State v. Blevins

[Cite as State v. Blevins, 2026-Ohio-1181.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LAWRENCE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 24CA22

v. :

JERRY RAY BLEVINS, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Defendant-Appellant. :

________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Karyn Justice, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellant.1

Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and

Andrea M. Kratzenberg, Lawrence County Assistant Prosecuting

Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for appellee.

________________________________________________________________

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT

DATE JOURNALIZED:

ABELE, J.

{¶1} This is an appeal from a Lawrence County Common Pleas

Court judgment of conviction and sentence. Jerry Ray Blevins,

defendant below and appellant herein, assigns the following

errors for review:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“MR. BLEVINS’S CONVICTIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED

BY THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF SUFFICIENT

EVIDENCE.”

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

Different counsel represented appellant during the trial court

1

proceedings.

Lawrence 24CA22 2

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO

ADVISE MR. BLEVINS REGARDING POST-RELEASE

CONTROL AT SENTENCING.”

{¶2} On June 21, 2024, a Lawrence County Grand Jury returned

an indictment that charged appellant with one count of fourth-

degree-felony aggravated trafficking in drugs and one count of

second-degree-felony aggravated trafficking in drugs, both in

violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1).

{¶3} On December 9, 2024, the trial court held a jury trial.

At trial, a confidential informant testified about two

controlled purchases of methamphetamine from appellant. During

the first buy, he purchased about one gram of methamphetamine.

During the second buy, the informant thought he purchased about

half an ounce of methamphetamine, but when he opened the bag he

discovered that it contained about 40 grams of methamphetamine.

{¶4} During the informant’s testimony, the State played

video recordings of the controlled buys. The informant

identified appellant as the person who gave him the drugs. The

video showed that, after the informant obtained the drugs, he

immediately walked to a police car and gave the drugs to the

police.

{¶5} The informant admitted that he had agreed to become an

informant to help reduce criminal charges that he faced after

officers discovered drugs in his possession. The informant

stated that he currently was serving a prison sentence for a

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tampering-with-evidence conviction and that he also had been

imprisoned in the past for other criminal offenses, including

“possession, tampering, vandalism and escape.”

{¶6} Ironton Police Captain Brandon Blankenship testified

and explained the procedure that he followed before the

informant approached appellant’s residence. He explained that,

before the informant approached appellant’s residence, officers

searched the informant to ensure that he did not have any drugs

on him. Blankenship also stated that, after the informant

returned to the police vehicle after he visited appellant’s

residence, the informant had drugs in his possession.

{¶7} Blankenship further explained that officers used a cell

phone to capture video and audio recordings of the two

transactions. Blankenship stated that the first controlled

purchase occurred during the nighttime, so Blakenship could not

see appellant and the informant, except on the video recording.

He indicated that because the second controlled buy occurred

during the daytime, he viewed the transaction directly and via

the recording.

{¶8} After Blankenship’s testimony, the State presented

evidence from two forensic scientists who tested the drugs. The

forensic scientists confirmed that the substances they tested

contained approximately .67 grams and 45 grams of

methamphetamine. After their testimony, the State rested.

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{¶9} At that juncture, appellant orally moved for a judgment

of acquittal, that the trial court denied.

{¶10} After hearing the evidence the jury found appellant

guilty of fourth-degree-felony and second-degree-felony

aggravated trafficking in drugs.

{¶11} On December 12, 2024, the trial court sentenced

appellant to serve 12 months in prison for the fourth-degree-

felony offense and to serve 8 to 12 years for the second-degree-

felony offense, with the sentences to be served consecutively to

one another for a total prison time of 9 to 13 years. The court

also imposed a period of postrelease control of no less than 18

months and no more than three years. This appeal followed.

I

{¶12} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts

that his convictions are against “the manifest weight of

sufficient evidence.” He argues that the informant’s testimony

was not credible and, thus, did not support appellant’s

convictions.

