The opinion
[Cite as State v. Higgins, 2026-Ohio-1133.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 2025CA0046-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
THOMAS HIGGINS COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 2024CR0094
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: March 31, 2026
SUTTON, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Thomas Higgins, appeals the judgment of the Medina
County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
Relevant Background Information
{¶2} This matter arises from the death of Z.H., due to a fentanyl overdose. After an
investigation, Z.H.’s drug dealer, Mr. Higgins, was charged with one count of corrupting another
with drugs, a violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3)/(C)(1), a felony of the second degree.
{¶3} Mr. Higgins pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and the trial court ordered
competency and sanity evaluations. Upon receiving the results of the competency evaluation, and
learning the Psycho Diagnostic Clinic did not perform a sanity evaluation because Mr. Higgins did
not agree with the not guilty by reason of insanity plea, the trial court found Mr. Higgins competent
to stand trial. Mr. Higgins’ plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was withdrawn and a not guilty
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plea was entered. Further, after a discussion regarding Mr. Higgins’ counsel’s motion to withdraw
from the case, based upon Mr. Higgins’ desire to represent himself at trial, the trial court continued
the trial date in order for Mr. Higgins to speak with his counsel about the case.
{¶4} Ultimately, the trial court allowed Mr. Higgins’ counsel to withdraw from the case
and, subsequent to a colloquy with the trial court, Mr. Higgins signed a waiver of counsel in open
court. A jury trial commenced and the State called Officer Kyle Haas, the investigating officer at
the crime scene, Dr. Lisa Deranek, the Medina County Coroner, Detective James Allenby, and
Taylor Bright, a public safety intelligence analyst who analyzed data from Z.H.’s cell phone. After
the State’s case-in-chief, Mr. Higgins made a Crim.R. 29 motion which was denied. Mr. Higgins
then testified on his own behalf and called S.M., Z.H.’s neighbor and friend who found Z.H.
unresponsive, as a defense witness. Mr. Higgins rested his case and renewed his Crim.R. 29
motion, which was again denied. The State then called Detective Allenby as a rebuttal witness.
{¶5} The jury returned a verdict of guilty on corrupting another with drugs, and made
a special finding that the controlled substance involved was fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled
substance. The trial court sentenced Mr. Higgins to a mandatory indefinite prison term of a
minimum of five years and a maximum of seven and a half years.
{¶6} Mr. Higgins now appeals raising two assignments of error for our review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING [MR. HIGGINS] TO
REPRESENT HIMSELF AND DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF STATE V. MARTIN REGARDING SELF-
REPRESENTATION.
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Higgins argues the trial court erred in permitting
him to represent himself at the jury trial. Specifically, Mr. Higgins argues the case had complex
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issues, such as cause of death, medical evidence, phone records, and hearsay evidence, and as the
trial proceeded, it was clear Mr. Higgins did not know the rules of evidence or procedure.
{¶8} “The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant both the right to counsel and ‘the
right to elect self-representation instead.’” State v. Yeager, 2018-Ohio-574, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.), quoting
State v. Tucker, 2016-Ohio-1353, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). However, “[a] defendant who wishes to
represent himself must knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to counsel.”
Yeager at ¶ 6, citing State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366 (1976), paragraph one of the syllabus. As
such, “[c]ourts are to indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of a fundamental
constitutional right including the right to be represented by counsel.” State v. Trikilis, 2005-Ohio-
4266, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). Thus, because waiver of counsel may be impactful upon a person's liberties,
“the trial court must make sufficient inquiry to determine whether [the] defendant fully
understands and intelligently relinquishes [his] right.” Trikilis at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Gibson, 45
Ohio St. 2d 366 (1976) at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶9} In Trikilis at ¶ 13, this Court explained as follows:
In determining the sufficiency of the trial court’s inquiry in the context of a
defendant’s waiver of counsel, this Court reviews the totality of the circumstances.
In verifying that a waiver of counsel is made knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently, a trial court should determine whether the defendant was advised of
the dangers and disadvantages of self [-] representation. While no one factor is
dispositive, [this Court] should consider whether the defendant was advised of the
nature of the charges and the range of allowable punishments, and, in addition, [this
Court] may consider whether the trial court advised the defendant of the possible
defenses to the charges and applicable mitigating circumstances. We reaffirm our
holding, however, that the trial court's discussion of possible defenses and
mitigating circumstances need not be fact specific. In order to avoid placing the
trial court in the role of an adversary, a broader discussion of defenses and
mitigating circumstances as applicable to the pending charges is sufficient. A court
may also consider various other factors, including the defendant's age, education,
and legal experience.
