
intense stress for such a person. Schizophrenia also affects a
person’s perception. Normal social behavior, such as offering to
shake hands, might make a schizophrenic feel attacked.
Officer Hirales, the officer who spoke with defendant in
Mexico on the day of the murders, described him as acting
calmly “like nothing had happened.” (See ante, p. 4.) Defendant
related that the shooting had occurred in front of his residence
and that he drove around Imperial County hoping to be killed
by police officers. About an hour after leaving the scene, he
realized he could escape to Mexico.
3. Prosecution Guilt Phase Rebuttal
Rachel’s sister testified about defendant’s long-standing
verbal abuse of his mother and arguments about the disposition
of his father’s estate.
Psychiatrist Dr. Alan Abrams, chief psychiatrist at
Centinela State Prison and an attorney, recounted defendant’s
admitted use of methamphetamine, heroin, LSD, PCP, cocaine,
marijuana, and alcohol. Methamphetamine usage can cause
hallucinations, delusions, and brain damage. Abrams
diagnosed defendant with polysubstance abuse,
methamphetamine dependence, and methamphetamine-
induced psychosis. Defendant also had a “mixed personality
disorder with antisocial and narcissistic features.” Abrams
disputed Dr. Smith’s testimony as to childhood-onset
schizophrenia, and delusions about law enforcement,
attributing some of defendant’s reported symptoms to his
substance abuse. Abrams asserted that defendant had given
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inconsistent or untruthful responses during interviews and
admitted to another expert that he was “just making things up.”
In his opinion, defendant “is deceitfully reporting facts about
himself and . . . deceitfully reporting symptoms,” but defendant
was “also a troubled guy who’s used way too much
methamphetamine.”
B. Penalty Phase Prosecution Evidence
The prosecution relied on the circumstances of the charged
crimes and victim impact testimony. The Speers’ daughter
testified that her parents were high school sweethearts, had
been married for 45 years, and were inseparable. They had
worked together at the Calipatria Police Department for
10 years. After Chief Speer died, his wife Evelyn was lost and
broken without him. Five months after the murder, Evelyn
suffered a stroke and, at the time of trial, was still too ill to be
left alone.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously denied
several of his motions to excuse a potential juror for cause. One
of those challenges has merit. In light of that conclusion, it is
unnecessary to address his other claims of error.
A. The Record Regarding Jury Selection
At the time of the April 2000 voir dire, “the jury selection
provisions of Proposition 115, codified in Code of Civil Procedure
former section 223, applied to this case. (Code Civ. Proc., former
§ 223, added by Prop. 115, as approved by voters, Primary Elec.
(June 5, 1990); Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282,
299−300 . . . .)” (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548,
608.) That statute directed in relevant part: “In a criminal case,
the court shall conduct the examination of prospective
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jurors. However, the court may permit the parties, upon a
showing of good cause, to supplement the examination by such
further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the
prospective jurors upon such a showing, such additional
questions by the parties as it deems proper. . . . [¶]
Examination of prospective jurors shall be conducted only in aid
of the exercise of challenges for cause.” (Code Civ. Proc., former
§ 223.) The trial court here properly assumed primary
responsibility for questioning prospective jurors. (Beck and
Cruz, at p. 608.)
After hardship excusals, 101 panelists completed juror
questionnaires. Thereafter, the selection process proceeded as
follows. Twenty-four names were drawn, with 12 taking the
jury box and the remaining panelists sitting in the “12-pack” of
extra panelists. After all 24 panelists were questioned, the court
took challenges for cause as to any of that two dozen. If a
panelist in the jury box was excused for cause, that person was
replaced in order by a panelist from the 12-pack. Peremptory
challenges were then directed to those panelists in the box, with
each excused panelist again replaced in order with a panelist
from the 12-pack. Once the 12-pack was exhausted, a new 12-
pack was drawn and questioned, followed by for-cause, then by
peremptory, challenges. The process was repeated until 12
jurors had been accepted by both parties.
The panelist who was ultimately seated as Juror No. 5 is
the subject of the challenge at issue and was questioned
relatively late in the process. By the time he was seated in the
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jury box the defense had exhausted its allotted peremptory
challenges.3
Juror No. 5 was 60 years old at the time of trial and had
worked for the El Centro Police Department from 1984 to 1997
as a “non-sworn I.D. tech[nician].” He retired from the El
Centro department several months before the murders.4 In
questionnaire responses Juror No. 5 agreed that he was able to
“follow the law as given to you by the judge, even if you disagree
with the law.” He had heard about the case from the “[p]olice”
but checked a box marked “[y]es,” when asked if he could “set
aside what [he had] heard and decide the case based only upon
the evidence presented in court.” However, he also wrote, “Yes,”
when asked if he would have “any difficulty keeping an open
mind until” he had heard all the evidence, arguments of counsel,
and instructions. And he answered “Yes” when asked if the
accusation of “killing a police officer” would prevent him “from
being a fair and impartial juror in this case,” writing that he had
“known Chief Speer for [a] number of y[ea]rs . . . along w[ith]
business dealings while w[ith] El Centro Police dept.” He wrote
he attended the funeral for Chief Speer but added he “had to
leave.”
During individual voir dire the court asked, “[I]s there
anything about your [El Centro Police Department]
experience . . . that would make it difficult for you to be fair and
impartial in a criminal case?” The juror replied, “I would like to
3
In total, the prosecution exercised 18 peremptory
challenges and the defense 20.
4
El Centro is a larger community, located about 30 miles
south of Calipatria, where Speer was the police chief.
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think not, but of course being in law enforcement, entrenched in
it for 15 years might be a little difficult.”
The court asked Juror No. 5 to expound on what he had
heard about the case from the “[p]olice.” He said, “I was going
that particular day and came across — I was told by an officer,
‘This is what’s happened concerning Chief Speer,’ and that’s
where I first heard about it.” The court asked, “Were you
requested or required —” He replied, “No, I was not involved in
it at all.” The court asked, “Anything you heard from the police
or anywhere else . . . would you be able to set that aside and
decide the case solely on the evidence in court?” The juror said,
“Yes, I could do that.”
The court asked about criminal cases he had followed in the
news, and Juror No. 5 said: “Yes, I followed it through the
newspaper, and then talking to some of the witnesses on . . .
here [who were] there . . . . I did hear about it that way.” He
added, “So in detail — you’re asking details? Yes, I knew
details.” He confirmed he could “wait until the end of the
case . . . until both sides had presented their case and argued
the case” before making up his mind.