A

{¶13} We initially observe that appellant’s assignment of

error appears to blend the “quantitively and qualitatively

different” standards that apply to sufficiency and manifest-

weight challenges. See State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

386 (1997) (“The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence

Lawrence 24CA22 5

and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and

qualitatively different.”). A challenge to the manifest weight

of the evidence requires a court to evaluate whether the greater

amount of credible evidence offered at trial supports the

defendant’s conviction. See id. at 387, quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990) (“Weight of the evidence concerns

‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence,

offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than

the other.’”). A court that considers a manifest weight

challenge must “‘review the entire record, weigh the evidence

and all reasonable inferences, and consider the credibility of

witnesses.’” State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-493, ¶ 208, quoting

State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 328. Reviewing courts also

must bear in mind, however, that credibility generally is an

issue for the trier of fact to resolve. See Eastley v. Volkman,

2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21; State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67

(2001); State v. Murphy, 2008-Ohio-1744, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.).

“‘Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is

particularly competent to decide “whether, and to what extent,

to credit the testimony of particular witnesses,” we must afford

substantial deference to its determinations of credibility.’”

Barberton v. Jenney, 2010-Ohio-2420, ¶ 20, quoting State v.

Konya, 2006-Ohio-6312, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Lawson,

1997 WL 476684 (2d Dist. Aug. 22, 1997). As the Eastley court

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explained:

“‘[I]n determining whether the judgment below is

manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every

reasonable intendment and every reasonable presumption

must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of

facts. . . .

If the evidence is susceptible of more than one

construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it

that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict

and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict

and judgment.’”

2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 21, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.

Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984), fn.3, quoting 5 Ohio

Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191–192

(1978). Thus, an appellate court will leave the issues of

evidence weight and witness credibility to the fact finder, as

long as a rational basis exists in the record for its decision.

State v. Picklesimer, 2012-Ohio-1282, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.); accord

State v. Howard, 2007-Ohio-6331, ¶ 6 (4th Dist.) (“We will not

intercede as long as the trier of fact has some factual and

rational basis for its determination of credibility and

weight”).

{¶14} Accordingly, a judgment of conviction is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence when the record contains

substantial credible evidence upon which the trier of fact

reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the

essential elements of the offense had been established. See

State v. Leonard, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 81, quoting State v. Getsy,

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84 Ohio St.3d 180, 193–194 (1998), citing State v. Eley, 56 Ohio

St.2d 169 (1978), syllabus (“‘The question to be answered when a

manifest-weight issue is raised is whether “there is substantial

evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all

the elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt’”

[emphasis omitted.]). A court may reverse a judgment of

conviction only if it appears that the fact finder, when it

resolved the conflicts in evidence, “‘clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20

Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983); accord

State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-2804, ¶ 31. A reviewing court should

find a conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence

only in the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at

387, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175; accord State v.

Clinton, 2017-Ohio-9423, ¶ 166; State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d

479, 483 (2000).

{¶15} On the other hand, a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence does not permit a reviewing court to assess the

credibility of the evidence. See State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-

2804, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Pountney, 2018-Ohio-22, ¶ 19,

quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two

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of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on

other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89,

102, fn. 4 (1997) (sufficiency review does not allow a reviewing

court to “ask whether the evidence should be believed but,

rather, whether the evidence, ‘“if believed, would convince the

average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt”’”); see generally State v. Balmert, 2025-Ohio-5588, ¶ 10,

quoting State v. Groce, 2020-Ohio-6671, ¶ 7 (a sufficiency

challenge requires a reviewing court to determine “‘whether the

evidence presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’”).

Instead, the question is whether the State’s evidence, if

believed, is legally sufficient to support a defendant’s

conviction. See Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386 (“sufficiency

is a test of adequacy”).

{¶16} In the case sub judice, appellant’s assignment of

error challenges the credibility of the informant’s testimony,

not the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. Thus, because

appellant’s brief does not contain a sufficiency argument, we do

not address this issue. See, e.g., State v. Quarterman, 2014-

Ohio-4034, ¶ 19 (“[a]ppellate courts are not obligated to

create, nor should they sua sponte provide, arguments on behalf

of parties”).

