Sean T. Wright v. 15th District Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-12737

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

SEAN T. WRIGHT,

as individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

15TH DISTRICT PALM BEACH COUNTY STATE

ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,

PALM BEACH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,

State Government Entities,

FRANK DI ORSINI,

PBSO Sherriff, Official and Individual Capacity,

SHERIFF OF PALM BEACH COUNTY,

Defendants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-12737

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:24-cv-81145-AMC

____________________

Before JORDAN, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Sean T. Wright, proceeding pro se, appeals the district

court’s orders dismissing his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

the 15th District Palm Beach County State Attorney’s Office (“State

Attorney’s Office”), dismissing his amended complaint against the

Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office (“PBSO”) and Deputy Frank Di

Orsini, and denying his motion for a temporary restraining order

(“TRO”) against Di Orsini. First, he argues that the district court

erred in concluding that his claims against the State Attorney’s Of-

fice were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Second, he

argues that the district court erred in dismissing his amended com-

plaint because he complied with the court’s instructions and pro se

form in amending his complaint, he had Article III standing to pur-

sue his claims, the district court failed to hold an evidentiary hear-

ing, and the district court misapplied various legal standards.

Third, he argues that the district court erred in denying his motion

for a TRO against Di Orsini and in failing to hold an evidentiary

hearing on the motion.

Because we write only for the parties who are already famil-

iar with the facts, we set out only such facts as are relevant to the

legal issues.

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I. DISCUSSION

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

We review de novo whether a party is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th

Cir. 2012). “We review de novo the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim,” accepting “a complaint’s

well-pleaded allegations as true and draw[ing] all reasonable infer-

ences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Huggins v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty.,

151 F.4th 1268, 1277 (11th Cir. 2025).

“A pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than a

pleading drafted by an attorney and is liberally construed.” Wald-

man v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017). Nonetheless,

“a pro se pleading must still suggest that there is at least some factual

support for a claim,” id., and “we cannot act as de facto counsel or

rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action,” Bilal

v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020).

“An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the origi-

nal complaint.” Reynolds v. Behrman Cap. IV L.P., 988 F.3d 1314,

1319 (11th Cir. 2021). However, where a district court dismisses a

claim and repleading that claim in an amended complaint would

be “futile,” the plaintiff may omit the claim from the amended

complaint without waiving the right to challenge its dismissal on

appeal. Id.

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial

power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any

suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

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United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-

jects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Under the Elev-

enth Amendment, “an unconsenting State is immune from suits

brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens

of another state.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465

U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (quotation marks omitted). This immunity ex-

tends to state agencies and to “arm[s] of the State,” but it “does not

extend to independent entities, such as counties or municipalities.”

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Fla. State Athletic Comm’n, 226

F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308

(11th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

In determining whether an entity is an arm of the state, the

Supreme Court has instructed courts to focus on (1) whether the

State structured the entity as part of itself or as legally independent,

(2) whether the entity is liable for its own judgments or whether

the State is formally liable, and (3) the degree of control the State

exerts over the entity, though courts should consult this final factor

with “caution” because “ultimate control of every state-created en-

tity resides with the State.” Galette v. N.J. Transit Corp., No. 24-1021,

slip op. at 10, 12 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2026) (quotation marks omitted); see

also Manders, 338 F.3d at 1309 (defining four factors relevant to as-

sessing whether an entity is acting as an arm-of-the-state: “(1) how

state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State

maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and

(4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity”).

“Whether a defendant is an ‘arm of the State’ must be assessed in

light of the particular function in which the defendant was engaged

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when taking the actions out of which liability is asserted to arise.”

Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308.

In Florida, state attorneys are elected in each judicial circuit,

Fla. Stat. § 27.01, and each state attorney is required to “appear in

the circuit and county court within his or her judicial circuit and

prosecute or defend on behalf of the state all suits, applications, or

motions, civil or criminal, in which the state is a party,” subject to

certain exceptions, Fla. Stat. § 27.02(1). While Florida has expressly

waived its immunity under Fla. Stat. 768.28 for lawsuits raising tra-

ditional tort claims, it has not consented to suit in federal court

based on “constitutional torts” under § 1983. Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of

Health & Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1514–15 (11th Cir. 1986).

