Harling

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

EVELYN J. HARLING, ]

]

Plaintiff, ]

]

v. ] Case No. 6:24-cv-1237-ACA

]

HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT ]

INSURANCE COMPANY, ]

]

Defendant. ]

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Evelyn Harling receives long-term disability benefits from

Defendant Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company. After approving her

application for benefits, Hartford determined that the amount Ms. Harling receives

as a Social Security benefit for disabled widows would offset her monthly disability

benefit from Hartford. Although Hartford told Ms. Harling that it would offset the

amount, it calculated and paid her benefits without an offset for the disabled widow’s

benefit for an extended period. In February 2024, Hartford informed Ms. Harling

that she was overpaid over $16,000 and requested reimbursement. Ms. Harling filed

this lawsuit to prevent Hartford from recovering the funds and reducing her future

payments.

Both parties move for summary judgment. For the reasons below, the court

WILL GRANT Hartford’s motion and WILL ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT

in its favor. (Doc. 24). The court WILL DENY Ms. Harling’s motion. (Doc. 23).

I. BACKGROUND

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court “draw[s] all inferences

and review[s] all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fort

Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th

Cir. 2018).

In 2019, Ms. Harling’s disability required her to stop working, and she applied

for Social Security benefits. (Doc. 15-1 at 58; see doc. 15-44 at 42; doc. 15-34 at

131). Ms. Harling’s notice of award from the Social Security Administration

(“SSA”) indicated that she was entitled to “monthly disability benefits” and

“disabled divorced widow’s benefits.” (Doc. 15-44 at 42; doc. 15-34 at 131). The

notice stated that she would receive $1,263 for the “Social Security benefits” and

that the agency would send “anoth[er] letter” about the disabled widow’s benefit.

(Doc. 15-44 at 42; doc. 15-34 at 131).

The widow’s benefit is paid to Ms. Harling because her ex-husband was the

family’s primary source of income. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1)(B). Ordinarily, a

claimant is not eligible for the widow’s benefit until she turns sixty. See id. But

because Ms. Harling was disabled, she was eligible for the disabled widow’s benefit,

which allows access to benefit after the claimant turns fifty. See id.; (see also doc.

15-33 at 58).

Ms. Harling also applied to receive benefits under her long-term disability

policy with Hartford. (See doc. 15-15 at 99–101). Ms. Harling’s policy explains that

Hartford calculates benefits by determining the monthly payable benefit and then

subtracting any “Other Income Benefits.” (Doc. 15-1 at 13–14). “Other Income

Benefits” means “the amount of any benefit for loss of income, provided to You, as

a result of the period of Disability for which You are claiming benefits under The

Policy.” (Id. at 22). The policy then lists examples of Other Income Benefits,

including “disability benefits under . . . the United States Social Security Act.” (Id.).

In January 2021, Hartford, after initially denying the claim, approved her

application for benefits. (Doc. 15-15 at 22–25). In the letter approving her

application, Hartford told Ms. Harling that it would reduce her monthly benefits by

her Other Income Benefits, including the disabled widow’s benefit. (Doc. 15-15 at

22, 24). Hartford attached to the letter a worksheet detailing the benefit calculations,

which included reductions for both her Social Security Disability and the disabled

widow’s benefit. (Id. at 25). The letter explained that Ms. Harling would receive the

minimum benefit allowed until it received a copy of the SSA award letter for the

disabled widow’s benefit. (Doc. 15-15 at 24).

In February 2021, the same Hartford claim examiner who sent Ms. Harling

the letter approving her benefits reviewed her claim and concluded that Ms. Harling

could not obtain both the disabled widow’s benefit and other Social Security

disability benefits. (Doc. 15-9 at 9). The claim examiner removed the offset from

Ms. Harling’s benefit, “recalc[ulated] up,” and sent a letter requesting an update on

Ms. Harling’s Social Security Disability application to “evaluate [her long-term

disability benefit] claim.” (Doc. 15-9 at 9; doc. 15-15 at 21). Hartford specifically

requested her approval or denial letter from the SSA. (Doc. 15-15 at 21).

In June 2021, Ms. Harling completed a claimant questionnaire. (Doc. 15-38

at 47). In the questionnaire, she reported receiving Social Security Disability in the

amount of $1,280 per month. (Id.). The questionnaire had a box for the disabled

widow’s benefit, but Ms. Harling did not check that box. (See id.; see also doc. 15-

32 at 112). Instead, she checked the box associated with the widow’s benefit—a

benefit not connected to her disability. (See doc. 15-38 at 47). She indicated that she

received $566 per month for this benefit. (See id.). According to a July 11, 2022 SSA

Benefit Verification Letter, Ms. Harling received $566 per month beginning in

December 2020 as a “disabled dependent of [a] wage earner.” (Doc. 15-34 at 133–

34).

