MADDOX

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

CARL MARQUIS MADDOX, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00261-JRO-MKK

)

J. WADAS, )

)

Respondent. )

ORDER DENYING HABEAS PETITION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGEMENT AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT

Petitioner Carl Marquis Maddox is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional

Institution in Terre Haute, Indiana (“FCI Terre Haute”), serving a sentence

imposed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. He petitions for

a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the Bureau of

Prisons’ (“BOP”) refusal to grant him certain time credits under the First Step

Act of 2018 (“FSA”). He also filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 13.

For the reasons stated below, Maddox has identified no errors in his

sentencing calculation. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(lxv), Maddox is

ineligible for time credit under the FSA. And the BOP’s purported

misrepresentations to him stating otherwise do not equitably estop the

government from denying Maddox time credits that Congress has plainly

prohibited to him.

Accordingly, his habeas petition, dkt. [1], is DENIED, and his motion for

summary judgment, dkt. [13], is DENIED.

I.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[C]hallenges to the computation of a sentence must be brought under 28

U.S.C. § 2241.” Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1997). The

Attorney General, acting through the BOP, is tasked with administering and

calculating the sentences of federal prisoners. See United States v. Wilson, 503

U.S. 329, 334–35 (1992); 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a). “A necessary predicate for the

granting of federal habeas relief . . . is a determination by the federal court that

[Petitioner’s] custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241).

II.

BACKGROUND

Maddox is currently serving a 144-month term of imprisonment, and the

BOP calculates his projected release date as July 3, 2028, including good-

conduct time credits. See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited Mar.

26, 2026).

In 2018, Maddox pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 100

grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of

heroin and some quantity of a mixture or substance containing a detectable

amount of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). Dkts. 9-3, 9-4.

As part of his plea agreement, he stipulated that he “should receive a two-level

enhancement for the defendant’s role in the offense,” with a citation to U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.1(b). Dkt. 9-3 at 3–4. His presentence investigation report (“PSR”) also

states that, “The parties agree that Maddox should receive a 2-level enhancement

for role. USSG § 3B1.1(b).” Dkt. 10 at 6. The section of the PSR calculating his

base offense level also indicates that he received a two-level increase under

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) because he “organized and led [two other individuals] in

regard to the drug distribution.” Id. at 12. After his sentencing, Maddox filed a

motion asking his sentencing court to amend his PSR to remove any reference

to a leader or organizer role because a conspiracy charge was dropped as part of

his plea agreement. United States v. Maddox, No. 0:18-cr-00014-JWB-BRT, dkt.

200 (D. Minn. Nov. 13, 2024). The sentencing court denied the motion because

the reference to Maddox having a manager or organizer role was “supported and

not objected to.” Id.; Dkt. 205 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2025).

At issue in Maddox’s habeas petition is his eligibility for certain time

credits that can be earned under the FSA, which the Court refers to as “FSA time

credits.” As discussed in more detail below, those credits may be earned by

participating in certain programming or other productive activities at the prison.

Respondent presents evidence showing that Maddox’s eligibility for FSA credits

has been reviewed multiple times since he arrived in BOP custody. Dkt. 9-1 at

4. Specifically, between December 1, 2019, and February 28, 2021, his status

was reviewed four times, and he was deemed ineligible to earn FSA time credits.

Id. at 3; Dkt. 9-5.

Respondent has submitted a declaration from FCI Terre Haute’s Case

Management Coordinator showing that, on February 28, 2021, a “previous

institution” erroneously changed Maddox’s status to show that he was eligible to

earn FSA credits. Dkt. 9-1 at 4–5; dkt. 9-5 at 3. Respondent’s brief states that

the change occurred at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield,

Missouri (“FMCP Springfield”). Dkt. 9 at 2. After that, BOP records showed that

Maddox was earning FSA time credits by completing classes and engaging in

other productive activities, which in turn moved his projected release date up by

a year. See, e.g., Dkt. 9-1 at 5; Dkt. 1-1 at 6.

After Maddox was transferred to FCI Terre Haute BOP staff reviewed his

FSA credit eligibility again. Dkt. 9-1 at 5; Dkt. 9-5 at 2. At that time, the BOP

found the error and updated his records to show that he was not eligible to earn

FSA time credits. Dkt. 9-1 at 5. Consequently, the BOP’s records currently

indicate that he has not earned any FSA time credits. Dkt. 9-7.

