Raycraft

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

EDUVIGES MARTINEZ HERNANDEZ, ) CASE NO. 3:25-CV-02591-DAR

)

Petitioner, )

) JUDGE DAVID A. RUIZ

vs. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

)

KEVIN RAYCRAFT, et al., ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

) JONATHAN D. GREENBERG

Respondents. )

) REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

)

This matter is before the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 72.2. Before the Court is the Petition

of Eduviges Martinez Hernandez (“Martinez Hernandez” or “Petitioner”), for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. No. 1) and the Return of Writ/Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 9). Petitioner

is being held in the custody of the Detroit Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”) at the Corrections Center of Northwest Ohio. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.)

For the following reasons, it is recommended that the Court DISMISS all Respondents from this

action except for Defendant Raycraft. It is further recommended that the Court GRANT Martinez

Hernandez’s Petition and ORDER Respondent to provide Martinez Hernandez with a bond hearing under

8. U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7) days of the adoption of this Report and Recommendation.

I. Factual Background1

Martinez Hernandez, a 60-year-old woman, has resided in the United States since 1998, mainly in

the Detroit, Michigan area. (Doc. No. 1 at 10.)

On August 20, 2025, Martinez Hernandez took a wrong turn on a highway in Detroit, which led her

to a checkpoint at the U.S./Canada border. (Id.) Customs and Border Patrol officials arrested her, and

Martinez Hernandez has since been detained at the Corrections Center of Northwest Ohio in Stryker, Ohio.

(Id.)

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) placed Martinez Hernandez in removal proceedings

before the Cleveland Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. (Id.) DHS charged Martinez

Hernandez with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as someone who entered the United

States without inspection, and under 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as an immigrant who was not in possession

of a valid entry document at the time of application for admission. (Id. at 10-11.)

Martinez Hernandez is a single mother and lived with both of her children her prior to her detention.

(Id. at 11.) One child is a U.S. citizen and the other resides legally in the United States as a recipient of

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. (Id.) Martinez Hernandez states that she has no prior arrests or

criminal history anywhere in the world, and she has never before been charged with any violation of U.S.

immigration laws. (Id.) “Based on her U.S. citizenship of her one child, her lengthy residence in the United

States, and her lack of criminal history,” Martinez Hernandez filed an application for Cancellation of Removal

for Non-Permanent Residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) with the immigration court. (Id.)

After Martinez Hernandez’s arrest and transfer to the Corrections Center of Northwest Ohio, “ICE

issued a custody determination to continue [Martinez Hernandez]’s detention without an opportunity to post

1 “[D]ocuments attached to the pleadings become part of the pleadings and may be considered” by the Court

on a motion to dismiss. Alexander v. N. Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545-46 (6th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007)).

bond or be released on other conditions.” (Id.)

On October 16, 2025, Martinez Hernandez requested a bond redetermination hearing before an

immigration judge (“IJ”). (Doc. No. 1-2 at 2-4.) On October 28, 2025, the IJ determined that the court

lacked jurisdiction to hold a custody hearing based on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision

in Matter of Yajure Hurtado. (Doc. No. 1-3; Doc. No. 9-1.)

On November 19, 2025, Martinez Hernandez timely appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA (Doc. No.

1-4), which appears to remain pending. (Doc. No. 1 at 12; Doc. No. 10 at 8.)

On November 28, 2025, Martinez Hernandez filed a motion requesting the Cleveland Immigration

Court hold a bond hearing based on her class membership in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-

CV-1873 (C.D. Cal.). (Doc. No. 10 at 14-15; Doc. No. 10-2.)

On December 2, 2025, the IJ denied the motion. (Doc. No. 10-4 at 1-2.)

On December 20, 2025, Martinez Hernandez filed another motion requesting the Cleveland

Immigration Court hold a bond hearing based on her class membership in Maldonado Bautista. (Doc. No.

10 at 14-15; Doc. No. 10-3.)

On January 2, 2026, the IJ denied the motion. (Doc. No. 10-4 at 3-4.)

A master hearing before the immigration court set for December 17, 2025 was continued to January

14, 2026, at the request of Martinez Hernandez. (Doc. No. 9 at PageID# 118; Doc. No. 9-2.) It appears the

master hearing is now set for March 11, 2026. (Doc. No. 10 at 9; Doc. No. 10-1.)

II. Federal Habeas Petition

On November 25, 2025, Martinez Hernandez filed her habeas Petition pursuant to § 2241. (Doc.

No. 1.) Attached to the Petition was an Application for Issuance of an Order to Show Cause pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2243, asking the Court to an issue an order directing Respondents to show cause within three days

why the Petition should not be granted. (Doc. No. 1-1.)

On December 10, 2025, the Court referred this matter to the undersigned for a report and

recommendation regarding the Petition. (Doc. No. 5.) The Court disagreed that § 2243 compelled the Court

to order the government to respond within three days. (Id.) The Court left the matter of expedited briefing

“to the sound discretion” of the undersigned. (Id.)

On December 11, 2025, the Court issued an Order establishing an expedited briefing schedule. (Id.

at 6.)

On January 12, 2026, Respondents filed a Response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc.

No. 9.)

On February 5, 2026, Martinez Hernandez filed the Traverse. (Doc. No. 10.)

On February 12, 2026, Respondents filed a Reply in Support of Dismissing the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. (Doc. No. 17.)

