The opinion
Judgment rendered April 1, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.
No. 56,521-CW
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
WILLIE JAMES JONES, Respondents
STEPHANIE JONES THOMAS,
AND CASSANDRA DENISE JONES
O/B/O ROSEMARY G. JONES
versus
THE ESTATE OF LAWSON J. Applicants
SCHUFORD, JR. AND HORACE
MANN COMPANIES
*****
On Application for Writs from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 642,740
Honorable Ramon Lafitte, Judge
*****
PORTEOUS, HAINKEL & JOHNSON, LLP Counsel for Applicants
By: Charles L. Chassaignac, IV
Emily S. Morrison
J. Brad Smitherman
DAVIS LAW OFFICE, LLC Counsel for Respondents
By: S. P. Davis, Sr.
Kharmen K. Davis-Taylor
*****
Before COX, STEPHENS, HUNTER,
MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.
HUNTER, J., dissents with written reasons.
ELLENDER, J.
In this tragic case arising from a fatal house fire, the estate of the
homeowner and its insurer filed a writ with this court contesting the trial
court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment against the claims of
the owner’s caregiver, who eventually died as a result of the fire. The matter
was granted to docket for arguments and briefing in accordance with La.
C.C.P. art. 966(H). For the following reasons, we grant the writ and reverse
the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
FACTS
On Friday, March 11, 2022, the Shreveport Fire Department (“SFD”)
responded to a residential fire at Lawson Schuford’s home. Rosemary
Jones, Schuford’s caregiver, called 911 and told the dispatcher, “The stove is
on fire.” Schuford, who was bedridden due to infirmities, was in his bed
when SFD arrived. Both he and Jones were pulled from the home and taken
to the hospital. Schuford was deceased upon arrival from smoke inhalation;
Jones eventually died on October 2, 2023, from the effects of smoke
inhalation and burns to her upper body and face.
At the time of the fire, Schuford had been bedridden for some time.
While he was able to reside in his home, Jones had been his full-time
caregiver for more than 15 years. In addition to caring for his personal
needs, her responsibilities included cleaning, running errands, booking
appointments, shopping, scheduling maintenance/repairs for the house, and
cooking. According to Jones’ daughter, prior to being bedridden, Schuford
fried fish every Friday. When he was no longer able, Jones continued this
tradition by frying fish for Schuford. March 11, 2022, was a Friday.
Even though Jones survived for a year and a half after the fire, her
serious condition preventing her from giving any statement as to how the
fire started. However, following his investigation, SFD Investigator
Lawrence Bunton concluded the fire likely originated in the kitchen on the
front right burner of the stove. Three of the four burners on the electric
range had a pot or pan on them, including the front right burner, and the
knob for the front right burner appeared to be activated and on. Bunton’s
report noted gas and electric services were supplied to the house, but both
meters had been removed by the utility companies prior to his investigation.
Ultimately, Bunton found while the exact cause of the fire was unknown, it
appeared to have originated on the stovetop, which was consistent with what
Jones told the 911 dispatcher.
Randy Stephens, an employee of EFI Global, also performed an
investigation into the cause of the fire, on behalf of the insurer. Stephens’
report stated the fire originated in the kitchen, on the stovetop, as a result of
cooking oil being heated to its ignition temperature before catching fire in a
pan on the front right stove burner. After this determination, other potential
heat sources in the area were considered and excluded, including an electric
toaster located next to the cooktop that was not plugged into a power source.
Stephens reported no evidence existed showing the cooktop malfunctioned
due to its wiring or heating elements, and the range controls revealed the
right front heating element control was in the “on” position. He also
observed neither the natural gas furnace nor the electrical panel showed any
signs of heat or fire effects.
The record indicates no additional investigations were requested or
conducted by either party.
2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 13, 2023, Jones’ husband and daughters filed suit against
Schuford’s estate and his homeowner’s insurer alleging Schuford was
negligent in failing to maintain a safe home environment, failing to maintain
a safe workplace, and failing to safely maintain all gas lines and appliances
in his home. The plaintiffs claimed these failures resulted in the house fire
that caused Jones’ ultimate death in October 2023, due to complications
from the burn injuries she sustained in the fire.