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(Emphasis in original.) (Internal citations omitted.) Therefore, in determining whether the trial
court made sufficient inquiry into whether Mr. Higgins knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
relinquished his right to counsel, this Court must look to the record and review the totality of
circumstances. See also State v. Briggs, 2021-Ohio-1980, ¶ 8-10 (9th Dist.).
{¶10} Here, the record reveals the trial court spoke with Mr. Higgins on two occasions
regarding his request to represent himself at trial. After a pre-trial hearing regarding Mr. Higgins’
competency to stand trial and his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity1, Mr. Higgins’ counsel
addressed the trial court regarding Mr. Higgins’ desire to represent himself and have her act as
standby counsel. At that time, Mr. Higgins expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney’s
performance and his desire for self-representation. The trial court asked Mr. Higgins if he went
to law school to which Mr. Higgins responded, “[n]o, but I know--I know- -I know this. I know
this case. I want to represent myself.” The trial court then told Mr. Higgins that “it’s great that
you know the case and you know the facts of the case. Do you know the law that applies?” Mr.
Higgins responded, “[y]es.” The trial court further inquired as to how Mr. Higgins learned the law
and Mr. Higgins responded that he “learned it in prison.” The trial court then warned Mr. Higgins
as follows:
[THE COURT]: Okay. So you’re up against a seasoned prosecutor that’s been to
law school, that knows the Rules of Evidence, that knows the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and you think you can adequately defend yourself?
Mr. Higgins responded “[y]es[,]” and went on to say he should not ever have been charged in this
case. The trial court then asked Mr. Higgins to explain how a grand jury works and Mr. Higgins
complied. In so doing, Mr. Higgins showed a cursory understanding of grand jury testimony and
1
Dr. Lynn A. Luna Jones determined to a reasonably degree of psychological certainty that
Mr. Higgins was competent to stand trial.
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the evidence necessary to indict someone on a crime. The trial court then told Mr. Higgins this
case could potentially go to trial and asked him to tell the court about the Rules of Evidence. Mr.
Higgins first replied that the State must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial
court told him that’s not the Rules of Evidence. The trial court went on to ask Mr. Higgins about
cross-examining witnesses, and Mr. Higgins indicated he would question the witnesses and knows
how to do so. Mr. Higgins stated, “I will just question them and ask them stuff that would lead to
my favor.” The trial court responded, “[a]nd you think it’s that simple[,]” to which Mr. Higgins
responded “[y]es.” The trial court responded, “[w]ell it’s not.” The trial court then denied Mr.
Higgins’ request to represent himself in order to provide Mr. Higgins the opportunity to confer
with his counsel and discuss the case in depth. The trial court explained:
I’m going to tell you that, you know, as a non-lawyer you are ill-equipped to go up
against a seasoned prosecutor that has been to school, that understands the rules,
that knows how to cross-examine and attend to witnesses and present evidence.
And I understand you have some rudimentary understanding, but before we make
this decision I want you to confer with your lawyer.
The trial court instructed Mr. Higgins’ counsel to speak with her client and, if he still wished to
represent himself, to file a motion with the court to consider.
{¶11} Prior to the commencement of trial, the court addressed pretrial motions filed by
Mr. Higgins’ counsel, including a motion to withdraw. Mr. Higgins’ counsel reiterated that Mr.
Higgins did not want her to represent him and he wanted to handle the case pro se. Further, Mr.
Higgins’ counsel stated she had been working with Mr. Higgins and “he’s been very adamant” that
he “still wishes to represent himself and does not want an attorney to proceed with him for any
trial purposes.”
{¶12} The trial court began a lengthy colloquy with Mr. Higgins regarding his desire to
represent himself. The trial court told Mr. Higgins he has both a constitutional right to counsel and
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to self-representation. The trial court then asked Mr. Higgins to explain why he thinks he is more
qualified to represent himself than a lawyer. Mr. Higgins responded, “I just know the case the best
and I just feel that I’d be better proving my innocence than an attorney.” The trial court inquired
if Mr. Higgins ever questioned witnesses, and Mr. Higgins said he had during a misdemeanor trial.