II. Law and Analysis

A. Proper Respondent

In a footnote, Respondents argue that “[i]n the ICE habeas context,” the proper respondent is the

“Field Office Director for ICE.” (Doc. No. 9 at PageID# 117 n.1.) Therefore, Respondents assert, the

remaining Respondents are not proper respondents. (Id.) (citing Mendoza v. Raycraft, No. 4:25cv2183,

2025 WL 3157796, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2025)).

The law requires that a district court shall direct a writ of habeas corpus “to the person having

custody of the person detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 319 (6th Cir. 2003)

(citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443

(1973)) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person

who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.”).

The Sixth Circuit noted that, historically, “the question of who is ‘the custodian,’ and therefore the

appropriate respondent in a habeas suit, depends primarily on who has power over the petitioner and ... on

the convenience of the parties and the court.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 319 (citing Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d

106, 122 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1004, 119 S.Ct. 1141, 143 L.Ed.2d 209 (1999)). The “general

rule” requires a petitioner to name “the individual having day-to-day control over the facility in which [the

petitioner] is being detained” as a respondent to his habeas corpus petition. Id. (citing Vasquez v. Reno, 233

F.3d 688, 696 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816, 122 S.Ct. 43, 151 L.Ed.2d 15 (2001)). This is

known as the “immediate custodian rule.” Id.

The question for an alien held in a state or county prison under an agreement with ICE is whether

their “immediate custodian” is the warden of the facility where the alien is detained or the ICE District

Director of the district where the alien is being detained. Id. at 320. The Sixth Circuit addressed this issue

in Roman. After considering the various ways in which other courts handled this issue, they concluded that

“although the warden of each detention facility technically has day-to-day control over alien detainees, the

INS District Director for the district where a detention facility is located ‘has power over’ alien habeas

corpus petitioners,” and is the proper respondent to a habeas petition by an alien in ICE custody. Id. (citing

Henderson, 157 F.3d at 122); see also Orozco-Valenzuela v. Holder, No. 1:14 CV 1669, 2015 WL 1530631,

at *4 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 2015) (Field Office Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE is the proper

respondent for a habeas petition brought by an alien in ICE custody at detention facilities in Ohio); Khodr

v. Adducci, 697 F. Supp. 2d 774, 776 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (“The Court will follow appropriate Sixth Circuit

authority and find the ICE District Director is the proper party to be sued in the habeas case here.”).

Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the proper respondent is Respondent Kevin Raycraft, Field Office

Director of the Detroit Field Office. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that all other Respondents be

dismissed from this action.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Respondents argue that Martinez Hernandez’s claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Doc. No. 9 at PageID# 118.) Respondents assert

that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) bars review of Martinez Hernandez’s claims, as “[t]he Secretary of Homeland

Security’s decision to commence removal proceedings, includes the decision to detain an alien pending such

removal proceedings.” (Id.) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

Respondents further argue that that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) also bars review of Martinez Hernandez’s

claims, as it “is an ‘unmistakable zipper clause’ that ‘channels judicial review of all [claims arising from

deportation proceedings]’ to a court of appeals in the first instance.” (Id. at PageID# 119) (citation omitted)

(additional internal quotation marks omitted). Respondents maintain that, reading § 1252(b)(9) and 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(5) together, “‘any issue—whether legal or factual—arising from any removal-related activity can

be reviewed only through the [petition-for-review] process.’” (Id.) (citations omitted). Since Martinez

Hernandez “challenges the decision and action to detain her, which arises from DHS’s decision to

commence removal proceedings,” Respondents argue that it “is thus an ‘action taken . . . to remove [her]

from the United States.’” (Id. at PageID# 120) (citations omitted). Citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2),

Respondents assert that “Congress severely limited this Court’s jurisdiction to three narrowly tailored issues:

whether petitioner is an alien; whether the petitioner was ordered removed; and whether petitioner has been

lawfully admitted and such status has not been terminated.” (Id. at PageID# 121.) As Martinez Hernandez’s

Petition does not challenge any of these three things, Respondents maintain that “the statute does not confer

this Court with jurisdiction.” (Id.)

Martinez Hernandez responds that neither statutory provision bars jurisdiction in this case. (Doc.

No. 10 at 3.) Martinez Hernandez argues that the Supreme Court has rejected Respondents’ argument

regarding the phrase “commence proceedings” in § 1252(g). (Id.) (citing Reno v. Am. Arab Anti-

Discrimination Comm., 25 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)). In addition, Martinez Hernandez asserts that Respondents

fail to cite any Sixth Circuit precedent supporting Respondents’ claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction over

the Petition pursuant to § 1252(g). (Id. at 4.) Martinez Hernandez maintains that the out-of-circuit cases on

which Respondents rely are distinguishable, as Martinez Hernandez is not subject to a final order of removal.

(Id.) Martinez Hernandez further argues that the Supreme Court also rejected Respondents’ interpretation

of the phrase “arising from” in § 1252(b)(9). (Id.) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 293 (2018)).

Martinez Hernandez asserts that Respondents fail to “provide[] any legal basis for the proposition that this

court lacks jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s case.” (Id. at 5.)

In its Reply in Support of Dismissing the Petition, Respondents cite a Third Circuit case holding that

§ 1252(b)(9) “bars subject matter jurisdiction over habeas claims arising from actions to remove an alien,

including those where the injury cannot be remedied after the fact – such as alleged illegal detention claims.”

(Doc. No. 17 at 3) (citing Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259 (3d Cir. 2026)).

