The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Travis Johnny Smith, ) CASE NO. 5: 25 CV 2733
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
)
v. )
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AT&T Corporation, ) AND ORDER
)
Defendant. )
Background
Pro se Plaintiff Travis Johnny Smith, who is incarcerated in Kentucky, has filed an in forma
pauperis civil complaint in this matter against AT&T Corporation. (Doc. No. 1.)
His complaint does not allege any specific legal claim or cause of action; he merely indicates
he seeks to assert federal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship. (Id. at ¶ II.) Nor does
his complaint set forth clear factual allegations. The Statement of Claim set forth in his complaint,
in its entirety, is that:
AT&T took my business numbers and never paid transfer from Tmobile, along with
putting it on Katie plamentera person credit.
(Id. at ¶ III.)
He asks for “9.4 million dollars for the miscommunications for [his] business.” (Id. at ¶
II.B.3.)
Standard of Review and Discussion
Although the standard of review for pro se pleadings is liberal, Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d
380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), “the lenient treatment generally accorded pro se litigants has limits.”
Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic
pleading requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations or construct claims on their
behalf. See Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001). Federal district courts are
expressly required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen all in forma pauperis complaints
brought in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such action that the court determines is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th
Cir. 2010). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must set forth “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (holding
that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs in determining whether a complaint is sufficient
to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). The allegations in the pleading “must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Furthermore, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must set forth allegations
sufficient to give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's legal claims are, as well as the
factual grounds upon which they rest. Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 437
(6th Cir. 2008). Courts do “not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint warrants summary dismissal
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). Even liberally construed, it fails to meet basic federal notice pleading
requirements or set forth allegations sufficient to state a plausible civil claim against Defendant
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upon which he may be granted relief. See Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726
(6th Cir. 1996) (holding a court is not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted
conclusions in determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (noting that conclusory allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983).
Although federal pleading requirements do “not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ ” they demand
more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[,]” which is the most
Plaintiff's complaint suggests here. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Conclusion
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted, and
his complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: March 11, 2026
/s/ John R. Adams
JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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