JORDAN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SCOTT J., : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff, :

:

vs. : NO. 24-cv-6865

:

FRANK BISIGNANO, :

Commissioner of Social Security, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LYNNE A. SITARSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE February 6, 2026

Plaintiff Scott J. brought this action seeking review of the Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration’s (SSA) decision denying his claim for Social Security Disability

Insurance (SSDI) benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433.

This matter is before me for disposition upon consent of the parties. For the reasons set forth

below, Plaintiff’s Request for Review (ECF No. 16) is DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff protectively filed for SSDI on October 24, 2021, alleging disability since

November 17, 2017, due to small fiber neuropathy, fibromyalgia, pain, muscle spasms and brain

fog. (R. 213). The application was denied at the initial level and upon reconsideration, and

Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (R. 72-76, 82-88).

Plaintiff, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert (VE) testified at an administrative

hearing on April 8, 2024. (R. 27-52). On April 18, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision unfavorable

to Plaintiff. (R. 11-26). Plaintiff appealed, and the Appeals Council denied his request for

review on October 29, 2024, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner

for purposes of judicial review. (R. 1-6).

On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court. (Compl., ECF No. 1).

On February 13, 2025, he consented to my jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(C).

(Consent, ECF No. 8). On July 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Brief and Statement of Issues in Support

of Request for Review. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16). The Commissioner filed a Response on

November 4, 2025. (Resp., ECF No. 19).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court has considered the administrative record in its entirety and summarizes here

the evidence relevant to the instant request for review.

Plaintiff was born on August 25, 1967, and was 50 years old on the alleged disability

onset date. (R. 256). He completed a four-year college. (R. 214). Plaintiff previously worked

as an automotive production supervisor and a dog walker. (Id.).

A. Medical Evidence

Plaintiff first developed fatigue1 in 2015, without any obvious precipitating event. (R.

359). Since that time, he has fairly consistently complained to his medical providers about this

problem. (See R. 360, 367, 374, 462, 464, 490, 501, 509, 590, 602, 609, 767, 838, 881, 886. But

see R. 426, 575, 580 (denying fatigue during these visits)). Due to Plaintiff’s fatigue, his

treatment has included educating him regarding the need to pace himself while performing

activities. (See, e.g., R. 459, 470, 496, 509).

Since his alleged disability onset, Plaintiff has also experienced significant involuntary

weight loss, which he suggests may be associated with problems eating. On November 18, 2017,

1 Plaintiff’s medical records sometimes couple his fatigue with malaise (i.e.,

“malaise/fatigue”). (See R. 524, 577, 584, 590, 602, 609, 881, 886).

Plaintiff weighed 227 pounds (down from 260 on December 21, 2016). (R. 595, 611). By

March 1, 2019, his weight had fallen to 225 pounds, and he complained of a “sensation of

something stuck in his throat.” (R. 303). On June 7, 2021, he weighed 191 pounds. (R. 448).

He lost nine more pounds by the time of a March 28, 2022 appointment. (R. 792). On May 4,

2023, Plaintiff told his primary care physician, Louise Butler, M.D., that he often does not finish

his meals because he gets tired while chewing. (R. 920). By December 6, 2023, Plaintiff

weighed 159 pounds. (R. 871).

Additionally, during the relevant period Plaintiff has reported pain and stiffness, often

associated with movement. (See, e.g., R. 590 (May 18, 2018: “I feel like the tin man getting up

and moving.”)). A March 25, 2019 CT scan showed mild to moderate spondylosis of the

cervical spine. (R. 394). On June 7, 2021, it was noted that an MRI showed mild to moderate

spondylosis in his lumbar spine. (R. 450). In response to worsening neck pain and upper

extremity weakness, on August 2, 2023, Plaintiff underwent a cervical spine MRI, which showed

mild to moderate degenerative changes mildly progressed since 2020. (R. 552, 862, 920). On

November 6, 2023, Plaintiff complained of “[g]eneralized achiness in his neck and low back,” as

well as “[g]eneralized upper as well as lower extremity numbness paresthesia and weakness.”

(R. 849). A lumbar spine MRI taken that day showed “evidence of advanced disc degeneration

especially L5-S1 and to a less[er] degree L4-L5.” (R. 860). At various points, Plaintiff has also

complained of pain in various other joints and body parts, including his chest, shoulders, arms,

elbows, hands, ribs, abdomen, hips, thighs, knees and feet. (See, e.g., R. 360, 374, 447, 460,

530).

Plaintiff was diagnosed by his rheumatologist with fibromyalgia in 2020. (R. 462). At

an October 13, 2021 visit with Kristine Vanselow, M.D., Plaintiff reported a “widespread itching

sensation,” a sensation of being “squeezed,” and “ongoing, uncontrolled pain” that the doctor

noted appeared “related to fibromyalgia,” with symptoms worse at night especially following

daytime activity. (R. 527; see also R. 438 (complaining on May 3, 2021 of “full body pain”)).

Dr. Vanselow observed that “multiple medications including amitriptyline, duloxetine, savella

[and] effexor have been tried without relief” and suggested gabapentin and lyrica, but Plaintiff

stated his belief that they had been attempted as well. (Id.). She referred him to the fibromyalgia

clinic. (Id.). At the November 19, 2021 outpatient evaluation, he reported tenderness all over

his body (but primarily in the neck and back), and his Revised Fibromyalgia Impact

Questionnaire Score placed him in the “severe” range. (R. 464). Plaintiff’s treatment plan

consisted of approximately 15 sessions of physical therapy consisting of, inter alia,

breathing/relaxation techniques, stretching and range of movement improvement, body

strengthening, aerobics, aquatics, manual therapy, neuromuscular re-education, a peripheral

nerve evaluation, posture and body mechanics training and patient education about the condition.

(R. 465). One month later, it was noted that Plaintiff’s symptoms remained “at baseline.” (R.

521). On March 28, 2022, Dr. Vanselow noted that Plaintiff’s worsening symptoms could not be

fully explained by his fibromyalgia and small fiber neuropathy diagnoses alone. (R. 790). She

also recorded that after initial visits at the fibromyalgia clinic Plaintiff did not return because his

pain worsened and he felt that “they didn’t listen to him . . . .” (Id.).