The undersigned notes that there is a line of cases within this district holding that the Court lacks

jurisdiction over habeas petitions such as this one. See, e.g., Munoz Nataren v. Raycraft, No. 4:26cv212,

2026 WL 214368, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2026); Amaya-Velis v. Raycraft, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL

100596, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2026). However, other opinions from this Court—which Respondents

fail to acknowledge—hold that the Court has jurisdiction over such habeas cases. See, e.g., Hu v. Raycraft,

Case No. 4:26-cv-113, 2026 WL 539117, at **2-5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2026) (report and recommendation);

Leiva Lemus v. Lynch, Case No. 4:26-cv-203, 2026 WL 496731, at **2-5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2026); Singh

v. Stevens, Case No. 3:26-CV-133, --- F. Supp. 3d. ---, 2026 WL 456489, at **2-3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 18,

2026); Zhen v. Doe, Case No. 3:25-cv-01507-PAB, 2025 WL 2258586, at **3-4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2025).

In Leiva Lemus, the Court rejected Respondents’ arguments that this Court lacked jurisdiction under

§1252(g) as follows:

The government next argues that § 1252(g) bars jurisdiction over Lemus’s

petition. (Doc. No. 6, at 10.) Section 1252(g) provides, in relevant part, “no

court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any

alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence

proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien

under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). As it did under § 1252(b)(9), the

government again argues that issues regarding an immigrant’s detention and

their entitlement to a bond hearing “aris[e] from” the decision to commence

removal proceedings and thus fall within § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional bar. (Doc.

No. 6, at 10.) Again, the government reads the statute too expansively.

The Supreme Court rejected as “implausible” that Congress intended § 1252(g)

to cover “all claims arising from deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Am.-Arab

Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482, 119 S. Ct. 936, 142 L. Ed. 2d

940 (1999) (hereinafter, “AADC”). Rather, the Supreme Court “narrow[ly]

read[ ]” § 1252(g), id. at 487, to only cover the “three discrete actions that the

Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings,

adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Id. at 482 (emphasis in original).

The Supreme Court adopted this narrow reading in light of § 1252(g)’s specific

purpose: to protect the executive branch’s discretion to decline pursuit of

certain individuals without prejudice to its ability to pursue others.3 See id. at

483–84.

Here, Lemus does not challenge the attorney general’s decision to commence

removal proceedings, to adjudicate his case, to execute a removal order, or any

exercise of discretion within those three discrete tasks. Instead, Lemus

challenges the attorney general’s failure to provide him a bond hearing to which

he claims statutory entitlement. While an immigrant’s detention is technically

related to the attorney general’s decision to commence proceedings, that

technical relation is insufficient to trigger § 1252(g). See Jennings, 583 U.S. at

294 (plurality) (“[In AADC,] [w]e did not interpret [§ 1252(g)] to sweep in any

claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions[.]”

(citing AADC, 525 U.S. at 482–83)); Alonso v. Tindall, No. 3:25-cv-652, 2025

WL 3083920, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 4, 2025) (“A claim of unlawful detention

[without a bond hearing] does not arise from the commencement of removal

proceedings ‘within the meaning of § 1252(g) simply because the claim relates

to that discretionary, prosecutorial decision.’” (quoting Ozturk v. Hyde, 136

F.4th 382, 397 (2d Cir. 2025)) (cleaned up) (further citations omitted)). Most

courts in the Sixth Circuit to have addressed the issue agree that challenges to

the government’s failure to provide a detained immigrant with a bond hearing

do not fall within the narrow scope of § 1252(g). See e.g., Puerto-Hernandez v.

Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28,

2025); Alonso, 2025 WL 3083920, at *3. Section 1252(g) does not bar review

of Lemus’s petition.

The out-of-circuit case law on which the government relies is all

distinguishable. Alvarez v. ICE and the three Central District of California cases

the government cites are distinguishable because the claimants there, rather

than challenging a failure to provide a bond hearing, challenged detention itself.

See Alvarez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir.

2016); Valencia-Mejia v. United States, No. 08-cv-2943, 2008 WL 4286979, at

*1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2008); Wang v. United States, No. 10-cv-389, 2010 WL

11463156, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2010); Herrera-Correra v. United States,

No. 08-cv-2941, 2008 WL 11336833, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008). Tazu v.

Att’y Gen. United States is even more distinguishable; the petitioner there

directly challenged execution of a pending removal order. See 975 F.3d 292,

294 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[Petitioner] filed a habeas petition, asking the [d]istrict

[c]ourt to stop the Attorney General from executing his valid removal

order[.]”). The government points to no binding or persuasive authority

supporting the proposition that § 1252(g) bars Lemus’s petition. As with §

1252(b)(9), § 1252(g) presents no bar here.

2026 WL 496731 at **4-5.

In Hu, the Court rejected Respondents’ arguments that this Court lacked jurisdiction under

§1252(b)(9) as follows:

Next, Respondents argue that Sections 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9) bar this

Court’s “review of decision to detain and/or remove.” Doc. 9, at 8. Section

1252(a)(5) states that the court of appeals is the “sole and exclusive means for

judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of

this chapter” except for subsection (e). Under Section 1252(b)(9):

Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation

and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from

any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the

United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial

review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided

in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under

Section 2241 of Title 38 or any other habeas corpus provision, by

section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law

(statutory or nonstatutory), to review an order or such questions of law

or fact.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

The Supreme Court has “described § 1252(b)(9) as a ‘zipper clause’ which

“consolidate[s] ‘judicial review’ of immigration proceedings into one action in

the court of appeals.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313.5 But the Court has made clear

that “it applies only ‘[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under

subsection (a)(1).’” Id. (emphasis added). As a result, “§ 1252(b)(9) does not

clearly apply to actions brought pursuant to the general habeas statute, and thus

cannot repeal that statute either in part or in whole.” Id. at 314; see id. at 302

(noting that the writ of habeas corpus historically “encompassed detentions

based on errors of law, including the erroneous application or interpretation of

statutes”); see also Ozturk, 136 F.4th at 399. Here, Hu is not challenging an

order of removal. Respondents therefore have not shown that section

1252(b)(9)’s jurisdictional-bar applies to Hu’s petition.

