Opinion

Koenig

Court
District Court, D. Oregon
Filed
Mar 25, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.1%

requiring federal habeas petitioners to first raise their claims to the highest state court before presenting them in federal court

How later courts described this case

  • requiring federal habeas petitioners to first raise their claims to the highest state court before presenting them in federal court

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

MICHAEL RAY KOENIG,

Case No. 2:25-cv-01187-HZ

Petitioner,

OPINION AND ORDER

v.

J. WOODLAND,

Respondent.

Michael Ray Koenig

16109038

Snake River Correctional Institution

777 Stanton Blvd.

Ontario, Oregon 97914

Dan Rayfield, Attorney General

Nick M. Kallstrom, Assistant Attorney General

Department of Justice

1162 Court Street NE

Salem, Oregon 97310

HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge

Petitioner, an adult in custody at the Snake River Correctional Institution, brings this 28

U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus action challenging his 2018 Marion County convictions. Because

Petitioner failed to file this case within the applicable statute of limitations, the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

On June 13, 2016, a Marion County grand jury indicted Petitioner in Case No.

16CR32285 on four counts of Rape in the First Degree, one count of Sodomy in the First Degree

Constituting Domestic Violence, one count of Assault in the Second Degree, one count of

Criminal Mistreatment in the First Degree, one count of Coercion Constituting Domestic

Violence, and one count of Assault in the Fourth Degree. Respondent’s Exhibit 104. On

January 19, 2017, in a case involving a different female victim, a Marion County grand jury

indicted Petitioner in Case No. 17CR3465 on two counts of Rape in the First Degree and one

count of Sodomy in the First Degree. Respondent’s Exhibit 105.

In May 2017, Petitioner proceeded to a bench trial on both indictments. Respondent’s

Exhibits 108, 109. The trial judge ultimately found Petitioner guilty on three counts of Rape in

the First Degree, one count of Sodomy in the First Degree, and two counts of Assault in the

Fourth Degree, and sentenced Petitioner to a total of 360 months of imprisonment. Respondent’s

Exhibits 102, 103. Petitioner appealed, but the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without

opinion and on August 29, 2019, the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. State v. Koenig, 296

Or. App. 490, rev. denied, 365 Or. 533 (2019).

On February 17, 2021, Petitioner filed a petition for state post-conviction relief (“PCR”).

Respondent’s Exhibit 119. Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCR trial court denied relief.

Respondent’s Exhibits 160, 161. Petitioner appealed, but the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed

in an unpublished opinion. Koenig v. Miller, 338 Or. App. 299 (2025). On June 12, 2025, the

Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Koenig v. Miller, 373 Or. 738 (2025).

On July 8, 2025, Petitioner signed the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in this

action, alleging one claim for relief under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and two claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent asks the Court to dismiss the Petition because

Petitioner did not initiate this case within the one-year statute of limitations applicable to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus cases. Petitioner was given the opportunity to file a brief in support

of his petition addressing Respondent’s assertion, but did not do so.

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) was enacted on April 24,

1996. It provides that a one-year statute of limitations applies to federal habeas corpus actions

filed by state prisoners. The one-year period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1).

The period of direct review referenced in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A) also includes the 90-

day period within which a petitioner can file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United

States Supreme Court, whether or not he actually files such a petition. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). If a litigant files a PCR action following the conclusion of his direct

review, so long as the PCR case is “properly filed,” the time during which it and subsequent PCR

appeals remain pending “shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). State court direct or collateral review concludes as of the

last date for seeking any further review in state court, not the date the appellate judgment issues.

Melville v. Shinn, 68 F.4th 1154, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2023).

Equitable tolling is available to toll the one-year statute of limitations applicable to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). A litigant

seeking to invoke equitable tolling must establish: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently; and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from timely filing his

petition. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). A petitioner who fails to file a timely

petition due to his own lack of diligence is not entitled to equitable tolling. Tillema v. Long, 253

F.3d 494, 504 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner bears the burden of showing that this “extraordinary

exclusion” should apply to him. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002).

In this case, the Oregon Supreme Court denied review on August 29, 2019, thereby

concluding Petitioner’s direct appeal in Oregon’s state courts. However, the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations did not begin to run until November 27, 2019, the day after Petitioner’s time to file

for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court ended. The one-year statute of limitations ran unabated

until Petitioner filed his state PCR Petition on February 17, 2021.1 Thus, by the time Petitioner

properly filed for collateral relief at the state level, 448 days had already elapsed.

The pending state PCR action tolled the AEDPA statute of limitations not only through

June 12, 2025, but until the time for seeking reconsideration of that decision passed 14 days

later. See Or. R. App. P. 9.25(1) (petitions for reconsideration of Oregon Supreme Court

decisions may be filed within 14 days after the entry of the order to be challenged); Melville, 68

F.4th at 1160 (the petitioner’s state post-conviction action was “pending” for § 2244’s purposes

until the petitioner “properly and timely” could have moved for reconsideration of Arizona Court

of Appeals decision); Cartwright v. Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, No.

3:22-cv-01510-AA, 2023 WL 6662450, at *1 (D. Or. Oct. 12, 2023) (“Recently, the Ninth

Circuit held that a state application for post-conviction relief is no longer ‘pending’ when ‘no

1 Because the State of Oregon does not follow the “prison mailbox rule,” the filing date of

the PCR Petition is the actual date of filing, not the date Petitioner signed the pleading. See

Baldeagle v. Lampert, 185 Or. App. 326, 330-32 (2002).

other state avenues for relief remain open,’ rather [than] the date on which the state court issues

final judgment or mandate.”) (quoting Melville, 68 F.4th at 1160-61). As a result, the statutory

tolling to which Petitioner was entitled by virtue of his pending state PCR action ended on June

26, 2025. As noted above, Petitioner signed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on July 8,

2025, at which point 460 days of the limitation period had elapsed, missing the one-year statute

of limitations by 95 days.

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is untimely. Petitioner presents no evidence or

argument to equitably toll the limitation period and, as such, the Petition must be dismissed as

untimely.2

CONCLUSION

For the reasons identified above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is

dismissed, with prejudice. The Court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability on the basis

that Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Ma rch 25 , 2026

DATE Marco A. Hernndez

United States District Judge

2 In any event, even if Petitioner had timely filed his Petition, because he did not “fairly

present” any of the claims alleged to the Oregon Supreme Court during the course of his direct

appeal or state PCR proceedings, his claims are procedurally defaulted and would not entitle him

to habeas corpus relief. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982) (requiring federal habeas

petitioners to first raise their claims to the highest state court before presenting them in federal

court).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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