Despite these issues, Plaintiff has had largely normal physical and mental examination

results, including full motor function, normal gait, coherent thought processes, normal thought

content, cooperative demeanor, and normal mood and affect. (See, e.g., R. 303, 307-08, 312-13,

316-17, 319-20, 322-23, 382-83, 386-87, 400-01, 427, 522, 528-29, 540, 546, 548-49).

On May 26, 2022, consultative examiner Gregory Coleman, Psy.D., conducted a mental

status evaluation of Plaintiff. (R. 806-18). Upon examination, he was irritable but otherwise

cooperative and normal, with coherent and goal-directed thought processes, good insight and

judgment, and intact attention, concentration, and memory. (R. 808). His activities of daily

living (ADLs) included personal care, cooking and preparing food, cleaning, doing laundry,

shopping, managing money, driving (although limited due to pain), taking public transportation,

socializing with family daily and friends and neighbors regularly, watching television, listening

to music, using social media, playing video games and dog-walking. (R. 809). He was

recommended for psychological therapy and vocation training and assessed with a good

prognosis, provided that he followed through with treatment and found “suitable full-time

employment” following completion of training. (Id.).

In the attached Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities

(Mental), Dr. Coleman opined that Plaintiff had no limitations in understanding or remembering

simple or complex instructions, carrying out simple ones, or making simple work-related

decisions; mild limitations in carrying out complex instructions, making judgments on complex

decisions or interacting with others; and moderate limitations in responding appropriately to

usual work situations and changes in a routine work setting. (R. 810-11). Dr. Coleman further

determined that Plaintiff’s abilities to concentrate, persist or maintain pace and adapt or manage

himself were not affected by his impairments. (R. 811).

On this same date, consultative examiner Ziba Monfared, M.D., also conducted an

Internal Medicine Examination of Plaintiff. (R. 819-22). Plaintiff complained to Dr. Monfared

that his pain, rated six or seven on a scale of 10 and sometimes worsening at night, traveled from

his neck through the rest of his body. (R. 819). Reported ADLs again included driving, cooking,

cleaning, laundry, shopping, childcare, personal care, watching television, listening to the radio,

using social media and playing video games. (R. 820). Upon examination, Plaintiff was in no

acute distress, demonstrated normal gait and stance without the need for an assistive device,

walked on heels and toes without difficulty, squatted 80 percent, and maneuvered himself

through the examination on his own. (Id.). Reviews of his musculoskeletal system and

extremities were also normal, and he exhibited full grip strength bilaterally without any

limitation in dexterity or grasping objects. (R. 821). His prognosis was assessed as good. (R.

822).

In the attached Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities

(Physical), Dr. Monfared opined that Plaintiff could continuously lift and carry up to 100

pounds, use his hands and feet bilaterally, and perform all postural maneuvers; sit, stand and

walk for eight hours at a time or in a workday; ambulate without a cane; and carry out all

activities listed on the form. (R. 825-30). Plaintiff also demonstrated normal range of motion in

all joints. (R. 832-35).

On June 3, 2022, State agency psychological consultant Richard Williams, Ph.D., opined

that Plaintiff had no limitations in adapting or managing himself and in understanding,

remembering, or applying information and mild limitations in interacting with others and

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. (R. 58). Upon reconsideration on November 15,

2022, State agency psychological consultant Douglas Schiller, Ph.D., opined that Plaintiff had

mild limitations in all four areas of mental functioning. (R. 67).

On July 21, 2022, State agency medical consultant Josie Mae Henderson, M.D., opined

that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds; frequently lift and carry 10 pounds;

push and pull without additional limitations; stand and/or walk and sit for six hours each in an

eight-hour workday; occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and frequently climb ramps

and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (R. 60). Upon reconsideration on

November 28, 2022, State agency medical consultant Charles Joseph Hubbard, Jr., M.D., opined

that Plaintiff had no exertional or postural limitations. (R. 68).

On October 6, 2023, it was noted that based on any antibody test Plaintiff had recently

been diagnosed with Sjogren’s syndrome,2 with unspecified organ involvement. (R. 865, 869,

917). Plaintiff was prescribed Duexis to assist with his joint pain and inflammation caused by

the condition. (R. 917). On November 10, 2023, he expressed concerns to Dr. Butler that the

syndrome could affect his heart rate, although he denied noticing any irregularities at that time.

(R. 914). On February 16, 2024, he returned for a follow up with no specific action taken or

recommended regarding his Sjogren’s syndrome. (R. 913).

B. Nonmedical Evidence

The record also contains non-medical evidence. On February 5, 2022, Plaintiff’s wife

completed an Adult Function Report on his behalf in which she wrote that he suffers from

stiffness and pain throughout his body, especially with activities such as sleeping, walking, and

driving. (R. 240). She indicated that Plaintiff’s pain impacts his ability to focus or lie down for

more than four hours. (R. 240-41). She described Plaintiff’s typical day as waking, stretching,

feeding and walking the dogs, driving his daughter to school, performing some unspecified

“work,”3 napping, running errands, working more, attending appointments, possibly napping,

and picking up his daughter from school. (R. 241). She reported that Plaintiff has pain with

2 Per the regulations:

Sjogren’s syndrome is an immune-mediated disorder of the

exocrine glands. Involvement of the lacrimal and salivary glands is

the hallmark feature, resulting in symptoms of dry eyes and dry

mouth, and possible complications, such as corneal damage,

blepharitis (eyelid inflammation), dysphagia (difficulty in

swallowing), dental caries, and the inability to speak for extended

periods of time. Involvement of the exocrine glands of the upper

airways may result in persistent dry cough.

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.00D7(a)(i).