Maddox asserts that the first time he was told he was ineligible for FSA

time credits was when he arrived at FCI Terre Haute. Dkt. 15 at 1. He represents

that he relied on the advice of case managers at multiple prisons to complete

programming and maintain a prison job so that he could earn FSA time credits.

Id. at 2–3. He also notes that he received an “EBRR incentive award” in August

2023. See dkt. 15-1 at 2.

Finally, Maddox disputes Respondent’s assertion that staff at FMCP

Springfield erroneously changed his FSA credit status, stating

The Respondent’s Att. 8 proves the Petitioner was

located at Morgantown when “FTC ELIGIBLE

REVIEWED” took place . . . . [I]t should also be noted

that it is well known that case managers at any facility

are not authorized to change an inmate’s actual release

date. “Exhibit A” proves that it was BOP officials in

“Grand Prairie” who awarded the petitioner with a 365

day reduction in his sentence that changed his outdate

from 2028 to 2027. . . . Springfield did not erroneously

change his status in the computer, evidence provided

by the respondent and petitioner verifies that previous

facilities including BOP officials in Grand Prairie had

awarded FSA Credits and EBRR INCENTIVES as well

Dkt. 15 at 2–4 (spelling errors in original corrected).

III.

DISCUSSION

Under the FSA, inmates may earn certain incentives for completing

evidence-based recidivism reduction (EBRR) programing and activities. 18

U.S.C. § 3632(d)(1)–(3). See also BOP Program Statement 522.01, “First Step Act

Program Incentives,” available at www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5220.01.pdf

(last visited Mar. 26, 2026). The FSA also allows inmates to earn time credits for

completing EBRR programming and activities. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4).

However, not all inmates who complete EBRR programming and activities are

eligible for FSA time credits. The statute explicitly forbids inmates serving

sentences for convictions of certain crimes from receiving FSA time credits. 18

U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D).

The BOP is denying Maddox the benefit of any FSA time credits because it

has determined that he is an ineligible prisoner under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3632(d)(4)(D)(lxv). It based this determination on his sentence relating to his

heroin offense in which “the sentencing court f[ound] that [he] was an organizer,

leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense.” Id. Maddox disputes

that he is ineligible. He also argues that, even if he is ineligible to receive FSA

time credits, the BOP should be equitably estopped from denying him the credits.

Maddox's petition fails on both arguments.

A. Eligibility for FSA Time Credits

Maddox contends that Section 3632(d)(4)(D)(lxv) of the FSA’s ineligible

prisoner provision does not apply to him. The Court disagrees.

Section 3632(d)(4)(D)(lxv) states, in relevant part, the following:

A prisoner is ineligible to receive time credits under this

paragraph if the prisoner is serving a sentence for a

conviction under any of the following provisions of law:

…

21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)) … relating to manufacturing,

distributing, dispensing, or possessing with

intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or

knowingly importing or exporting, a mixture or

substance containing a detectable amount of

heroin if the sentencing court finds that the

offender was an organizer, leader, manager, or

supervisor of others in the offense, as determined

under the guidelines promulgated by the United

States Sentencing Commission.

This section clearly applies to Maddox. He is serving a sentence for a conviction

that clearly falls within 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), namely possession with the intent

to distribute a substance containing a detectable amount of heroin. His

judgment shows that he pleaded guilty to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). Dkt. 9-4. His

plea agreement and PSR reflect that he admitted that he was “an organizer,

leader, manager, or supervisor” of others in the offense under the Sentencing

Guidelines by stipulating to a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.

Maddox does not contest he is serving a sentence for a conviction of 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) or that the sentencing Court found that he admitted to at

least one of the provisions of § 3B1.1. His sole argument against the

straightforward application of Section 3632(d)(4)(D)(lxv) to his sentence is what

he perceives as an inconsistency in his plea agreement and PSR. Specifically,

the plea agreement states that he was stipulating to a “two-level enhancement

for the defendant’s role in the offense” under § 3B1.1(b). Dkt. 9-3 at 4–5

(emphasis added). But the PSR states that he received a two-level enhancement

under § 3B1.1(c) because he organized and led two others in connection with the

drug distribution. Dkt. 10 at 12 (emphasis added). Maddox argues that this

purported discrepancy shows that his enhancement was not actually under

subsection (b) but under subsection (c). The Court is not persuaded.