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{¶17} In the case sub judice, as we explain below, we do not

believe that appellant’s case is an exceptional case in which

the evidence weighs heavily against his conviction. Instead, we

believe that the record contains substantial, credible evidence

upon which the trier of fact reasonably could have concluded,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the essential elements of the

offense had been established. Thus, appellant’s conviction is

not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

B

{¶18} A conviction for aggravated trafficking in

methamphetamine requires the State to establish, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that a defendant knowingly sold, or offered to

sell, methamphetamine. See R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (C)(1). In

the case sub judice, appellant disputes whether the informant’s

testimony was sufficiently credible so as to establish, beyond a

reasonable doubt, the elements of the offense.

{¶19} As this court recently recognized, “a confidential

informant’s testimony and credibility are generally matters for

the trier of fact to weigh and determine, and the trier of fact

is free to accept or reject any and all of the evidence.”

(Citations omitted.) State v. Burns, 2025-Ohio-5442, ¶ 20 (4th

Dist.). Because Burns is particularly relevant to the issue

appellant raises in his first assignment of error, we quote it

at length:

Lawrence 24CA22 10

In State v. Anderson, 2018-Ohio-2013 (4th Dist.),

this court considered whether Anderson’s charges were

against the manifest weight of the evidence when

Anderson asserted that a confidential informant with a

criminal history, financial incentive, and incentive to

mitigate punishment for his own drug offense, lacked

credibility. We observed:

[T]his court and others generally have

rejected manifest-weight challenges based upon a

confidential informant’s alleged lack of

credibility. State v. Stevens, 4th Dist. Highland

No. 09CA3, 2009-Ohio-6143, 2009 WL 4021149, ¶ 25;

accord State v. Bachman, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-

17-006, 2018-Ohio-1242, 2018 WL 1567641; State v.

Bradley, 2015-Ohio-5421, 55 N.E.3d 580 (8th Dist.),

¶¶ 26–28; State v. Fisher, 3rd Dist. Hardin No. 6-

13-03, 2014-Ohio-436, 2014 WL 538642, ¶¶ 10–11;

State v. Altman, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 12 CO 42,

2013-Ohio-5883, 2013 WL 6921497, ¶¶ 33–37; State v.

Price, 3rd Dist. Logan No. 8-13-03, 2013-Ohio-3984,

2013 WL 5230326, ¶ 24; State v. Smith, 193 Ohio

App.3d 201, 2011-Ohio-997, 951 N.E.2d 469 (3rd

Dist.), ¶ 20; State v. Moore, 5th Dist. Stark No.

2008-CA-00228, 2009-Ohio-4958, 2009 WL 3003996, ¶

23. In Bachman, for instance, the court concluded

that the defendant’s trafficking charge was not

against manifest weight of the evidence, even

though the defendant asserted that the confidential

informant's testimony lacked credibility due to the

informant's “drug addiction and previous bad acts.”

Id. at ¶ 18. The court pointed out that the

defendant's “trial counsel thoroughly explored the

various credibility issues relating to” the

confidential informant. The court noted that the

jury was aware of the informant's credibility

issues and was entitled to weigh it accordingly.

The court did not believe “that the jury’s

credibility determination was against the manifest

weight of the evidence.” Id., citing State v. Neal,

5th Dist. Stark No. 1998CA00288, 1999 WL 744148,

*2–3, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2863, *5–6 (June 21,

1999) (rejecting defendant’s manifest weight

argument challenging the credibility of

identification testimony based upon the witness's

credibility upon a determination that defense

counsel thoroughly cross-examined the witness and

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explored the credibility issue at trial).

Id. at ¶ 41.

In Anderson, we observed that, in Bachman, supra,

the court also observed that the officers who monitored

the informant’s controlled buy with the defendant

substantiated the informant’s testimony. “The officers

testified at length as to the procedures they employ to

ensure that [the informant] was not in possession of any

drugs prior to the transaction, which included searching

[the informant] and his vehicle.” Id. at ¶ 19. Further,

in Bachman and in the case sub judice, after the

informant’s contact with the defendant, the officers

rendezvoused with the informant who advised the officers

that the defendant sold him narcotics and gave the

officers the narcotics. Anderson at ¶ 42.

Moreover, other Ohio courts have rejected similar

manifest-weight challenges based upon a confidential

informant's alleged lack of credibility. In State v.