3 Plaintiff’s wife may have been referring to his dog-walking work that did not rise to the

level of substantial gainful activity. (R. 17).

personal care but can do it without assistance. (Id.). Plaintiff also prepares his own meals, does

laundry, vacuums, washes dishes, mows and cleans up the yard, shops (mostly online but also in

stores sometimes), manages money, watches television, plays with his dogs, and socializes with

others (including monthly visits to family). (R. 242-44). His wife checked boxes indicating that

Plaintiff has difficulty with lifting, squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, sitting,

kneeling, stair climbing, memory, completing tasks, concentration, understanding, following

instructions and using his hands. (R. 244-45). She predicted that Plaintiff could walk for 20

minutes at a time. (R. 245). She added that he can generally follow spoken instructions but must

read written ones twice and that he has “no attention span,” does not finish what he starts, and

struggles with changes to his routine. (R. 245-46). Plaintiff’s wife further indicated that he

wears a wrist brace. (R. 246).

On October 23, 2022, Plaintiff’s wife completed a second Adult Function Report that

largely tracked the earlier one, although she now endorsed additional impairments and

limitations. (R. 258-65). She noted that Plaintiff does not sleep more than four hours at a time,

suffers from brain fog, lacks a short-term memory and experiences spasms that cause him to drop

things. (R. 258). She claimed that he had stopped mowing the yard, working outside,

socializing with non-family and getting along with others and that due to brain fog he could no

longer manage money. (R. 260-63). Additionally, she claimed that Plaintiff required a cane

when walking on uneven ground. (R. 264).

At the April 8, 2024 administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that he has diagnoses for

Lyme disease, Epstein-Barr virus, fibromyalgia, small fiber neuropathy and Sjogren’s syndrome.

(R. 41). He indicated that he is unable to grip fully, that he lacks balance due to his neuropathy

and that due to his conditions he has lost 100 pounds from his prior high of 260 or 270 pounds.

(R. 42, 45). In a typical day, he goes to bed around 1 a.m., sleeps for approximately four hours

before getting up due to tightness, stretches for up to 30 minutes, feeds his dogs and lets them

out, does more stretches while showering, makes breakfast, watches television, uses a heating

pad and TENS unit, naps, goes to appointments as needed, walks his dogs again, helps to cook

dinner, washes dishes, vacuums, mows the lawn (which must now be broken up over two days),

and takes a bath. (R. 44-45). He also drives his daughter to and from school but only drives

within 10 minutes of his home due to spasms and pain, which he assessed as “at least seven or

eight . . . .” (R. 32-33, 45). Plaintiff claimed he can only sit for approximately 20 minutes

before having to move. (R. 44). He stated that his resting muscle tension is “through the roof”

and that his pain makes it difficult to pay attention and concentrate, which he believed would

prevent him from working full-time. (R. 45-46). According to Plaintiff, he has “tried everything

[he] can,” but his symptoms have persisted. (R. 46).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

To be eligible for benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate to

the Commissioner that he cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential analysis is used to evaluate a disability claim:

First, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is currently

engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, then the

Commissioner considers in the second step whether the claimant has

a “severe impairment” that significantly limits his physical or

mental ability to perform basic work activities. If the claimant

suffers a severe impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based on

the medical evidence, the impairment meets the criteria of the

impairment listed in the “listing of impairments,” . . . which result

in a presumption of disability, or whether the claimant retains the

capacity to work. If the impairment does not meet the criteria for a

listed impairment, then the Commissioner assesses in the fourth step

whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant has the

residual functional capacity [RFC] to perform his past work. If the

claimant cannot perform his past work, then the final step is to

determine whether there is other work in the national economy that

the claimant can perform.

Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The

disability claimant bears the burden of establishing steps one through four. If the claimant is

determined to be unable to resume previous employment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner

at step five to establish that, given the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and mental

and physical limitations, he is able to perform substantial gainful activities in jobs existing in the

national economy. See, e.g., Poulos v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007).

Judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner is limited. A district court is

bound by the factual findings of the Commissioner if they are supported by substantial evidence

and decided according to correct legal standards. See, e.g., Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360

(3d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” and “such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112,

118 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Even if the record could support a contrary conclusion,

the decision of the ALJ will not be overruled as long as there is substantial evidence to support it.

See, e.g., Simmonds v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 54, 58 (3d Cir. 1986). The Court exercises plenary

review over legal issues. See, e.g., Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir.

1999).

IV. ALJ’S DECISION

Following the administrative hearing, the ALJ issued a decision in which he made the

following findings:

1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

on September 30, 2023.

2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from

his alleged onset date of November 17, 2017 through his date last insured of

September 30, 2023 (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).

3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairments:

peripheral neuropathy; Sjogren’s syndrome; fibromyalgia; and degenerative disc

disease of the cervical spine (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR

404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that,

through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to

perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except the claimant can

tolerate frequent exposure to unprotected heights, extreme cold, extreme heat and

vibrations. He can frequently operate hazardous machinery.

6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was capable of performing past

relevant work as a packaging supervisor, DOT# 920.132-010, light as generally

performed and medium as actually performed, SVP 6; production supervisor,

DOT# 699.130-010, light as generally and actually performed, SVP 7; plant

manager, DOT# 183.117-010, sedentary as generally performed and medium as

actually performed, SVP 8; and supervisor, motorcycle, DOT# 806.131-014, light

as generally and actually performed, SVP 8. This work did not require the

performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual

functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).

7. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at

any time from November 17, 2017, the alleged onset date, through September 30,

2023, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).

(R. 14-22). Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 22).

V. DISCUSSION

In his request for review, Plaintiff raises three issues:

1. Whether the Administrative Law Judge erred by failing to

properly analyze or consider whether the claimant met or equaled a

medical listing for Sjorgren’s [sic] Syndrome?

2. Whether the Administrative Law Judge erred by failing to

properly analyze or consider whether the claimant met or equaled a

medical listing for fibromyalgia?

3. Whether substantial evidence existed to support the

Administrative Law Judge’s finding that the claimant could

perform work at a medium exertional level?

(Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 10 (capitalization omitted)).

A. The Medical Listings at Step Three

At step three, the ALJ analyzes whether a claimant’s impairments or combination of

impairments meet or medically equal one of the listings that prevent an adult, regardless of age,

education, or work experience, from performing any gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a).