The court asked Juror No. 5 more about his written
responses. It noted the juror’s answer that because defendant
was accused of killing Chief Speer it “might give you some
difficulty,” and that the juror had “indicated that [he] had
known Chief Speer for a number of years.” It asked: “You’ve
had some business dealings with him . . . while you were at the
El Centro Police Department,” and added, “Business dealings
out of police work?”
Juror No. 5 replied, “Business outside originally,”
confirming that the dealings involved real estate. He added,
“And then I would see Chief Speer occasionally when he came to
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the department. We would go out for coffee, et cetera,” and
“going back a few years, I campaigned for him when he ran for
Sheriff, and so we were — in that sense, a friendship existed.”
The court asked, “Was your relationship with Chief Speer such
that you do not feel that you could be a fair and impartial juror
in a case where someone is accused of murdering him?” The
juror replied, “I could. I could.” The court asked, “You could?”
Juror No. 5 replied, “Sure.”
The court said, “[Y]ou indicated that you went to Chief
Speer’s funeral?” The juror said, “And left. Had to leave.” The
court asked, “Were you able to make it into the church . . .” The
juror replied, “No, I got called in just as I was approaching,”
adding “I didn’t go, but the intentions were there.”
The court subsequently turned to the list of anticipated
witnesses, asking Juror No. 5 to identify anyone on the list
whom he knew and explain how he knew them. Juror No. 5 said,
“[A]ll of the El Centro police officers that are listed,” and, at the
court’s direction, identified 14 individuals he recognized on the
list. The court asked: “Any persons that you’ve listed, because
of your past dealings with them or knowledge of their
reputation, anything like that, [whom] you would not be able to
weigh their testimony fairly and impartially in the manner that
you would any other witness testifying on the same subject?”
Juror No. 5 replied: “No. Just because they are police officers,
no.” The court asked again about comparing their testimony
with “another witness testifying on the same subject,” and Juror
No. 5 said, “No, I wouldn’t.” The court asked, “Think you could
weigh their testimony fairly and impartially?” Juror No. 5 said,
“Sure.” Juror No. 5 then left the courtroom.
The court asked, “Anything from the defense as to” Juror
No. 5? Counsel requested the court inquire whether the panelist
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“has had any dealings or contacts with Evelyn Speer since the
incident” and “specifically ask what his relationship and
dealings with her was,” and “[w]hether or not he would be able
to set aside . . . those contacts, and be as fair and impartial as
the other jurors . . . who didn’t have such information.” Counsel
added, “I think we’re in dangerous waters when we have a
gentleman [who] expresses some difficulty, obviously wants to
be fair, has details of the offense from witnesses . . . It’s possible
Ms. Speer may come in here in the penalty phase asking to put
our client to death.” The court said it had heard she had suffered
a “debilitating stroke,” and the prosecutor said that she would
not appear, did not speak, and there would be testimony tying
the stroke to her husband’s murder. Defense counsel argued
that in the event Ms. Speer did not testify, Juror No. 5 “might
have knowledge about her stroke[] that if it doesn’t come in
might be relevant and could affect the jury. What we’re talking
about, he’s got law enforcement information, what happens if
evidence doesn’t come in at trial in other areas, . . . he has
knowledge of certain things? . . . [¶] . . . [W]e’re asking him to
set aside certain things. He followed the case closely. He talked
to witnesses, he talked to officers. He’s . . . had business
dealings with Mr. Speer. He knows Mrs. Speer.” The court said
it would “inquire further into [Juror No. 5’s] relationship with
Mrs. Speer. He indicated some real estate dealings. I don’t
know if that went on for any time after Mr. Speer’s demise. If it
did, he may have had dealings with her.”
Juror No. 5 returned to the courtroom. The court asked,
“[D]id you have any contact with [Evelyn Speer] after the
incident that we’re dealing with?” Juror No. 5 replied, “No, I did
not.” When asked to describe his relationship with her, Juror
No. 5 said: “Just acquaintance. I didn’t associate with her
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socially or anything like that, just knew her and seen her with
Chief Speer.” The court asked if he knew Chief or Evelyn Speer
better, and Juror No. 5 said, “Chief Speer.” The court asked if
he would have any difficulty “being fair and impartial in a case
where Evelyn Speer is peripherally involved,” and Juror No. 5
replied, “No.” The court asked, “Did you have any of those real
estate transactions with her” and Juror No. 5 replied: “No, it
was with him, and it was just looking at a house. No purchase
made.” The court asked, “You didn’t buy the house?” Juror
No. 5 replied: “No, didn’t buy the house, oh no.” Juror No. 5
then left the courtroom again.
The court noted defense counsel had referred to a panelist
having some knowledge of the case from police sources and the
media. The court observed that in cases like the Oklahoma City
bombing every person in the country would have followed it. It
went on: “It seems to me that the answer is the rule, is the same
in all of the cases. It doesn’t matter if the jurors heard about it,
the question is, can they set it aside?” Defense Counsel
Beaudikofer said, “We can find lots of jurors who haven’t had
contacts with the victim, special information from witnesses in
the case. That’s different than the media.” He referred to an
example the court had previously offered during voir dire in
which it followed the strict notice requirements in a landlord
tenant dispute and denied relief to a property owner who had
wanted to evict her tenant. Defense Counsel Beaudikofer noted
that in that circumstance the court had not had any choice.
“When you are putting up a juror in a case where he has to
decide life or death, it’s totally within his discretion what he
does. And if you were given an opportunity to give favorable
discretion on that [land]lady, I expect you might have. And just
because of the favorable impression that you had had of her, at
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least you learned from her in the courtroom. These people
[referring to Juror No. 5 and other panelists] had those kinds of
impressions about the victim or witnesses prior to coming in
here to court. I don’t think they should sit as jurors, each and
every one of them should be excused for cause.”
The court replied: “[M]y option with the [property owner]
was just to disregard the law, say there has been substantial
compliance, which is not legal, and there would have been no
appeal. . . . I followed the law, that is what the jurors are saying
they can do. I don’t know what more we can ask.”
Defense Counsel Sada said: “I don’t think it’s the same . . .
somebody who gets information from a police officer is not
significantly different than the . . . paramedic who responded to
the scene, what he may or may not have seen, what he would
bring into the mix because of having been there which would,
we find, preclude him. He says here he can be fair. By allowing
him to sit would be reversible error.” He continued: “There is a
lot of information that can be used to contemplate the jury
potential regarding, number one, what was said about the
officers regarding [defendant’s] past, things he would know,
individual knowledge, even if he didn’t bring the bias in the
courtroom, which would probably come out one way or the other.
