State of New Jersey v. Justin I. Quiles

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0493-24

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JUSTIN I. QUILES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted March 9, 2026 – Decided March 30, 2026

Before Judges Natali and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Union County, Indictment No. 22-08-0642.

Evan F. Nappen Attorney at Law PC, attorneys for

appellant (Louis P. Nappen, on the brief).

William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney

for respondent (Milton S. Leibowitz, Assistant

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Justin I. Quiles appeals from the trial court's denial of his

motion to suppress the seizure of weapons and ammunition by law enforcement

following a stop and warrantless search of his motor vehicle. Based on our

review of the record and application of the pertinent legal principles, we affirm.

I.

On January 26, 2022, Elizabeth Police Department Officers Kellen Moran

and Jamie Ferreira were patrolling the area of Walnut and Mary Street in

Elizabeth; an area described by officers as being known for high violent crime

and narcotics activity. While on patrol, they observed a gray Jeep Cherokee

with Pennsylvania plates double-parked on Walnut Street, impeding the flow of

traffic and causing other vehicles to drive around the vehicle into oncoming

traffic lanes. The officers conducted a motor vehicle stop and identified the

occupants. Defendant was driving the vehicle, and Josh Everett was in the

passenger front seat.

Officer Ferreira approached the driver's side of the vehicle, and Officer

Moran approached the passenger side. Officer Ferreira requested defendant's

license, registration, and insurance; but defendant, appearing very nervous, was

unable to produce the requested items and instead handed over the vehicle's

manual. When Officer Ferreira followed up, defendant allegedly remained

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confused and ultimately was asked to exit the vehicle. As this occurred, Officer

Moran observed Everett making a bending movement toward the front passenger

floorboard, which Everett told officers was to search for his phone. The officers

then removed both occupants from the vehicle.

After defendant exited the vehicle, Officer Ferreira testified he used his

flashlight to illuminate the area around the driver's side door and observed an

"extended magazine" in the door pocket. While this was happening, Everett

broke free and attempted to escape but was chased and apprehended by Officer

Moran. Officer Moran performed a pat down of Everett and recovered a

handgun from his right coat pocket.

Subsequently, the officers searched the Jeep and recovered the extended

magazine Officer Ferreira had seen, a fully loaded Glock 45 handgun from under

the driver's seat with two additional magazines, an extended magazine from the

passenger door, a loaded Springfield XD-M handgun from the glovebox, and a

loaded assault rifle in a case with defendant's name in the rear storage area of

the passenger compartment of defendant's Jeep.

In August 2022, a grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant

with second-degree unlawful possession of an assault firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

5(f) (count one); two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun,

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N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (counts two and three); two counts of fourth-degree

possession of large capacity ammunition magazine, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j) (counts

seven and eight); and fourth-degree possession of hollow point ammunition,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)(1) (count ten).

Defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence seized, arguing the

stop, search and seizure were unconstitutional warrantless searches.

Additionally, defendant filed a letter with court services and the prosecutor's

office requesting admission into the Pretrial Intervention ("PTI") Program,

outlining "compelling reasons" for acceptance, including lack of criminal

history, responsibilities as a caretaker, educational ambition, character

references and inadvertent violation of New Jersey gun laws.

A suppression hearing was held before the court in March 2024. At the

hearing, Officer Moran testified, detailing the officers' observations during the

stop and the subsequent search. Additionally, the video footage from the

officers' body-worn camera was submitted.

On May 14, 2024, the trial court issued a written opinion and order

denying defendant's suppression motion. The court found the stop was justified

based on a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-67 due to the Jeep's double-parking and

impediment of traffic. The court also found the officers lawfully ordered

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defendant out of the car based on the principles set forth in Pennsylvania v.

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) and State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599 (1994), and

because of his failure to produce documentation.

As for the warrantless search of the vehicle, the court determined that the

officers' observation of the extended magazine in plain view established

probable cause under the automobile exception, which arose spontaneously and

unforeseeably during a lawful stop. The trial court also found that the scope of

the search was constitutionally permissible, and all items seized were

admissible.

