Briddick

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TYLER BRIDDICK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:24-CV-1871-MAB

)

JOHN HOUSEMAN, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is currently before the Court on the motion for summary judgment on

the issue of exhaustion filed by Defendant John Houseman on April 23, 2025 (Doc. 28).

Plaintiff Tyler Briddick did not file a response to the motion within the timeframe for

doing so, nor has he sought leave to file an out-of-time response despite being given the

opportunity to do so (see Doc. 31). For the reasons explained below, Defendant’s motion

(Doc. 28) is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Tyler Briddick, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections,

brought this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional

rights while at Shawnee Correctional Center. He claims that on February 27, 2023, he was

mentally struggling, and he put his arm in the chuckhole of his cell and asked Defendant

John Houseman, a correctional counselor, for a crisis team (Doc. 14, p. 2; see also Doc. 1,

p. 6). Houseman responded by grabbing Plaintiff’s arm, twisting it, and repeatedly

slamming it into the chuckhole (Doc. 14, p. 2; see also Doc. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff never received

care for his mental health or the injuries to his arm (Doc. 14, p. 2; see also Doc. 1, p. 6).

Following a threshold review of the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff was

permitted to proceed on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim (Count 1) and a

deliberate indifference claim (Count 2) against Houseman (Doc. 14, pp. 3, 4).

Defendant Houseman filed his motion for summary judgment on the issue of

exhaustion on April 23, 2025, arguing that Plaintiff did not fully exhaust a single

grievance against him at any time between the date of the incident on February 27, 2023,

and the date he filed this lawsuit on August 13, 2024 (Doc. 28). Plaintiff did not file a

response within the allotted time for doing so. See SDIL-LR 7.1(b)(1) (allowing 30 days to

respond to motion for summary judgment); FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d) (allowing three extra days

when motion was served by mail). However, on January 12, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion

asking for a status update and explaining that he was having issues with the mail at

Menard (Doc. 30). The Court entered an Order, explaining that Defendant Houseman’s

motion for summary judgment was under advisement and that it never received a

response from Plaintiff (Doc. 31). The Court told Plaintiff that if he believed he should be

allowed to submit a late response, he should file a motion by February 23, 2026, asking

for permission to do so (Id.). To date, Plaintiff has not filed anything further with the

Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s task is to view the record

and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party

and decide if there is a genuine material dispute of fact. Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources,

Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2021); Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832,

836 (7th Cir. 2014). In instances like this, where “a nonmovant fails to respond to a motion

for summary judgment, the movant ‘still ha[s] to show that summary judgment was

proper given the undisputed facts,’ with those facts taken as usual in the light most

favorable to the nonmovant.” Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 543 (7th Cir. 2011)).

Normally on summary judgment, the court does not “weigh conflicting evidence,

resolve swearing contests, determine credibility, or ponder which party's version of the

facts is most likely to be true.” Stewart, 14 F.4th at 760. However, when the motion for

summary judgment pertains to a prisoner’s failure to exhaust, the Seventh Circuit has

held that disputed factual questions can and should be resolved by the judge (rather than

a jury) as a preliminary matter in an evidentiary hearing known as a “Pavey hearing.”

Smallwood v. Williams, 59 F.4th 306, 315 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739,

742 (7th Cir. 2008)). Accord Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2015); Roberts v.

Neal, 745 F.3d 232, 234 (7th Cir. 2014). When a prisoner does not raise sufficient factual

allegations to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, then no evidentiary hearing

is necessary. Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Smallwood, 59 F.4th

at 318). After reviewing Defendant’s brief and the evidence in this case, which is

uncontested by Plaintiff, the Court has determined that there are no genuine issues of

material fact and a hearing is not necessary.

FACTS

In this case, Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is deemed an admission that Defendant’s version of the facts is true. SDIL-LR

56.1(g) (“All material facts set forth in a Statement of Material Facts . . . shall be deemed

admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically disputed.”). The Court

thus credits Defendant’s uncontroverted facts so long as they are properly supported by

evidence in the record. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2); Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877,

884 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).

According to grievance records from Shawnee and the ARB, Plaintiff filed four

grievances in the time between the incident with Houseman on February 27, 2023, and

the commencement of this lawsuit on August 13, 2024 (Doc. 28-1, para. 11; Doc. 28-3; Doc.

28-4; Doc. 28-5, para. 14; Doc. 28-6).

The first grievance, emergency grievance #2023-3-54, is dated March 9, 2023, and

it is about a non-working shower at Shawnee and medical treatment for a rash on

Plaintiff’s feet (Doc. 28-4, pp. 1–2; see also Doc. 28-6, pp. 1, 5–8).

The second grievance, emergency grievance #2023-3-56, is dated February 28 but

was signed on March 9, 2023; it is about being denied a bible while on crisis watch (Doc.

28-4, pp. 3–4; see also Doc. 28-6, pp. 1, 9–13).

The third grievance is dated March 19, 2023, but was signed on March 22, 2023,

and filed directly with the ARB because it related to issues at Shawnee but was filed after

Plaintiff had been transferred to Menard (Doc. 28-6, pp. 14–21). The grievance is about a

ticket Plaintiff received following an incident on March 19th where Plaintiff threw urine

and feces out of his cell, the disciplinary proceedings, his transfer to Menard,1 and his

treatment in segregation at Menard (Id.).