In March 2022, Hartford terminated Ms. Harling’s benefits for failure to

provide proof of an ongoing disability. (Doc. 15-15 at 7–12). Hartford reversed its

decision on receipt and review of additional medical records in June 2022. (Id. at

149). Internal records from the same time note that Ms. Harling received two Social

Security Disability benefits, citing her 2021 “CQ” and a February 2020 SSA letter

that stated she was entitled to the disabled widow’s benefit, which would be an

offset. (Doc. 15-5 at 11). Consequently, the claims manager wrote that Social

Security “[c]larification is needed.” (Id.). The next month, Hartford sent Ms. Harling

a letter that noted she started receiving Social Security Disability in January 2020

and that “she was entitled to disabled divorced widow’s benefit starting” at the same

time. (Doc. 15-15 at 146). Hartford requested “the award letter for this benefit”

because “it would be [an] offset to the claim.” (Id.).

In response, Ms. Harling provided a benefit verification letter. (Doc. 15-34 at

132–35). The letter contains two distinct sections indicating two different benefit

amounts, both covering the period beginning December 2020. (Id. at 133–34).

Hartford requested additional documentation specific to the disabled widow’s

benefit. (Doc. 15-5 at 8; see also doc. 15-34 at 130–31). Ms. Harling provided the

initial notice of award that she previously included in her benefit application with

Hartford. (Compare doc. 15-34 at 131, with doc. 15-44 at 42). In August 2022,

Hartford again objected to Ms. Harling’s submission. (Doc. 15-15 at 145).

Ms. Harling then requested that Hartford communicate with the SSA directly. (Doc.

15-34 at 129).

In July 2023, Ms. Harling completed another claimant questionnaire. (Doc.

15-34 at 67). Like her answer in the June 2021 questionnaire, she reported both

Social Security benefits to Hartford, indicating that she received $2,125.60 for both

benefits. (Id.; see doc. 15-32 at 114). But she did not check the box for the disabled

widow’s benefit. (Doc. 15-34 at 67; doc. 15-15 at 123, 125). Instead, she reported

that she received the widow’s benefit. (Doc. 15-34 at 67). Accordingly, Hartford sent

follow-up letters to Ms. Harling again requesting her notice of award for the disabled

widow’s benefit. (Doc. 15-15 at 123, 125).

In November 2023, an internal review discovered that the amount reported by

Hartford’s vendor for Ms. Harling’s Social Security benefits did not account for both

of her awards. (Doc. 15-3 at 14). Shortly after, Ms. Harling provided to Hartford an

award letter specific to the disabled widow’s benefit. (Doc. 15-33 at 57–58).

Hartford then concluded that the amount it had offset for the previous four years did

not include the disabled widow’s benefit. (Doc. 15-15 at 111–13; doc. 15-2 at 15). It

informed Ms. Harling that it had overpaid her each month and requested that she pay

back $16,665.10. (Doc. 15-15 at 111–13, 115–19). Ms. Harling appealed (doc. 15-

32 at 110–20; doc. 15-15 at 109), but Hartford affirmed its decision (doc. 15-15 at

103–08).

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Ms. Harling asserts a claim against Hartford to secure withheld disability

benefits. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1–3). ERISA provides no standard for reviewing decisions of

plan administrators or fiduciaries. Capone v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 592 F.3d 1189, 1195

(11th Cir. 2010). Depending on the plan, one of three standards govern: “(1) de novo

where the plan does not grant the administrator discretion; (2) arbitrary and

capricious where the plan grants the administrator discretion; and (3) heightened

arbitrary and capricious where the plan grants the administrator discretion and the

administrator has a conflict of interest.” Id. (footnote omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a six-step framework to review ERISA

policy administrators’ decisions. Blankenship v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350,

1354–55 (11th Cir. 2011). To apply the framework, the court should:

(1) Apply the de novo standard to determine whether the claim

administrator’s benefits-denial decision is “wrong” (i.e., the

court disagrees with the administrator’s decision); if it is not, then

end the inquiry and affirm the decision.

(2) If the administrator’s decision in fact is “de novo wrong,”

then determine whether he was vested with discretion in

reviewing claims; if not, end judicial inquiry and reverse the

decision.