On July 1, 2024, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea on count one

for second-degree unlawful possession of an assault firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

5(f), in exchange for dismissal of all other counts. The State agreed to

recommend a three-year sentence, with one-year parole ineligibility. On

September 6, 2024, the court sentenced defendant below the recommended plea

to a term of three years' probation, 100 days in the county jail, and applicable

fines and penalties.

Defendant appeals from the trial court's order denying his suppression

motion and also challenges the validity of his convictions, contending:

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POINT I

WHETHER THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY

DENYING THE SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE.

POINT II

WHETHER THIS MATTER SHOULD BE STAYED

PENDING DETERMINATION(S) REGARDING THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UNDERLYING

STATUTE.

POINT III

WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF NOT ALLOWING

PTI APPLICATIONS TO PROCESS WITHOUT

PRIOR STATE APPROVAL FOR ILLEGAL

FIREARM POSSESSION OFFENSES SHOULD BE

STRUCK AS A FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIR DENIAL

OF DUE PROCESS AND AN ABUSE OF

DISCRETION.

II.

"[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the

factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings

are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Ahmad,

246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Elders, 192

N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We "defer[] to those findings in recognition of the trial

court's 'opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the

case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509,

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526 (2022) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244); see also State v. Smart, 253 N.J.

156, 164 (2023). Accordingly, "[w]e will set aside a trial court's findings of fact

only when such findings 'are clearly mistaken.'" State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521,

538 (2017) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)). "We accord

no deference, however, to a trial court's interpretation of law, which we review

de novo." Ibid.

Defendant contends the court erred in denying his suppression motion

asserting: (1) the scope of the traffic stop should have been confined to

examining defendant's documentation and issuing a ticket for the violation; (2)

the officers unconstitutionally removed defendant and Everett from the vehicle;

(3) the trial court erred in finding that the officers saw the extended magazine

in "plain view"; (4) the search of the vehicle itself was unconstitutional; and (5)

the officers could not have determined that the magazine they observed was

contraband. Defendant argues that the combination of the alleged constitutional

violations prevent admission of any of the discovered evidence, as it is all "fruit

of the poisonous tree." We are not persuaded by any of defendant's arguments.

"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, in almost identical language,

protect against unreasonable searches and seizures." Smart, 253 N.J. at 164

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(quoting Nyema, 249 N.J. at 527). Warrantless "searches and seizures

conducted without warrants issued upon probable cause are presumptively

unreasonable and therefore invalid." State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398

(2022) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 246). To overcome the presumption of an

unreasonable search and seizure, the State must demonstrate by a

"preponderance of the evidence that an exception to the warrant requirement

applies." State v. Manning, 240 N.J. 308, 329 (2020).

As a threshold matter, a police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle

where the officer suspects the driver committed a motor vehicle violation. State

v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999) (citing State v. Smith, 306 N.J. Super. 370,

380 (App. Div. 1997)). In Delaware v. Prouse, the United States Supreme Court

held that police may stop a vehicle only if they have a reasonable and articulable

suspicion that a motor vehicle offense has been committed. 440 U.S. 648, 663

(1979). In State v. Bacome, the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[t]o

be lawful, an automobile stop 'must be based on reasonable and articulable

suspicion that an offense, including a minor traffic offense, has been or is being

committed.'" 228 N.J. 94, 103 (2017) (quoting State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639-

40 (2002)).

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On appeal, defendant does not directly challenge the lawfulness of the

traffic stop; rather, he contends the stop should have been limited to the scope

of the traffic violation and defendant should have simply been issued a motor

vehicle ticket. We determine defendant's argument lacks merit because it

ignores the fact that defendant failed to comply with the officer's requests to

provide identification, registration and insurance as permitted by the valid stop

of his vehicle for a traffic violation. Defendant also alludes to racial animus as

the reason for the stop. We find no merit to this assertion because not only does

defendant provide no evidence supporting this contention besides defendant's

race, but he also failed to challenge the basis of the stop being a traffic violation,

which is nondiscriminatory in nature.

We next turn to defendant's contention that the officers' directive for

defendant and his passenger to exit the vehicle was inappropriate and all

evidence seized thereafter should have been suppressed. Defendant contends

the trial court erred in not finding the removal of defendant and his passenger

"constituted an extension beyond the scope of the purpose of the stop and,

thereby, was unlawful."