The fourth grievance is dated January 17, 2024, and it seems to have been filed

directly with the ARB (see Doc. 28-6, pp. 1, 2–4). The grievance is about Plaintiff’s transfer

to Menard, which he claims caused family grief and resulted in a loss of programs,

extreme mental trauma, and lack of treatment for his mental and physical ailments (Id.).

DISCUSSION

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that a prisoner may not bring a lawsuit

about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available administrative

remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011).

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear the burden of proving.

Pavey, 663 F.3d at 903 (citations omitted). In order for a prisoner to properly exhaust his

or her administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the

place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286

F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). Failure to

do so means failure to exhaust. Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004).

As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance process

outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code to exhaust his claims. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §

504.800, et seq. (2017). Grievances must be filed within 60 days of the incident giving rise

1 Plaintiff was transferred from Shawnee to Menard on March 21, 2023 (Doc. 28-1, para. 14; Doc. 28-2, p. 7).

to the grievance, except if the inmate can demonstrate good cause for not filing it in a

timely manner. Id. at 504.810(a). The standard grievance process requires the inmate to

first submit their grievance to their counselor, then the grievance officer for a decision by

the warden, and then an appeal to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) for a final

determination by the Director of the IDOC. Id. at §§ 504.810(a), 504.830(e), 504.850(a), (d),

(e).

However, if the inmate designates the grievance as an emergency, it is submitted

directly to the warden. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840. If the warden finds that an

emergency exists, then the grievance will be handled on an expedited basis by the

grievance officer; the grievance bypasses the counselor entirely. Id. On the other hand, if

the warden determines that the grievance should not be handled on an emergency basis,

the inmate is notified and must resubmit the grievance through the standard grievance

process. Id.

Finally, if the grievance pertains to disciplinary proceedings that occurred at, or

other issues that pertain to, a facility other than the facility where the inmate is currently

housed, then the inmate must submit the grievance directly to the ARB. 20 ILL. ADMIN.

CODE § 504.870.

Here, the records in this case suggest that the grievance process was available to

Plaintiff, and that he understood it, including how to submit emergency grievances,

which grievances he needed to submit directly to the ARB, and all of the steps to fully

exhaust a grievance. There is no evidence, however, that Plaintiff filed a grievance

pertaining to the incident with Defendant Houseman on February 27, 2023. The only

grievances in the record are for wholly unrelated incidents and issues; Houseman is not

named in any of them, nor do they describe any of the conduct that Plaintiff alleged in

the complaint. These grievances, therefore, did not serve to put prison officials on notice

of any purported problem with Houseman and thus cannot serve to exhaust Plaintiff’s

claim against him in this lawsuit. See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2020)

(noting that the purpose of exhaustion is to give “a prison ‘notice of, and on opportunity

to correct, a problem.’” (quoting Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013))). See

also 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(c) (requiring that grievances “contain factual details

regarding each aspect of the offender's complaint, including what happened, when,

where and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in

the complaint.”).

CONCLUSION

Defendant John Houseman’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of

exhaustion (Doc. 28) is GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED without prejudice due

to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and

close this case on the Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 24, 2026

s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE

Plaintiff is advised that this is a final decision ending his case in this Court. If

Plaintiff wishes to contest this decision, he can appeal to the Seventh Circuit by filing a

notice of appeal in the district court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App.

P. 4(a)(1)(A). This deadline can be briefly extended upon a motion demonstrating

excusable neglect or good cause. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A), (C). See also Sherman v. Quinn,

668 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining the good cause and excusable neglect

standards); Abuelyaman v. Illinois State Univ., 667 F.3d 800, 807 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining

the excusable neglect standard).

Plaintiff also has the option—prior to filing a notice of appeal—of filing a post-

judgment motion under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60 asking the undersigned to reconsider the

judgment. Any such motion, so long as it is in proper form and timely filed, will stop the

clock for filing a notice of appeal until the district court has decided the motion. Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a); Robinson v. Sweeny, 794 F.3d 782, 783 (7th Cir. 2015). To be “proper,” the

motion must state the grounds for relief from the adverse judgment. Robinson, 794 F.3d

at 783.2 To be timely, the motion must be filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment,

and that deadline cannot be extended. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv), (vi); Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2); Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 507 (2020). Once the motion is

ruled on, the 30-day clock to file a notice of appeal will begin anew. Banister, 590 U.S. at

2 Accord Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir. 2014) (motion will toll time to appeal so long

as it contains an identifiable and substantive reason for reconsidering); Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 707

(7th Cir. 2010) (in order to toll time for filing notice of appeal, motion must comply with Rule 7.1(b)(1) and

“state with particularity the grounds for seeking the order” and “the relief sought”).

508 (citing Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv)).

The current cost of filing an appeal with the Seventh Circuit is $605.00. The filing

fee is due at the time the notice of appeal is filed. Fed. R. App. P. 3(e). If Plaintiff cannot

afford to pay the entire filing fee up front, he must file a motion for leave to appeal in

forma pauperis (“IFP motion”) along with a recent statement for his prison trust fund

account. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). The IFP motion must set forth the issues Plaintiff

plans to present on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C).