This inquiry functions to identify those claimants whose medical impairments are so severe they

would be found disabled regardless of their vocational background, making further inquiry

unnecessary. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990). The claimant bears the burden of

producing medical findings showing her impairments meet or medically equal a listed

impairment. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120 n.2. To meet this burden, the claimant must establish

all the requirements of the relevant listing. Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 530 (claimant who meets only

some of the listing requirements, “no matter how severely, does not qualify”); see also Hartung

v. Colvin, No. 12-6155, 2016 WL 2910096, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2016). Meeting a listing

cannot be based on diagnoses alone. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(d). Because matching or equaling a

listing at step three results in an automatic finding of disability, the listings are strictly construed

against claimants. See Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 530-32.

1. Sjogren’s Syndrome

As both parties note, to meet or equal the listing for Sjogren’s syndrome (Listing 14.10)

Plaintiff must show that it involves at least two organs/body systems with: (1) one involved to a

moderate or greater degree; and (2) two or more constitutional symptoms or signs (i.e., severe

fatigue, fever, malaise or involuntary weight loss). 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §

14.10A(1)-(2). Alternatively, he must show “[r]epeated manifestations” of the condition, at least

two of the constitutional symptoms or signs, and marked limitations in: (1) ADLs; (2)

maintaining social functioning; or (3) timely completing tasks because of deficiencies in

concentration, persistence, or pace. Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.10B(1)-(3).

According to Plaintiff, he has fulfilled this duty because the record shows that he

consistently “complained for years” about coughing and difficulty swallowing and, moreover,

experienced problems regarding “his hands and knees locking up,” fatigue, malaise, and

involuntary weight loss of more than 100 pounds since the onset of this condition. (Pl.’s Br.,

ECF No. 16, at 11 (citing SSR 16-3p)). However, the Commissioner counters that the record

contains hardly any evidence of Sjogren’s syndrome beyond a few passing references to a

diagnosis and a follow up and certainly nothing constituting “repeated manifestations.” (Resp.,

ECF No. 19, at 7). He continues that, in fact, Plaintiff denied many of the constitutional markers

described in the listing and, even when such problems as fatigue were noted, no indication exists

that they were repeatedly “severe” as defined by the relevant regulations. (Id. at 7 & n.3 (citing

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.00(C)(12))). Moreover, he points out that the ALJ’s

discussion of Plaintiff’s ADLs reflects that they were not “markedly” restricted and highlights

the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff had only mild limitations in interacting with others and

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. (Id. at 7).

The Commissioner continues that Plaintiff may have preferred a more granular analysis

of the listing but adds that the ALJ was not required to use any particular language in

constructing a decision that sufficiently develops the record to permit meaningful judicial

review. (Id. at 7-8 (citing Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004))). He maintains

that under applicable case law the ALJ was instead permitted to fulfill this duty through a

discussion of the medical record following his conclusion that Plaintiff’s impairments did not

meet or equal a listing, without tailoring this discussion to the one for Sjogren’s syndrome. (Id.

at 8 (citing Rembert v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 142 F. App’x 570, 572 (3d Cir. 2005))). He

emphasizes that the ALJ reiterated throughout the decision that Plaintiff’s examinations were

largely benign, that his treatment was conservative without the need for injections or surgeries,

that he engaged in a variety of ADLs, and that all record opinions found that his impairments

were not fully work-preclusive. (Id.). The Commissioner contrasts the ALJ’s analysis backed

by substantial evidence with Plaintiff’s summary conclusions, unsupported arguments and failure

to cite to the records that purportedly establish his contentions. (Id. (citing Atkins v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 810 F. App’x 122, 129 (3d Cir. 2020))). He therefore asks the Court to reject

Plaintiff’s undeveloped assertions and affirm the ALJ’s step three finding regarding Plaintiff’s

Sjogren’s syndrome. (Id.).

The Commissioner is correct that Plaintiff has failed to adequately develop his

contentions. See Groff v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-06040-RAL, 2022 WL 17083647, at *5 (E.D. Pa.

Nov. 17, 2022) (“It is necessary to demonstrate, not just assert, that the ALJ erred.

Demonstration calls for careful citation to the evidence, not just a conclusory assertion that

leaves the judge to search through 1,000 pages of records to see if the assertion is so.”) (citing

United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91, 113 (3d Cir. 2021)). Although he catalogues several

ailments that he attributes to his Sjogren’s syndrome and posits that “the record” at large

“clearly” meets or exceeds Listing 14.10, (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 19, at 7), he makes no attempt to

explain how the specific criteria listed in either subsection “A” or “B” have been fulfilled. For

instance, as a threshold matter subsection “A” requires “involvement of two or more organs/body

systems,” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.10A, but Plaintiff identifies none. Indeed, it is

doubtful that he could carry this burden because his Sjogren’s syndrome diagnosis was “with

unspecified organ involvement.” (R. 869, 905 (emphasis added)). Moreover, given his failure to

name the affected organs or body systems, Plaintiff also necessarily does not explain how at least

one of them was impacted to a moderate or greater severity level. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,

app. 1, § 14.10A(1). Furthermore, Plaintiff does not specify which two or more of the relevant

constitutional markers (fatigue, fever, malaise and involuntary weight loss) he allegedly has at a

“severe” level. Although Plaintiff’s 100-pound weight loss undoubtedly meets this requirement,

he merely claims that he “experience[s] fatigue and malaise,” without elaborating in any way as

to their supposed severity.4 (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 11).

4 There is no question that Plaintiff repeatedly complained to his medical providers about

fatigue and malaise. (R. 360, 367, 374, 462, 464, 490, 501, 509, 524, 577, 584, 590, 602, 609,

767, 838, 881, 886). However, the record generally reflects that these symptoms were not

severe. For example, when asked about being “[a]lways tired/fatigue[d],” Plaintiff responded,

“no.” (R. 575, 580; see also R. 426 (denying fatigue outright), 559 (reporting “some weakness

and fatigue”). But see R. 374 (checking a box on a form indicating that he had “[f]atigue,

profound and impairs daily function”)). Plaintiff’s providers also suggested at times that his

fatigue could be managed by pacing himself when carrying out activities. (See R. 459, 470, 496,

509).