We think he should be removed for cause. . . . [¶] . . . There is a
lot of things that put this into a position where it’s not safe to
leave this juror on as cause exists. We strongly urge the court
and we are making a challenge for cause.” The prosecutor
responded that Juror No. 5 had said he could be “fair and
impartial” and “was not equivocal.”
Defense Counsel Beaudikofer pointed out that Juror No. 5
did say “he would have difficulty. I think under the
circumstances where he has such contacts, danger of polluting
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the jury and him carrying a bias are so apparent that the
challenge for cause should be sustained.” Defense Counsel Sada
added, “We’re not calling him a liar. . . . [W]hen his starting
point is announced, a red flag goes up and everything else that
is involved with this potential juror needs to be considered
within that context. We’re saying that within the context of
employment, with the starting point, he is a cause.”
The court stated: “I got to admit, I’m not sure if there is a
case — defense has not pointed out a case, neither has the
prosecution that indicates that these kind of cumulative facts
add up to a challenge for cause. There may be such a case out
there, but I’m sticking to [Code of Civil Procedure section] 229,
which I suppose is the best thing to do unless there is a case that
says otherwise. And it doesn’t say anything about the state of
affairs or facts that would cause a reasonable person to strongly
suspect that the juror may not be fair. [¶] What it says is the
existence, actual existence of a state of mind of the juror
evincing enmity against or bias towards either party.” The court
continued: “Now, with regard to his statement he would find it
difficult, I have to say, we are dealing with the frailties of
the . . . . English language. When we say, ‘Would you find it
difficult?’ Well, you know, I could see jurors saying, I would find
it difficult, and if it is proven that Mr. Deen actually caused the
death of these people, I would find it difficult to find him not
guilty for obvious emotional reasons. I don’t think that evinces
an enmity against Mr. Deen or bias towards either party. Other
than that, there is nothing that appears to apply. The challenge
for cause will be denied as to [Juror No. 5].”
Shortly after Juror No. 5 was questioned, defendant
requested additional peremptory challenges because of the
“large number of law enforcement people” in the panel. The
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defense did not initially make a change of venue motion. The
court asked, “given the occupational makeup of” the panelists,
“why is there any reason to believe that the jury is going to get
any better?” when subsequent groups of panelists are
questioned during voir dire.5
It added: “I’ll be blunt here. It may be that the . . .
appropriate remedy, assuming your objection is well-taken, is a
change of venue to a place where not so many peace officers
worked or where a large percentage of the jury pool are not
connected to peace officers or correctional officers, law
enforcement.” Counsel replied that at “a minimum” the defense
team was “excusing people that knew the victim,” asserting “we
don’t have to go too far to find people that don’t know the victim.”
The court replied: “You are going to have to go a long way to
find a jury that didn’t know [Chief] Leonard Speer. A long way.”
Defense counsel replied: “I am talking about having coffee
with him. Working with him professionally. Having business
dealings with him.” The prosecutor asked how many panelists
had “indicated that,” and counsel identified panelists Raymond
C. and Daniel P., adding, “It’s been more than that.” The court
noted it had reviewed the questionnaires for the next panel that
would be called and anticipated that there would be the “same
number of people” in law enforcement. It denied the request for
additional peremptory challenges.
Defendant then requested “as a fall-back position” at least
two additional challenges because he had peremptorily
challenged two panelists who had “served professionally and
5
Although a third panel was sent to the courtroom at the
end of voir dire, and some of these panelists completed
questionnaires, the jury of 12 was sworn before excusals on the
third panel began.
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personally with the victim in this case.” He also, for the first
time, made an oral motion for a change of venue. The prosecutor
exercised three more peremptory challenges, and the jury panel
was set. Opening statements were scheduled to begin the
following day.
Before swearing the jury, the court addressed defendant’s
request for two additional peremptory challenges and the
change of venue motion. As to the request for additional
challenges, the court noted, “With regard again to knowledge of
the victims, I only have one who had any knowledge of the
victims other than perhaps . . . reading somebody’s name in the
paper. That would be [Juror No. 5], who indicated that he had
had some dealings with Mr. Speer, real estate, and also had
knowledge of him as a police officer, but didn’t indicate that he
was a friend of his or anything.” Counsel said, “He indicated
that he went to coffee with him.” The court said: “Okay. I could
imagine that could happen if you are going to look at a house or
something like that. He didn’t indicate a strong affection.
Again, he’s the only one. So the court will deny the request for
additional peremptory challenges based on the showing that has
been made.” Neither the court nor counsel mentioned Juror
No. 5’s admission that he had worked on Speer’s election
campaign or his statement: “and so we were — in that sense, a
friendship existed.”
The court then addressed defendant’s oral change of venue
motion. When discussing the publicity prong of the venue analysis,
the court stated that “no jurors have indicated that they have heard
anything about the case. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [i]n excess of what we have
told them here at trial.” Defense counsel asserted that Juror No. 5,
the “former property clerk [sic] for [the] El Centro Police
17
PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
Department told us specifically that he heard it directly from
officers involved in the investigation.”6 The court agreed.
Defense counsel said: “I go back to [Juror No. 5] again, not
to belabor the point on him, in the case of [Juror No. 5], he heard
facts, information on the date of the offense. It’s
unreasonable . . . for any of us to believe that whatever evidence
comes in will not be supplemented[,] at least in his mind[,] by
his recollection of what fellow law enforcement officers said” and
he will “become an advocate based on information that wasn’t
admissible, maybe was not even correct.” The court agreed to
“conduct some additional inquiry of [Juror No. 5] regarding
what it was that he heard.” The prosecutor objected and
requested the court instead review the transcript of Juror No. 5
from earlier that day. The court did so.
After its review the court said: “I’m still grasping for a
possible answer that he could have given or possible information
that he could have received that would yield a challenge for
cause in spite of the fact that he has indicated that he could set
all of that aside and base his decision on the evidence in the
case.” The court asked if a panelist says they heard certain
information, but they could set that aside and base their
“ ‘decision on the facts presented at the trial’ ” is that “a
challenge for cause?”
Counsel responded that “[t]here doesn’t have to be one factor
that makes a person challengeable for cause,” but “[t]here could be
6
In several instances counsel at trial and on appeal appear
to misrecall or misconstrue the record of Juror No. 5’s
statements. The record taken as a whole indicates that Juror
No. 5 had retired during the year before the killings and had
never worked on the case.