The defendants filed two motions for summary judgment. The first,
filed in January 2024, argued the plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence
showing they could prove the claims contained in their petition. Because
none of the evidence available in the case proved Schuford was responsible
for the fire, and because the plaintiffs provided no evidence to refute the
findings made by Investigators Bunton and Stephens, the defendants argued
all claims against Schuford and his insurer should be dismissed.
The defendants further argued the evidence the plaintiffs would need
to show Schuford was liable for the house fire simply did not exist. The
only two people who had actual knowledge of what occurred were now both
deceased, there were no investigative reports contradicting those rendered by
Bunton and Stephens, and there was no testimony to contradict Jones’
statements to 911 dispatch. Because the plaintiffs did not, and could not,
produce any relevant evidence in support of their claims, the defendants
argued their motion for summary judgment should be granted.
In support, the defendants attached a copy of the discovery responses
provided to them by the plaintiffs, as well as an affidavit from Stephens,
stating he was a senior fire investigator with EFI Global with 38 years of
3
experience in fire investigations. In addition to setting out his qualifications
and experience, the affidavit laid the foundation for his investigative report,
which was also attached in support of the motion. The motion was set for
hearing on April 1, 2024.
On March 19, 2024, the plaintiffs filed an amended petition. In
addition to claiming Schuford’s estate and homeowner’s insurer were liable
for the injuries and economic loss sustained by Jones in the house fire, they
also claimed Schuford’s homeowner’s policy provided both liability and
medical coverage to domestic employees injured in the course and scope of
their employment as a result of an accidental fire occurrence. All other
claims remained the same as those made in the initial petition, including that
Schuford failed to maintain a safe home and work environment, and his gas
lines and appliances caused the fire at issue.
On March 27, 2024, only five days prior to the hearing on the
defendants’ first motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs filed an
untimely opposition, arguing genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether the homeowner’s insurance provided coverage for “domestic
employees,” whether Jones was a “domestic employee,” and the actual cause
of the fire. The plaintiffs claimed Jones was a domestic employee, and as
such, she was entitled to the liability coverage detailed in Schuford’s
homeowner’s policy. They argued no fault determination was necessary in
order for them to recover under this liability coverage, and suggested the
policy provided a workers’ compensation type-coverage for domestic
employees hurt in an accident while performing work at the home.
As to the cause of the fire, the plaintiffs claimed there was no
evidence Jones started it, and no evidence Schuford did not; in essence, there
4
was insufficient evidence to allow an accurate determination of what
actually caused the fire. The plaintiffs also argued the report of Stephens
was unreliable because he did not scientifically test the gas or electrical lines
to determine if they were dangerous or defective, further supporting their
argument a genuine issue of material fact existed that would preclude
summary judgment. They also claimed Stephens’ report was unreliable and
should not be considered because he was not accepted as an expert in fire
investigation, and they argued he mischaracterized Bunton’s report by
stating he determined the fire originated on the stove. Finally, the plaintiffs
noted Bunton’s report concluded the exact cause of the fire was unknown.
For these reasons, they contended summary judgment should be denied. In
support, the plaintiffs attached a copy of the homeowner’s insurance policy,
as well as an affidavit from Bunton which outlined his past work experience
and laid the foundation for his report.
The defendants filed a reply, arguing the plaintiffs’ opposition was
untimely and should not be considered, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art.
966(B)(2). The defendants also argued even if the trial court did consider
the untimely opposition, the plaintiffs still failed to raise any genuine issues
of material fact. They contended a fault determination was absolutely
necessary for the plaintiffs to recover damages from the insurer because the
homeowner’s policy was a liability policy that provided coverage to
domestic employees only in cases where the homeowner was found liable
for injuries sustained by a third party due to the domestic employee’s
negligence. Finally, the defendants claimed the plaintiffs’ quarrel with
Stephens’ report lacked merit, as his report was attached to his affidavit, and
established the proper foundation. The defendants also pointed out the
5
plaintiffs offered no expert report of their own to rebut Stephens’ report,
instead relying on the report of Bunton, which the defendants contended was
not contradictory as both investigators found the fire likely originated on the
front right burner of the stovetop. Ultimately, the defendants argued the
plaintiffs could not rely on a lack of factual support as to the cause of the fire
to defeat summary judgment.
On the date of the summary judgment hearing, April 1, 2024, the
plaintiffs orally requested to continue, which the trial court granted.
The defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment on
August 1, 2024, wherein they again argued no genuine issues of material
fact existed as to the cause of the fire, and the plaintiffs could provide no
evidence to support the claims made in their original or amended petition.
The arguments and attached evidence mirrored those in the first motion for
summary judgment, which the trial court never ruled on. A hearing on the
second motion was originally scheduled for October 14, 2024, but was
ultimately continued and reset for hearing on March 31, 2025. The plaintiffs
filed no opposition to the second motion for summary judgment.
ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT
At the hearing on the second motion, the trial court allowed the
plaintiffs to offer and introduce into the record the untimely opposition to
the first motion, along with the attached exhibits. The trial court then denied
summary judgment, stating competing opinions had been submitted as to
what caused the fire, creating a genuine issue of material fact as to causation.
The trial court also noted the homeowner’s policy provided coverage for
accidental occurrences, and the issue of whether the fire was accidental, and
thereby covered by the liability provisions, was also a genuine issue of
6
material fact. The defendants requested written reasons for judgment, to
which the trial court submitted a transcript of its oral reasons for its ruling,
followed by a writ application to this court. After reviewing defendants’
writ, this court granted the matter to docket, briefs were submitted by both
parties, and oral arguments were made to the court.
THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
The defendants argue they presented sufficient evidence to show no
genuine issue of material fact existed, and they were entitled to summary
judgment under the law. While there is no direct evidence because both
Schuford and Jones were unable to give statements before their deaths, the
defendants argue there is also no circumstantial evidence pointing to
Schuford’s liability. They show the unrefuted facts established Jones was
responsible for cooking because Schuford was bedridden, she called 911 and
reported the stove was on fire, and emergency personnel pulled Schuford
from his bed upon their arrival at the house. They also note both
investigators found the fire originated from the stovetop, and the plaintiffs
offered no evidence to support their claims the home was unsafe, nor did
they offer any evidence the gas lines and appliances were defective.
The defendants argue there is simply no evidence to support the claim
Schuford was responsible for the fire, thereby shifting the burden of proof to
the plaintiffs to offer evidence of the claims made in their petition to defeat
summary judgment, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). The defendants
contend the plaintiffs must present some evidence showing Schuford’s
negligence caused the fire, and they offered absolutely nothing to that effect.
Further, the defendants claim there is no presumption of negligence in a fire
case, and even if a presumption did exist, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine does
7
not apply in cases such as this where the defendant produces evidence
negating the inference of negligence. More simply put, the fire cannot be
presumed to be the result of Schuford’s negligence when the plaintiffs
provided no evidence he was in any way responsible for the fire.
Finally, the defendants argue the mere fact the homeowner’s policy
provides liability coverage for bodily injury does not create a genuine issue
of material fact. While the plaintiffs appear to view the policy as a sort of
workers’ compensation policy, the defendants show it provides liability
coverage only for injuries for which an insured is legally liable. If Schuford
was liable for causing the fire, then the policy should cover the plaintiffs’
damages, but with no proof of liability, summary judgment is proper.
The plaintiffs contend the trial court did not commit reversible error
as genuine issues of material fact exist as to the validity, applicability, and
liability of the homeowner’s insurance policy to Jones’ injuries and eventual
death as a result of the fire in Schuford’s home. The plaintiffs reiterate that
no negligence finding is required because, they contend, the insurance policy
covered domestic employees who were injured at work regardless of
whether the policyholder was actually liable for those injuries.
Regarding the cause of the fire, the plaintiffs contend the investigation
and report done by Bunton conflicted with that done by Stephens, who they
claim is not a qualified expert. They argue his qualifications, or lack
thereof, create a genuine issue of material fact as to the reliability of his
opinion. They also argue his opinion as to the cause of the fire was baseless,
speculative, and unsupported by the evidence; they urge this court not to
consider it in our review. Additionally, at oral argument, they suggested
8
summary judgment would be premature as additional discovery could result
in evidence showing Schuford was responsible for the fire.
The defendants counter that evidence Schuford caused the fire
resulting in his and Jones’ deaths is absolutely required before the plaintiffs
can recover under Schuford’s homeowner’s policy. They argue a
homeowner’s policy is not like workers’ compensation, but rather it is a
personal liability policy allowing recovery only when legal liability exists
because of bodily injury or property damage caused by the insured. They re-
urge all their prior arguments, adding if the plaintiffs had challenged
Stephens under Daubert, the trial court would have been required to have a
hearing and issue a ruling prior to hearing the motion for summary
judgment. As no objection was made, and as Stephens’ testimony and report
were properly introduced in support of the motion, the defendants argue this
court may consider his opinion and testimony in its consideration of the trial
court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. La. C.C.P. art.