The record indicates that Plaintiff consistently denied the existence of the remaining

Turning to the listing’s subsection “B” criteria, which Plaintiff also does not address, it is

doubtful that the handful of references in the record to his Sjogren’s syndrome, some of which

merely acknowledge the diagnosis, constitute “repeated manifestations” of the condition. (R.

865, 869, 913, 914, 917). In addition, as just stated, Plaintiff fails to identify a second severe

constitutional symptom or sign beyond his involuntary weight loss. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt.

P, app. 1, § 14.10B (also requiring “at least two” of these to establish the subsection “B”

criteria). Lastly, he does not show a marked level of limitation in ADLs, social functioning or

timely completing tasks because of deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace. Id. pt.

404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.10B(1)-(3); see also 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00F(2)(d)

(defining “[m]arked limitation” as one in which the claimant’s “functioning in this area

independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited”). As the

ALJ noted, despite his diagnoses Plaintiff’s ADLs included cooking, cleaning, laundry, shopping

and childcare. (R. 19 (citing Ex. 10F/1-2); see also R. 241-44 (Adult Function Report

additionally listing ADLs of, inter alia, caring for and walking dogs, attending appointments,

personal care, and washing dishes)). He also socialized in person and online with family and (for

at least a significant period after the alleged disability onset) friends, (R. 242-44), and Drs.

Coleman, Williams and Schiller all determined that he had only mild limitations in interacting

with others. (R. 58, 67, 810-11). And as for any limitations in completing tasks due to problems

with concentration, persistence or pace, Dr. Coleman determined that he had none and Drs.

Williams and Schiller concluded that they were only mild. (R. 58, 67, 811).

For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s first claim.

constitutional marker, fever. (R. 319, 322, 374, 426, 532, 534, 543, 551, 559, 573, 575, 584,

604, 609, 611, 767, 851, 856, 899).

2. Fibromyalgia

Because fibromyalgia is not an impairment listed in Appendix 1, at step three the ALJ

must instead determine whether it medically equals a listing, such as Listing 14.09D for

inflammatory arthritis.5 SSR 12-2p. Listing 14.09 may be equaled in four ways. First, there

must be persistent inflammation or deformity of: (1) a major lower extremity joint plus: (a) a

documented medical need for a mobility aid (such as a walker); or (b) an inability to use an

upper extremity to independently initiate, sustain and complete work-related activities involving

fine and gross movements as well as a documented medical need for a hand-held assistive or

seated mobility device involving the use of the other hand; or (2) a major upper extremity joint

plus a medically documented inability to use either upper extremity to carry out such activities.

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.09A(1)-(2). Second, a claimant must have inflammation

or deformity in an upper or lower extremity joint involving at least two organs/body systems

with: (1) one involved at a moderate or greater severity level; and (2) two or more of the severe

constitutional symptoms or signs noted in the prior subsection. Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §

14.10B. Third, the claimant must have spondylitis or other spondyloarthropathies resulting in

ankylosis (fixation or immobility) of the spine measured at a minimum of 30 degrees of flexion

from a vertical (zero degrees) position. Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.10C. Fourth, the listing

may be equaled through “[r]epeated manifestations” of inflammatory arthritis, at least two of the

constitutional symptoms or signs, and marked limitations in: (1) ADLs; (2) maintaining social

functioning; or (3) timely completing tasks because of deficiencies in concentration, persistence,

or pace. Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.10B(1)-(3).

5 Disability may also be established at step three if the claimant’s fibromyalgia, in

combination with one or more other medically determinable impairments, equals a listing, see

SSR 12-2p, but here Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have considered whether his

fibromyalgia alone met or equaled Listing 14.09. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 12).

Plaintiff’s “argument” in support of this claim consists of a single bald assertion: “It is

also submitted that the ALJ should have considered whether the Claimant’s fibromyalgia met or

equaled a listing at 14.09 D.” (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 12 (citing SSR 12-2p)). That is it.

Accordingly, this Court could easily find that the claim has been waived. See McGuirk v.

O’Malley, No. 23-1192, 2024 WL 3470848, at *6 n.2 (W.D. Pa. July 18, 2024) (“The Court

finds Plaintiff’s argument on this point difficult to follow as it is very conclusory and Plaintiff

provides no citations to the record. Thus, this argument is likely waived . . . .”); Hyer v. Colvin,

No. 15-297-GMS, 2016 WL 5719683, at *11 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016) (“It is not enough merely

to present an argument in the skimpiest way, and leave the Court to do counsel’s work – framing

the argument, and putting flesh on its bones through a discussion of the applicable law and

facts.”) (quoting Ve Thi Nguyen v. Colvin, No. C13-882, 2014 WL 1871054, at *2 (W.D. Wash.

May 8, 2014)).

Nonetheless, in light of the sentence’s placement at the end of Plaintiff’s (albeit limited)

argument in support of his Sjogren’s syndrome claim, and giving him the benefit of the doubt,

this Court treats that argument as lodged on behalf of his fibromyalgia claim as well. As such,

however, Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia claim suffers from the same defects, i.e., a lack of any attempt

whatsoever to cite relevant evidence and explain how it fulfills the criteria of the relevant listing.

(See Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 11-12; see supra § V.A.1). But even if Plaintiff had engaged with

the listing criteria, a brief review of each of the four ways in which the inflammatory arthritis

listing may be established shows that his claim is inadequate.

First, assuming Plaintiff could show persistent inflammation in a major lower extremity

joint (such as his knees (see, e.g., R. 523, 539, 547, 553)), the record documents no medical need

for any of the assistive devices mentioned in subsection “A.1” of Listing 14.09. See 20 C.F.R.

pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.09A(1) (requiring, inter alia, a medical need for a walker, bilateral

canes/crutches, seated mobility device, or hand-held assistive device). Dr. Monfared noted upon

physical examination that Plaintiff required no such mobility aids, (R. 820), and Plaintiff himself

only claimed to need, at most, a single cane when walking on uneven ground and a wrist brace.