Following a lawful traffic stop, an officer may require a driver to exit the

vehicle, Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111. "If, during the course of the stop or as a result

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of the reasonable inquiries initiated by the officer, the circumstances give rise

to" reasonable, articulable suspicion that the motorist is involved in criminal or

unlaw activity, the officer may broaden the inquiry of the detention. State v.

Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365, 371 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting State v. Dickey,

152 N.J. 468, 479-80 (1998)) (internal quotations omitted).

To determine whether reasonable suspicion existed, a judge must consider

the totality of the circumstances, viewing the "whole picture" rather than taking

each fact in isolation. State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 554-55 (2019) (quoting

State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 361 (2002)). Courts should give weight to "'the

officer's knowledge and experience' as well as 'rational inferences that could be

drawn from the facts objectively and reasonably viewed in light of the officer's

expertise.'" State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 279 (1998) (quoting State v. Arthur,

149 N.J. 1, 10-11 (1997)).

Our case law is clear that an officer may order the removal of an operator

of a vehicle who refuses or is unable to provide proof of ownership in order to

search for proof of ownership. State v. Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. 1, 21-22 (App.

Div. 2023) (citing State v. Terry, 232 N.J. 218, 222 (2018)). In the context of a

registration search, the exception is "predicated on the principle that a police

officer has the lawful right to request that a driver, stopped for a motor vehicle

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violation, provide proof of ownership." Id. at 21. This is due to "the State's

'compelling interest in maintaining highway safety by ensuring that only

qualified drivers operate motor vehicles and that motor vehicles are in a safe

condition.'" Id. at 22 (quoting Terry, 232 N.J. at 233).

Defendant failed to provide proper identification or proof of ownership of

the vehicle upon request, instead handing Officer Moran the vehicle's instruction

manual. Additionally, Officer Moran observed defendant as nervous and

confused, a factual determination made by the trial court, which is entitled to

our deference based on the trial court's observation of Officer Moran's testimony

and other evidence adduced at the hearing. Also, Everett made a furtive

movement towards the floor, another factual determination by the trial court

gleaned from Officer Moran's testimony that is entitled to our deference. Due

to defendant's failure to provide proof of ownership or identification and

Everett's furtive movement, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding the

removal of defendant was proper and the evidence seized thereafter was

appropriate.

We next address defendant's challenges to the officers' seizure of the

weapons and ammunition in the vehicle. We conclude defendant's contention

that the extended magazine seized from the driver side door panel was not

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justified under the plain view exception to be without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion and we affirm for the reasons set forth by the

trial court. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only that the record reflects the trial court

credited Officer Ferreria's testimony that he "clearly saw the extended magazine

in the plain view from the outside of the vehicle" to find probable cause existed,

which is entitled to our deference.

We now address defendant's contention that the warrantless search of the

remainder of the vehicle was improper and the court should have suppressed all

remaining evidence seized. As we noted, the search disclosed a fully loaded

Glock 45 handgun under the driver's seat with two additional magazines, a

loaded Springfield XD-M handgun from the glovebox and a loaded assault rifle

in a suitcase with defendant's name on it in the rear storage area of the passenger

compartment of his Jeep.

"To justify a warrantless search or seizure, 'the State bears the burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] warrantless search or

seizure falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant

requirement.'" State v. Vanderee, 476 N.J. Super. 214, 230 (App. Div. 2023)

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 546 (2019)).

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Each exception to the warrant requirement has their own essential elements that

must be satisfied to justify a warrantless search. Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. at 20.

In support of the validity of the search, the State relies on the automobile

exception to the warrant requirement. The controlling precedent construing the

automobile exception under our State Constitution is State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409,

447-50 (2015). The Court instructed in Witt that any "searches on the roadway

based on probable cause arising from unforeseeable and spontaneous

circumstances are permissible." 223 N.J. at 450. The circumstances giving rise

to probable cause must not exist "well in advance of" the search. Smart, 253

N.J. at 174. The automobile exception is limited "to on-scene warrantless

searches." State v. Fennimore, 261 N.J. 364, 375 (2025) (quoting Witt, 223 N.J.

at 449).