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PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
a combination of circumstances . . . demeanor, . . . the answer to a
number of different questions taken together which would cause a
significant doubt as to [the] reliability of that person’s verdict if
they are on the jury. I think that is what we’re talking about with
[Juror No. 5].” The court said, “I have been begging for . . .some sort
of case authority on that. The authority that I find when I look [at
death penalty cases] says things like . . . ‘the fact that a juror
indicated that he . . . had certain feelings that the defendant was
guilty of the crime does not . . .warrant a challenge for cause where
the juror said they could be fair and impartial.’ ” The court noted
a case where the panelist had said they would favor peace officers’
testimony, and the Supreme Court said on appeal that the “juror
said they could be impartial, follow the law, that’s good enough. I
understand the defense’s concern. I think I might have the same
concern myself. It appears from the examination of the appellate
cases in death penalty cases that for cause means [Code of Civil
Procedure section] 229 and Witherspoon, and that sort of thing, but
not reasonable suspicion or possibility . . . . That is what I’m
begging for authority on that.” Counsel responded that “I think
that the court would agree [it has] discretion . . . if you get a feeling
from the totality of the circumstances that this man appears . . . he
would have difficulty being impartial.”
The court stated that Juror No. 5 “said that he could be fair
and impartial; that he could base his decision on the evidence here
in court. If at this point in the trial the court is going to say, well,
that is a challenge for cause, and I don’t think it is, I think I would
just be imposing my will on the process if I were to do that because
the appellate authority seems pretty clear that is not a challenge
for cause. [¶] . . . I looked since we began this voir dire process,
where is the line on pass for cause or grant a challenge for cause?
And it appears clear that where the juror says, ‘I could be fair and
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PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
impartial and set aside . . . my feelings,’ things they heard about
the case, . . . unless the court disbelieves the statement, and I have
no reason to disbelieve it, that is not a for-cause challenge. I’m
stuck with that, even though I might be uncomfortable if I were the
defense. That’s the way that comes out. So the jury will remain as
it is.”
The court then denied the oral change of venue motion. It
noted that there was no prejudicial pretrial publicity, and those
panelists who had heard about the case had “indicated that they
could set aside what they heard, whatever that may be, and
decide the case based on the facts presented at trial. We
have . . . one juror who is in the box, [Juror No. 5], who has some
prior contact with Chief Speer in the context of looking at a
house for real estate and that sort of thing, and general
knowledge of him as a law enforcement officer. And I don’t think
that is sufficient for a change of venue motion.” The jury was
then sworn.
B. Analysis
“The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees the right of a defendant in all criminal prosecutions
to a trial by an ‘impartial jury.’ The California Constitution
independently guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury.
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; see People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th
449, 462 . . . .) ‘The Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury
and the due process right to a fundamentally fair trial guarantee
to criminal defendants a trial in which jurors set aside
preconceptions, disregard extrajudicial influences, and decide
guilt or innocence “based on the evidence presented in court.” ’ ”
(People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 402–403 (Mataele).)
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
California’s Code of Civil Procedure 7 contains a statutory
framework designed to implement the jury trial right and
describes the circumstances in which a potential juror can be
excluded from service. Section 2258 defines a juror challenge as
“an objection made to the trial juror[] . . . and is [one] of the
following classes and types.” Section 225, subdivision (b)(1),
permits a challenge for cause for: “(A) General disqualification,”
(see § 203, subd. (a) [identifying those generally disqualified]),
“(B) Implied bias — as, when the existence of the facts as
ascertained, in judgment of law disqualifies the juror,” or
“(C) Actual bias — the existence of a state of mind on the part of
the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which
will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and
without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.”
7
All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.
8
Section 225 provides inter alia:
“A challenge is an objection made to the trial jurors that
may be taken by any party to the action, and is of the following
classes and types: [¶] . . . [¶]
“(b) A challenge to a prospective juror by either:
“(1) A challenge for cause, for one of the following reasons:
“(A) General disqualification — that the juror is
disqualified from serving in the action on trial.
“(B) Implied bias — as, when the existence of the facts as
ascertained, in judgment of law disqualifies the juror.
“(C) Actual bias — the existence of a state of mind on the
part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties,
which will prevent the juror from acting with entire
impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of
any party.
“(2) A peremptory challenge to a prospective juror.”
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
Section 225, subdivision (b)(2) permits peremptory challenges.
In the context of a trial, bias can be understood generally as a
tendency to favor or disfavor a person or group of people, or to
lean in favor of or against a certain outcome.
Section 229 defines “implied bias” by setting out categories
which, as a matter of law, render a prospective juror unqualified
to serve. In establishing the criteria for “implied bias” the
Legislature has concluded, as a matter of policy, that persons
meeting them are categorically disqualified from jury service
because the Legislature statutorily implies, or imputes, a bias
to them. The Legislature has made those criteria specific and
circumscribed, providing that a “challenge for implied bias may
be taken for one or more of the [enumerated] causes, and for no
other.” (§ 229.) Under section 229, a challenge for implied bias
lies only for the reasons listed in that provision. (People v.
Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 670.)
The section 229 categories of an implied bias objection
include various kinds of relationships between the potential
juror and a litigant, victim or witness (id., subds. (a), (b)); service
as trial or grand juror or as a witness in a previous trial between
the same parties (id., subd. (c)); an interest in the questions
involved in the trial beyond that which any member of the
community might have (id., subd. (d)); having an “unqualified
opinion or belief” as to the merits of the action founded upon
knowledge of its material facts (id., subd. (e)); or a state of mind
evincing enmity against, or bias towards, either party (id., subd.
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PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
(f)).9 Implied bias is “bias conclusively presumed as [a] matter
of law.” (United States v. Wood (1936) 299 U.S. 123, 133.)
9
Section 229 provides: “A challenge for implied bias may be
taken for one or more of the following causes, and for no other:
“(a) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to any
party, to an officer of a corporation which is a party, or to any
alleged witness or victim in the case at bar.
“(b) Standing in the relation of, or being the parent, spouse,
or child of one who stands in the relation of, guardian and ward,
conservator and conservatee, master and servant, employer and
clerk, landlord and tenant, principal and agent, or debtor and
creditor, to either party or to an officer of a corporation which is a
party, or being a member of the family of either party; or a partner
in business with either party; or surety on any bond or obligation
for either party, or being the holder of bonds or shares of capital
stock of a corporation which is a party; or having stood within one
year previous to the filing of the complaint in the action in the
relation of attorney and client with either party or with the
attorney for either party. A depositor of a bank or a holder of a
savings account in a savings and loan association shall not be
deemed a creditor of that bank or savings and loan association for
the purpose of this paragraph solely by reason of his or her being a
depositor or account holder.
