The opinion
03/31/2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs March 5, 2026
GENESIS ROOFING COMPANY v. TENNESSEE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION REVIEW COMMISSION
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Sumner County
No. 24-CV-146 Jennifer S. Nichols, Judge1
No. M2025-01003-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-
5-322 of a decision of the Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Review Commission (the “Review Commission”). Asserting that the petition was untimely
because it had been filed more than 60 days after entry of the agency’s final order, the
Review Commission filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1). The petitioner opposed the motion by asking
for an enlargement of time pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02. The trial
court denied the petitioner’s motion for an enlargement of time and granted the Review
Commission’s motion to dismiss. The petitioner appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KRISTI M. DAVIS
and VALERIE L. SMITH, JJ., joined.
Daniel Caden Crowell, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Genesis Roofing Company.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, and
Rachel A. Newton, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Occupational
Safety and Health Administration Review Commission.
1
The case was transferred by agreement from Chancellor Louis W. Oliver, III, to Judge Jennifer
S. Nichols, Circuit Court Division II, on January 29, 2025, to hear to its final disposition.
OPINION
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of a workplace accident on May 10, 2019, involving Christopher
O’Guin, an employee of Genesis Roofing Company (“Genesis Roofing”).
On May 10, 2019, Mr. O’Guin was assigned to a Genesis Roofing crew working on
a commercial roof in Nashville, Tennessee, which contained flush mounted skylights. After
being instructed by the Foreman to get more materials, Mr. O’Guin fell through a skylight,
sustaining serious injuries for which he was immediately hospitalized, where he remained
until he died six days later, on May 16, 2019.2
On May 17, 2019, the Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(“TOSHA”) initiated an investigation concerning the fatal on-the-job injury. Following its
investigation, TOSHA determined that Genesis Roofing violated several occupational
safety regulations. Based on its findings, TOSHA issued two citations to Genesis Roofing.
Citation 1 contained two items, both deemed “Serious,” for which it assessed a penalty of
$9,500.3 Citation 2 contained one item, a reporting violation that was deemed “Other-than-
Serious,” for which it assessed a penalty of $500.4
Genesis Roofing accepted Citation 2 and paid the $500 penalty; however, it
contested Citation 1, contending that the findings were factually inaccurate and contrary to
law.
Four years later, on June 7, 2023, the dispute was heard by the TOSHA Review
Commission. Then, on May 2, 2024, eleven months after the hearing, the Review
Commission entered a final order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law that
2
Genesis Roofing did not notify TOSHA of the incident until Mr. O’Guin died, May 16, 2019.
TOSHA initiated its investigation the following day.
3
Citation 1, Item 1, was for a violation of 29 CFR § 1926.501(b)(4)(i), which states that “[e]ach
employee on walking/working surfaces shall be protected from falling through holes (including skylights)
more than 6 feet (1.8 m) above lower levels, by personal fall arrest systems, covers, or guardrail systems
erected around such holes.” The assessed penalty for this violation was $7,000.00.
Citation 1, Item 2, was for a violation of 29 CFR § 1926.502(f)(1)(iii), which states, “Points of
access, material handling areas, storage areas, and hoisting areas shall be connected to the work area by an
access path formed by two warning lines.” The assessed penalty for this violation was $2,000.00.
4
Citation 2, Item 1, was for a violation of Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce
Development Rule 0800-01-03.05(1)(a)(2) which states, “Within 24 hours after the in-patient
hospitalization of one or more employees . . . as a result of a work-related incident, [the employer] must
report the in-patient hospitalization . . . to TOSHA.” The assessed penalty for this violation was $500.00.
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affirmed both items under Citation 1 as well as the $9,500 penalty. Although the certificate
of service said the order was emailed to counsel for Genesis Roofing on May 2, 2024, the
order was not sent until May 6, 2024.
Then, on July 5, 2024, counsel for Genesis Roofing e-filed the Petition for Judicial
Review with the Chancery Court for Sumner County, Tennessee.