At the time of his sentencing, § 3B1.1 provided:

Based on the defendant’s role in the offense, increase

the offense level as follows:

(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a

criminal activity that involved five or more

participants or was otherwise extensive, increase

by 4 levels.

(b) If the defendant was a manger or supervisor (but

not an organizer or leader) and the criminal

activity involved five or more participants or was

otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels.

(c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader,

manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity

other than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2

levels.

United States Sentencing Commission 2016 Guidelines Manual, U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.1 (eff. Nov. 1, 2016, to Oct. 31, 2018), available at

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-

manual/2016/GLMFull.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2026). There is overlap in

these subsections. Subsection (a) and (b) both apply to crimes involving “five or

more participants” but subsection (a) applies only to an “organizer or leader” and

subsection (b) applies only to a “manager or supervisor.” Subsection (c) applies

to any “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” for any crime (regardless of

the number of participants). Thus, in stipulating to a § 3B1.1 enhancement,

Maddox stipulated that he was an organizer leader, manager, or supervisor of

others when he violated 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).

Maddox’s argument about the discrepancy between subsection (b) and (c)

in his plea agreement and PSR fails. First, the PSR’s citation to § 3B1.1(c) on

page 7 appears to be a typo. Page 1 of the PRS cites to § 3B1.1(b). See Dkt. 10

at 6. So, there likely is no discrepancy between the plea agreement and the PSR.

Second, and more fundamentally, the citation discrepancy is a distinction

without a difference for purposes of applying Section 3632(d)(4)(D)(lxv) to

Maddox’s FSA ineligibility. Section 3632(d)(4)(D)(lxv) is written in the disjunctive:

the sentencing court needed to have found that he was “an organizer, leader,

manager, or supervisor.” It does not matter which. Section 3632(d)(4)(D)(lxv)

applies in any case. A finding of only one of these roles suffices to render him

ineligible for FSA credit. Thus, by agreeing to either subsection (b) or (c) of

§ 3B1.1(b), he admitted to being “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor.”

That is all that Section 3632(d)(4)(D)(lxv) requires.

B. Equitable Estoppel

Statutory ineligibility aside, Maddox argues the BOP should be estopped

from denying him FSA credit time because he relied on BOP staff representations

that he was eligible to enroll in classes and take a prison job to earn FSA time

credits. Dkt. 15 at 2. Whether an ineligible prisoner may establish a right to

FSA credit time under a theory of equitable estoppel appears to be an issue of

first impression within the Seventh Circuit. Neither party has cited any case law

from the Seventh Circuit suggesting that equitable estoppel may apply in a

habeas action to require the BOP to give an inmate time credits for which he is

statutorily ineligible. Instead, they cite to Murphy v. Hood, 276 F.3d 475, 477

(9th Cir. 2001), in which the Ninth Circuit “assum[ed] without deciding that

estoppel may be invoked against the government” in a habeas case on facts that

are similar but not on all fours with this case.1

Murphy is not a FSA case, but it addressed a similar good credit time

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). This statute reduces a prisoner’s sentence by

up to one year upon successful completion of a BOP residential drug treatment

program. In Murphy, the habeas petitioner enrolled in and was admitted by the

BOP to such a program. Upon completion of the program, he would have been

eligible for a one-year sentence reduction. Id. at 476. The petitioner was

statutorily eligible to participate in the program and began participating,

including completing 500 hours of residential treatment. Id. at 477. The BOP

1 Maddox also cites Ramirez v. Phillips, No. 2:23-cv-cv002911-KJM-JDP, 2023 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 228778 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2023), for the proposition that “FSA credits may not

be withdrawn.” That case is not binding on this Court. In addition, it does not stand for

the general proposition that the BOP cannot tell an inmate that he has earned FSA time

credits and then later change course. Instead, in Ramirez, the BOP took away earned

FSA time credits for which the petitioner was statutorily eligible, and estoppel was not

at play. Maddox’s situation is materially different because he is not statutorily eligible

to earn FSA time credits.

later denied him the opportunity to complete the community-based portion of

the program because he was determined to be a flight risk based on an earlier

conviction for escape. Id. That decision meant he could not receive the one-year

sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). Id. The petitioner argued

that the BOP should have been equitably estopped from refusing to let him

complete the program because the BOP knew about his escape conviction when

he was admitted to the program. Id.