The record supports the officers were not acting on any previous

information or tip but were addressing the spontaneous motor vehicle stop of

defendant's vehicle based on a traffic violation. We note, after the removal of

the occupants, the extended magazine was discovered in plain view and Everett

attempted to flee. Moreover, after Everett was apprehended, a search of his

person revealed he possessed a firearm. We conclude these circumstances—

namely the discovery of the extended magazine in plain view and Everett's

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attempted flight that uncovered his possession of a firearm—clearly gave rise to

the probable cause necessary for the "on the scene" search of the remainder of

the vehicle without a warrant under the automobile exception.

We further conclude, based on the record, that the scope and extent of the

search was lawful. As a general principle, "[t]he scope of a warrantless search

of an automobile is defined by the object of the search and the places where

there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." State v. Esteves, 93

N.J. 498, 508 (1983). Depending on the facts, those places may include

containers within a motor vehicle, as it has long been recognized that the

automobile exception extends to containers in the vehicle that could be

concealing the object of the search. See State v. Wilson, 478 N.J. Super. 564,

578-79 (2024) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) ("If

probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the

search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object

of the search")); see also State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 10-11 (1980) (disallowing a

warrantless search of a vehicle's trunk under the distinctive facts presented).

The constitutional analysis regarding scope hinges upon "the object of the

search" as to which there is probable cause. Wilson, 478 N.J. Super. at 572.

Notably, in State v. Cohen the Court determined:

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This holding in no way suggests that areas within the

interior of the car would require separate probable

cause findings in order to conduct a warrantless search.

We are not dividing up the interior of vehicles such that

an officer would need to establish different or

additional probable cause to search the front seat as

opposed to the back seat, for example. Pursuant to the

automobile exception, if an officer has probable cause

to search the interior of the vehicle, that probable cause

encompasses the entirety of the interior.

We are also not suggesting that the warrantless search

of a trunk or engine compartment will always require

separate probable cause findings. Instead, we reiterate

that a warrantless search of a car "must be reasonable

in scope" and "strictly tied to and justified by the

circumstances which rendered its initiation

permissible."

[254 N.J. 308, 327-28 (2023) (emphasis added)

(quoting Patino, 83 N.J. at 10-11).]

The hearing record clearly exhibits the officers had probable cause to

believe the vehicle contained firearms based on the magazine inside the vehicle

that was in plain view and the weapon found on Everett. The search of the

entirety of the passenger compartment, including the back storage area of the

vehicle and the case wherein the rifle was contained, fits squarely within the

holding of Cohen as illegal weapons were the "object of the search." Therefore,

the trial court's determination that the officers conducted a valid warrantless

search under the automobile exception was not error.

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III.

We now address defendant's remaining points first raised on appeal

concerning: (1) his request to stay the matter until a determination is made by

our courts concerning the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j); and (2) his

assertion that the "government's practice of not allowing PTI applications to

process without prior state approval" is a violation of due process and an abuse

of discretion.

"Generally, an appellate court will not consider issues, even constitutional

ones, which were not raised below." State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012).

"For sound jurisprudential reasons, with few exceptions, '[we] decline to

consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an

opportunity for such a presentation is available.'" Witt, 223 N.J. at 419 (quoting

State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)) (additional internal quotation marks

omitted).

Appellate courts do not "consider questions or issues not properly

presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is

available 'unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the

trial court or concern matters of great public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal Indem.

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Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58

N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)).

Defendants failed to raise these arguments either during defendant's

suppression motion or at his guilty plea hearing. The record lacks evidence

defendants sought a stay from the trial court. Rule 2:9-5(b) mandates the stay

application first be made to the trial court before such relief is sought from us

and therefore, we decline to consider defendant's stay request.

Defendant raised the alleged unfairness of the PTI process in his PTI

"application" letter, but this issue was not substantively decided by any orders

on appeal, because defendant entered a guilty plea before a determination was

rendered on his PTI "application" rendering this issue moot below. Also,

defendant has not provided reasons as to why he failed to inquire about his PTI

application prior to entering a guilty plea or proofs that he reserved his appeal

rights concerning the PTI application.

Because we conclude defendant's arguments do not involve issues

regarding jurisdiction and are not matters of great public importance, they do

not warrant departure from the general rule not to consider arguments made for

the first time on appeal. Therefore, we decline to consider defendant's request

for a stay or his due process challenges surrounding the PTI procedures.

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Affirmed.

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