On October 15, 2024, the Review Commission filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 12.02(1) motion to dismiss the Petition for Judicial Review as untimely under
Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322(b)(1)(A)(iv), which requires review petitions to “be
filed within sixty (60) days after the entry of the agency’s final order thereon.” The Review
Commission contended that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the
petition was filed four days late. Genesis Roofing responded by asking the trial court for a
four-day enlargement of time based on excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 6.02 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. After the parties briefed the issues, the trial court held
a hearing, following which it took the matter under advisement. Then, on May 27, 2025,
the trial court denied Genesis Roofing’s Motion for an Enlargement of Time, granted the
Review Commission’s Motion to Dismiss, and dismissed the Petition for Judicial Review.
This appeal followed.
ISSUES
Genesis Roofing presents one issue on appeal:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the request by
Petitioner-Appellant, Genesis Roofing Company, for a four-day enlargement
of time for excusable neglect, pursuant to Rule 6.02 of the Tennessee Rules
of Civil Procedure, to petition for judicial review of the TOSHA Review
Commission’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to T.C.A.
§ 4-5-322.
The Review Commission states its issue as follows:
Whether the trial court properly dismissed the petition for judicial review of
a decision of the Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Review Commission, when the petition was filed beyond the 60-day
statutory filing deadline.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a request for an enlargement of time
under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02 is for abuse of discretion. Williams v. Baptist
Mem’l Hosp., 193 S.W.3d 545, 551 (Tenn. 2006).
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“Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case is a question of law that
we review de novo with no presumption of correctness.” Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe,
401 S.W.3d 595, 602 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Word v. Metro Air Servs., Inc., 377 S.W.3d 671,
674 (Tenn. 2012)).
ANALYSIS
I.
A petition for judicial review must be filed within 60 days after entry of the agency’s
final order. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b)(1)(A)(iv). The Review Commission’s Final
Order was entered on May 2, 2024. Genesis Roofing filed its Petition for Judicial Review
on July 5, 2024. Thus, the Petition for Judicial Review was filed four days after the 60-day
deadline.
Genesis Roofing admits that its petition was not timely filed but maintains that the
trial court should have enlarged the time for filing under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
6.02, which reads:
When by statute or by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order
of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time,
the court for cause shown may, at any time in its discretion, (1) with or
without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made
before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a
previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified
period permit the act to be done, where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect, but it may not extend the time for taking any action under
Rules 50.02, 59.01, 59.03 or 59.04, except to the extent and under the
conditions stated in those rules. This subsection shall not apply to the time
provided in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) for filing a notice of
appeal, nor to the time provided in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure
24(b) & (c) for filing a transcript or statement of evidence.
The Review Commission counters this argument, insisting that the trial court could
not consider the motion to enlarge the time under Rule 6.02, relying in part on Watauga
Indus., Inc. v. Greenwell, No. E1999-00699-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 991632 (Tenn. Ct.
App. July 19, 2000). The Commission further argues, as stated in its brief:
By its terms, Rule 6.02 does not apply to the time for filing a notice of appeal
under Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a)—a filing requirement that is “mandatory and
jurisdictional,” Am. Steinwinter Investor Grp. v. Am. Steinwinter, Inc., 964
S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). And the Supreme Court has found
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that “a petition for [judicial] review is comparable to a notice of appeal.”
Schering-Plough [Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 999
S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tenn. 1999)]; see United Steelworkers [of Am. v.
Tennessee Air Pollution Control Bd., 3 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1998)] (stating that the deadline under § 4-5-322(b)(1) for filing a petition
for judicial review is “mandatory and jurisdictional”). So, Rule 6.02 likewise
does not apply to the time for filing a petition for judicial review under Tenn.
Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b)(1)(A)(iv).
(Footnotes omitted).
Not to be deterred, Genesis Roofing relies on an earlier decision, Houseal v.