In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court

recognized an exception to Eleventh Amendment “for suits against

state officers seeking prospective equitable relief to end continuing

violations of federal law.” Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180

F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999). The Ex parte Young exception ap-

plies to actions against state officials rather than “States or their

agencies, which retain their immunity against all suits in federal

court.” Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,

506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).

Prosecutors also enjoy absolute immunity from a civil suit

for damages under § 1983 for activities that are intimately associ-

ated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Imbler v. Pacht-

man, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). This “includes actions preliminary

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to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the court-

room,” and it extends to a prosecutor’s “out-of-court effort to con-

trol the presentation of a witness’ testimony.” Mikko v. City of At-

lanta, 857 F.3d 1136, 1142 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omit-

ted). It does not extend to actions that are not taken in a prosecu-

tor’s role as an advocate. Id.

Section 1983 imposes liability on “[e]very person who, under

color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not

override a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Will v. Michi-

gan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 (1989). Additionally,

“[r]espondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under

§ 1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).

Here, as an initial matter, Wright did not waive his right to

appeal the district court’s dismissal of his claims against the State

Attorney’s Office by filing an amended complaint that omitted

these claims. Reynolds, 988 F.3d at 1319. Once the district court

found that the State Attorney’s Office was entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity and instructed Wright that “[a]ny future

pleading shall not name the [State Attorney’s Office] as a Defend-

ant,” Wright’s inclusion of these claims in an amended complaint

would have been “futile.” Consequently, Wright was not required

to include these claims in his amended complaint to preserve a

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challenge to the district court’s Eleventh Amendment immunity

findings on appeal. Id. at 1319.

The State Attorney’s Office was acting as an arm of the State

of Florida in carrying out the functions described in Wright’s com-

plaint—including, e.g., prosecuting a case on behalf of the State

against Darius, Wright’s neighbor, and issuing subpoenas to

Wright. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308–09; Galette, No. 24-1021, slip op.

at 10, 12; Fla. Stat. § 27.02(1). Because Florida has not waived its

immunity for § 1983 claims, Wright’s claims against the State At-

torney’s Office were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Gam-

ble, 779 F.2d at 1514–15. Moreover, to the extent that Wright

sought prospective injunctive relief against the State Attorney’s Of-

fice (even though his complaint only requested such relief against

PBSO and Di Orsini), his claims would not fall under the Ex parte

Young exception because he sued the State Attorney’s Office itself

rather than a state official, see Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth.,

506 U.S. at 146.

Moreover, to the extent that Wright’s claims against the

State Attorney’s Office were based solely on the actions of employ-

ees (e.g., stealing mail from his mailbox or harassing him), they fail

for an independent reason: the State Attorney’s Office could not be

held vicariously liable for the conduct of employees under § 1983.

City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385. Lastly, because the State Attorney’s

Office was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, Wright’s

arguments regarding qualified immunity and prosecutorial im-

munity are immaterial.

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8 Opinion of the Court 25-12737

For these reasons, the district court did not err in dismissing

Wright’s complaints against the State Attorney’s Office based on

Eleventh Amendment immunity.

B. Dismissal Based on Standing

“Article III standing is a threshold jurisdictional question

that we review de novo.” Mack v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 1353,

1356 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted).

Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to adjudi-

cating “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Mack,

994 F.3d at 1356. “To determine whether a dispute satisfies Article

III’s case-or-controversy requirement, courts have established

three justiciability doctrines, [p]erhaps the most important of

which is the standing doctrine.” Mack, 994 F.3d at 1356 (alteration

in original) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he irreducible consti-

tutional minimum of standing contains three elements.” Lujan v.

Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “The plaintiff must have

(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the chal-

lenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be re-

dressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578

U.S. 330, 338 (2016). An injury in fact requires the “invasion of a

legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and

“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504

U.S. at 560 (quotation marks omitted). “Absent exceptional cir-

cumstances, a third party does not have standing to challenge in-

jury to another party.” Miccosukee, 226 F.3d at 1230.

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Here, the district court did not err in dismissing several of

Wright’s claims for lack of standing. As to Count One, Wright did

not clearly allege how he was injured by a state judge’s and assis-

tant state attorney’s failure to request his video evidence in a pros-

ecution against his neighbor, and Wright therefore lacked Article

III standing as to this portion of his claim. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560;

Miccosukee, 226 F.3d at 1230. Additionally, to the extent that

Wright may have been injured by wrongfully issued subpoenas, he

failed to allege facts showing how these subpoenas were “fairly

traceable to the challenged conduct of” the named defendant—spe-

cifically, PBSO. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338. The plain terms of

Wright’s amended complaint alleged that the state judge and assis-

tant state attorney, rather than PBSO, were responsible for issuing

the subpoenas. Thus, the district court correctly determined that

Wright lacked Article III standing as to Count One and properly

dismissed it without prejudice. See Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338; McGee,

727 F.3d at 1326. Regarding Count Four, Wright failed to allege

how he was injured by the filing of a fraudulent affidavit in a pros-

ecution against his neighbor, and the district court therefore

properly dismissed this claim for lack of Article III standing. Lujan,

504 U.S. at 560; Miccosukee, 226 F.3d at 1230. Wright also failed to

allege facts showing that he was injured by Di Orsini’s evidence

tampering in the criminal case against Darius for the purposes of

Article III standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Miccosukee, 226 F.3d at

1230.

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C. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint

must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Mere legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of

truth”; instead, “they must be supported by factual allegations.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

Generally, “[a] court’s review on a motion to dismiss is lim-

ited to the four corners of the complaint,” Wilchombe v. TeeVee

Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks

omitted), along with any exhibits attached to it, Baker v. City of Mad-

ison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2023). A court may also consider

materials that are incorporated by reference into the complaint,

which requires that the document be referenced in the complaint,

that it be central to the plaintiff’s claim, and that its contents be

undisputed. Id. Video footage may be incorporated by reference

into a complaint. See id. at 1277. A motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim “always presents a purely legal question; there are no

issues of fact because the allegations contained in the pleading are

presumed to be true.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d

1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997).

While “municipalities and other local governmental bodies

are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983,” Board of County Com-

missioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997), § 1983

does not authorize vicarious liability against a municipality or local

government body, Smothers v. Childers, 159 F.4th 922, 930 (11th Cir.

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2025). Instead, to hold a local government liable under § 1983, a

plaintiff must establish that his rights were violated pursuant to a

“custom” or “policy” of the local government. Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A plaintiff may alternatively

show that “a municipal official with final policy-making authority

in the area of the act or decision ma[de] the challenged act or deci-

sion.” Smothers, 159 F.4th at 930–31(quotation marks omitted). A

local government may also be held liable under § 1983 for the in-

adequate training of its employees “where the failure to train

amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with

whom the police come into contact.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. A

suit against a county sheriff in his or her official capacity is in effect

a claim against the county itself. Barnett v. MacArthur, 956 F.3d

1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020).

To succeed on a custom or policy theory against a local gov-

ernment, “a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights

were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that

constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and

(3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v.

Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, “[f]or a

custom or policy theory to be actionable, the custom or policy

must be so well-settled and pervasive that it assumes the force of

law; it must be persistent and widespread, so the county had either

actual or constructive knowledge of it.” Smothers, 159 F.4th at 931.

“Normally[,] random acts or isolated incidents are insufficient to

establish a custom or policy.” Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d

1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).

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There is “no general right, based upon either the Constitu-

tion or federal statutes, to the provision of medical treatment and

services by a state or municipality.” Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty.

Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987). However, the ex-

istence of a custodial relationship or other special relationship be-

tween an individual and a government may trigger a constitutional

duty of the government to provide medical services. Id. at 1034.