(R. 246, 264). Further, the record lacks evidence that Plaintiff could not use one or both of his

arms to perform work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.09A(1)(b)-(2).

Second, it remains unclear which two organs/body systems are allegedly involved with any

major joint inflammation, let alone how either is “severely” involved, and as determined above,

(see supra n.4), the record does not establish that Plaintiff’s fatigue or malaise was severe. 20

C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.09B. Third, although Plaintiff was diagnosed with lumbar

and cervical spondylitis, (R. 394, 422, 426-27, 450-51), it was described as only “mild-to-

moderate.” (R. 394, 450). Along these lines, the Court could locate no references in the record

to “ankylosis,” and in fact Dr. Monfared confirmed that Plaintiff’s range of motion in his lumbar

and cervical spine was within normal limits. (R. 833). Fourth, as noted with Plaintiff’s

Sjogren’s syndrome, he cannot meet the full set of “repeated manifestations” criteria because of

his lack of severe fatigue, fever or malaise (notwithstanding his severe involuntary weight loss)

and because he was not “markedly” limited in ADLs, social functioning, or timely completing

tasks due to deficiencies in his concentration, persistence, or pace. (R. 58, 67, 241-44, 810-11);

see also 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.09D.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s first two claims.

B. Medium Work RFC

1. The Parties’ Positions

After setting forth the applicable background law including the definition of “medium

work,” Plaintiff submits that the ALJ’s determination that he could work at a medium exertional

level is unsupported by substantial evidence because it ignores the “overwhelming evidence” of

his pain and discomfort, weakness, and ambulation and memory problems in favor of a few more

positive but cherrypicked treatment notes. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 12-13 (citing Sykes, 228

F.3d 259; Chitwood v. Brown, 788 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1986); Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601 (2d

Cir. 1986))). He posits that this evidence indicates that his symptoms were consistent with his

diagnoses despite the ALJ’s contrary findings and that the ALJ merely substituted his own lay

opinion in place of what the evidence actually shows. (Id. at 13 (citing McEaney v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 536 F. Supp. 2d 252 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); Boulton v. Astrue, No. 5:07CV88-J, 2008 WL

474410 (W.D. Ky. 2008))). He cites several cases for the propositions that pain and weakness

are non-exertional impairments that must be considered by the ALJ, that subjective complaints of

pain must be accorded great weight if backed by the evidence and only discounted if refuted by

it, and that they may support a claim for disability. (Id. at 14 (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d

31 (1st Cir. 1999); Smith v. Calvano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981); Taybron v. Harris, 667

F.3d 412, 415 n.6 (3d Cir. 1981); Bittel v. Richardson, 441 F.2d 1193, 1195 (3d Cir. 1981)

(additional citations omitted))). He adds that his lengthy employment history (having worked for

36 years) and the fact that he lost his job due to the inability to keep pace counsel in favor of

awarding him benefits and, moreover, that his age at the time of alleged disability onset (50)

places a greater burden on the Commissioner when denying them. (Id. (citing Dikeman v.

Halter, 245 F.3d 1182, 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2001); Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th

Cir. 1990))).

The Commissioner counters that the ALJ’s medium work RFC determination was

consistent with the regulations and supported by substantial evidence. (Resp., ECF No. 19, at 9

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 404.1545(a)(1),

404.1546(c); SSR 96-8p) (additional citation omitted)). He observes that Plaintiff again fails to

identify any specific evidence warranting greater limitations or that the ALJ did not consider and

instead offers only broad and unsupported generalities regarding the decision’s supposed defects.

(Id.). Reminding the Court that it is not the ALJ’s burden to explain why Plaintiff did not require

further restrictions, he asserts that the ALJ fulfilled his duty to make findings based on the record

evidence when he acknowledged Plaintiff’s alleged difficulties but pointed out his repeatedly

benign examination results, lack of more aggressive treatment, and substantial ADLs, which

collectively furnished a reasonable basis to discount his subjective complaints. (Id. at 9-10

(citing R. 19-20) (additional citations omitted)). The Commissioner continues that the ALJ also

considered Drs. Williams’s and Schiller’s findings on both initial review and reconsideration that

Plaintiff did not have any severe mental impairments or work-related restrictions, as well as Dr.

Coleman’s consultative opinion that he had a moderate limitation in his ability to respond

appropriately to usual work situations and changes in work routines but only mild or no

limitations in all other areas of mental functioning. (Id. (citing R. 20-21, 810-11)). Turning to

the opinions on Plaintiff’s physical functioning, the Commissioner emphasizes that although Dr.

Henderson concluded on initial review that Plaintiff was limited to light work, Dr. Hubbard upon

reconsideration and Dr. Monfared in his consultative opinion determined that Plaintiff had no

exertional restrictions. (Id. at 10-11 (citing R. 59-62, 68-69, 825-30)). The Commissioner

maintains that in the face of these opinions ranging from no exertional limitations to a restriction

to light work (but none suggesting Plaintiff could not work at all), the ALJ reasonably resolved

the conflicting evidence in finding that Plaintiff could work at the medium exertional level. (Id.

at 11 (citation omitted)).

Next, the Commissioner refutes Plaintiff’s claims that the ALJ ignored his symptoms

such as pain, weakness and memory problems, stressing that the ALJ in fact credited many of

them and limited his RFC accordingly but adding that the ALJ also retained great discretion

having reviewed the record and conducted the hearing to evaluate Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints. (Id. (citing R. 19-20; Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612 (3d Cir. 2014); Burke v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 317 F. App’x 240, 244 (3d Cir. 2009); Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97,

103 (2019))). He argues that a reasonable mind considering the record could find several

grounds for concluding that Plaintiff’s complaints were not fully corroborated. (Id. at 12).

Additionally, he points out that Plaintiff failed to identify the purportedly “overwhelming

evidence” ignored by the ALJ and contrasts this deficiency with the ALJ’s repeated citations to

the record in support of his findings. (Id.). Noting that the ALJ need not refer to each piece of

evidence, and that the fact that he did not do so does not mean he failed to consider the entire

record, the Commissioner submits that the Court should accept the ALJ’s representation that he

considered all the evidence. (Id. (citing Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 204 (3d

Cir. 2008); Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 297 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2008); Hur v.