966(A)(2). The procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish
these ends. Id. Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under
the same criteria governing the district court’s consideration of whether
summary judgment is appropriate. Seaberry v. GoAuto Ins. Co., 56,181 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 7/16/25), 417 So. 3d 1197. Summary judgment shall be
rendered if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).
9
If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter
that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, then the
mover’s burden only requires him to point out to the court that there is an
absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse
party’s claim, action, or defense. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). The burden is
on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Id. To avoid summary judgment, a
nonmoving party who would bear the burden of proof at trial on the factual
issues concerned in the motion for summary judgment needs only to
introduce prima facie evidence of such facts; if the nonmoving party fails to
introduce prima facie evidence, there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Brown v. LSU Health Scis. Ctr.- Shreveport, 56,195 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/25),
409 So. 3d 471.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided by law, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided for in La. C.C.P. arts. 966 and 967, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. La. C.C.P. art. 967(B). If the
adverse party does not so respond, then summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be rendered against him. Id.
The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage
occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that he knew or,
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the ruin, vice, or
defect which caused the damage, that the damage could have been prevented
10
by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such
reasonable care. La. C.C. art. 2317.1.
Further, negligence cannot be assumed or proved by what “could
have” happened, by speculation, or by possibilities. Myles v. Turner, 24,198
(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/19/94), 632 So. 2d 384. The mere occurrence of a fire
does not justify the inference of negligence because fires may occur from
separate and distinct causes. Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. Solloway, 25,462
(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/19/94), 630 So. 2d 1353, writ denied, 94-0575 (La.
4/22/94), 637 So. 2d 162. The plaintiff must still establish the defendant’s
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. Caldwell v. Texas Indus.,
Inc., 441 So. 2d 472 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1983). The plaintiff will only meet his
burden where he can show sufficient circumstances wherein the inference of
defendant’s negligence outweighs all other reasonable explanations as to
what caused the fire. Blanchard v. Sotile, 394 So. 2d 633 (La. App. 1 Cir.
1980), writ denied, 399 So. 2d 601 (La. 1981). This burden of proof
requires the plaintiff to show that the fire was “most likely” caused by the
defendants, or that negligence on the part of the defendant is the “most
plausible” explanation. Wells v. Morgan Gas Co., 26,641 (La. App. 2 Cir.
3/1/95), 651 So. 2d 951, writ denied, 95-0784 (La. 5/5/95), 654 So. 2d 327.
This burden may be met by direct or circumstantial evidence. Caldwell,
supra.
On de novo review, we find the defendants met their burden to show
an absence of factual support for the plaintiffs’ claims. As set out in their
second motion for summary judgment, there is no evidence in the record
even suggesting Schuford’s house was not maintained properly or was
unsafe for Schuford as a resident and Jones as his employee; there is no
11
evidence pertaining to potentially defective gas lines or appliances. The
defendants established Schuford, who was found in his bed by SFD, was
bedridden and unable to care for himself, and Jones, who called 911 telling
the dispatcher the stove was on fire, was responsible for cooking. The
defendants carried their burden to show there was no genuine issue of
material fact as to the lack of factual support for the plaintiffs’ claims
Schuford’s negligence was the cause of the fire.
As the burden then shifted, we now look to whether the plaintiffs
provided sufficient evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact. While
we will still consider the merits of the substantive arguments made by both
parties, we must point out that typically, when a court grants a motion to
continue a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, the filing deadlines
are reset. Reed v. Restorative Home Health Care, LLC, 19-01974 (La.
2/26/20), 289 So. 3d 1028. However, that applies only in cases where the
same motion is continued, reset, heard, and disposed of. In this case, the
original motion for summary judgment was never disposed of. Rather than
asking for the original to be reset, the defendants filed a second motion after
the plaintiffs filed their amended petition. The second motion was a
completely separate filing that also addressed the new claims made in the
amended petition. As such, the regular filing deadlines set forth in La.