Custodial relationships arise from incarceration “or other forms of

involuntary confinement through which the government deprives

individuals of their liberty and thus of their ability to take care of

themselves.” White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999).

In the non-custodial setting, we have suggested that it might

be possible for an official’s deliberate indifference to constitute a

substantive due process violation, but only where “the act can be

characterized as arbitrary or conscience shocking in a constitu-

tional sense.” Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 329 F.3d 1300,

1305 (11th Cir. 2003); see Waldron v. Spicher, 954 F.3d 1297, 1310

(11th Cir. 2020). But see L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v. Peterson, 982 F.3d

1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2020) (“We doubt that deliberate indifference

can ever be ‘arbitrary’ or ‘conscience shocking’ in a non-custodial

setting.”). Such a claim would require a showing, “at the very least,

. . . of deliberate indifference to an extremely great risk of serious

injury to someone in Plaintiffs’ position.” Waddell, 329 F.3d at

1306.

Qualified immunity protects officers engaged in discretion-

ary functions from civil liability under § 1983 if the officer’s actions

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do “not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Perez v.

Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks

omitted). An officer raising a defense of qualified immunity must

show that he or she acted within the scope of his or her discretion-

ary authority, such that the officer acted in accordance with his or

her job-related duties and within the scope of his or her authority.

Huggins, 151 F.4th at 1278. If the officer meets this burden, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the officer (1) violated a

statutory or constitutional right that was (2) clearly established at

the time of the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1278.

“The Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable

searches and seizures by the government, is not implicated by en-

try upon private land to knock on a citizen’s door for legitimate

police purposes unconnected with a search of the premises.”

United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006). Addi-

tionally, “[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitu-

tion” and are instead created and defined “by existing rules or un-

derstandings that stem from an independent source such as state

law.” The Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577

(1972). A plaintiff may not ground a substantive due process claim

merely in the denial of a state-defined property right. See Greenbriar

Vill., L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook, City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.

2003).

A pro se plaintiff “must be given at least one chance to

amend [his] complaint before the district court dismisses the action

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with prejudice” unless the plaintiff does not wish to do so or allow-

ing him to do so would be “futile.” Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit,

927 F.3d 1123, 1132–33 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).

“Typically, where standing is lacking, a court must dismiss the

plaintiff’s claim without prejudice.” McGee v. Solic. Gen. of Richmond

Cnty., 727 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).

The district court did not err when it dismissed Wright’s

complaint for failure to state a claim. In Count Two, Wright’s al-

legations that PBSO Deputy Coleman threatened him and

“force[d] [him] to give a statement” even after he told Deputy Cole-

man he was injured may have been sufficient to show a custodial

relationship for the purposes of a Fourteenth Amendment deliber-

ate-indifference claim. Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1034. Indeed, liberally

construing Wright’s allegations, see Waldman, 871 F.3d at 1289,

Deputy Coleman “deprive[d] [Wright] of [his] liberty” and his abil-

ity to take care of himself by preventing him from leaving until he

gave a statement, see White, 183 F.3d at 1257. Nonetheless, Wright

did not name Deputy Coleman as a defendant in Count Two. In-

stead, he named PBSO and Sheriff Bradshaw in his official capacity,

and, as a result, his claim was subject to the requirements of Monell.

Barnett, 956 F.3d at 1296. Because Wright failed to allege any facts

showing that Deputy Coleman was inadequately trained or acted

pursuant to a “custom” or “policy” of PBSO, much less one that

was “so well settled and pervasive that it assume[d] the force of

law,” the district court properly dismissed Count Two. See Monell,

436 U.S. at 694; Smothers, 159 F.4th at 931; Canton, 489 U.S. at 388.

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Wright’s Count Three claim regarding the search of his

mailbox and removal of his mail by PBSO employees—which also

named PBSO and Sheriff Bradshaw in his official capacity—simi-

larly fails under Monell. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Smothers, 159 F.4th

at 931. Wright failed to allege how the conduct of the PBSO em-

ployees on a single, isolated instance on December 9, 2021, was

performed pursuant to a “custom” or “policy” of PBSO that was

“so well settled and pervasive that it assume[d] the force of law,”

see Smothers, 159 F.4th at 931; Depew, 787 F.2d at 1499, or resulted

from inadequate training, see Canton, 489 U.S. at 388.