2026 WL 539117 at *4. See also Lopez v. Noem, Case No. 3:26 CV 128, 2026 WL 395202, at *4 n.5 (N.D.

Ohio Feb. 12, 2026) (“Respondents misleadingly cite Khalil as supporting their proposition that Section

1252(b)(9) divests district courts of subject matter jurisdiction over habeas claims arising from actions to

remove noncitizens, including alleged illegal detention claims. . . . An actual review of Khalil, however,

illustrates that this Court actually retains jurisdiction over detention-based claims like Petitioner’s.”)

The Court finds persuasive the majority of opinions in this district finding that §§ 1252(g) and

1252(b)(9) do not bar the Court from considering habeas petitions such as this one. Therefore, the Court

finds it has jurisdiction over Martinez Hernandez’s Petition challenging her lack of a bond hearing.2

C. Exhaustion

Respondents argue that the Court should dismiss the Petition, as Martinez Hernandez has failed to

exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 9 at PageID# 121.) Respondents assert that other judges in this

district have dismissed similar habeas petitions for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Id. at

PageID# 122) (citations omitted).

Martinez Hernandez argues that she has attempted to exhaust all her administrative remedies. (Doc.

No. 10 at 8.) However, “requiring [her] to pursue further administrative remedies would certainly be futile

and result in additional hardship for [her]….” (Id.) Martinez Hernandez asserts that she appealed to the

BIA “in vain,” as the BIA “is bound by [its] own precedent.” (Id.)

2 As noted supra, in Leiva Lemus, the Court found the distinct between a challenge to detention, versus a

challenge to a lack of a bond hearing, to be an important one for jurisdictional purposes. 2026 WL 496731

at **2-5. The Court concluded a challenge to detention is “likely barred.” Id. at *4.

“[T]he Sixth Circuit has not yet decided whether courts should impose prudential exhaustion in the

context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful mandatory detention.” Ramirez Moreno Ramirez

Moreno v. Lynch, Case No. 4:26 CV 275, 2026 WL 496634, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2026) (citations

omitted). “Without guidance, the courts in this circuit have largely applied Ninth Circuit precedent but have

recached conflicting results. Compare Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 778 (N.D. Ohio

2025) (‘Here, all three [Ninth Circuit] factors weigh against requiring exhaustion.’), with Monroy Villalta

v. Greene, 794 F. Supp. 3d 528, 531 (N.D. Ohio 2025) (dismissing petition for failing to exhaust available

administrative remedies).” Ramirez Moreno, 2026 WL 496634, at *2.

In Ramirez Moreno, the Court found the petition was not required to exhaust his administrative

remedies, explaining as follows:

Applying these factors, this Court finds that all three weigh against requiring

exhaustion. In so finding, this Court joins several other in this circuit that have

reached the same conclusion in analogous cases. E.g., Echavvarria Morales v.

Noem, 2026 WL 100583, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2026); Lopez-Campos, 797

F. Supp. 3d at 778; Puerto-Hernandez, 2025 WL 3012033, at *7.

First, the issue raised in the Petition is purely legal in nature and does not

require the agency to develop the record. The Petition requires the Court to

interpret two statutes (Section 1226(a) and Section 1225(b)(2)(A)) to determine

which applies to Petitioner. Matters of statutory interpretation belong

historically within the province of the courts. Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (“[C]ourts need not and under the

[Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an agency

interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”).

Second, there is nothing in the record that suggests that relaxing the exhaustion

requirement here would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative

scheme. Petitioner raises a constitutional challenge to his continued detention

without a bond hearing. The Sixth Circuit has previously signaled that such

challenges are beyond administrative review. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d

273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n alien’s due process challenge generally does

not require exhaustion (the BIA lacks authority to review constitutional

challenges)[.]”); accord Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 494 (6th Cir. 2006)

(“Exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required in cases of non-

frivolous constitutional challenges to an agency’s procedures.”).

Third, administrative review is not likely to change Respondents’ view that

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to Petitioner. BIA (the reviewing agency), in

conjunction with the Department of Justice, has made clear its interpretation

mandating detention of noncitizens like Petitioner during removal proceedings.

Puerto-Hernandez, 2025 WL 3012033, at *7 (“It is simply implausible that the

BIA would change its position, regardless of the arguments set forth in this

particular case, thus precluding meaningful review.” (citing See Matter of

Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025)).

Further, even if this Court were to find that prudential concerns warranted

exhaustion, it could still choose to waive exhaustion when the “legal question

is fit for resolution and delay means hardship, or when exhaustion would prove

futile.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Shearson, 725 F.3d at

594 (“[T]here are some exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. For example,

exhaustion may not be required when the administrative remedy ‘does not serve

the purposes behind the exhaustion doctrine[ ],’ if the ‘administrative remedies

are inadequate or not efficacious,’ or ‘where pursuit of administrative remedies

would be a futile gesture.’ ” (citation omitted)).