Barnhart, 94 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir.

2004))). He maintains that, reading the decision as a whole, the ALJ easily fulfilled the

reasonable articulation requirement by setting forth his logic in crafting Plaintiff’s RFC and

asserts that Plaintiff’s contrary contentions amount to nothing more than an improper request for

the Court to usurp the ALJ’s role and reweigh the evidence to formulate a new RFC. (Id. at 12-

13 (citing Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 369 (2021); T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of

Roswell, 574 U.S. 293, 302 (2015); Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir.

2011); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004))).

2. Analysis

RFC is “the most a [Plaintiff] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1545(a)(1). To determine the RFC, the ALJ must base the assessment on “all of the relevant

medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3); Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41. That

evidence includes medical records, observations made during formal medical examinations,

descriptions of limitations by the claimant and others, and observations of the claimant’s

limitations by others. Id. The ALJ’s finding of residual functional capacity must “be

accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v.

Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).

Moreover, under Social Security Ruling 16-3p, the ALJ must follow a two-step process

in evaluating the Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms specifically: (1) determine if there is an

underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment, shown by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, that could reasonably be expected to

produce the Plaintiff’s pain or symptoms; then (2) evaluate the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of the symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the Plaintiff’s

functioning. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4-8 (Mar. 16, 2016). In evaluating the

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ must consider

relevant factors such as the objective medical evidence, evidence from medical sources,

treatment course and effectiveness, daily activities, and consistency of Plaintiff’s statements with

the other evidence of record. Id.

It is within the province of the ALJ to evaluate the credibility of a claimant. Van Horn v.

Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983). “Although ‘any statements of the individual

concerning [his] symptoms must be carefully considered,’ the ALJ is not required to credit

them.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing SSR 96–7p

and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)). An ALJ’s “findings on the credibility of [a] claimant [] ‘are to be

accorded great weight and deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of

observing a witness’s demeanor and credibility.’” Irelan v. Barnhart, 243 F. Supp. 2d 268, 284

(E.D. Pa. 2003) (citation omitted). An ALJ may disregard a claimant’s subjective complaints

when contrary evidence exists in the record. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067-68 (3d Cir.

1993). However, the ALJ must provide her reasons for discounting a claimant’s testimony.

Burnett, 220 F.3d at 122; Matullo v. Bowen, 926 F.2d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 1990).

Here, despite Plaintiff’s contention that the evidence of his disabling “pain and

discomfort, ambulation problems, and weakness,” as well as his “memory issues,” was

“overwhelming,” (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 13), he fails to cite any such evidence in support of

his argument. It is true that in the “Factual History” section of his brief, he cites a handful of

treatment notes reflecting these maladies, such as: (1) a May 2018 note from Colleen Matejicka,

D.O., in which he complains about “feel[ing] like the tin man getting up and moving”; (2)

another from Dr. Butler in May 2023 recording his complaints of worsening numbness in his

arms and wrists; and (3) a third note from Marcelino Oliveri, D.O., in November 2023 noting

Plaintiff’s limp and complaints of radicular leg pain and upper and lower extremity numbness,

paresthesia, and weakness. (Id. at 8 (citing R. 590, 849, 920)). However, these treatment notes,

even coupled with Plaintiff’s testimony along the same lines, (see, e.g., R. 33, 45-46), hardly

constitute “overwhelming” evidence of disability in the face of the contrary evidence relied upon

by the ALJ in his decision.

This evidence included, among other records: (1) Dr. Monfared’s consultative opinion

setting forth Plaintiff’s ADLs of housework and childcare, finding full strength in the upper

extremities and no sensory deficits or muscle atrophy upon examination, and concluding that

Plaintiff could perform medium work; (2) Dr. Hubbard’s administrative findings that Plaintiff

has no exertional limitations; (3) a September 5, 2023 treatment note from Hany Salama, M.D.,

recording that Plaintiff had a normal gait and range of motion with no edema or tenderness; (4)

MRIs showing only mild to moderate degenerative changes in the cervical and lumbar spine; (5)

chiropractic care but a lack of any more aggressive treatment of his disc issues like epidural

steroid injections or surgeries; (6) Drs. Williams’s and Schiller’s administrative findings that he

has no severe mental impairments; (7) Dr. Coleman’s consultative opinion that he had no or only

mild limitations in all areas of mental functioning (except for one moderate limitation); and (8)

Plaintiff’s acknowledgement that his medication causes no side effects. (R. 19-21 (citing Exs.

2A, 4A, 3F/23, 4F, 9F, 10F, 11E/4, 13F/10)). In short, Plaintiff essentially asks this Court to

reweigh the evidence referenced in his brief against that cited by the ALJ in support of his

decision, but such second-guessing is not permissible under applicable case law. See Chandler,

667 F.3d at 359 (“Courts are not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual

determinations.”) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).

Moreover, Plaintiff is incorrect that the ALJ failed to account for the impairments set

forth above. The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s allegations surrounding them,6 (see R. 19 (noting

his claims of, inter alia, pain, difficulty lifting and need for a cane and that his conditions

collectively “affected his memory”)), but determined that their purported “intensity, persistence

and limiting effects” were not fully consistent with the medical evidence, (id.), as detailed in the

6 Plaintiff appears to cite Sykes, Chitwood and Bapp for the proposition that an ALJ must

“acknowledge the Claimant’s non-exertional limitations,” (see Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 13),

although his omission of any pinpoint citations or explanatory parentheticals leaves the Court

unable to assure itself of the precise point he wishes to make in invoking these cases. Further

obscuring his intentions is the fact that the shared legal tenet set forth in all three does not apply

here, where the ALJ did not rely on the Medical Vocational Guidelines to determine disability

and, furthermore, took testimony from a VE. See Sykes, 228 F.3d at 266 (“when the claimant has

exertional and nonexertional impairments[,] . . . courts . . . require the testimony of a vocational

expert or other similar evidence,” not just resort to the guidelines); Chitwood, 788 F.2d at 1388