(3) If the administrator’s decision is “de novo wrong” and he was

vested with discretion in reviewing claims, then determine

whether “reasonable” grounds supported it (hence, review his

decision under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious

standard).

(4) If no reasonable grounds exist, then end the inquiry and

reverse the administrator’s decision; if reasonable grounds do

exist, then determine if he operated under a conflict of interest.

(5) If there is no conflict, then end the inquiry and affirm the

decision.

(6) If there is a conflict, the conflict should merely be a factor for

the court to take into account when determining whether an

administrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.

Id. at 1355. Ms. Harling bears the burden of proving she is entitled to the benefits.

See Glazer v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 524 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2008).

Ms. Harling argues that Hartford mistakenly concluded that it overpaid her

because the disabled widow’s benefit is not an offset under the policy’s term.1 (Doc.

23-1 at 8–15; doc. 26-2 at 18–26). And even if it is, Ms. Harling contends that ERISA

regulations prevent Hartford from “reconsidering” any decision several years after

her approval. (Doc. 23-1 at 15–20; doc. 26-2 at 26–27, 31–34). Moreover,

Ms. Harling relies on several equitable principles to bar Hartford from recovering

the money. (Doc. 23-1 at 21–26; doc. 26-2 at 27–31).

1 The policy’s terms are incorporated into the welfare benefit plan. (Doc. 15-1 at 36).

Hartford disagrees because it contends that the disabled widow’s benefit

serves as an offset. (Doc. 24-1 at 12–15). Even if this interpretation is incorrect,

Hartford argues that it is entitled to deferential review and that its decision was

reasonable. (Id.; doc. 25 at 12–17). Finally, Hartford notes that it never reconsidered

any decision because it initially informed Ms. Harling that the disabled widow’s

benefit was an offset under the policy.2 (Doc. 24-1 at 15–19; doc. 25 at 18–21).

The court addresses Hartford’s motion first before turning to Ms. Harling’s

motion.

1. Hartford’s motion

a. The arbitrary and capricious standard of review governs.

To begin, the parties dispute which standard of review governs Hartford’s

interpretation that the disabled widow’s benefit is an offset. At step one of the

Eleventh Circuit’s framework, the court may assume that the administrator’s

decision was de novo wrong and resolve the case on the remaining steps. Goldfarb

v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 106 F.4th 1100, 1106 (11th Cir. 2024).

Accordingly, the court assumes that Hartford’s interpretation was de novo wrong and

moves to step two.

2 Ms. Harling objects to Hartford’s motion because it does not specifically invoke Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and because the court denied without prejudice her motion for

discovery. (Doc. 26 at 1–2; see also doc. 21). Because the court resolves whether the disabled

widow’s benefit is an offset in Hartford’s favor, the court OVERRULES Ms. Harling’s objection.

At step two, Ms. Harling’s policy granted Hartford full discretion. (Doc. 15-1

at 20 (“We have full discretion and authority to determine eligibility for benefits and

to construe and interpret all terms and provisions of The Policy.”); id. at 36 (similar

language)). Ms. Harling does not dispute the policy’s language grants Hartford

discretion to review claims and interpret the policy. (See doc. 26-2 at 14–17). She

instead proffers three arguments for why de novo review should apply despite this

clear grant.

First, Ms. Harling argues that the policy’s language relies on statutory

definitions, and the court must not defer to Hartford’s statutory interpretation. (Doc.

23-1 at 8–9; doc. 26-2 at 14, 22). Ms. Harling maintains that the policy incorporates

the definition of “disability benefits” from the Social Security Act. (Doc. 26-2 at 22–

23). But she cites nothing in the policy’s text to support this argument other than the

words “disability benefits” themselves. (See id.; see also doc. 23-1 at 10). Nothing

in the record or policy suggests that Hartford incorporated this statutory definition.

(See generally doc. 15-1).

Next, Ms. Harling contends the court should review de novo Hartford’s

interpretation because Hartford offers “post hoc rationales” for its decision. (See doc.

26-2 at 14). Yet, no case that Ms. Harling relies on holds that a “post hoc rationale”

changes the standard of review. See, e.g., Tippitt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,

276 F. App’x 912, 915 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding it was not error for a district court

to rely on “post hoc explanations” under the arbitrary and capricious standard of

review); Prolow v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 584 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1137 (S.D. Fla. 2022).

In any event, Hartford told Ms. Harling that the disabled widow’s benefit was a

disability benefit that would offset her benefit award. (Doc. 15-15 at 22–25). It

restated this reasoning in its final decision. (Doc. 15-15 at 103–08).