Here, as discussed above, the legal question is fit for exhaustion and the pursuit

of administrative remedies would almost certainly be a futile gesture. The

Petition is just one—of what the Court can only estimate are thousands—of

petitions seeking analogous relief because of BIA’s and ICE’s recent

interpretative shift. Immigration courts across the country are denying bond

hearings for noncitizens like Petitioner, claiming the courts lack jurisdiction

under recent BIA guidance. This Court cannot think of anything more clearly

amounting to a “futile gesture” than requiring Petitioner to spend time

appealing the Immigration Court’s decision to deny him a bond hearing to the

very agency that passed down that unequivocal directive. See Matter of Yajure

Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025) (holding that any individual who

has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was later detained is no

longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under §

1225(b)(2)(A)). See also Contreras-Lomeli v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2976739, at

*4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2025) (“Waiver based on futility is appropriate when

an administrative agency ‘has predetermined the disputed issue’ by having a

‘clearly stated position’ that the petitioner is not eligible for the relief sought.”

(quoting Cooper v. Zych, 2009 WL 2711957, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25,

2009))); Barco Mercado v. Francis, 2025 WL 3295903, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.

26, 2025) (“To force [Petitioner] to request a bond hearing from an immigration

judge—which would be denied under the BIA’s recent decision and, even if it

were held, would result in release being denied under that decision—and then

appeal that denial to the same BIA that has prevented immigration judges from

hearing bond requests in the first place, all before allowing [Petitioner] to seek

judicial review [of his detention]...would be ‘Kafkaesque.’ ”).

2026 WL 496634 at **2-3. See also Gonzalez Lopez v. Raycraft, Case No. 4:25CV2449, 2025 WL 3280344,

at **2-4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 2025) (finding prudential exhaustion not required).

This Court agrees with the reasoning in Ramirez Moreno and Gonzalez Lopez and concludes that

prudential exhaustion is not required in this case. Furthermore, even if prudential concerns warrant

exhaustion, given the facts of this case, administrative exhaustion should be waived.

D. Merits

Martinez Hernandez argues that her mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) “violates

the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),” as § 1225(b)(2)(A) “does not apply to

individuals like Petitioner who previously entered and are now residing in the United States.” (Doc. No. 1

at 3.) Instead, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which “allows for release on conditional parole or bond,” applies to

individuals such as Martinez Hernandez. (Id.) Martinez Hernandez also alleges a due process violation

based on her mandatory continued detention. (Id. at 13-14.)

Respondents argue that Martinez Hernandez “is an applicant for admission (specifically, an alien

present without admission)” and was “placed directly into removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.”

(Doc. No. 9 at PageID# 127.) Respondents assert that Martinez Hernandez “is therefore subject to detention

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and ineligible for a custody redetermination hearing before an IJ.”

(Id.) Respondents maintain that “applicants for admission may only be released from detention if DHS

invokes its discretionary parole authority under 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5).” (Id. at PageID# 129.) Respondents

also “advise[d]” the Court that a declaratory judgment issued by the Central District of California finding

that a “nationwide class of members, such as Petitioner, were unlawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2) rather than § 1226(a)” has “no preclusive effect and should not be considered as a basis to grant

the Petition.” (Id. at PageID# 132-33) (citing Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, Case No. 5:25 CV 1873

(C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025)).3

Martinez Hernandez responds that in making their arguments as to the application of §

1225(b)(2)(A), “Respondents fail to address the overwhelming majority of district court cases – including

within the Sixth Circuit and Northern District of Ohio – holding that noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who

have been apprehended inside the United States rather than at the border, may be lawfully detained only

under § 1226(a).” (Doc. No. 10 at 9.) Martinez Hernandez argues that “[t]his Court should join the

overwhelming majority of district courts that have considered and rejected the government’s position,

including those in the Sixth Circuit and the Northern District of Ohio.” (Id. at 13) (citation omitted). In

addition, Martinez Hernandez asserts that Respondents fail to “specifically address” her claim that “the

government’s misapplication of § 1225(b) to unlawfully detain her and continue to deny her bond violates

her due process rights.” (Id. at 14) (citations omitted).

Respondents, relying on out of district cases, argue that “[r]ecent decisions are clear that aliens who

entered the United States without parole or inspection, like Petitioner, ‘shall be detained.’” (Doc. No. 17 at

1-3) (citing Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Singh v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-00157,

2026 WL 74558 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 9, 2026); Lucero v. Field Off. Dir., No. 1:25-cv-823, 2025 WL 3718730

(S.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 2025)).

In Chavez v. Director of Detroit Field Office, this Court rejected Respondent’s arguments that

petitioners such as Martinez Hernandez are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A):

2. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2) & 1226(a)

The government’s primary objection to the R&R is that § 1225(b)(2) mandates

Chavez’s detention without bond. According to the government, any immigrant

“in the United States without admission or parole that [is] placed in removal

3 In her Traverse, Martinez Hernandez alleges that she is part of the Maldonado Bautista class. (Doc. No.

10 at 14-15.) Because the Court finds that Martinez Hernandez is otherwise entitled to relief, it does not

reach the effect of Maldonado Bautista here. Ramirez Moreno, 2026 WL 496634, at *1 n.1

proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a [is]...subject to detention under §

1225(b)(2)(A), and thus ineligible for a bond redetermination hearing[.]” (Doc.

No. 12, at 4.) Upon review of the text, structure, and history of the statute, the

Court cannot agree with the government’s interpretation of § 1225(b)(2).

When interpreting statutes, courts “must give effect to the clear meaning of the

statutes as written.” Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir.