(“Where a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment, such as pain, that significantly

limits his or her ability to perform the full range of work contemplated by the Guidelines, the

ALJ may not rely on the Guidelines to satisfy the Secretary’s burden of proof, but must instead

produce vocational testimony.”); Bapp, 802 F.3d at 603 (“[W]hen a claimant’s nonexertional

impairments significantly diminish his ability to work—over and above any incapacity caused

solely from exertional limitations—so that he is unable to perform the full range of employment

indicated by the medical vocational guidelines, then the Secretary must introduce the testimony

of a vocational expert (or other similar evidence) that jobs exist in the economy which claimant

can obtain and perform.”). In any event, to the extent that these cases stand for the premise

seemingly proffered by Plaintiff, they are distinguishable because in this case the ALJ considered

Plaintiff’s nonexertional impairments. (R. 19).

prior paragraph. Additionally, although Plaintiff correctly points out that subjectively reported

non-exertional impairments like pain may support a claim for disability, particularly where

corroborating medical evidence exists, (see id. at 14 (citations omitted)), it remains “well settled

that a claimant need not be pain-free or experiencing no discomfort in order to be found not

disabled.” Andreolli v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 07-1632, 2008 WL 5210682, at *4 (W.D. Pa.

Dec. 11, 2008) (citing Welch v. Heckler, 808 F.2d 264, 270 (3d Cir. 1986)). Here, as explained

by the ALJ, other substantial evidence existed apart from Plaintiff’s testimony that his pain was

not as severe and/or limiting as alleged.7 (R. 19 (citations omitted); see also Pl.’s Br., ECF No.

16, at 14 (acknowledging that an ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain if

contrary evidence exists) (citing Smith, 637 F.2d at 972)).

Finally, Plaintiff suggests that his employment history and age each warrant awarding

benefits. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 14 (citations omitted)). The Court easily disposes of this first

proposition, for which Plaintiff cites no authority,8 because “[t]he law is well-established that the

ALJ’s failure to afford [a claimant] heightened credibility based solely on [his or] her work

7 Because the ALJ’s RFC determination was backed by substantial evidence, Plaintiff’s

two out-of-circuit district court cases cited on page 13 of his brief are distinguishable. (Pl.’s Br.,

ECF No. 16, at 13 (citing McEaney, 536 F. Supp. 2d 252; Boulton, 2008 WL 474410)). First, the

ALJ was not required to perform a “function-by-function” assessment of every physical and

mental ability listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b)-(d), as set forth in McEaney. See Glass v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-15279, 2019 WL 5617508, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2019) (“Contrary

to Plaintiff’s assertion otherwise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit does

not require an ALJ to perform a ‘function-by-function’ analysis at step four, so long as the ALJ’s

RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record.”) (collecting cases).

Second, in Boulton, “no medical source opinion” supported the ALJ determination that Plaintiff

could perform medium work. 2008 WL 474410, at *4. In this case, by contrast, two of the three

medical sources to evaluate Plaintiff’s physical capabilities concluded that he had no exertional

limitations at all (with a third limiting him to light work). (R. 59-62, 68-69, 825-30).

8 Relatedly, Plaintiff identifies no legal support for the notion that it is significant that he

lost his last job due to an alleged inability to keep pace. Furthermore, the Court observes that the

three opinions in the record to assess his mental functioning all set forth no or only mild

limitations in this area. (R. 58, 67, 811).

history does not amount to an error requiring remand.” Shore v. Kijakazi, No. 20-1169-SRF,

2022 WL 782701, at *10 (D. Del. Mar. 15, 2022) (citations omitted); see also Sanborn v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F. App’x 171, 177 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding that “the ALJ’s credibility

determination . . . based on a broad view of the record . . . would have been supported by

substantial evidence regardless of whether the ALJ had explicitly considered [the claimant’s]

employment history.”). Corley v. Barnhart, 102 F. App’x 752, 755 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ALJ

did not err by failing to afford Corley heightened credibility based solely on his work history.”).

In purported support of his attendant contention regarding his age, Plaintiff cites Dikeman

and Terry, which both observed: “As age is one of the factors that must be considered, it should

surprise no one that the [Commissioner] faces a more stringent burden when denying disability

benefits to older claimants.” Dikeman, 245 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Terry, 903 F.2d at 1275)

(alteration in Dikeman). Specifically, if, as here, the claimant “is ‘closely approaching advanced

age (50–54), [the Commissioner] will consider that [his] age, along with a severe impairment and

limited work experience, may seriously affect [his] ability to adjust to a significant number of

jobs in the national economy.’” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c)) (some alterations added).

However, based on Plaintiff’s own arguments, his work experience is anything but “limited.”

(See Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 16, at 14 (highlighting 36-year employment history)). Moreover, in both

Dikeman and Terry, the ALJ determined that the claimant could not perform her past relevant

work, triggering application of the Medical Vocational Guidelines or “grid rules.” Dikeman, 245

F.3d at 1184; Terry, 903 F.3d at 1275; see 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Grid Rule

200.00(a) (“The following rules reflect the major functional and vocational patterns which are

encountered in cases which cannot be evaluated on medical considerations alone, where an

individual with a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) is not

engaging in substantial gainful activity and the individual’s impairment(s) prevents the

performance of his or her vocationally relevant past work.”) (emphasis added); see also Lesh v.

Saul, No. 1:19-cv-01416-RDM-GBC, 2020 WL 5500186, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2020) (noting

that an inability to perform past relevant work “could trigger the grid rules due to [the

claimant’s] borderline age category”). Here, by contrast, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could

perform his past relevant work as a packaging supervisor, production supervisor, plant manager

and supervisor of motorcycle assembly, and thus the need to consider the grid rules and the

impact of Plaintiff’s age under them never arose. (R. 21 (citing Dictionary of Occupational

Titles 806.131-014)); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (if the ALJ determines at step four that the

claimant can perform past relevant work, he or she “will find [the claimant] not disabled” and

proceed no further in the sequential analysis).

For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s third claim as well.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Request for Review is DENIED. An

appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Lynne A. Sitarski .

LYNNE A. SITARSKI

United States Magistrate Judge