“(c) Having served as a trial or grand juror or on a jury of
inquest in a civil or criminal action or been a witness on a previous
or pending trial between the same parties, or involving the same
specific offense or cause of action; or having served as a trial or
grand juror or on a jury within one year previously in any criminal
or civil action or proceeding in which either party was the plaintiff
or defendant or in a criminal action where either party was the
defendant.
“(d) Interest on the part of the juror in the event of the action,
or in the main question involved in the action, except his or her
interest as a member or citizen or taxpayer of a county, city and
county, incorporated city or town, or other political subdivision of a
county, or municipal water district.
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PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
“Actual bias,” on the other hand, is neither presumed nor
categorical. It is based upon a particularized assessment of the
state of mind of the individual panelist in the context of a given
case. Here the trial judge did not find Juror No. 5 had, in the
words of the statute, an “unqualified opinion or belief as to the
merits of the action” or a state of mind reflecting “enmity
against, or bias towards, either party” to the litigation. (§ 229,
subds. (e), (f).) However, the court did not adequately examine
whether he may have harbored actual bias under section 225.10
A review of the statutory language demonstrates that sections
225 and 229 are complementary provisions that should be
considered together. Section 225 provides that a challenge may
be granted for either actual (id., subd. (b)(1)(C)) or implied bias
(id., subd. (b)(1)(B)). Section 229 explicates when bias is
“(e) Having an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits
of the action founded upon knowledge of its material facts or of
some of them.
“(f) The existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing
enmity against, or bias towards, either party.
“(g) That the juror is party to an action pending in the court
for which he or she is drawn and which action is set for trial before
the panel of which the juror is a member.
“(h) If the offense charged is punishable with death, the
entertaining of such conscientious opinions as would preclude the
juror finding the defendant guilty; in which case the juror may
neither be permitted nor compelled to serve.”
10
Section 227 provides: “The challenges of either party for
cause . . . may be taken separately, in the following order . . . :
“(a) To the panel.
“(b) To an individual juror, for a general disqualification.
“(c) To an individual juror, for an implied bias.
“(d) To an individual juror, for an actual bias.”
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PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
“implied” or imputed, as a matter of law, but it does not
undermine or supplant an actual bias inquiry under section 225.
Many of the categories listed in section 229 are based on
some readily identifiable data point: the panelist is either
closely related to a party or not; he has sued a party before or he
hasn’t; he sat on a related jury or he didn’t. When one of those
delineated facts is ascertained there is a nonrebuttable
presumption of bias and the panelist is categorically deemed
unqualified to serve. But there is some overlap between the two
statutes, which is most discernible in section 229, subdivision (f)
(hereafter section 229(f)). That subdivision requires an inquiry
into the panelist’s state of mind, just as section 225 does.
However, simply because a panelist is not presumptively
disqualified as impliedly biased under section 229’s explicit
categories does not mean his or her state of mind would enable
them to serve with “entire impartiality” (§ 225(b)(1)(C)) or
without “enmity against, or bias towards, either party”
(§ 229(f)). Section 225 and section 229(f) expand the inquiry to
ensure that panelists harboring actual or implied bias do not sit.
In this regard there is no practical difference between the trial
court’s fact-finding job under sections 225 and 229(f). Both
require something more than resolving a question of historical
fact. Instead, they call for consideration of a panelist’s state of
mind and a reasoned judgment concerning the panelist’s ability
to evaluate the evidence fairly and impartially.
This understanding of the interaction between the
statutes is consistent with the holding of People v. Ledesma,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at page 670: “Under California law, a juror
may be excused for ‘implied bias’ only for one of the reasons
listed in Code of Civil Procedure section 229, ‘and for no other.’
(Code Civ. Proc., § 229.) If the facts do not establish one of the
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PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
grounds for implied bias listed in that statute, the juror may be
excused for ‘[a]ctual bias’ if the court finds that the juror’s state
of mind would prevent him or her from being impartial.”
Thus, even when a panelist does not overtly express bias
or otherwise manifest statutorily defined implied bias, they may
be properly excused for cause based on the court’s finding of
actual bias under section 225. A consideration of either actual
bias or “implied bias” under section 229(f) requires a factual
finding that includes “determinations of demeanor and
credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”
(Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 428 (Witt); see People v.
Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 196–197.) “Except where bias is
clearly apparent from the record, the trial judge is in the best
position to assess the state of mind of a juror or potential juror
on voir dire examination.” (People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th
1148, 1175.)
As we observed in reviewing the ruling on a for-cause
challenge in another death penalty case: “When a prospective
juror is excused following voir dire, . . . whether that juror ‘is
substantially impaired is an issue for the trial court’s
determination.’ [Citation.] We defer to the trial court’s decision
so long as the trial court applied the correct legal standard and
reached a decision supported by substantial evidence.”
(People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1085–1086 (Baker), and
cases cited.) By analogy, in Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at page 424,
the high court articulated a standard for determining when a
capital panelist may be excused for cause consistent with the
Sixth Amendment. In that context the court explained, an
excusal may be granted when the panelist’s “views would
‘prevent or substantially impair the performance’ ” of his or her
“ ‘duties as a juror in accordance with’ ” the instructions and the
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PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
juror’s oath. Witt observed that a panelist’s “bias” need not be
“proved with ‘unmistakable clarity.’ ” (Ibid.) “Despite . . . lack
of clarity in the printed record, . . . there will be situations where
the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a
prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially
apply the law.” (Id. at pp. 425–426.) This explanation captures
the distinction between the categorical factors in much of section
229 when there is no “lack of clarity in the printed record,” and
the broader inquiry that is required under sections 229(f) and
225. Reading the statutes together assures that the right to a
fair and impartial jury is protected. It is the trial court’s
obligation to ensure that those chosen to sit on a jury are
qualified to do so.
The court here concluded it lacked the authority to grant
the challenge, despite its misgivings, because the juror said he
could be fair and follow his oath and the court determined the
juror was sincere when he said so. We evaluate the court’s
decision based on the record at the time the decision was made.
This record reflects the following.