2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In so doing, the courts “assign

each word of the statute its ordinary, contemporary, common meaning..., while

keeping in mind that statutory language has meaning only in

context.” Id. (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Finally, “[i]t

is a cardinal principal of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the

whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or

word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534

U.S. 19, 31, 122 S. Ct. 441, 151 L. Ed. 2d 339 (2001) (citation and quotation

marks omitted).

a. The Relevant Text

The Court begins with the relevant text. Section 1226(a) states, in relevant part,

“[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and

detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the

United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Section 1225(b)(2) then states, “in the case

of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration

officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a

doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding

under section 1229a[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(2)(A). An “applicant for admission”

is “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who

arrives in the United States[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). “Admission” in turn is

defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection

and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

Putting these statutes together, it would appear that § 1226(a) provides a

general rule, while § 1225(b)(2) provides a carveout to that rule. Section

1226(a) applies broadly to immigrants arrested and detained pending removal

determinations. Meanwhile, § 1225(b)(2) carves out from § 1226(a) those

immigrants who are (1) either present in the United States without having

lawfully entered after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer or

arriving in the United States and (2) seeking lawful entry via inspection and

authorization by an immigration officer.

On this reading, § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to Chavez. While he is present in

the United States without admission (Doc. No. 6-1 ¶¶ 5–6), and thus an

“applicant for admission,” he is not seeking to lawfully enter. Indeed, it would

strain the words of the statute to say that one who has been in the United States

since 2001 is seeking to enter it. See, e.g., Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-

cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (“those like

[petitioner], who have been here for years upon years and never proceeded to

obtained any form of citizenship ...are not ‘seeking’ admission”); Barrera v.

Tindall, No. 3:25-cv-541, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19,

2025) (“Noncitizens who are present in the country for years, like [petitioner]

who has been here 20 years, are not actively ‘seeking admission.’ ”). Rather, as

an immigrant arrested and detained while “already in the country[,]” Jennings,

583 U.S. at 289, Chavez falls more aptly within § 1226(a)’s default rule. See,

e.g., Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8 (“There can be no genuine

dispute that Section 1226(a), and not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a

noncitizen who has resided in this country for over twenty-six years and was

already within the United States when apprehended and arrested during a traffic

stop, and not upon arrival at the border.”).

The government argues, however, that Chavez’s very presence in the United

States as an unadmitted immigrant renders him subject to § 1225(b)(2). (Doc.

No. 12, at 4–5.) It argues that, because an immigrant may not legally remain in

the United States without being admitted, any unadmitted immigrant remaining

in the United States must be treated as “seeking admission” and subject to §

1225(b)(2). (Doc. No. 12, at 4 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§

1101(a)(13), 1182(a)(6).) Section 1226(a), as the government argues, applies

only to immigrants who were admitted into the United States and later became

deportable. (Doc. No. 12, at 8.) The government’s textual analysis is flawed.

The government’s interpretation would render the term “seeking admission”

entirely superfluous of “applicant for admission.” Indeed, the government

appears to acknowledge this. (Doc. No. 12, at 4 (“aliens present in the United

States without admission or parole that are placed in removal proceedings...are

applicants for admission....Such aliens are also considered ‘seeking

admission[.]’ ”).) This Court will not presume that Congress intended its words

to be redundant or superfluous. See TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 31 (directing courts

to construe statutes as to not render any word superfluous). If Congress meant

for all “applicants for admission” to be understood as “seeking admission” it

would not have used both terms in the same sentence. Sumba v. Crowley, No.

1:25-cv-13034, 2025 WL 3126512, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2025) (“[T]he

[c]ourt rejects as implausible the government's contention that two distinct

terms in the same subparagraph—‘applicant for admission’ and ‘an alien

seeking admission’—somehow bear the same meaning even though they are

(obviously) different terms.” (emphasis in original)).

Relatedly, the government’s interpretation fails to give effect to Congress’s

choice to use the active term “seeking” in describing those immigrants covered

by § 1225(b)(2). “Seeking” “implies action[.]” Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL

2496379, at *6; see also Sumba, 2025 WL 3126512, at *4 (“a present participle

stated in the progressive tense [ ] implies some ongoing, affirmative action[.]”

(emphasis in original)). “Seeking” requires something more than just passively

being present in the United States.

Finally, the government’s argument that § 1226(a) only applies to admitted

immigrants conflicts with the statute itself. Section 1226(a) provides for

discretionary bond to immigrants “arrested and detained pending” a removal

determination—it makes no distinction between admitted and unadmitted

immigrants. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Further, § 1226(c)(1)(A, D, E) carves out

certain inadmissible immigrants from § 1226(a)’s discretionary bond

provision. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A, D, E). If § 1226(a) only applied to admitted

immigrants, it would be unnecessary for Congress to carve out certain

inadmissible immigrants in § 1226(c)(1)(A, D, E). Again, this Court will not

presume that Congress intended that its words would be superfluous. TRW Inc.,

534 U.S. at 31 (directing courts to construe statutes as to not render any word

superfluous). Overall, the text of the statute supports the Court's reading.

b. The Relevant Context and Structure

The structure of the overall statutory scheme, as described in Jennings, 583

U.S. 281, further supports this Court’s reading. In Jennings, the Supreme Court

described § 1226(a) as the “default rule” that applies to immigrants “present in

the country” including immigrants “who were inadmissible at the time of

entry[.]” Id. at 288. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court described § 1225(b) in

more specific terms. The Supreme Court noted that § 1225(b) operates within

a process that “generally begins at the Nation's borders and ports of

entry[.]” Id. at 287. The Supreme Court further noted that “§ 1225(b) applies

primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States[.]” Id. at 297. The

Supreme Court's analysis in Jennings thus supports the Court's reading that §

1225(b)(2) applies to immigrants seeking to lawfully enter the United States,

while § 1226(a) provides a default rule applicable to immigrants detained in the

United States, regardless of whether they were originally admitted.