Lastly, Ms. Harling argues for de novo review because Hartford did not

provide a full and fair review because it did not provide her the entire claim file.

(Doc. 26-2 at 16). She relies on 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503–1(h)(2)(iii), but that regulation

does not entitle her to the entire record—only the relevant portions. Glazer, 524 F.3d

at 1245–46. She does not specify which documents Hartford did not supply or how

not receiving those documents impacted her review. (See doc. 26-2 at 16–17).

Because the plan granted Hartford discretion, the arbitrary and capricious

standard governs.

b. Hartford reasonably determined that the disabled widow’s benefit

qualified as an offset.

At step three, because the arbitrary and capricious standard governs, the court

will not disturb the determination if it was reasonable. Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue

Shield of Ala., Inc., 890 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1989). Thus, Hartford’s decision

“must be upheld as not being arbitrary or capricious, even if there is evidence that

would support a contrary decision.” Id.

Ms. Harling first argues that the disabled widow’s benefit is not a “disability

benefit” under the policy’s terms. (Doc. 26-2 at 18, 22–25). After defining “Other

Income Benefits,” the plan outlines specific examples of benefits that qualify as

“Other Income Benefits,” including “disability benefits under . . . the United States

Social Security Act.” (Doc. 15-1 at 22). The policy does not further define “disability

benefits.” (See id.).

It is undisputed that Ms. Harling would not be entitled to the disabled widow’s

benefit but-for her disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1); (doc. 24-1 at 12; doc. 26-2

at 25). The parties also agree that Social Security Act authorizes the disabled

widow’s benefit. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1); (doc. 24-1 at 13; doc. 23-1 at 14; doc.

26-2 at 24). The SSA notice of award characterizes the disabled widow’s benefit as

a “disability benefit.” (Doc. 15-33 at 58). Other communications from the SSA to

Ms. Harling connect her disability to her entitlement for the disabled widow’s

benefit. (See, e.g., doc. 15-34 at 60, 134). Based on the SSA letters, the policy’s

language, and that Ms. Harling received the benefit early because she was disabled,

it was reasonable for Hartford to determine that the disabled widow’s benefit was a

“disability benefit” under the Social Security Act.

Ms. Harling resists this conclusion. She argues that the policy does not

explicitly mention the disabled widow’s benefit as an example of an Other Income

Benefit. (Doc. 26-2 at 19). But nothing in the policy’s text indicates the examples

are intended to be exhaustive. (See doc. 15-1 at 22). Nor is Ms. Harling’s reliance on

Smith v. Board of Trustees of Teachers’ & State Employees’ Retirement System, 471

S.E.2d 121 (N.C. App. 1996) persuasive. In that case, a North Carolina court held

that disabled widow’s benefits did not qualify as “primary Social Security disability

benefits” under a state statute. Id. at 123. But Smith involved interpreting a state

statute, not a contractual provision. Moreover, this court must give deference to

Hartford’s determination under ERISA, whereas the court in Smith was not bound

by deferential review. See id.

Ms. Harling also contends that the disabled widow’s benefit does not fall

within the broad definition of “Other Income Benefit,” so it cannot serve as an offset.

(Doc. 23-1 at 12–13; doc. 26-2 at 18–20). The plan defines “Other Income Benefits”

as “any benefit for loss of income . . . as a result of the period of Disability for which

You are claiming benefits under The Policy.” (Doc. 15-1 at 22). She maintains that

it is not a benefit given for a “loss of income” because she receives the benefit as

spousal support because her ex-husband was the primary wage earner. (Doc. 26-2 at

20). However, “the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy terms” control. See

Alexandra H. v. Oxford Health Ins. Freedom Access Plan, 833 F.3d 1299, 1307 (11th

Cir. 2016). And the policy’s text does not limit the definition to a loss of the

policyholder’s income. (See doc. 15-1 at 22). The disabled widow’s benefit is

designed to replace the lost income both from the loss of primary wage earner and

Ms. Harling’s inability to work because of her disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e).

Thus, it is for “loss of income.”

The disabled widow’s benefit meets the remaining requirements of the “Other

Income Benefit” definition. It is undisputed that (1) Ms. Harling receives the

disabled widow’s benefit (Doc. 15-33 at 58; doc. 15-34 at 60, 134); (2) she would

not have received the benefit early but-for her disability (doc. 24-1 at 12, 14; doc.