Jefferson, 2021-Ohio-281, (3d Dist.), the defendant

argued that the confidential informant not a credible

witness because he testified in exchange for case

consideration and had a motive to ensure defendant's

conviction. The court, however, held:

“[T]he jury is not precluded from relying on

a witness’s testimony simply because the witness

has a criminal history or a motivation to provide

testimony favorable to the prosecution.” State v.

Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-26, 2020-Ohio-427,

¶ 44, citing State v. Nitsche, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 103174, 2016-Ohio-3170, ¶ 44. “Instead, a

witness’s criminal history, prior drug use, or

potential bias are factors that the jury may

consider in determining whether to credit the

witness's testimony and in assigning weight to the

witness’s testimony.” Id., citing State v. Price,

3d Dist. Logan No. 8-13-03, 2013-Ohio-3984, ¶ 23-

24. Here, the jury was informed of the agreement

between the confidential informant and law

enforcement officers, specifically that he assisted

law enforcement in his capacity as a confidential

informant in exchange for case consideration for

his pending drug-related charges. See State v.

Kammeyer, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-48, 2020-Ohio-

3842, ¶ 51. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that

the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest

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injustice by finding the confidential informant’s

testimony credible. See State v. Cartlidge, 3d

Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-44, 2020-Ohio-3615, ¶ 26

(“In the end, a ‘[m]ere disagreement over the

credibility of witnesses is not a sufficient reason

to reverse a judgment on manifest weight

grounds.’”), quoting State v. Cervantes, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 18AP-505, 2019-Ohio-1373, ¶ 28.

Jefferson at ¶ 36.

In the case sub judice, appellant’s trial counsel

thoroughly cross-examined co-defendant Fender and

confidential informant Gibson about their criminal

records and incentives to testify. The jury heard

testimony that Fender awaited sentencing in her case and

that Gibson received compensation and an opportunity to

avoid criminal charges. See Anderson at ¶ 43 (jury heard

ample testimony about the confidential informant’s

criminal history and did not lose its way when it

credited the informant’s testimony and rejected the

defendant’s testimony). Here, the jury sitting as the

trier of fact was “free to believe or disbelieve any or

all of the testimony the confidential informant

“presented” at trial. State v. Crump, 2010-Ohio-5263,

¶ 26 (10th Dist.).

. . . .

Importantly, in the case at bar appellee played a

video recording of the transaction for the jury that

showed during the controlled buy appellant retrieve the

scales and handle the methamphetamine in coordination

with codefendant Fender. Although appellant contends

that the video does not show what exactly appellant

handed to Fender, in Anderson, supra, 2018-Ohio-2013, we

noted that while we recognized that none of the video or

audio evidence crystallized the moment the defendant

handed drugs to the confidential informant in exchange

for money, the evidence did record the informant and the

defendant engaged in conversations that trained law

enforcement officers testified constituted drug

transactions. Id. at ¶ 45. Moreover, we noted that

direct evidence of a hand-to-hand drug transaction is

not necessarily required to sustain a drug-trafficking

conviction. Id., citing State v. Chafin, 2017-Ohio-

7622, ¶ 36-38 (4th Dist.) (rejecting similar argument

that drug-trafficking conviction against manifest weight

of the evidence when video failed to document hand-to-

hand drug transaction); State v. McLemore, 2000 WL

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422368, *2 (9th Dist.) (defendant’s conviction not

against the manifest weight of the evidence even though

officers who observed controlled buy did not see what

transpired between appellant and informant, and even

though defendant asserted that informant lacked

credibility because she cooperated with police in

exchange for the dismissal of criminal charges against

her).

As noted above, in the case sub judice, the co-

defendant and confidential informant’s testimony are

substantially consistent and two officers corroborated

their testimony and provided photos and the video

surveillance. Therefore, like Anderson, even if none of

the video or documentary evidence clearly shows that

appellant exchanged drugs for money, Gibson and Fender’s

testimony, along with the officer’s corroborating

observations, provides ample competent credible evidence

to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant

committed the offense aggravated drug trafficking.

Anderson at ¶ 45.

Burns, 2025-Ohio-5442, at ¶ 21-24 and 27-28 (4th Dist.).

