holding that district courts have a duty to “screen out” habeas petitions lacking merit on their face under 28 U.S.C. § 2243
How later courts described this case
- holding that district courts have a duty to “screen out” habeas petitions lacking merit on their face under 28 U.S.C. § 2243
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ALEXIS SANCHEZ-GARCIA, ) CASE NO. 4:25 CV 2736
)
Petitioner, ) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER
)
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
) AND ORDER
WARDEN IAN HEALY )
)
Respondent. )
)
)
Pro se petitioner Alexis Sanchez-Garcia, a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at FSL
Elkton, filed the present Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
challenging the determination by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) that he is ineligible to apply
earned time credits under the First Step Act (“FSA”) because he is subject to a Final Order of
Removal. (Doc. No. 1).
In 2024, Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance on
board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and sentenced to 70 months
imprisonment. (See Doc. No. 1) ((D.V.I. No. 3:21-CR-00020, Doc. Nos. 159, 197). Petitioner
alleges that he has earned 225 days of FSA credits and the BOP is improperly denying him
application of those credits. (Doc. No. 1 at 6-7).
According to the Petition, Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies. Prison staff
determined that Petitioner was ineligible to apply time credits because he is subject to a final
order of removal. (Doc. No. 1-2). Petitioner appealed that decision. In response to Petitioner’s
appeal, the BOP Regional Director also advised Petitioner that he is unable to apply any FSA
credits because he is the subject of a final order of removal. (See Doc. No. 1-3). In his appeal to
the Central Office, Petitioner stated that if a final order exists, he would like a copy of the order,
but if one does not exist then he should be receiving FSA credits “considering I have been
participating in the courses offered.” (Doc. No. 1-4).
Federal district courts must conduct an initial review of habeas corpus petitions. See 28
U.S.C. § 2243; Alexander v. N. Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). A
court must deny a petition “if it plainly appears from the Petition and any attached exhibits that
the Petitioner is not entitled to relief” in the district court. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts (applicable to Section 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule
1(b)); see also Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding that district courts
have a duty to “screen out” habeas petitions lacking merit on their face under 28 U.S.C. § 2243).
The First Step Act established a system whereby eligible inmates can participate in
evidence-based recidivism reduction programs to earn time credits to reduce their prison time.
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3632. Under the FSA, an eligible inmate can earn 10 days of time
credits “for every 30 days of successful participation in evidence-based recidivism reduction
programming or productive activities.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(i). An inmate can earn an
additional 5 days during those 30 days if (1) his recidivism-risk rating is minimum or low, and
(2) his risk of recidivism has not increased for two consecutive recidivism assessments by the
-2-
BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii); see also 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(c)(2).
The FSA further provides, however, that a “prisoner is ineligible to apply time credits . .
. if the prisoner is the subject of a final order of removal under any provision of the immigration
laws[.]” See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i); see also 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(a)(2) (stating that for any
inmate eligible to earn FSA credits “who is . . . [s]ubject to a final order of removal . . . the
[BOP] may not apply FSA Time Credits toward prerelease custody or early transfer to
supervised release”). Because Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal, he is ineligible to
apply time credits under the FSA. See Regla-Araujo v. Warden, FCI Elkton, No. 4:25-cv-544,
2025 WL 1532498, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101686, *5 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 2025) (“Based on
the plain language of the statute, petitioner is ineligible to apply FSA time credits because he is
subject to a final order of removal.”).
Accordingly, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is
denied and this action is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Further, the
Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not
be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Dan Aaron Polster 3/13/2026
DAN AARON POLSTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-3-