{¶13} The trial court then explained this is a felony trial and the charge is corrupting
another with drugs, a felony of the second degree. The trial court asked Mr. Higgins if he intended
to take the stand in his own defense and explained that it is Mr. Higgins’ choice whether he testifies
or not. The trial court also advised Mr. Higgins that he needed “to figure out some way of
portraying [himself] on the stand[,]” and that he would be subject to cross-examination by the
State. Mr. Higgins responded, “I’m prepared to tell the truth. I know the truth of the case, so I’m
ready to appear to be cross-examined and all of that.” The trial court asked Mr. Higgins if he had
ever done an opening or closing statement, and Mr. Higgins responded no but he “know[s] what it
is.” The trial court explained there are certain elements the State must prove in this matter and
read the indictment to Mr. Higgins which listed the elements of corrupting another with drugs.
The trial court further explained Mr. Higgins would have the opportunity to cross-examine the
State’s witnesses and warned him, “if you don’t effectively cross-examine [the State’s witnesses],
it’s going to be potentially detrimental to your situation.” The trial court again told Mr. Higgins
he has “a very competent attorney sitting next to [him][,]” who has tried quite a few cases in front
of the court and “that’s something that [Mr. Higgins] really [needs] to take into consideration.”
{¶14} Additionally, the trial court told Mr. Higgins if the jury were to find him guilty, he
would be facing a mandatory period of incarceration, from two to eight years, and that if the court
sentenced him to two years, he could serve an additional year under Reagan Tokes based upon his
conduct in prison. The trial court stated:
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[a] two-year sentence becomes a two-to-three-year sentence, or a four-year
sentence becomes a four-to-six-year sentence, and so forth. So you have to
understand that [] you have significant liberty interests at stake here[,] . . . [a]nd if
you are not effective in being your own attorney, you [] could face prison time,
significant prison time.
The trial court also explained Mr. Higgins could face a fine up to $15,000, and would be subject
to post-release control, which, if Mr. Higgins committed another offense during that period-of-
time, Mr. Higgins could face even more time in prison. Mr. Higgins responded affirmatively that
he understood what the trial court explained to him, and he was “prepared for trial.”
{¶15} The trial court asked Mr. Higgins “what defenses do you think you have[,] and Mr.
Higgins responded:
All of the evidence. . . that the lawyers shared with me, the evidence, it leads
towards two witnesses as actually being the person behind the crime . . .[T]here’s
no evidence that puts me there after he died. I don’t even know when he died . . .
[I]t’s like none of the evidence proves that I did this. The evidence proves that the
witnesses who gave the statements had something to do with it.
After allowing Mr. Higgins to further explain his possible defenses, the trial court cautioned:
“think about your defense and how the defense is going to be presented . . . there are Rules of
Evidence. . . . [A]re you familiar with the Rules of Evidence?” Mr. Higgins responded, “[y]es.”
The trial court went on to ask Mr. Higgins if he is familiar with the Rules of Criminal Procedure
and specifically Crim.R. 29. Mr. Higgins again responded affirmatively and indicated he could
ask his standby counsel any questions regarding motions. Mr. Higgins stated, “I’m capable of
proving my innocence better than any attorney could because I was there and I know everything
that happened and I know I’m innocent.” The trial court asked Mr. Higgins about any mitigating
factors that might lesson the punishment in this case and Mr. Higgins responded his counsel told
him the State was not interested in a plea with probation, so he “would rather go to trial than jail
time since [he is] innocent.”
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{¶16} At that time, the trial court granted Mr. Higgins’ attorney’s motion to withdraw and
Mr. Higgins signed a Waiver of Counsel form, in open court, that stated, “I, Thomas Higgins,
Defendant in the above cause, having been advised by the court of the nature of the charge against
me, and of my rights under the Constitution, hereby waive, in writing, and in open court, my right
to be represented by counsel.”
{¶17} Based upon this record, and the totality of the circumstances, the trial court made
sufficient inquiry into whether Mr. Higgins knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently relinquished
his right to counsel. The record shows that the trial court advised Mr. Higgins of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, advised Mr. Higgins of the nature of the charge and the range
of allowable punishments, and the trial court discussed possible defenses to the charges and
applicable mitigating circumstances. The trial court also spoke at length with Mr. Higgins
regarding the rules of criminal procedure and evidence, and walked him through each stage of the
trial.