The government, however, argues that the Supreme Court’s analysis

in Jennings supports its reading. (Doc. No. 12, at 4–5, 13.) First, the

government points to the Supreme Court’s statement that § 1225(b) “applies

primarily to aliens seeking entry to the United States (‘applicants for admission’

in the language of the statute.)” (Doc. No. 12, at 4–5 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S.

at 297).) Using this single, isolated sentence, the government argues that the

Supreme Court understood “seeking admission” and “applicant for admission”

to be one and the same and resultantly, understood § 1225(b)(2) to apply to all

unadmitted immigrants in the United States. But when reading Jennings as a

whole, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court did not construe § 1225(b) to

apply so broadly. The Supreme Court understood § 1225 to operate “at the

Nation's borders and ports of entry” and involve the “inspect[ion] [of

immigrants] by immigration officers[.]” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. This

language does not indicate broad application to all unadmitted immigrants in

the United States. Rather, as other courts in the Sixth Circuit have found, this

language indicates that § 1225(b)(2) applies to those arriving in the

country. See, e.g., Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-13073, 2025

WL 2952796, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025).

Next, the government argues (Doc. No. 12, at 13) that the Supreme Court

in Jennings characterized § 1226 as applying only to admitted immigrants

present in the United States. This is incorrect. As discussed

above, Jennings describes § 1226 as governing immigrants “present in the

country” including immigrants “who were inadmissible at the time of

entry[.]” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. From this language, the Supreme Court

clearly contemplated § 1226(a)’s application to unadmitted immigrants present

in the United States. In light of the foregoing, the structure of the relevant

statutes, as described by the Supreme Court in Jennings, supports the Court’s

reading.

c. The Relevant History

The history of § 1226(a) further supports the Court’s reading. Like other courts

within the Sixth Circuit, Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL

2609425, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); Contreras-Lomeli v. Raycraft, 2:25-

cv-12826, 2025 WL 2976739, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2025), this Court finds

persuasive the historical analysis contained in Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F.

Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025):

Before [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility

Act of 1994 (“IIRIRA”)] passed, the predecessor statute to Section

1226(a) governed deportation proceedings for all noncitizens arrested

within the United States. [ ] This predecessor statute, like Section

1226(a), included discretionary release on bond. [ ] Upon passing

IIRIRA, Congress declared that the new Section 1226(a) “restates the

current provisions in [the predecessor statute] regarding the authority of

the Attorney General to arrest, detain, and release on bond a[ ]

[noncitizen] who is not lawfully in the United States.” [ ]

Id. at 1260 (internal citations omitted). Immigrants unlawfully in the United

States were within the scope of § 1226(a)’s predecessor, and Congress

declared § 1226(a) to have the same scope as its predecessor. It thus stands to

reason that immigrants unlawfully in the United States fall within § 1226(a).

The government, however, argues that the history of the IIRIRA supports its

reading. (Doc. No. 12, at 8.) As the government argues, the IIRIRA was

intended “to eliminate ‘an anomaly whereby immigrants who were attempting

to lawfully enter the United States were in a worse position than persons who

had crossed the border unlawfully.” (Id. (quoting Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918,

928 (9th Cir. 2020)).) Thus, as the argument goes, this Court should avoid any

reading of the statute that would give immigrants who have already unlawfully

entered the country any more procedural rights than those who attempted to

enter at a port of entry.

The government’s historical analysis is overbroad. The IIRIRA “did not fully

disrupt the old system, including the system of detention and

release[.]” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-6924, 2025 WL 2637503, at

*12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (citing H.R. Rep. 104-469, 229 (1996)). While

the IIRIRA was intended to address some inequities in the treatment of arriving

immigrants and those already present, Congress also intended, as discussed

above, to leave in place the discretionary bond framework available to most

immigrants at the time. Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1260. In other words,

“Congress’[s] concern about adjusting the law in some respects to reduce

inequities in the removal process did not mean Congress intended to entirely

up-end the existing detention regime by subjecting all inadmissible noncitizens

to mandatory detention[.]” Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at

*12 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The government's historical

analysis thus fails.

The government’s argument also fails to account for § 1226’s recent history via

the Laken Riley Act. Pub. L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3 (2025). The Laken

Riley Act added § 1226(c)(1)(E) which, in relevant part, mandates detention of

immigrants who are (1) in the United States without admission or parole and

(2) have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. §

1226(c)(1)(E). If, as the government argues, § 1226(a) only applied to admitted

immigrants, Congress would not have had to carve out certain unadmitted

immigrants using the Laken Riley Act. Further, if, as the government argues, §

1225(b)(2) mandates detention of all unadmitted immigrants, then it would be

pointless for Congress to mandate the detention of a subset of those unadmitted

immigrants using the Laken Riley Act.3 This Court “will not find that Congress

passed the Laken Riley Act to ‘perform the same work’ that was already

covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8 (citation

omitted); Barrera, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4 (citation omitted).

d. Relevant Case Law

In the end, the Court finds the government’s interpretation unpersuasive.4 And

the Court is not alone. The vast majority of courts to consider it have rejected

the government’s interpretation.5 Indeed, almost every—if not every—district

court within the Sixth Circuit to consider it has rejected the government’s

interpretation.6 These courts found, as the Court finds here, that immigrants like

Chavez who have spent years in the United States before being detained are

subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)’s discretionary bond provision—not 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)’s mandatory detention provision.

In support of its argument, the government cites three non-binding, out-of-

circuit decisions in which district courts adopted the government's

interpretation. (Doc. No. 12, at 2 (citing Chavez v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-2325,

2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025); Vargas Lopez v. Trump, No.