Juror No. 5 was forthcoming and open as to his
associations with Chief Speer, the fact that he had heard details
from law enforcement on the day of the killings and thereafter,
and that he followed the case in the press. He wrote in his
questionnaire that he would have difficulty keeping an open
mind and that the accusation of killing a police officer would
prevent him from being fair and impartial. He explained that
he had known Chief Speer for a number of years, had business
dealings with him, knew his wife, would have coffee with him
from time to time, and campaigned for him when he ran for
sheriff. He added: “in that sense, a friendship existed.” He was
on his way to attend Speer’s funeral but was called away as he
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PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
was approaching the service. He knew 14 of the potential
witnesses. When asked if his experience as a police employee
would make it difficult for him to be fair and impartial, he
replied: “I would like to think not, but of course being in law
enforcement, entrenched in it for 15 years might be a little
difficult.” Nevertheless, Juror No. 5 said he could be a fair and
impartial juror in a case where someone was accused of
murdering Chief Speer, could set aside what he had heard from
law enforcement sources, could fairly evaluate the testimony of
people he knew, and could “wait until the end of the case . . .
until both sides had presented their case and argued the case”
before making up his mind.
The court concluded that Juror No. 5 was being honest
when he made that self-assessment. And yet, the trial court
recognized the difficulty. It characterized its own thinking as
“grasping” for a possible answer Juror No. 5 could have given
that would support a challenge, even though he said he could be
fair and impartial. It twice described itself as “begging” for case
authority that would permit it to grant the challenge. It stated
that section 229 “doesn’t say anything about the state of affairs
or facts that would cause a reasonable person to strongly suspect
that the juror may not be fair. [¶] What it says is the existence,
actual existence of a state of mind of the juror evincing enmity
against or bias toward either party . . . . Other than that, there
is nothing that appears to apply.” By concluding the challenge
for cause could only be granted if it found one of the
circumstances delineated in section 229, the trial court failed to
consider the full scope of its authority, and to read section 229(f)
in conjunction with section 225.
It turned to case authority for guidance, asking: “[W]here
is the line on pass for cause or grant a challenge?” In the end it
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PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
concluded that when a panelist says they can be fair and can set
aside their feelings and what they have heard, “That is good
enough,” and “I’m stuck with that.” The court understood its
role and its responsibility too narrowly.
In the face of a challenge for cause the court is called upon
to independently consider whether a prospective juror can and
will be fair to both sides, judge the case based solely on the
evidence presented, and follow the law as instructed by the
court. Making that assessment can be challenging. It requires
the court to determine the panelist’s existing state of mind and
discern how that panelist will discharge their role if called upon
to do so. As with other bias determinations, in making its ruling
the court must objectively consider the totality of the
circumstances before it. As we explained in In re Manriquez
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 785, 799, “ ‘[W]hat constitutes “actual bias” of a
juror varies according to the circumstances of the case.’ ” These
factors include the person’s statements, along with any
expression of concern or hesitancy; the panelist’s knowledge of
and relationship to the victim or the defendant; and their own
assessment of their willingness and ability to discharge their
responsibility as the law requires. A panelist’s self-assessment
is surely relevant. But even when a panelist says they want to
be fair, and believes they can be, the ultimate question remains
with the court. (See People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997,
1041; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 450.) Of course,
even the wisest of trial judges cannot predict the future with
certainty. Resolution of the question may often turn on case
specific matters of degree: just how much information the
panelist has been exposed to; the source of the information; the
closeness of relevant relationships; the intensity of their views
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PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
on matters at issue; and the source of those views. All are
relevant, and none is necessarily dispositive.
Yet the court must be also attuned to the practical
constraints of human nature and empanel a jury whose
members can reasonably be expected to act in accordance with
their oath. A given panelist may very well want to be fair and
follow the law. They may truly aspire to do so. They may also
hesitate to say otherwise. As we have observed, all these
concerns are amplified in a death penalty case where the
prospective juror might be called upon to decide between the
death penalty and life imprisonment. (See generally, People v.
Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 62, 73, 75 [dealing with a change of
venue motion and discussing the particular challenges of
seating jurors who were familiar with homicide victims].) At the
end of the day the “line” this trial judge cast about for is an
objective determination to be made by the court based on the
totality of circumstances. The judge’s conclusion will be upheld
on appeal if it is reached by applying the proper standard and is
supported by substantial evidence. (Baker, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
pp. 1085–1086.)
Here the trial court’s narrow application of section 229
failed to consider other pertinent authority, including
section 225, subdivision (b)(1)(C)’s definition of actual bias.
Evaluating whether that state of mind exists is informed by the
high court’s similar approach in the Sixth Amendment context.
We have observed that the Witt “standard is consistent with the
state Constitution’s impartial jury guarantee.” (Mataele, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 405 [referencing Cal. Const., art. I, § 16]; People
v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 844.)
As with cases decided under Witt, a court may form a
“definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to
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PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
faithfully and impartially apply the law.” (Witt, supra, 469 U.S.
at pp. 424, 426.) In doing so, “[t]he trial court is entitled to
consider the entirety of a prospective juror’s examination in
deciding whether a[n] . . . excusal is justified.” (People v. Tate
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 675, fn. 22.) While Witt deals particularly
with attitudes on the death penalty, its characterization sheds
light on how a trial court should consider whether a panelist’s
“state of mind . . . will prevent the juror from acting with entire
impartiality.” (§ 225, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
A ruling on a challenge for cause should proceed as follows.
If, taking into account the panelist’s statements and demeanor,
the trial judge finds that circumstances such as the panelist’s
relationship with the parties or potential witnesses, or any other
factors bearing on potential bias, would prevent or substantially
interfere with the panelist’s ability to follow their oath and base
their decision solely on the evidence, follow the law as
instructed, and decide the case with “entire impartiality, and
without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party” (§ 225,
subd. (b)(1)(C)), the challenge should be granted.
Conversely, if the panelist says they can and will be fair,
the court accepts that assessment as honestly held, and the
court objectively finds the panelist can act impartially as the law
requires, the challenge should be denied. Here the trial court
could not discern the standard, “the line,” between granting or
rejecting the challenge. Instead, it considered itself “stuck” with
the juror’s self-assessment, even though the court itself
harbored substantial misgivings. It misunderstood existing
precedent to rigidly hold that if a “juror said they could be
impartial, follow the law, that’s good enough.” As a result, the
court did not make the findings required of it. We review that
ruling at the time it was made. Ordinarily, we review a trial
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PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
court’s factual findings with deference. Here, however, the court
failed to properly understand the scope of its authority to
objectively determine the panelist’s qualification to serve and
hence did not apply the proper standard in making that
evaluation. As the court explained in Horsford v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
359, 393: “ ‘Action that transgresses the confines of the
applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and
we call such action an “abuse” of discretion.’ ” In addition, in
reviewing a ruling on a for-cause challenge, we review the
factual findings upon which the ruling is based for the presence
of substantial evidence supporting it. (People v. Silveria and
Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 245.)