As for the portion of Wright’s claims against PBSO and Sher-

iff Bradshaw in Counts Five through Seven, Wright again failed to

allege facts sufficient to satisfy Monell, because he did not indicate

that PBSO deputies lacked adequate training or were acting pursu-

ant to a well-settled custom or policy when they trespassed on his

property, threatened him, harassed him, disturbed his quiet enjoy-

ment of his property, or performed unlawful searches. Smothers,

159 F.4th at 931; Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Canton, 489 U.S. at 388.

Moreover, Wright’s Fourth Amendment interests were not impli-

cated merely by PBSO officers and Di Orsini entering his property

to serve subpoenas. See Taylor, 458 F.3d at 1204.

Wright’s claims against Di Orsini individually in Counts Five

through Seven also fail. Even assuming that Di Orsini was not en-

titled to qualified immunity, Wright’s vague assertions that Di Or-

sini engaged in a “HARASSMENT campaign,” threatened him, vi-

olated a state no-contact order, and engaged in evidence tampering

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16 Opinion of the Court 25-12737

in Darius’s case did not plausibly allege the violation of Wright’s

federal rights for the purposes of § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Similarly, Wright’s conclu-

sory assertions that Di Orsini conducted “illegal searches” of his

property, without accompanying factual allegations as to the na-

ture of these searches or whether Di Orsini entered Wright’s prop-

erty at all (rather than, e.g., merely “[b]locking . . . a [p]rivate [g]ate”

to the property), did not adequately state a Fourth Amendment vi-

olation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. And while Di Orsini’s disturbance

of Wright’s right to quiet enjoyment of his property may have vio-

lated a state-defined property right, it did not violate a federal right

for the purposes of § 1983. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Greenbriar Vill.,

345 F.3d at 1262.

Wright contends that the district court abused its discretion

in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to view his video and

audio evidence before dismissing his claims. But the court did not

need to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve the “pure[] legal

question” of whether Wright’s amended complaint was subject to

dismissal. See Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1367. Indeed, there were

“no issues of fact” to resolve at an evidentiary hearing because, at

the motion to dismiss stage, the court was required to assume that

Wright’s allegations in his complaint and his characterizations of

his video and audio evidence were true. See id. Moreover, contrary

to Wright’s assertions that the district court failed to honor his sta-

tus as a pro se party, Waldman, 871 F.3d at 1289, the court liberally

read his pleadings, attempted to group his allegations into cogniza-

ble claims, and gave him a chance to replead his complaint before

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dismissing several of his claims with prejudice. Silberman, 927 F.3d

at 1132. Similarly, Wright’s mere compliance with the court’s in-

structions and the instructions in the pro se § 1983 form could not

cure his otherwise deficient claims. Bilal, 981 F.3d at 911.

D. Temporary Restraining Order

We review the denial of a motion for a temporary restrain-

ing order or preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Long

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 924 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2019).

Courts consider four factors in determining whether a tem-

porary restraining order is warranted, “which are whether the mo-

vant has established: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the

merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not

granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the re-

lief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief

would serve the public interest.” See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.

Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005). “Controlling prec-

edent is clear that injunctive relief may not be granted unless the

plaintiff establishes the substantial likelihood of success criterion.”

Id. at 1226.

Here, for the reasons explained above, Wright failed to es-

tablish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims

against Di Orsini, and the district court therefore did not err in

denying his motion for a TRO. Moreover, the district court did not

need to hold an evidentiary hearing on Wright’s motion because,

even accepting Wright’s characterizations of his video and audio

USCA11 Case: 25-12737 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 18 of 18

18 Opinion of the Court 25-12737

evidence, his claims against Di Orsini still would not adequately

allege the violation of a federal right for the purposes of § 1983.

AFFIRMED.