C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2) would have governed the filing of any oppositions and,
if the plaintiffs wanted an opposition considered, they would have been
required to file a timely opposition to the second motion for summary
judgment. As we have already determined the defendants established the
lack of support for the plaintiffs’ claims, when the plaintiffs filed no timely
opposition and offered no evidence to support their claims a genuine issue of
12
material fact existed, the defendants’ unopposed motion for summary
judgment should have been granted. However, as indicated, we will still
address the merits of plaintiffs’ substantive arguments.
At the hearing on the second motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiffs offered nothing more than their untimely opposition to the first
motion, as well as arguments in support of their claims, with no evidence
proving the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. They re-urge these
same arguments on appeal, but it is well established that conclusory
allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculations will not
suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact. Robert v. Turner Specialty
Servs., L.L.C., 50,245 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 182 So. 3d 1069.
The plaintiffs’ suggestion summary judgment is premature because
additional time is needed to prove the existence of genuine issue of material
fact as to the causation of the fire is lacking in merit. This fire occurred in
March 2022, the petition was filed in March 2023, the first motion for
summary judgment was filed in January 2024, the second in August 2024,
and the hearing did not occur until March 2025. In other words, there was
more than an adequate amount of time to allow for discovery by both parties
in a case with these facts. Despite having nearly three years in which to
conduct discovery, beyond sending and responding to interrogatories and
requests for production, the record contains no evidence the plaintiffs made
any attempts to have the cause of the fire investigated or to request any
testing be done on the gas lines and appliances to determine if they were
faulty. Even with additional time, it is highly unlikely any reliable tests
could be conducted at this time; nearly four years have passed since the fire.
The plaintiffs argue the defendants never had any testing of the gas lines or
13
appliances conducted, but, as the burden of proof rests with the plaintiffs
pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1), the defendants are not responsible for
providing the plaintiffs with test results to allow them to prove their claims.
If any tests were desired by the plaintiffs, then it would be their
responsibility to obtain them.
Turning to the plaintiffs’ argument a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether the house fire was accidental because the reports
submitted by Investigators Bunton and Stephens contradict one another, this
argument lacks merit. These reports simply do not contradict each other, nor
do they create a genuine issue of material fact as to the cause of the fire.
Bunton’s report states while the exact cause of the fire was unknown, it
appeared to have originated on the front right burner of the kitchen stove.
Stephens’ report went a bit further and included his opinion the cause of the
fire was cooking grease heating to ignition temperature and catching fire, but
his conclusion is not irreconcilable with Bunton’s report.
As to the plaintiffs’ argument Stephens’ report should be disregarded
because he was not accepted as an expert by the trial court, this argument
lacks merit. Stephens’ affidavit set out his experience and laid the
foundation for his report, which was attached. Under La. C.C.P. art. 967(A),
supporting and opposing affidavits are to be based on personal knowledge,
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show
affirmatively the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Further, sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in
an affidavit are to be attached or served. Stephens’ affidavit and the
corresponding report were clearly submitted in accordance with these rules.
14
While there was no Daubert challenge to Stephens, even if we did not
consider him an expert, the court is not prohibited from considering his
report as opinion testimony. If a witness is not testifying as an expert, his
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions
or inferences which are rationally based on the perception of the witness,
and helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of
a fact in issue. La. C.E. art. 701. Stephens’ affidavit established he had
nearly four decades of experience in fire investigations, and his report was
limited to his own observations of the scene and the information provided to
him by SFD, in accordance with La. C.E. art. 701. Consequently, this
argument lacks merit and we will consider Stephens’ report.
Finally, we consider the plaintiffs’ claim a genuine issue of material
fact exists in that Schuford’s homeowner’s policy might allow Jones’
surviving family members to recover damages under the policy. They
contend it allows a domestic employee to seek damages regardless of
whether the injuries suffered were the result of Schuford’s negligence or the
fault of the domestic employee. This argument is lacking in merit. The
liability portion of Schuford’s homeowner’s policy plainly states, under the
Liability Coverages portion:
1. Coverage L – Personal Liability – “We” pay, up to the “limit” that
applies, all sums for which an “insured” is legally liable because of
“bodily injury” or “property damage” caused by an “occurrence”
to which this coverage applies.
The policy clearly provides coverage only in such cases where an insured is
legally liable for injuries, and the suggestion a finding of negligence is not
required for an injured person to collect damages under this liability policy
is baseless.