The distinction between reversing for failure to apply the
correct legal standard and holding that a ruling is unsupported
by substantial evidence can be a fine one. Here we are not
concluding the court misused its judgment, instead the record
reflects the court failed to exercise its judgment as the law
requires. Had the trial court made a finding, informed by its
own observations and objective evaluation, and made a record of
the factors on which it relied, we could then examine the record
to see if the determination was supported by substantial
evidence. Here however, the court did not. As a result, we
cannot. In this case, a juror who had not been properly
evaluated as the law requires sat on defendant’s case. 11 Under
11
We hasten to add that we are not concluding that Juror
No. 5 acted improperly in any way or failed to follow his oath.
We hold instead that, at the time the court’s decision was made,
it failed to exercise its judgment as the law requires and to
provide a record permitting proper appellate review.
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
the circumstances reflected in this record the judgment in its
entirety must be reversed.
In summary, we include the following observations for
guidance going forward. In applying sections 225 and 229(f) the
court applies an objective standard, taking into account the
totality of circumstances. When a panelist has been personally
acquainted with a party, victim, or witness, or has received
detailed information about the case from prospective witnesses,
those circumstances are particularly significant and merit close
consideration. While any such fact, standing alone, may not
categorically dictate an excusal for cause, the discussion in
Tidwell highlights the difficulty in achieving an “impartial
adjudication” in such an instance. Over 100 years ago the Court
of Appeal in People v. Ruef (1910) 14 Cal.App. 576, 594 aptly
observed: “If the trial judge is, from the examination of the
juror, or other evidence, doubtful as to whether or not the juror
can and will discard his opinion, and fairly and impartially try
the case, he should resolve such doubt against the juror and
excuse him. This is the safe rule; and if followed would save
much trouble and grave questions before the courts of appeal.”
We also note that, in picking a fair and impartial jury, there
are other important aims to be achieved as well. The object is
to employ a balanced and consistent assessment. The standard
for granting an excusal for cause should be set neither too low
nor too high. The guiding principle is whether the challenged
panelist can give both sides a fair trial as the law requires. Jury
selection is also designed to achieve a panel that represents the
community, including those with differing perspectives and life
experiences. A diversity of approaches and experiences among
jurors helps assure that the case will be given a close and
thorough evaluation.
33
PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
Before finding that a panelist is actually biased under
section 225, the court must form a “definite impression” that the
prospective juror would be “unable to faithfully and impartially
apply the law.” (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 424, 426.) Likewise
on appeal the reviewing court must conclude that the trial
judge’s factual finding as to the panelist’s impairment is
supported by substantial evidence. In this regard the trial court
must ensure that the record is sufficient to facilitate appropriate
appellate review. It must conduct, or allow counsel to conduct,
an adequate voir dire to clarify the pertinent circumstances
bearing on the panelist’s state of mind. When such a record is
lacking, whether because sufficient inquiry was not made, or
was inhibited by arbitrary time limits or other constraints, both
the court and the advocates may resort to preconceived notions
or unsupported deductions, rather than evaluating the panelist
as an individual and in light of the particular circumstances.
(See § 223, subd. (b)(1), & (2), added by Stats. 2017, ch. 302, § 2,
eff. Jan. 1, 2018.)
34
PEOPLE v. DEEN
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed in its entirety and the matter
remanded to the superior court for trial de novo.12
CORRIGAN, Acting C. J.
We Concur:
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
WEINGART, J.*
RUBIN, J.**
12
In the trial court, the competency phase was given a
different case number than the case number assigned to the
guilt, sanity, and penalty phases. We have added the
competency case number to our automatic appeal docket here
for the remaining phases. The competency phase is part of the
case on appeal and encompassed by our disposition. (See
People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 155–156, 180–181.)
__________________________
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division One, assigned pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
** Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District, Division One, assigned pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
35
PEOPLE v. DEEN
S092615
Concurring Opinion by Justice Groban
I concur in the majority’s opinion in full. I write to observe
that this case follows a familiar pattern: Like so many of our
death penalty appeals, the record contains significant evidence
that defendant Omar Richard Deen, starting at a young age,
suffered from severe mental illness.1 Multiple defense experts
1
(See, e.g., People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 638
[psychologist “diagnosed defendant with schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar type,” meaning “defendant exhibited
schizophrenic features, such as hallucinations and delusions”];
People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 564 [a psychologist
“concluded defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia”
and “noted that defendant had suffered several paranoid
delusions over the previous 20 years”]; People v. Steskal (2021)
11 Cal.5th 332, 342 [“The defense psychiatrist . . . concluded
that Steskal suffered from chronic paranoia that had progressed
to full-blown psychosis”]; People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513,
530 [mental health professionals opined that “defendant
suffered from schizophrenia” and “schizo-affective disorder”];
People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 489–491 [defendant
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia]; People v. Potts (2019)
6 Cal.5th 1012, 1025 [defendant diagnosed by psychiatrist
several months before the killing with chronic “ ‘paranoid
schizophrenia’ ”]; People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 937
[defendant had been diagnosed repeatedly with “depression,
bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia”]; People v. Ghobrial (2018)
5 Cal.5th 250, 262–263 [“Defendant exhibited a number of
psychotic behaviors and regularly suffered from
hallucinations”]; People v Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 866
1
PEOPLE v. DEEN
Groban, J., concurring
testified at trial that defendant suffered from childhood-onset
paranoid schizophrenia with psychotic delusions and was a
“severely impaired individual with . . . very serious psychoses.”
Prior to the crimes at issue, defendant was hospitalized and
experienced auditory and visual hallucinations. This case raises
the difficult question of whether capital punishment is
appropriate for individuals with severe mental illness.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment precludes capital punishment for
individuals with intellectual disabilities because these
individuals “have diminished capacities to understand and
process information.” (Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304,
318 (Atkins); see also id. at p. 317 [those with intellectual
disabilities possess “characteristics . . . [that] undermine the
(Mendoza) [psychiatrist testified that defendant was suffering
from “major depressive disorder with psychotic features”];
People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 271 [the defendant’s brain
“scan was consistent with his having suffered a brain injury and
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia”]; People v. Hajek and Vo
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1165 [psychologist concluded that one
defendant suffered “from a cyclothymic disorder and a
borderline personality disorder”]; People v. DeHoyos (2013)
57 Cal.4th 79, 96 [defendant diagnosed with “chronic
schizophrenia of the paranoid type”]; People v. Blacksher (2011)
52 Cal.4th 769, 784–785 [defendant diagnosed as a paranoid
schizophrenic who suffered from delusions]; People v. Weaver
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 941 [psychologists testified that
defendant suffered from schizophrenia]; People v. Medina (1995)
11 Cal.4th 694, 724 [psychologist “testified that defendant
suffered from a psychotic disorder, probably schizophrenia”];
People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 516 [evidence presented
that defendant had a “ ‘schizotypal personality disorder in
conjunction with a moderate degree of brain damage’ ”].)