Roberts, 709 S.W.2d 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984), which applied Rule 6.02 to a Tennessee
Code Annotated § 4-5-322 petition for review. As Genesis Roofing argues in its brief:
[T]he Review Commission relies on this Court’s unpublished decision in
Watauga Indus., to argue that Rule 6.02 does not apply to T.C.A. § 4-5-322
petitions for review. However, this Court’s 2000 unpublished decision in
Watauga Indus. cannot supersede its prior 1984 published decision in
Houseal v. Roberts applying Rule 6.02 to a T.C.A. § 4-5-322 petition for
review. Watauga Indus. does not mention Houseal at all, despite its
controlling authority. Instead, Watauga Indus. rests on the Tennessee
Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Schering-Plough, analogizing T.C.A. § 4-
5-322 petitions for review to notice of appeal filed under Tenn. R. App. P. 4.
Seizing on this, the Review Commission claims that Schering-Plough
“effectively abrogated” Houseal.
While Schering-Plough drew comparison between T.C.A. § 4-5-322
petitions for review and Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) notices of appeal, it did not
equate them for purposes of Rule 6.02. In fact, Schering-Plough did not
involve Rule 6.02 at all. Not surprisingly, it does not mention Houseal either.
But the current Rule 6.02 applicable to this case—amended since Watauga
Indus.—draws a sharp distinction, expressly exempting Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a)
notices of appeal but not T.C.A. § 4-5-322 petitions for review.
(Citations omitted).
We have determined that the Review Commission has the better argument based on
the reasoning stated by our Supreme Court in Schering-Plough Healthcare Products, Inc.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 999 S.W.2d 773 (Tenn. 1999), which reads in pertinent part:
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[W]e agree with the Court of Appeals that a petition for review is comparable
to a notice of appeal. As we stated in Jaco, a petition for judicial review is
the continuation of an administrative proceeding in much the same way that
an appeal can be characterized as a continuation of the underlying action.
Id. at 776. And as we explained in Watauga, while relying on the reasoning in Schering-
Plough:
[A] deadline for filing a petition for judicial review in a contested
administrative case is mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure to adhere to
it is fatal for those seeking review. Since a petition for review in the Trial
Court is comparable to a notice of appeal in this Court, the mandatory nature
and jurisdictional effect of the statutory time limit set forth in T.C.A. § 50-7-
304(h), (i), which bears the same plain meaning as the time limit for a notice
of appeal, also carries the same effect. This statute clearly says Watauga’s
petition for judicial review was required to be filed within thirty days after
the decision of the Board became final under T.C.A. § 50-7-304(h), ten
calendar days after the date of the mailing of written notification of the
decision. From the record before us, there is no dispute but that the Board
mailed the decisions as required by subsection (h). Accordingly, since
Watauga failed to file its Petition for Review in a timely manner, the Trial
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the Board of Review’s
decision in Greenwell that the employees were locked out of Watauga’s
premises. Therefore, we vacate the Trial Court’s decision in Greenwell and
dismiss Watauga’s Petition for Review in Greenwell.
2000 WL 991632, at *9 (citations omitted).
As our Supreme Court noted in Schering-Plough, “the statute clearly requires that
the petition for review be filed within the sixty-day time period.” 999 S.W.2d at 777.
Accordingly, Rule 6.02 may not be employed to avoid the unambiguous jurisdictional
mandate in Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322. See id. (“As previously stated, where
the language contained within the four corners of a statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous,
courts are not at liberty to depart from the language of the statute.” (citing Carson Creek
Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993))). Thus,
the trial court did not err by denying Genesis Roofing’s motion to enlarge the time to file
its Petition for Review.
Because the 60-day time limit in Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322(b)(1)(A)(iv)
is jurisdictional, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the Petition for
Judicial Review. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
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IN CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Costs of appeal are assessed
against the appellant, Genesis Roofing Company.
________________________________
FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., C.J.
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