Cortese

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RICK LARRY CORTESE JR.,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-01830

v.

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

FRANK BISIGNANO,1

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is a January 27, 2026, report and recommendation filed by

Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson recommending that the decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security, (hereinafter, “the Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff Rick Larry Cortese Jr’s

(“Cortese”) claims for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social

Security Act be affirmed. (Doc. 17). On February 7, 2026, Cortese filed a timely objection to

the report. (Doc. 18). Based on the Court's review of the relevant filings along with the report,

Cortese’s objection is overruled, and the report will be adopted in its entirety.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

“A district court may ‘designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including

evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and

recommendations for the disposition’ of certain matters pending before the court.” Brown v.

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)). Within fourteen

1 The Court agrees with Judge Carlson’s finding that the previous Commissioner of

Social Security, Martin O’Malley, should be substituted with the current Commissioner of

Social Security, Frank Bisignano. (Doc. 17, at 1 n.2); see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

166 n.11 (1985) (stating “[i]n an official-capacity action in federal court, death or replacement

of the named official will result in automatic substitution of the official's successor in office”)

days of being served a report and recommendation, “any party may serve and file written

objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When a party timely files objections, the district court is to conduct a de

novo review of the challenged portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings unless the objection

is “not timely or not specific.” Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6–7 (3d Cir.1984); 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The Court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and

recommendations.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “Although the standard is de novo, the extent of

review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may rely on

the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.” Rahman v.

Gartley, No. CV 3:23-363, 2024 WL 555894, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2024) (citing United v.

Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

II. DISCUSSION

Cortese applied for DIB on April 24, 2022, alleging that he suffered from a disability

beginning September 18, 2021, due to the combined effects of various conditions. (Doc. 8-2,

at 11-14; Doc. 17, at 6). Cortese did not work between September 18, 2021, through

September 30, 2022. (Doc. 8-2, at 13). Cortese was twenty-eight years old at the time of the

alleged onset of his disability, has a high school education, and previously worked as an

electronics technician. (Doc. 8-2, at 25; Doc. 17, at 6).

On November 9, 2023, an administrative law judge (the “ALJ”) held a hearing on

Cortese’s claim for DIB. (Doc. 8-2, at 11). At the hearing the ALJ applied the five-step process

used to determine whether a claimant is entitled to DIB. (Doc. 8-2, at 12); see 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4) (providing the five-step process). At step one, the ALJ must determine whether

a claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, and if they are, they are not considered

disabled. (Doc. 8-2, at 12); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ must

determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment with sufficient duration, and if they

do not, they are not considered disabled. (Doc. 8-2, at 12); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

The third step requires the ALJ to determine if the claimant suffers from a medical impairment

sufficiently severe in terms of duration, effect on basic work activities, and based on criteria

listed at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). (Doc. 8-2, at 12-13); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If

the claimant’s disability is not sufficiently severe, they are not considered disabled. (Doc. 8-2,

at 12-13); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(iii). At step four, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s

residual functional capacity and their past relevant work. (Doc. 8-2, at 13); see 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can continue to do their past work, they are not considered

disabled. (Doc. 8-2, at 13); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). In the fifth and final step, the

ALJ must consider the claimant’s residual functional capacity and age, education, and work

experience to determine if the claimant can adjust to other work. (Doc. 8-2, at 13); see 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can transition to other work, they are not

considered disabled. (Doc. 8-2, at 13); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

The ALJ found that Cortese is not entitled to DIB because although his impairments

limit his functional capacity and ability to continue his past work, they are not sufficiently

severe under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d), Cortese could continue to perform light work, and

Cortese could adjust to other work. (Doc. 8-2, at 13-26). In his report, Judge Carlson

considered the complete record before the ALJ and determined that the Court should not

overturn the ALJ’s finding because there was “substantial evidence in the record” supporting

the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 17, at 25-46). Cortese objects to the report because, according to

Cortese, Judge Carlson did not sufficiently address the ALJ’s failure to discuss and consider

evidence related to the side effects Cortese experienced due to medication he took for his

impairments, such as Prednisone and psychotropic medication. (Doc. 18, at 2).

The role of courts in reviewing an ALJ’s decision is not to determine whether the ALJ

made the correct decision, but rather, to determine whether there is “substantial evidence”

supporting the decision. See Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).