{¶18} Indeed, the trial court repeatedly warned Mr. Higgins that he would be facing a
seasoned prosecutor who went to law school and knew the rules of evidence and procedure, and
Mr. Higgins could be quite disadvantaged in that regard. In spite of the trial court’s repeated
warnings, Mr. Higgins continually indicated he was prepared for trial and knew the case better
than anyone, including his own attorney.
{¶19} Further, regarding Mr. Higgins’ argument that his unpreparedness to represent
himself was “apparent during trial,” we turn to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In
Faretta, the Supreme Court of the United States explained:
The record affirmatively shows that Faretta was literate, competent, and
understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will. The
trial judge had warned Faretta that he thought it was a mistake not to accept the
assistance of counsel, and that Faretta would be required to follow all the ‘ground
9
rules' of trial procedure. We need make no assessment of how well or poorly Faretta
had mastered the intricacies of the hearsay rule and the California code provisions
that govern challenges of potential jurors on voir dire. For his technical legal
knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of
the right to defend himself.
(Emphasis added.) Faretta at 835-836.
{¶20} Accordingly, Mr. Higgins’ first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
[MR. HIGGINS’] CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶21} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Higgins argues his conviction for corrupting
another with drugs is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Mr. Higgins
argues the State, in bearing the burden of proof at trial, failed to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Higgins “furnished fentanyl” to the decedent, Z.H. Mr. Higgins admits to selling
Z.H. methamphetamine, but not fentanyl.
{¶22} As to manifest weight of the evidence, this Court has previously stated:
[i]n determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and
all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist. 1986). “When a court of appeals reverses a
judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the
appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the fact[-]finder’s resolution of the
conflicting testimony.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting Tibbs v.
Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982).
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{¶23} An appellate court should exercise the power to reverse a judgment as against the
manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional cases. Otten at 340. “[W]e are mindful that
the [trier of fact] is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness.” (Internal
quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Gannon, 2020-Ohio-3075, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.). “This Court
will not overturn a conviction on a manifest weight challenge only because the [trier of fact] found
the testimony of certain witnesses to be credible.” Id.
{¶24} To the extent Mr. Higgins argues the State presented no evidence that he sold or
gave fentanyl to Z.H., in support of his conviction for corrupting another with drugs, Mr. Higgins’
argument sounds in sufficiency rather than weight. See State v. Yatson, 2022-Ohio-2621, ¶ 69 (9th
Dist.). Sufficiency tests the State’s burden of production while manifest weight tests its burden of
persuasion. See State v. Ross, 2023-Ohio-1185, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). Thus, manifest weight challenges
concern the reliability or believability of the State’s evidence, not its adequacy. Yatson, at ¶ 69.
See State v. Vincente-Colon, 2010-Ohio-6242, ¶ 20 (“[S]ufficiency and manifest weight are two
separate, legally distinct arguments.”) (9th Dist.).
{¶25} Further, to the extent Mr. Higgins argues he consistently admitted to Detective
Allenby, and testified at trial, that he sold methamphetamine to Z.H., but he did not sell fentanyl,
the jury heard this testimony as well as the cross-examination of Mr. Higgins wherein Mr. Higgins
admitted he did not test the drugs he sold Z.H. for fentanyl. The jury also heard Mr. Higgins’
testimony regarding alleged issues with the police investigation in this matter, as well as Detective
Allenby’s testimony regarding how the police determined which drugs in Z.H.’s house to test and
how the police determined, through cell phone analytics, Mr. Higgins was the prime suspect in
this matter. As indicated above, “[t]his Court will not overturn a conviction on a manifest weight
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challenge only because the [trier of fact] found the testimony of certain witnesses to be credible.”
Gannon, 2020-Ohio-3075, at ¶ 20.
{¶26} Based upon our review of this record, the trier of fact did not clearly lose its way
and create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new
trial ordered.
{¶27} Accordingly, Mr. Higgins’ second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶28} Mr. Higgins’ first and second assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of
the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
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Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETTY SUTTON
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
MICHAEL J. GOEBL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and STEFANIE H. ZARANEC, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.