{¶20} We believe that our reasoning set forth in Burns

applies here to appellant’s argument. Appellant’s argument is

based upon his assertion that the informant was not a credible

witness due to his previous criminal history and his incentive

to assist the State to secure a conviction so that he would

obtain leniency with respect to his own criminal charges. As we

explained in Burns, however, the credibility of an informant’s

testimony is a matter reserved to the fact finder.

{¶21} Furthermore, even if the video recording did not fully

“crystallize[] the moment [appellant] handed drugs to the

confidential informant in exchange for money,” Burns at ¶ 27,

the record contains competent and credible evidence to support

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appellant’s conviction for trafficking in drugs. The officer

testified that, before the informant approached appellant’s

residence, officers had searched the informant to ensure that he

did not have any drugs in his possession before the controlled

buy. The recording shows that, after the controlled buy, the

informant returned directly to the law enforcement officer and

gave the drugs to the officer. Nothing on the video or audio

portion of the recording suggests that the informant had the

opportunity to surreptitiously obtain drugs from any person

other than appellant. Thus, a logical inference is that the

informant obtained the drugs from appellant.

{¶22} We also observe that appellant’s trial counsel fully

cross-examined the informant regarding his previous involvement

with the justice system and questioned his motives.

Additionally, during closing argument, trial counsel suggested

that the jury should not believe the informant’s testimony.

Thus, the jury had ample opportunity to weigh the competing

evidence and apparently decided that the State’s evidence was

more convincing. See State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-5316, ¶ 45 (4th

Dist.) (conviction was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence when the officer’s testimony about the controlled buy,

the existence of audio/video recordings, and the recovery of

heroin and methamphetamine after the controlled buys

corroborated the informant’s testimony); State v. McIntosh,

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2018-Ohio-5343, ¶ 53 (4th Dist.) (“Obviously, the jury was in

the best position to weigh the informant’s circumstances when it

evaluated the informant’s credibility, and we should not second-

guess its decision. Even though appellant may believe that the

informant is not a credible witness, the jury was free to

believe otherwise.”). Consequently, based upon our review of

the record we do not believe that the jury verdict constitutes a

manifest miscarriage of justice.

{¶23} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.

II

{¶24} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts

that his sentence is contrary to law because, during the

sentencing hearing, the trial court failed to advise him that

postrelease control “was discretionary and that a violation of

[postrelease control] would subject him to the consequences set

forth in R.C. 2967.28.” Appellant asserts that although the

trial court included appropriate language in its sentencing

entry, the statute however required the court to provide these

notices on the record during the sentencing hearing.

{¶25} The State agrees that, at the sentencing hearing, the

trial court did not advise appellant of the sanctions that the

parole board could impose if he violates any terms of his

postrelease control. The State thus agrees that this court

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should remand the matter to the trial court for the sole purpose

of giving appellant the proper postrelease-control

notifications.

{¶26} When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts

apply the standard set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). E.g., State

v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-1083, ¶ 13; State v. Grashel, 2025-Ohio-580,

¶ 19 (4th Dist.). The statute authorizes appellate courts to

“increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence” “if it

clearly and convincingly finds either of the following”:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing

court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section

2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section

2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the

Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

{¶27} As relevant here, a trial court that imposes a period

of postrelease control must give the defendant specific

advisements before it imposes sentence. To validly impose

postrelease control, a trial court must orally inform the

defendant of “[1] the term of supervision, [2] whether

postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, and [3] the

consequences of violating postrelease control.” State v. Bates,

2022-Ohio-475, ¶ 11, citing State v. Grimes, 2017-Ohio-2927, ¶

11, overruled on other grounds by State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-

2913, see State v. Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 22-23, overruled on

Lawrence 24CA22 17

other grounds by Harper.

{¶28} R.C. 2967.28(B) and (C) specify the terms of

supervision and state that

a period of post-release control required by this

division for an offender shall be of one of the following

periods:

(1) For a felony sex offense, five years;

(2) For a felony of the first degree that is not a

felony sex offense, up to five years, but not less than

two years;

(3) For a felony of the second degree that is not

a felony sex offense, up to three years, but not less

than eighteen months;

(4) For a felony of the third degree that is an

offense of violence and is not a felony sex offense, up

to three years, but not less than one year.