15
In support of their position Jones would be covered regardless of a
liability finding, the plaintiffs rely on the portion of the liability policy
pertaining to medical payments, which provides:
2. Coverage M – Medical Payments To Others – “We” pay the
necessary medical expenses if they are incurred or medically
determined within three years from the date of an accident causing
“bodily injury” covered by this policy. Medical expenses means
the reasonable charges for medical, surgical, X-ray, dental,
ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, and funeral services;
prosthetic devices; hearing aids; prescription drugs; and
eyeglasses, including contact lenses.
This coverage does not apply to “you” or to any person who is a
regular resident of “your” household, other than a “domestic
employee.” With respect to others, this coverage applies only to:
a. A person on an “insured premises” with the permission of an
“insured;” or
b. A person away from an “insured premises” if the “bodily
injury:”
1) Arises out of a condition on an “insured premises”
or the access ways immediately adjoining an
“insured premises;”
2) Is caused by an activity of an “insured;”
3) Is caused by a “domestic employee” in the course
of his or her employment by an “insured;” or
4) Is caused by an animal owned by or in the care of
an “insured.”
While the policy does use the term “domestic employee,” coverage is
plainly activated only where the domestic employee’s negligence caused
harm or injury to a third party. In such a case, the insurer would cover the
domestic employee as an insured should the injured party file suit and claim
the negligence of the insured’s domestic employee caused his injuries.
The defendants correctly conceded at oral argument if Schuford was
liable for Jones’ injuries, the policy would allow recovery for her medical
16
bills; however, they pointed out the coverage for medical payments was
contained in the policy, and any recovery by the plaintiffs would require
Schuford be found at fault for the fire. Ultimately, we agree the plain
language of the policy does not allow for what amounts to a first-party claim
by a domestic employee against the insured for any and all injuries sustained
on the job, without also a finding of liability on the part of the insured.
In summary, plaintiffs argue the record contained insufficient
evidence to establish the cause of the fire. However, this lack of evidence
leaves their claims of an improperly maintained home, or faulty gas lines
and appliances, as responsible for the death of Jones, in the realm of pure
speculation. Ultimately, regardless of whether Stephens’ report was allowed
as opinion testimony, and regardless of what Bunton’s report did or did not
conclude, the unfortunate reality for the plaintiffs is the record simply does
not contain evidence supporting their claims. There is no evidence within
the record even tending to show the Schuford home was not properly
maintained, and the plaintiffs offered no evidence of any kind to support
their claims the gas lines and appliances were faulty.
We are acutely sympathetic to the pain plaintiffs have suffered as
loved ones left to grieve their wife and mother’s long-suffering and tragic
passing, but the responsibility to provide some evidence to support their
claims and establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact rested
with them. As they were unable to do so, we find the trial court’s denial of
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was inappropriate and
unsupported by the law and evidence. For these reasons, we reverse the trial
court and grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
17
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the writ, reverse the judgment of
the district court, grant the motion for summary judgment filed by the Estate
of Lawson Schuford and Teacher’s Insurance Company, and dismiss with
prejudice the claims of Willie James Jones, Stephanie Jones Thomas, and
Cassandra Denise Jones on behalf of Rosemary Jones. Costs of this appeal
are assessed to the plaintiffs, Willie James Jones, Stephanie Jones Thomas,
and Cassandra Denise Jones on behalf of Rosemary Jones.
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED, AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT GRANTED.
18
HUNTER, J., dissenting.
Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous. Bellard v.
Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 07-1335 (La. 4/18/08), 980 So. 2d 672. If an insurance
policy is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, then it is
considered “ambiguous” and must be liberally interpreted in favor of
coverage. Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd., 634 So. 2d 1183 (La. 1994).