The Ninth Circuit assumed for the sake of argument that estoppel might

apply but concluded that it did not in the petitioner’s case. The Ninth Circuit

defined the elements of equitable estoppel on the government as follows:

The elements of equitable estoppel are that (1) the party

to be estopped knows the fact, (2) he or she intends that

his or her conduct will be acted on or must so act that

the party invoking estoppel has a right to believe it is

intended, (3) the party invoking estoppel must be

ignorant of the true fact, and (4) he or she must

detrimentally rely on the former’s conduct . . . .

Petitioner must also demonstrate that the government

engaged in affirmative misconduct going beyond mere

negligence and that the government’s wrongful act will

cause a serious injustice, and the public’s interest will

not suffer undue damage by imposition of the liability.

Applying this standard the Ninth Circuit concluded: “Although [the petitioner]

had completed a significant portion of the BOP’s drug treatment program,

participation in a drug treatment program is a benefit and can hardly be said to

have disadvantaged [him].” Id. at 478.

The Ninth Circuit’s government estoppel test is not binding on this Court.

And both parties overlook the Seventh Circuit’s well-established approach for

considering estoppel arguments against the government:

equitable estoppel may only lie against the government

in a small set of cases: “when the traditional elements

of estoppel are shown and there is affirmative

misconduct on the part of the government.”

United States v. Rand Motors, 305 F.3d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Kennedy v. United States, 965 F.2d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1992)). Those traditional

elements of estoppel are: “(1) misrepresentation by the party against whom

estoppel is asserted; (2) reasonable reliance on that misrepresentation by the

party asserting estoppel; and (3) detriment to the party asserting estoppel.”

Kennedy, 965 F.2d at 417. The critical difference between the Seventh Circuit’s

approach and the Ninth Circuit’s is that the Seventh Circuit does not include

any “serious injustice” or “public interest” consideration. So, this Court will not

consider those factors. In all other respects, the approaches between the

Circuits are, essentially, the same.

But there are strong reasons to assume that the Seventh Circuit would

not apply the traditional approach and would reject Maddox’s equitable estoppel

argument outright. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has ever

recognized a claim of estoppel against the government. Matamoros v. Grams,

706 F.3d 783, 793–94 (7th Cir. 2013); Bayari v. Holder, 560 F. App’x 607, 609

(7th Cir. 2014). Because of the established rule that people are charged with

knowledge of the law, it is not reasonable for a person to rely on a government

official’s statement when that statement is contrary to the law. See Heckler v.

Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 63, 66 (1984). The

Seventh Circuit has suggested that the Supreme Court’s holding in Heckler

should be interpreted to mean that one claiming equitable estoppel must show

they are entitled to the statutory benefit at issue before estoppel may apply.

Kennedy, 965 F.2d at 419 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing Heckler).2 As discussed

in the previous section of this Order, Maddox is not eligible for credit time under

the plain meaning of the FSA. Regardless of what any BOP staff member

purportedly told him, Maddox has not shown that he is entitled to a benefit that

Congress has plainly prohibited. So, he cannot jump the initial hurdle the

Seventh Circuit submits he must. See id.

The Seventh Circuit’s suggestion in Kennedy that a preliminarily showing

of entitlement to a statutory benefit as a pre-requisite to arguing estoppel is well-

founded. Serious questions of sovereign immunity and separation of powers

arise if prisoners may obtain benefits for which Congress has plainly stated they

are ineligible. Consider sovereign immunity. Generally, the government cannot

be sued unless it has consented to suit. United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S.

287, 289 (2009). But a free-standing cause of action in equity that confers a

benefit to which Congress has never consented is an end-run around this

foundational principle of government sovereignty. Consider separation of

powers. As one commentator put it, “[a] misinformed or overly generous

bureaucrat [or prison officer] should not be able to . . . rewrite the laws enacted

by Congress . . . .” Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Modern Status of Applicability

of Doctrine of Estoppel Against Federal Government and Its Agencies, 27 A.L.R.

2 Respondent cites out of circuit case law for this same proposition. Dkt. 9 at 7 n.1 (“In

the context of other sentencing credit mechanisms, courts generally do not apply

equitable estoppel in a manner that overrides statutory authority.”).

Fed. 702 § 2[a] (1976). Indeed. A free-standing equitable estoppel claim against

the government would allow just that by granting benefits to those whom

Congress did not intend.

These concerns dissipate if this Court simply follows the Seventh Circuit’s

suggestion in Kennedy that Maddox must show that he is entitled to the

statutory benefit of FSA credit time before arguing equitable estoppel. Kennedy,

965 F.2d at 419 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992). So, that’s what this Court decides to do

here. Maddox cannot obtain habeas relief on a theory of equitable estoppel

because he is an ineligible prisoner under Section 3632(d)(4)(D)(lxv).