(C) Any sentence to a prison term for a felony of

the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject

to division (B)(1) or (4) of this section shall include

a requirement that the offender be subject to a period

of post-release control of up to two years after the

offender’s release from imprisonment, if the parole

board, in accordance with division (D) of this section,

determines that a period of post-release control is

necessary for that offender.

{¶29} R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) and (e) require a trial court to

notify a defendant whether postrelease control is mandatory or

discretionary. See Grimes at ¶ 11. Postrelease control is

mandatory “if the offender is being sentenced, other than to a

sentence of life imprisonment, for a felony of the first degree

or second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of

the third degree that is an offense of violence and is not a

felony sex offense.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d). Postrelease

control is discretionary if the court is sentencing the offender

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“for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not

subject to [R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d)].” R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e).

{¶30} Additionally, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f) requires a trial

court to notify a defendant of the consequence of violating

postrelease control. This provision requires the trial court to

notify a defendant that, if the defendant violates a condition

of postrelease control,

the parole board may impose a prison term, as part of

the sentence, of up to one-half of the definite prison

term originally imposed upon the offender as the

offender’s stated prison term or up to one-half of the

minimum prison term originally imposed upon the offender

as part of the offender’s stated non-life felony

indefinite prison term.

{¶31} A sentence that imposes postrelease control without

providing the defendant with these statutory notifications at

the sentencing hearing renders the postrelease-control portion

of the sentence contrary to law. See Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, at

¶ 23.

{¶32} In addition to orally informing a defendant of (1) the

term of postrelease control, (2) the discretionary or mandatory

nature of postrelease control, and (3) the consequences of

violating postrelease control, the trial court also must

incorporate these notifications into its sentencing entry.

Bates, 2022-Ohio-475, at ¶ 12. A sentence that imposes

postrelease control is contrary to law if the trial court fails

to provide these notices at the sentencing hearing or in the

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sentencing entry. Id.

{¶33} In the case sub judice, at the sentencing hearing the

trial court informed appellant of the term of postrelease

control. The court stated that it sentenced appellant to a

period of postrelease control of “up to three years, but not

less than 18 months.” The trial court did not, however, orally

notify appellant (1) whether this period of postrelease control

was discretionary or mandatory, or (2) the consequences of

violating postrelease control. Although the trial court

incorporated these two notifications into its sentencing entry,2

the trial court also was required to advise appellant these

notifications at the sentencing hearing. See Bates, 2022-Ohio-

475, at ¶ 12. The court’s failure to do so means that the trial

court did not properly impose postrelease control, and the

postrelease control portion of appellant’s sentence is contrary

to law. See Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, at ¶ 23; State v. Griffin,

2024-Ohio-4806, ¶ 31 (1st Dist.); State v. Bolan, 2024-Ohio-

2640, ¶ 11-12 (8th Dist.).

{¶34} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

2 The State claims that the trial court’s sentencing entry informs

appellant that his period of postrelease control is mandatory. Our review of

the trial court’s sentencing entry indicates that the court used the word

“discretionary” to describe appellant’s period of postrelease control. See

December 30, 2024 Nunc Pro Tunc entry (“the defendant is advised that upon

the completion of the prison term, the defendant could be subject to a

discretionary period of supervision . . . .”). Because we are reversing and

remanding the postrelease-control portion of the trial court’s sentence, the

trial court may clarify any discrepancy on remand.

Lawrence 24CA22 20

sustain appellant’s second assignment of error, reverse the

postrelease-control portion of appellant’s sentence and remand

this matter to the trial court for resentencing on postrelease

control only. We otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT

WITH THIS OPINION.

Lawrence 24CA22 21

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed in part,

reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. Appellee and appellant shall equally share

the costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this

appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this

Court directing the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas to

carry this judgment into execution.

If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail

has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it

is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon

the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is

to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an

application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in

that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will

terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period,

or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with

the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant

to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court

of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses

the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will

terminate as of the date of such dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that

mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

For the Court

BY:__________________________

Peter B. Abele, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a

final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal

commences from the date of filing with the clerk