26-2 at 25; doc. 15-33 at 58); (3) the benefit replaces income, (doc. 26-2 at 20); see

42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1). That means, Ms. Harling received the disabled widow’s

benefit “for loss of income” and “as a result of the period of Disability” that she

claimed benefits from Hartford. (See doc. 15-1 at 22). Thus, Hartford’s interpretation

was reasonable.

The court’s inquiry ends at step four because Hartford’s interpretation was

reasonable. In passing, Ms. Harling contends Hartford has a conflict of interest, (doc.

23-1 at 17; doc. 26-2 at 33, 35), but she makes no substantive argument, failing to

cites any authority or portions of the record (see doc. 23-1 at 17; doc. 26-2 at 33,

35). Because a passing reference is not sufficient to raise the issue, the court does

not consider it. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th

Cir. 2014).

c. Hartford never reconsidered its determination.

Even if Hartford’s decision was reasonable, Ms. Harling argues that Hartford’s

correction of its overpayment constitutes a “reconsideration” of its initial decision,

and it is improper for Hartford to make this “determination” outside the mandatory

forty-five-day limit for claims decisions. (Doc. 26-2 at 26, 31–34). The court

disagrees with both arguments.

In its initial determination letter to Ms. Harling, Hartford informed her that

she was entitled to benefits, subject to an offset because of both Social Security

benefits. (Doc. 15-15 at 24–25). The benefit calculation worksheet attached to the

determination explicitly states, “Reductions for Other Income Benefits: Social

Security Disability, Disabled Widow’s Benefit.” (Id. at 25). Although Ms. Harling

disputes that this letter “state[s] a disabled widow’s benefit was an offset,” (doc. 26-

2 at 5 ¶ 13), she does not dispute the contents of the letter as they appear in the

record, nor does she point to anything in the record that establishes that she was told

otherwise. To be sure, Hartford miscalculated Ms. Harling’s offset, but it never

determined that the disabled widow’s benefit was not an offset, and Ms. Harling

proffers no evidence that Hartford informed her that it was not an offset. The error

provision allows Hartford “to recover . . . any amount that [it] determine[s] to be an

overpayment.” (Doc. 15-1 at 19). Consequently, Hartford’s invocation of the error

provision to recover the offset payments was not a new determination—it was an

enforcement of the original decision.

Ms. Harling argues that Hartford’s invocation of the error provision was a

redetermination of the original benefits decision and every benefit payment that

Hartford distributed over four years. (Doc. 26-2 at 26–27, 31–34). And this “re-

determination,” she maintains, must comply with the claim determination timeline,

which is forty-five days. (Id. at 33). Ms. Harling cites no authority to support her

argument, nor does the policy’s text compel that result. The claims procedure

deadline is separate from the error provision. (Compare doc. 15-1 at 19, with id. at

39). There is no mention of a deadline for Hartford to demand repayment in the error

provision section. (Id. at 19). Moreover, although Ms. Harling contends that she

reported the two Social Security benefits to Hartford so it knew she was receiving

the disabled widow’s benefit, she did not report receiving the disabled widow’s

benefit in her questionnaires. (Doc. 15-38 at 47; doc. 15-34 at 67).

d. Ms. Harling’s equitable arguments fail.

In response to Hartford’s motion, Ms. Harling offers three equitable theories

why Hartford should not be entitled to the funds. All theories rest on the same

premise: because Hartford paid Ms. Harling the funds, it should not be allowed to

reclaim the funds.

i. Voluntary Payment Doctrine

Ms. Harling first argues that the voluntary payment doctrine bars Hartford

from offsetting the funds from future payments. (Doc. 26-2 at 27–29). But

Ms. Harling points only to state law cases. See Voyager Ins. Co. v. Whitson, 867 So.

2d 1065, 1076 (Ala. 2003); Emory Univ., Inc. v. Neurocare, Inc., 985 F.3d 1337,

1348–49 (11th Cir. 2021) (applying Georgia law). ERISA federal common law, not

state law, governs this action. See Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 959 (11th

Cir. 1986). And Ms. Harling cites no—nor has the court found any—authority

applying the voluntary payment doctrine under ERISA federal common law.

ii. Laches

Ms. Harling also argues the doctrine of laches bars Hartford from recovering

the funds. (Doc. 26-2 at 30–31). But the doctrine of laches is an affirmative defense.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c); Herman v. S.C. Nat. Bank, 140 F.3d 1413, 1427–28 (11th

Cir. 1998). And Ms. Harling does not cite a case where the plaintiff relied on the

doctrine to support her cause of action. (See doc. 23-1 at 24–25; doc. 26-2 at 30–31).