Even assuming without deciding that Maddox could theoretically obtain

FSA credit time on a theory of equitable estoppel, Respondent argues that

Maddox can prove neither the traditional equitable estoppel elements nor

affirmative misconduct. Dkt. 9 at 6–7. The Court agrees.

First, the BOP misinforming Maddox of his eligibility for FSA time credits

and then correcting its mistake is not “affirmative misconduct.” The Seventh

Circuit has stated that the misconduct must be “egregious” to trigger equitable

estoppel consideration—something akin to a conspiracy to trap unsuspecting

victims. E.g., Gutierrez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2006). Maddox’s

predicament—unable to earn FSA time credits—is not that. His situation is

precisely what Congress had in mind when it made inmates like him ineligible

for such time credits.3 There is no evidence in the record suggesting that any

3 Maddox directs the Court to a 1999 decision from the U.S. District Court for the

District of Oregon to support his position on this point. In that case, Dowling v. Crabtree,

58 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1173 (D. Ore. 1999), the petitioner completed a residential drug

misrepresentation by the BOP was “affirmative” as opposed to merely

inadvertent, or at worst, negligent. It is certainly not “egregious.” Id. Similarly,

Maddox says that it is “well known” that prison-level staff cannot change an

inmate’s release date, so it must be that more highly-ranked BOP officials

decided to award him FSA time credits. Dkt. 15 at 3. There is no evidence to

support that contention. And again, even if BOP officials above the prison level

mistakenly deemed him eligible for FSA time credits, that does not suggest that

the mistake resulted from affirmative misconduct.

Second, the activities to which Maddox points to support his reliance

claim—that is, participating in classes and working a prison job in reliance on

the BOP’s misrepresentations—are benefits, not detriments. He fails to explain

how rehabilitative programing harmed him. He never suggests that he would not

have taken the classes or worked a prison job if he had known he was ineligible

for FSA time credits. Notably, even though the classes and job ultimately did

and alcohol program that the BOP determined did not meet all the requirements for

receiving a sentence reduction. The BOP initially told the petitioner that he did not need

to reenroll in the treatment portion of the program in order to receive a sentence

reduction. Id. But, nearly two years later, as the petitioner was about to be released to

prerelease custody, the BOP changed its mind and interpreted its regulations to

determine that the program he completed did not meet the criteria for early release. Id.

By that time, he did not have enough time remaining on his sentence to reenroll in the

program and receive a sentence reduction. Id. The court held that an injustice would

result if the BOP were not estopped from denying him early release because the BOP’s

actions caused the petitioner to lose his chance to reenroll in the program in time to

receive the sentence reduction. Id. at 1174. The Dowling opinion is not binding on this

Court. It is fundamentally inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit’s guidance in Kennedy,

965 F.2d at 419 n.2, and the fact that “[t]he Supreme Court has never affirmed a finding

of estoppel against the government,” Matamoros, 706 F.3d at 793–94. Moreover,

Dowling is distinguishable. There is no evidence in Maddox’s case that the BOP’s actions

caused Maddox to forego other opportunities that would have resulted in his early

release or otherwise benefited him.

not allow him to earn FSA time credits, they did allow him to earn other benefits

under the statute (such as increased telephone and visitation time), and it

appears that he may have earned such benefits, as evidenced by the “EBRR

Incentive Award” he received on August 5, 2023. See dkt. 15-1 at 2. And these

benefits are in addition to the general rehabilitative quality of BOP programing

and honest work.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Maddox is statutorily ineligible to earn FSA time credits, and his claim that

the BOP should be estopped from denying him the credits fails. He has not shown

that the BOP has erred in calculating his sentence. His petition for writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, dkt. [1], is DENIED with prejudice, and his

motion for summary judgment, dkt. [13], is DENIED.

Final judgment shall issue by separate entry.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 3/26/2026

Distribution: Uy un en ict Jud

CARL MARQUIS MADDOX J nite States district udge

11766-041 Southern District of Indiana

TERRE HAUTE - FCI

TERRE HAUTE FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

Inmate Mail/Parcels

P.O. BOX 33

TERRE HAUTE, IN 47808

Jeffrey D. Preston

DOJ-USAO

jeffrey.preston@usdo}.gov

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