ALEXANDER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

HUNTER ALEXANDER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:26-cv-00525-JPH-MJD

)

JOHN DOES, )

I.R.S., )

U.S. POSTAL, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER SCREENING AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT,

GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,

AND WARNING OF FILING RESTRICTION

This week, plaintiff Hunter Alexander has flooded this Court with frivolous

lawsuits. See Alexander v. Does, Car Makers, 1:26-cv-00528-JMS-KMB (S.D.

Ind. Mar. 18, 2026); Alexander v. Does (old electrical in HUMS, septic in dirt, water

lines in dirt), 1:26-cv-00521-TWP-MG (S.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2026); Alexander v.

John Does (Microwave, Stove, Prop[a]ne, LLC), 1:26-cv-523-MPB-MG (S.D. Ind.

Mar. 18, 2026) (S.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2026); Alexander v. John Does, Trash

Companies, EPA, 1:26-cv-00526-JRS-KMB (S.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2026); and

Alexander v. John Doe, Gas Stations, 1:26-cv-00531-SEB-TAB (S.D. Ind. Mar.

19, 2026).

In this Order, the Court rules on Mr. Alexander's motions, screens and

dismisses his complaint, and warns Mr. Alexander about frivolous litigation.

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

The motion to proceed in forma pauperis, dkt. [3], is granted to the extent

that the plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $18.32. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Whitaker v. Dempsey, 83 F.4th 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 2023)

(stating that even a prisoner with $2000 in assets might be eligible to proceed in

forma pauperis). Mr. Alexander shall have through April 17, 2026, in which to

pay this sum to the clerk of the district court.

He is informed that after the initial partial filing fee is paid, he will be

obligated to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's

income each month that the amount in his account exceeds $10.00, until the

full filing fee of $350.00 is paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). After the initial partial

filing fee is received, a collection order will be issued to the plaintiff and his

custodian.

II. Screening and Dismissal of the Complaint

A. Screening Standard

When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To

determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same

standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).

Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The

Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent

standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d

714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017).

B. The Complaint

Mr. Alexander names the IRS, the U.S. Postal Service, and "John Does" as

defendants.

Mr. Alexander alleges that the U.S Postal Service introduced a new

currency denominated as "$000.59³" which "is considered a tenth" and that this

denomination does not exist. He alleges that this invalid "tenth" currency has

snowballed into tax-related problems. Mr. Alexander alleges that his

incarceration has caused him to lose business documents, which has impeded

his ability to address tax matters and maintain records.

Mr. Alexander seeks damages.

C. Dismissal of the Complaint

The complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim and as

frivolous.

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when it "lacks an arguable

basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An

allegation is factually frivolous when it is "clearly baseless, fanciful, fantastic,

delusional, irrational, or wholly incredible." Felton v. City of Chicago, 827 F.3d

632, 635 (7th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). "A claim is legally frivolous if it is 'based

on an indisputably meritless legal theory.'" Id. (quoting Neitske, 490 U.S. at

327−28). Here, Mr. Alexander's allegation that a new "tenth" denomination has

been introduced is plainly factually frivolous.

Mr. Alexander's claim that he has difficulty filing tax records or

maintaining business records due to his incarceration is not factually frivolous.

But he does not allege, nor could he, that either the IRS or the Postal Service

was involved in this issue. Thus, this claim is dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. See Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d

649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) ("Individual liability under § 1983 … requires personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.") (internal quotation

omitted).

In almost all cases where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the plaintiff

should be provided an opportunity to amend his complaint or show cause why

the case should not be dismissed. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d

1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Without at least an opportunity to amend or to

respond to an order to show cause, an IFP applicant's case could be tossed out

of court without giving the applicant any timely notice or opportunity to be heard

to clarify, contest, or simply request leave to amend."). Such a step is

unnecessary here where there is no chance that Mr. Alexander could file an

amended complaint that states a viable claim related to the allegations, such as

they are, in his complaint. See Egwuenu v. Charles Schwab & Co., 834 F. App'x

245 (7th Cir. Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished) (noting dismissal with prejudice,

without leave to amend, was justified in case where plaintiff had previously filed

frivolous cases about "the same vast, persistent conspiracy."). Accordingly, this

case is dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Final judgment consistent with this Order

shall now issue.

III. Motion for Counsel

Mr. Alexander has filed a motion for assistance recruiting counsel. Dkt. 4.

Litigants in federal civil cases do not have a constitutional or statutory right to

court-appointed counsel. Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2018).

Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) gives courts the authority to "request" counsel.

Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989). As a practical

matter, there are not enough lawyers willing and qualified to accept a pro bono

assignment in every pro se case. See Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th 755, 764 (7th

Cir. 2022) (explaining that courts must be careful stewards of the limited

resource of volunteer lawyers).

Courts may consider the merits of a plaintiff's claim when deciding

whether to recruit counsel. Id. at 766. Here, it would not be in the interest of

justice to recruit counsel for a wholly meritless case. Thus, the motion to appoint

recruited counsel, dkt. [4], is denied.

IV. Warning Regarding Strikes and Frivolous Lawsuits

Because this case is being dismissed for failure to state a claim, Mr.

Alexander is warned that it may constitute a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),

which limits a prisoner's ability to proceed in forma pauperis after having three

cases or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. See Hill v. Madison Cty., Ill., 983 F.3d 904,

906 (7th Cir. 2020) ("It makes good sense for a judge who believes a dismissal to

come within the scope of § 1915(g) to include notice to that effect," even though

later courts must make the conclusive determination of whether each prior

dismissal meets the statutory definition). A plaintiff who has struck out cannot

proceed in forma pauperis unless he alleges that he is "in imminent danger of

serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Additionally, the Court has a duty to deter frivolous filings. "Every paper

filed . . . no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the

institution's limited resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that

these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice."

Montgomery v. Davis, 362 F.3d 956, 957 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting In re McDonald,

489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989)). Frivolous filing behavior cannot be tolerated, and "the

judicial authority to curb it is ample." Support Sys. Int'l v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185,

186 (7th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases).

The Court warns Mr. Alexander that this pattern of litigation must stop,

or he risks filing restrictions. If Mr. Alexander continues to file frivolous

pleadings, the Court will restrict him from filing new actions or motions in this

Court and may elect to assess fines against him.

V. Conclusion

Mr. Alexander's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, dkt. [3], is granted.

He has through April 17, 2026, to pay the Court $18.32. Once he does, the

Court will issue a collection order to collect the rest of the filing fee.! Mr.

Alexander's motion to appoint counsel, dkt. [4], is denied.

This case is dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Final judgment consistent

with this Order shall now issue.

Mr. Alexander is warned that the dismissal of this action may constitute a

strike under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). He is further warned that if he persists in filing

frivolous lawsuits in this Court, the Court may sanction him by restricting him

from filing new actions or motions in this Court or imposing monetary sanctions.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 4/1/2026 Sjamnu Patnaik Hanbore

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

HUNTER ALEXANDER

201044

PENDLETON - CF

PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Inmate Mail/Parcels

4490 West Reformatory Road

PENDLETON, IN 46064

Financial Deputy Clerk

Electronic notice to IDOC

1 Despite the Court's dismissal of this action, Mr. Alexander is still required to pay the

$350.00 filing fee, as it is the filing of the case that triggers the obligation to pay a

filing fee.