8:25-cv-526, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); Sandoval v. Acuna,

No. 6:25-cv-1467, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025)).) The Court

finds these decisions unpersuasive for the same reasons it finds the

government’s arguments unpersuasive: (1) they fail to give effect to, and indeed

render superfluous, the term “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2) and portions

of § 1226(c); (2) they fail to read the Supreme Court's analysis

in Jennings wholistically, and thus fail to properly consider the overall statutory

scheme; and (3) they overgeneralize the relevant legislative history and thus

fail to see that Congress intended to maintain the discretionary bond

framework. Other courts within the Sixth Circuit have rejected these

cases. See Orellana, 2025 WL 3006763, at *4 (rejecting Chavez and Vargas

Lopez); Mejia v. Woosley, No. 4:25-cv-82, 2025 WL 2933852, at *3 n.2 (W.D.

Ky. Oct. 15, 2025) (rejecting Chavez and Vargas Lopez); Moralez-Martinez v.

Raycraft, No. 25-cv-13303, 2025 WL 3124695, at *6 n.3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7,

2025) (describing Chavez and Vargas Lopez as “outliers” and adopting

majority interpretation).

* * *

In light of the text, structure, and history of the relevant statutes, the Court

rejects the government’s interpretations of 8 U.S.C. §§

1225(b)(2) and 1226(a). Section 1225(b)(2) does not apply to all unadmitted

immigrants present in the United States, and § 1226(a) is not limited to

immigrants admitted into the United States. Rather, § 1226(a) applies broadly

to immigrants arrested and detained pending removal determinations.

Meanwhile, § 1225(b)(2) carves out from § 1226(a) those immigrants who are

(1) either present in the United States without having lawfully entered after

inspection and authorization by an immigration officer or arriving in the United

States and (2) seeking lawful entry via inspection and authorization by an

immigration officer. Chavez, who is currently detained pending a removal

determination and who is not seeking to lawfully enter the United States, is

governed by § 1226(a) and its discretionary bond framework.

Case No. 4:25-cv-2061, 2025 WL 3187080, at **3-8 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2025).

The Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Buenrostro-Mendez does not change the above analysis, as it

is not controlling precedent, and this Court recently rejected the reasoning of the majority’s opinion in

Buenrostro-Mendez. See Lopez, 2026 WL 395202, at **6-10 (holding petitioner was not subject to

detention under § 1225(b)(2)). The Court is troubled by Respondents’ failure to disclose, let alone attempt

to distinguish, the line of cases in this district rejecting Respondents’ arguments that petitioners such as

Martinez Hernandez are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).

The Court agrees with the well-reasoned decisions by this Court rejecting the application of

mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) in similar cases. See, e.g., Ramirez Moreno, 2026 WL 496634, at

**3-6; Lopez, 2026 WL 395202, at **6-10; Hu, 2026 WL 539117, at **6-8; Gonzalez Lopez, 2025 WL

3280344, at **4-6; Chavez, 2025 WL 3187080, at **3-8. In addition, this Court finds that “because

[Martinez Hernandez’s] detention is governed by § 1226(a)’s discretionary bond framework,” the

government’s application of § 1225(b)’s mandatory detention provisions to Martinez Hernandez violated

her due process rights. Chavez, 2025 WL 3187080, at *8.

Because Martinez Hernandez should be considered for release on bond under §1226(a), the

undersigned recommends the Court GRANT her petition and order the immigration court to conduct a bond

hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

The Court notes that Martinez Hernandez argues that the “appropriate remedy” in her case is

“immediate release.” (Doc. No. 10 at 16.) Martinez Hernandez asserts that “[i]f this Court determines that

§ 1226(a) controls Petitioner’s detention, then Respondents have provided no lawful basis for Petitioner’s

detention and Petitioner must be released.” (Id.) (citing Gimenez Rivero v. Mina, 6:26-cv-66-RBD-NWH,

2026 WL 199319 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026)). In the alternative, in the event the Court finds a bond hearing

under § 1226(a) is the appropriate remedy, Martinez Hernandez asks for the Court to “mandate” the

following procedural “safeguards”: (1) “Respondents should be ordered to hold a hearing within 7 days or

else release Petitioner”; (2) “this Court should order that the Government bears the burden of establishing

by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger or flight risk”; and (3) the Court should

“retain jurisdiction to review the immigration judge bond decision to ensure compliance with the Court’s

order and due process.” (Id. at 17.) The Court notes that Respondents failed to address these arguments.

(Doc. No. 17.)

The undersigned declines to recommend Martinez Hernandez’s immediate release, and instead

recommends, consistent with other decisions of this district, that Respondent provide Martinez Hernandez

with a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) within seven (7) days of the adoption of this Report and

Recommendation. While the undersigned recognizes and understands Martinez Hernandez’s concerns, the

undersigned further declines to recommend what burden the Government bears at the bond hearing.

Furthermore, in the absence of any authority cited by Martinez Hernandez regarding retention of jurisdiction

to review the IJ’s bond decision, the undersigned also declines to recommend the Court retain jurisdiction

for such a purpose.

V. Conclusion

For all the reasons set forth above, it is recommended that the Court DISMISS all Respondents from

this action except for Respondent Raycraft. It is further recommended that the Court GRANT Martinez

Hernandez’s Petition and ORDER Respondent to provide Martinez Hernandez with a bond hearing under

8. U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7) days of the adoption of this Report and Recommendation.

Date: March 12, 2026 s/ Jonathan Greenberg

Jonathan D. Greenberg

United States Magistrate Judge

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Courts

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this document. Failure to file objections

within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Berkshire v.

Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2019).