2
PEOPLE v. DEEN
Groban, J., concurring
strength of the procedural protections that our capital
jurisprudence steadfastly guards”]; cf. Mendoza, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 911 [under the California Constitution’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment (art. I, § 17), a
court must examine the “ ‘mental capabilities’ ” of the defendant
and if the punishment “ ‘ “ ‘ “offends fundamental notions of
human dignity” ’ ” [citation], the court must invalidate the
sentence’ ”].) For similar reasons, juveniles are also
constitutionally exempted from “the most severe punishment”
because the juvenile’s “blameworthiness is diminished, to a
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity” and the
death penalty has no clear “deterrent effect.” (Roper v. Simmons
(2004) 543 U.S. 551, 568, 571 (Roper).) This court and/or the
Legislature will eventually need to determine whether the same
reasoning applies to the execution of individuals suffering from
severe mental illness. (Cf. Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 909
[“ ‘it may be that mentally ill offenders who are utterly unable
to control their behavior lack the extreme culpability associated
with capital punishment’ ”].)2
2
(See also Note, Evolving Standard of Decency: How Ohio
House Bill 136 Makes a Compelling Case for a Nationwide
Prohibition on Execution of Criminal Offenders Who Suffered
from Severe Mental Illness at the Time of Their Crime (2023)
54 U.Tol. L.Rev. 493, 508 [the diminished capacity of those who
suffer from serious mental illness “is sufficient to suggest that
the main justifications for the death penalty — deterrence and
retribution — are not served by executing the mentally ill”];
Note, Cruel and Unusual: The Constitutional Requirement for
Heightened Protections for Defendants with Severe Mental
Illness in Capital Cases (2021) 57 Idaho L.Rev. 299, 304–306
[concluding that there appears to be a national consensus that
the death penalty should not be imposed on individuals with
3
PEOPLE v. DEEN
Groban, J., concurring
The American Bar Association’s Death Penalty Due
Process Review Project concluded that individuals with severe
mental illness should not be subject to execution because capital
punishment is unlikely to serve any meaningful deterrent or
retributive purposes for such cognitively impaired individuals.
(Death Penalty Due Process Review Project, American Bar
Association, Severe Mental Illness and the Death Penalty (Dec.
2016) pp. 1, 38 <https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/aba/
SevereMentalIllnessandtheDeathPenalty_WhitePaper.pdf> [as
of Apr.6, 2026]; all Internet citations in this opinion are archived
by year, docket number, and case name at <https://courts.ca.gov/
opinions/cited-supreme-court-opinions>.) According to the
American Bar Association, “current mechanisms in the criminal
justice process,” i.e., competency to stand trial, the insanity
defense, mitigating factors at the penalty phase of a capital trial,
and competency to be executed, “do not adequately protect
defendants with severe mental illness against death sentences
and executions.” (Id. at p. 38; see generally id. at pp. 19–25.) In
its view, the continued sanctioning of the death penalty for
individuals with severe mental illness is misaligned with both
professional and public consensus and immediate reforms are
necessary. (See id. at pp. 34–38.)
Consistent with that conclusion, some states have enacted
laws that allow individuals charged with aggravated murder,
severe mental illness]; Note, Addressing Defendants Who Are
“Crazy, But Not Crazy Enough”: How Hall v. Florida Changes
the Death Penalty for Mentally Ill Defendants (2016) 47 U.Tol.
L.Rev. 743, 745–746 [evolving standards of decency should lead
the high court to treat mentally ill offenders the same as
individuals with intellectual disabilities and likewise exclude
them from death penalty eligibility].)
4
PEOPLE v. DEEN
Groban, J., concurring
who do not meet “the standard to be found not guilty by reason
of insanity . . . or the standard to be found incompetent to stand
trial,” to nevertheless establish ineligibility for the death
penalty. (Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 2929.025(A)(1)(b); see also Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 532.130(3), 532.135 & 532.140.) Much like
juveniles and intellectually disabled individuals with
“diminished capacities” (Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 318), these
laws make ineligible for the death penalty those persons with
serious mental illness that significantly impaired the person’s
capacity to exercise rational judgment. At current, a person
with severe mental illness is eligible for execution in California
as long as they understand their punishment and the reason for
it. (See Pen. Code, § 3701.) But, as Roper and Atkins remind
us, a person may be competent to stand trial, sane at the time
of the offense, and competent to be sentenced to decades in
prison, yet fundamental notions of human decency may
nonetheless prohibit their eligibility for execution. As the high
court and our court have repeatedly reminded, “ ‘death is
different.’ ” (Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 994;
accord People v. Zimmerman (1984) 36 Cal.3d 154, 158.) Since
defendant’s death sentence was vacated by our opinion on other
grounds, we do not need to decide this issue here. But the time
will come when we need to determine whether executing
someone who is psychotic or schizophrenic or hears voices
offends “ ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.’ ” (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at
p. 561.)
5
PEOPLE v. DEEN
Groban, J., concurring
GROBAN, J.
We Concur:
LIU, J.
EVANS, J.
6
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Deen
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal XX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S092615
Date Filed: April 6, 2026
__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Imperial
Judge: Jeffrey Bruce Jones
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Michael J. Hersek, Mary K. McComb and Galit Lipa, State Public
Defenders, Harry Gruber, Ryan R. Davis and AJ Kutchins, Deputy
State Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General,
Dane R. Gillette and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys
General, Julie L. Garland, Ronald S. Matthias and James William
Bilderback II, Assistant Attorneys General, Robin Urbanski, Holly D.
Wilkens, Charles C. Ragland, Kristine A. Gutierrez and Daniel J.
Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
AJ Kutchins
Deputy State Public Defender
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000
Oakland, CA 94618
(510) 267-3300
Daniel J. Hilton
Deputy Attorney General
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 738-9073