Liability insurance policies should be interpreted to effect, rather than to
deny coverage. Hodge v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 55,656 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 6/26/24), 388 So. 3d 1290, writ granted, 24-00958 (La. 1/14/25),
398 So. 3d 645.
Reversal of district court's findings of fact is warranted under manifest
error standard of review only when the record, viewed in its entirety,
contains no reasonable factual basis for district court's finding and
establishes that finding is clearly wrong; without such showing, appellate
court may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been sitting as trier of
fact, it would have weighed evidence differently. Criswell v. Kelley, 54,188
(La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 335 So. 3d 489. The issue to be resolved by a
reviewing court under the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of appellate
review for factual determinations is not whether the trier of fact was right or
wrong, but whether the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Burks
v. Hogan, 55,699 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/24), 387 So. 3d 848, writ denied, 24-
00814 (La. 10/15/24), 394 So. 3d 814. Reversal of the trial court's findings
of fact is warranted under the manifest error standard of review only when
the record, viewed in its entirety, (1) contains no reasonable factual basis for
the district court's finding and (2) establishes that the finding is clearly
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wrong; without such a showing, the appellate court may not reverse, even if
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed
the evidence differently. Wakefield v. Chevrolet, 55,984 (La. App. 2 Cir.
12/18/24), 401 So. 3d 1275. The trial court's findings of fact are subject to
the manifest error standard of review, and the Court of Appeal may not set
these aside unless they are manifestly erroneous or plainly wrong.
Wakefield, supra.
On review of factual determination for manifest error, the issue to be
resolved by the reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or
wrong, but whether the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one.
Bellard, supra. If the factual findings are reasonable considering the record
reviewed in its entirety, a reviewing court may not reverse, even if
convinced that, had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed
the evidence differently. Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 07-1335 (La.
4/18/08), 980 So. 2d 672, 676 (Per Justice Weimer, with the Chief Justice
and three justices concurring in part). This Court’s later opinion
distinguished Bellard: “District court's findings of fact are subject to
manifest error standard of review; court of appeals may not set aside unless
they are manifestly erroneous or plainly wrong.” Criswell, supra.
A de novo standard of review is required when an appellate court
considers ruling on summary judgment motions. The appellate court must
use the same criteria that governed the trial court’s determination of whether
summary judgment was appropriate. Jackson v. Minden Police Dep’t,
54,799 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/16/22), 351 So. 3d 883, writ denied, 22-01844
(La. 2/14/23), 355 So. 3d 616. A motion for summary judgment should be
granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
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admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine
issue as to a material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966.
A fact is material if its existence or nonexistence may be essential to
the plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery, i.e.,
material facts are those which potentially ensure or preclude recovery, affect
a litigant's ultimate success, or determine the outcome of the legal dispute.
Chreene v. Prince, 52,351 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/18), 256 So. 3d 505. Only
when reasonable minds must inevitably conclude that the mover is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on the facts before the court is summary
judgment warranted. Any doubt is to be resolved in favor of trial on the
merits. Thornhill v. Black, Sivalls, and Bryson, Inc., 394 So. 2d 1191
(La.1981).
The burden of proof is on the party moving for summary judgment,
and the court should resolve every reasonable doubt against the mover.
Roberts v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 566 So. 2d 163 (La. App. 4
Cir.), writ denied, 571 So. 2d 647 (La. 1990). The fact that evidence
preponderates in favor of the party moving for summary judgment does not
justify the denial of trial on the merits. Carroll v. Newtron, Inc., 477 So. 2d
719 (La. App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 478 So. 2d 530 (La. 1985).
Without question, several issues remain to be addressed by the lower
court. The trial court identified conflicting expert opinions regarding the
origin and cause of the March 11, 2022, fire, which ultimately led to the
demise of both the cared-for and the caregiver. Both the Shreveport Fire
Department and EFI Global placed the origin in the kitchen but were unable
to determine a definitive cause. Additionally, the parties dispute whether the
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Horace Mann Homeowners Policy provides no-fault liability coverage for
the death of Rosemary Jones while she was acting as a domestic employee.
One party contends coverage applies automatically based on Jones’ status as
a domestic employee, while another asserts coverage applies only if the
homeowner is found liable. Under the policy, Jones qualifies as a domestic
employee because she was hired by either the deceased or an authorized
agent for the estate of his household to provide familial around-the-clock
care. Furthermore, nothing in the policy excludes recovery based on the
scope of her employment.
This Court has consistently upheld that summary judgment is
improper where genuine issues of material fact remain or where resolution
would require impermissible credibility determinations. Undergirded with a
plethora of Louisiana jurisprudence, trial courts are afforded broad
discretion in evidentiary rulings, including but not limited to credibility
determinations and interpretations of policy and law. Those subsequent
determinations should not be disturbed on appeal absent clear error or an
abuse of discretion, thus reinforcing the deference given to trial courts in
managing proceedings and evaluating the evidentiary record.
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