Several cases that Ms. Harling relies on do not even discuss the doctrine of

laches. See Phillips v. Mar. Ass’n-I.L.A. Loc. Pension Policy Plan, 194 F. Supp. 2d

549 (E.D. Tex. 2001); Dandurand v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F. Supp. 2d 178

(D. Me. 2001). In the one case that relies on the doctrine, the plaintiff asserted the

doctrine as a defense to a pension fund’s counterclaim, and the court noted the

doctrine “arises when a defendant’s position is so prejudiced by length of time and

inexcusable delay.” See Kaliszewski v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat. Pension, No. 03-

216E, 2005 WL 2297309, at *8 (W.D. Pa. July 19, 2005). Accordingly, the doctrine

of laches does not apply.

iii. Misrepresentation

Ms. Harling also argues that Hartford violated the duty of loyalty by making

a misrepresentation, so the insurer should not be entitled to the funds it paid. (Doc.

23-1 at 21–23; doc. 26-2 at 29–30). Ms. Harling also relies on Jones v. American

General Life & Accident Insurance Company, 370 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 2004). Jones,

however, is inapposite. The Eleventh Circuit addressed only the legal question of

whether the plaintiffs could bring a cause of action based on the breach of a duty of

loyalty in the ERISA context. See id. at 1071–74. In any event, the facts, too, are

different. In Jones, the plaintiffs pleaded that the insurer told them they were entitled

to benefits and sent letters representing the plaintiffs’ insurance would continue. Id.

at 1067, 1071–72. Here, Ms. Harling proffers no evidence that Hartford informed

her that the disabled widow’s benefit would not serve as an offset. The letters sent

to Ms. Harling say the opposite. (See, e.g., doc. 15-15 at 22–25).

2. Ms. Harling’s motion

Most of Ms. Harling’s motion repeats the same arguments made in opposition

to Hartford’s motion. (Compare doc. 23-1, with doc. 26-2). Accordingly, those

arguments fail for the same reasons explained above. Ms. Harling’s motion offers

two distinct arguments. The court addresses each in turn.

First, to the extent that Ms. Harling argues the court should award relief

because she has since turned sixty and the widow’s benefit is not an offset,

Ms. Harling was not sixty (and thus not entitled to the widow’s benefit) when she

appealed Hartford’s decision and filed this action. (Doc. 23-1 at 26–27). And the

challenged decision holds only that the disabled widow’s benefit is an offset under

the plan. (Doc. 15-15 at 103–08). Because Hartford has not yet determined that the

widow’s benefit serves as an offset, Ms. Harling’s arguments are premature because

she cannot challenge a decision that has not been made. See Lanfear v. Home Depot,

Inc., 536 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11th Cir. 2008) ([P]laintiffs in ERISA actions must

exhaust available administrative remedies before suing in federal court.”); see also

Knight v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 936 F.3d 1322, 1338 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[F]ederal courts

will not give advisory opinions.” (quotation marks omitted)).

Second, she argues that equitable estoppel “is available where the plaintiff can

show that (1) the relevant provisions of the plan at issue are ambiguous, and (2) the

plan provider or administrator has made representations to the plaintiff that

constitute an informal interpretation of the ambiguity.” Jones, 370 F.3d at 1069. In

the ERISA context, equitable estoppel is “very narrow.” Id.

Ms. Harling does not argue the policy’s text is ambiguous nor does she

establish any representations “that constitute an informal interpretation of the

ambiguity.” Id.; (see doc. 23-1 at 21–24; doc. 27 at 8–9). Although Ms. Harling

argues that the payment amount qualifies as a representation, she points to no

authority for her position. (See doc. 23-1 at 21). And Ms. Harling does not address

the written representations that Hartford sent informing her that the disabled

widow’s benefit was an offset, its repeated request for information, and her failure

to accurately reflect her benefits on multiple questionnaires. Accordingly, equitable

estoppel does not apply. See Griffin v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 989 F.3d

923, 936 (11th Cir. 2021) (applying equitable estoppel when the administrator made

representations).

Because the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hartford on

Ms. Harling’s sole claim and Ms. Harling’s additional arguments fail, the

court WILL DENY Ms. Harling’s motion for summary judgment.

I. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the court WILL GRANT Hartford’s motion and

ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT in its favor. (Doc. 24). The court WILL

DENY Ms. Harling’s motion. (Doc. 23).

DONE and ORDERED this March 26, 2026.

ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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