“Substantial evidence ‘does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.’” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 555 (1988)); see also Johnson, 529 F.3d at 200. “A court may not weigh the

evidence or substitute its own findings for the Commissioner’s.” Michael Edward Davern v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 660 F. App’x 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2016). The Court may not overturn the

ALJ and Commissioner’s decision simply because the Court would have interpreted evidence

differently or came to a different factual conclusion. See Gaddis v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 417 F.

App'x 106, 107 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (stating “courts are bound by [the

Commissioner and ALJ’s] findings even if they would have decided the factual inquiry

differently”); see also Mease v. Berryhill, No. CV 17-2327, 2018 WL 6521830, at *1 (E.D. Pa.

Dec. 12, 2018) (stating the same).

However, while the substantial evidence standard is deferential to the ALJ and the

Commissioner’s findings, the ALJ does not meet the standard by relying on a single piece of

evidence if they ignore or fail to address conflicting pieces of evidence. See Nazario v. Comm'r

Soc. Sec., 794 F. App'x 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2019) (nonpresidential) (stating “[a] single piece of

evidence . . . will not satisfy the substantiality test if the [Commissioner] ignores, or fails to

resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence” (quoting Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d

110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)). However, this rule does not mean that an ALJ must discuss every

piece of evidence in the record so long as the ALJ considers contrary evidence and makes a

reasonable decision to weigh other evidence more heavily. See Pintal v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 602

F. App'x 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2015) (nonprecedential) (stating “an ALJ is not required to cite every

piece of evidence in the record”); see also Sean B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 24-10922, 2025

WL 2848391, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2025) (stating “notwithstanding that [the ALJ] did not cite

every single piece of evidence that Plaintiff relies on in his briefing, the ALJ's determination

was nonetheless supported by substantial evidence”).

Cortese argues that Judge Carlson erred by understating the amount of evidence in the

record concerning the side effects Cortese experienced from medication he took, such as

Prednisone and medication for his mental health issues. (Doc. 18, at 2). Cortese avers that the

ALJ’s decision is not based on substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to consider

evidence from Cortese’s medical records and testimony that Cortese suffered from severe side

effects. (Doc. 18, at 2-7). The Court disagrees with Cortese’s characterizations of the ALJ’s

decision and agrees with Judge Carlson’s determination that the ALJ’s decision was based on

substantial evidence. The ALJ extensively discussed Cortese’s medical records, considered

parts of the records indicating Cortese experienced side effects from his various medications,

and concluded that the medical records overall show that Cortese’s functionality improved

because of his treatments. (Doc. 8-2, at 20-21). The ALJ cited various parts of Cortese’s

medical records discussing side effect and noted that at various points Cortese experienced

either “minimal side effect” or more major medical conditions that “may be related to the use

of a steroid medication.” (Doc. 8-2, at 20). The ALJ also discussed medical records showing

that Cortese experienced medical issues that “may be related to psychotropic medication.”

(Doc. 8-2, at 20-21). While Cortese is correct that certain evidence in the record indicates that

he suffered from medication side effects, the ALJ did not simply ignore the fact that Cortese

experienced side effects from Prednisone and other medications as Cortese suggests. (Doc. 8-

2, at 20-21; Doc. 18, at 12-17). Rather, the ALJ weighed parts of the medical record indicating

that Cortese improved overall during treatment along with the evidence such as expert

testimony introduced by the government and found that the evidence suggesting Cortese

could perform certain work outweighed evidence that he could not function due to his

condition or side effects from medication. (Doc. 8-2, at 20-26). The Court cannot reweigh this

evidence or overturn the ALJ or Commissioner’s decision simply because a reasonable jurist

could come to a different conclusion. See Davern, 660 F. App’x at 174; see also Gaddis, 417 F.

App’x at 107 n.3. Accordingly, the Court agrees with Judge Carlson that the ALJ and the

Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and the Court will ADOPT

the report as the opinion of the court. (Doc. 17, at 25-45).

III.CONCLUSION

The Court agrees with the report’s sound reasoning and discerns no error of law.

Accordingly, the report (Doc. 17) is ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY as the opinion of the

Court. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and the Clerk of Court is directed

to enter judgment in the Commissioner’s favor and CLOSE this case.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: March 2, 2026 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge