Hayat

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UMAR HAYAT,

A220-647-471,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-02416

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

DAVID O’NEILL, Acting Field

Office Director of Enforcement and

Removal Operations, Philadelphia

Field Office, Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM

On December 15, 2025, the petitioner, appearing through counsel,

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Doc. 1. In this petition, Umar Hayat, a native and citizen of Pakistan,

challenges the legality of his pre-removal-order immigration detention

without an individualized bond hearing. At the time of filing, Hayat was

being held in the custody of United States Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) at Pike County Correctional Facility, located in Pike

County, Pennsylvania.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hayat initially entered the United States without inspection at or

near Calexico, California, on or about November 18, 2021. Hayat was

apprehended by Customs and Border Patrol shortly thereafter and

detained until January 27 or 28, 2022, at which time he was released on

his own recognizance, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).1 Pet. Ex. A,

Doc. 1-2, at 3. At the time of his release, Hayat was served with a Notice

to Appear, DHS Form I-862, dated January 27, 2022, which declared him

to be subject to removal as an “alien present in the United States who

has not been admitted or paroled,”2 and which directed him to appear for

a hearing before an immigration judge in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, at

1 At the time of his initial release, Hayat was served with a Notice

of Custody Determination, DHS Form I-286, dated January 27, 2022, and

prepared by a deportation officer, which ordered him released on his own

recognizance pursuant to “section 236 of the Immigration and

Nationality Act and part 236 of title 8, Code of Federal Regulations.” Pet.

Ex. A, Doc. 1-2, at 3. He was also served with an Interim Notice

Authorizing Parole, dated January 28, 2022, which indicated that he had

been paroled into the United States temporarily under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(A)(5), which allows for discretionary parole into the United

States “under such conditions as [DHS] may prescribe only on a case-by-

case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”

Pet. Ex. A, Doc. 1-2, at 5. Hayat’s initial release on parole appears to have

been based on his expressed intention to apply for asylum.

2 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring him to be an “arriving

alien” was checked. Pet. Ex. B, Doc. 1-2, at 7.

a date and time to be determined.3 Pet. Ex. B, Doc. 1-2, at 7.

On November 3, 2022, Hayat timely applied for asylum by filing a

Form I-589, Application for Asylum with U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services (“USCIS”), and he was granted a work permit. His

asylum application has not yet been adjudicated. In the several years

that he has been present in the United States, Hayat has lived a

“productive and law-abiding life.” Pet. ¶ 6, Doc. 1, at 3.

In November 2025, an asylum officer served Hayat by mail with a

superseding Notice to Appear, DHS Form I-862, dated November 6, 2025,

which declared him to be subject to removal as an “alien present in the

United States who has not been admitted or paroled,”4 and which

directed him to appear for a hearing before an immigration judge in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on January 5, 2027. Pet. Ex. C, Doc. 1-2, at

10.

3 The date and time spaces on the form were filled in with “TBD”

instead of an actual date and time. Pet. Ex. B, Doc. 1-2, at 7. As a

result, this initial notice to appear was apparently legally defective.

, 593 U.S. 155, 160–72 (2021) (holding that, under

8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G), “time and place information must be included in

a notice to appear”).

4 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring him to be an “arriving

alien” was checked. Pet. Ex. C, Doc. 1-2, at 10.

Hayat has complied with all directions and requirements of asylum

and immigration officers since being released on his own recognizance.

He was doing so when he reported to the Philadelphia ICE field office on

December 1, 2025, for a routine check-in. Once there, he was taken into

custody and detained by immigration authorities. Later, he was

transferred to Pike County Correctional Facility, where he remains in

civil immigration detention. He has been denied any opportunity to post

bond or to be released on other conditions.

II. DISCUSSION

Since the United States began restricting

immigration into this country in the late 19th century,

it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking

entry into the country and those already residing

within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line”

who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do

not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded

to persons inside the United States. But once a

noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal

circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to

due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s

borders, “whether their presence here is lawful,

unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction

between noncitizens who have entered and reside in

the United States and those who have not yet entered

“runs throughout immigration law.”

, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2025 WL 3228945, at *1

(D. Idaho Nov. 19, 2025) (quoting , 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925),

and , 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted).

Consistent with this distinction, “[t]wo statutory sections govern

the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225 and 1226.” , 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.

Sept. 23, 2025), , No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As

concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law

authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens

into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the

Government to detain certain aliens pending the

outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”

, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).

Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is

present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an

‘applicant for admission.’” , 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2).

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who ( ) are arriving in the

United States, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or

have been physically present in the United States for less than two years

without being admitted or paroled, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (the

“designation provision”),5 ( ) are inadmissible either for

misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to

the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based

on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility for lack of

documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited

removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien

expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which

case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final

determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have

5 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of

aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of

aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security,

§ 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii), but the current scope of that designation is “the full

scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been

admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been

physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year

period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited

removal under § 1225(b)(1).

, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025);

, 962 F.3d 612, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic

overview of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii));

, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62–64 (D.D.C.

2025) (same), , No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).

such a fear, until removal. § 1225(b)(1)(B).

, 962 F.3d 612, 618–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing

expedited removal provisions); , ___ F.

Supp. 3d ____, 2025 WL 3314420, at *9–10 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025)

(same); , 805 F. Supp. 3d 48,

59–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same), , No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11,

2025).

Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader . . . catchall provision” that applies

to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the

United States.6 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); , 583 U.S. at 287.

Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary

(not expedited) removal proceedings. § 1225(b)(2)(A);

§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration

judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory

detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A); § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of

Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting

6 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to

those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not

relevant here. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).

removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on

land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be

returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather

than be detained); , 2025 WL 3228945, at *1 (“Section

1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow

humanitarian parole.”).

Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of

removal proceedings.” , 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are

already present in the United States may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c).

Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for

these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a

warrant issued by the Attorney General,[7] an alien may be arrested and

detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from

the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that

7 This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has

been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in

the applicable regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2);

§§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).

such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain

pending. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide

that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that

such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the

alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8),

1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities8 are tasked with an initial bond or

custody determination, §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the

alien may may request an individualized bond hearing before an

immigration judge, §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); § 1003.19

(setting out procedures for the review of bond determinations by

immigration judges). , 586 U.S. 392, 397

(2019) (“If the alien is detained, he may seek review of his detention by

an officer at the Department of Homeland Security and then by an

immigration judge (both exercising power delegated by the Secretary);

and the alien may secure his release if he can convince the officer or

immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the

community.”) (citations omitted). An adverse bond determination by the

8 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue

arrest warrants. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8).

immigration judge can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals.

8 U.S.C. §§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3).

, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018)

(summarizing § 1226(a) bond procedures).

Finally, “Section 1226(c) . . . carves out a statutory category of

aliens who may be released under § 1226(a).” , 583 U.S. at

289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require

mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond

hearing under § 1226(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may

only be released under very narrow circumstances involving a

determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is

necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a

flight risk or a danger to the community. § 1226(c)(4);

, 583 U.S. at 289.

The petitioner in this case, Umar Hayat, has been detained by

immigration authorities without a bond determination pending

disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.9 In his petition,

9 The parties appear to agree that the petitioner has been putatively

detained without an opportunity for a bond determination pursuant to

Hayat argues that, because he was detained within the interior of the

United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory pre-removal-order

detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he contends that he may only be

properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires that he be given an

opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. Hayat further asserts

two claims under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”): (a) a claim

that the agency has failed to follow its own bond regulations; and (b) a

claim that, to the extent that he had been paroled into the United States

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(A)(5) rather than conditionally paroled under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a), the revocation of his parole prior to adjudication of his

asylum application was arbitrary and capricious.10 In addition to these

statutory arguments, Hayat argues that his pre-removal detention

without an opportunity to be considered for release on bond violates his

§ 1225(b)(2). The respondent has identified no other basis for his

detention. Moreover, the petitioner has not been placed in expedited

removal proceedings, as would be expected for a § 1225(b)(1) detainee, he

has no criminal record to qualify him for mandatory detention under

§ 1226(c), and immigration officials have refused to give him a bond

hearing, as required under § 1226(a).

10 Having granted relief on the basis of the petitioner’s primary

statutory claim—that his detention is pursuant to § 1226(a) rather than

§ 1225(b)(2)—we decline to reach the petitioner’s alternative arguments

that his detention violates the APA.

Fifth Amendment due process rights.11

The respondent raises several arguments in opposition to the

petition. First, the respondent argues that various jurisdiction-stripping

provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) prevent

this court from considering the petition before us. Second, the respondent

argues that the petitioner lacks standing to bring his APA claims, which

expressly provides that it is available only for final agency action “for

which there is no other adequate remedy in court,” 5 U.S.C. § 704.12

Third, the respondent argues that § 1225(b)(2) does properly apply to the

petitioner, and that it prescribes mandatory detention. Finally, the

respondent argues that applying § 1225(b)(2) here comports with due

process.13

A. Jurisdiction

We necessarily turn first to the question of this courts’ jurisdiction.

11 Having found a statutory basis for relief, we do not reach the

constitutional issues raised by the petitioner as alternative grounds for

relief. , 485

U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of

judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional

questions in advance of the necessity of defending them.”).

12 note 10.

13 note 11.

The respondent initially argued that the petitioner’s habeas claims are

jurisdictionally barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), § 1252(b)(9), and

§ 1252(a), statutory provisions that strip federal district courts of

jurisdiction to consider certain immigration-related habeas claims. The

respondent, however, has withdrawn that argument and conceded that

this court has subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the

petition. Doc. 8. The court agrees that it may properly exercise

jurisdiction over this matter.

Section 1252(g) provides that, “[e]xcept as provided in this section

and notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . , no court shall have

jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising

from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence

proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any

alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The language of this

statutory provision, however, does not “sweep in any claim that can

technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney

General.” , 583 U.S. at 294. Rather, the Supreme Court has

interpreted § 1252(g) to apply to “just those three specific actions

themselves.” at 294;

, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (“[Section 1252(g)] applies only to three

discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or

action’ to ‘ proceedings, cases, or removal

orders.’”). Here, Hayat does not challenge the commencement of his

removal proceedings, the Attorney General’s decision to adjudicate his

case, or the execution of a removal order. He contests only the legality of

his detention without a bond hearing. Accordingly, § 1252(g) does not bar

this court from exercising jurisdiction over Hayat’s habeas petition.

Section 1252(b)(9) is commonly described as a “zipper clause”

because it channels judicial review of all decisions and actions arising

from removal proceedings into a single petition for review (“PFR”) from a

final order of removal. , 164 F.4th 259, 275 (3d Cir.

2026) (“Section 1252(b)(9) works as a ‘zipper’ clause, channeling ‘most

claims that even relate to removal’ into PFRs. It ensures that petitioners

get only one bite at the apple.”) (citations omitted). Section 1252(b)(9)

provides that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising

from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the

United States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order

[of removal],” and that “no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus

under section 2241 of Title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision . . . to

review such an order or such questions of law or fact.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(9). “Because judicial review of a final order of removal is

available only in the court of appeals, district courts cannot review these

‘arising from’ claims either.”

, 950 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2020).

In , the Third Circuit

read the “arising from” phrase to require courts to “ask:

If not now, when? If the answer would otherwise be

never, then § 1252(b)(9) poses no jurisdictional bar.”

The “point” of that subsection, [the court]

explained, “is to channel claims into a single PFR, not

to bar claims that do not fit within that process.” So

when aliens can get review later—by litigating before

an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration

Appeals, and then by way of a PFR to a court of

appeals—they must do so. District courts play little if

any role in that sequence. But when aliens raise claims

that courts cannot “meaningfully” review through the

PFR process, those claims do not “arise from” the

“actions taken” or “proceedings brought” to remove

them.

, 164 F.4th at 273–74 (citations and brackets omitted). In ,

the Third Circuit further clarified that such “[a] now-or-never claim must

raise legal or factual that a court of appeals will not later be

able to review meaningfully on a PFR. It is not enough to assert an injury

that cannot be remedied later.” at 274–75; at 275 (“[T]o

avoid getting channeled to a PFR, a claim must raise now-or-never

, not just now-or-never harms.”).

In , the petitioner brought a detention-specific “punitive

detention” claim, which did not challenge the length or conditions of his

detention, but instead he argued that his detention was “impermissible

retaliation and unlawful because it depend[ed] on [an] unconstitutionally

vague foreign policy ground.” at 277. These arguments against

detention were “identical to his arguments against removal.” at 276.

Because his detention-specific claim “just repackage[d] his challenges to

his removal,” it raised questions that the court of appeals could

meaningfully review in the PFR context, and the district court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to decide that claim under the “zipper clause,”

§ 1252(b)(9). at 277.

Unlike the petitioner in , Hayat does not argue that his

continued detention is unlawful because the Government’s removal

action itself is invalid. Indeed, Hayat does not seek review of a final order

of removal, he does not challenge the decision to initiate removal

proceedings against him, and he does not challenge the decision to

initially detain him. Rather, he challenges only his continued detention

, to which he contends he is entitled under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a). His habeas petition presents a proper now-or-never

claim, independent of and wholly collateral to the removal process, which

raises no legal or factual questions that could be meaningfully reviewed

by the court of appeals in the PFR context. , 583 U.S. at

294–95 (plurality opinion) (finding that § 1252(b)(9) did not present a

jurisdictional bar to claims challenging prolonged detention without an

individualized bond hearing); , 586 U.S. at 402 (plurality opinion)

(same); , 950 F.3d at 186 (“[Section 1252(b)(9)] does not

reach claims that are independent of, or wholly collateral to, the removal

process . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, § 1252(b)(9) does not bar this court from exercising

jurisdiction over Hayat’s habeas petition.

Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes a federal district court from

exercising jurisdiction to review decisions by the Attorney General or the

Secretary of Homeland Security “the authority for which is specified

under this subchapter to be in [their] discretion.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). But Hayat does not challenge a decision.

Rather, he challenges the statutory authority to detain him

. The scope of the government’s statutory detention

authority is “not a matter of discretion.” , 533 U.S. at 688;

, No. 2:25-cv-05555, 2025 WL 3188399, at *4

(E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025). Accordingly, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar this

court from exercising jurisdiction over Hayat’s habeas petition.

B. Merits

We turn then to the merits of the petition. The respondent purports

to have detained Hayat pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which provides

for mandatory detention without the opportunity for release on bond. The

petitioner, however, contends that he could only be properly detained

under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and under that statute, he is entitled to an

individualized bond hearing.

“[F]or section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be

met—in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine

that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking

admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be

admitted.’” , 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)), , No. 25-1902 (1st Cir.

Dec. 23, 2025); , 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (citing

); , No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL

3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (citing and );

, No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *4

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing ). Significantly, “Section

1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to an alien who is an applicant for

admission and ‘seeking admission.’” , 2025 WL 3188399, at *6

(emphasis in original); , 2025 WL 3709045, at

*4 (citing and , ___ F. Supp., 3d ____,

2025 WL 2976572, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025)); , 2026

WL 296215, at *4 (quoting ).

Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives

in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Meanwhile, the phrase

“seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, and the courts of this circuit

have construed the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe

“active and ongoing conduct—physically attempting to come into the

United States, typically at a border or a port of entry.” , 2025

WL 3188399, at *6; , 2025 WL 3709045, at *4

(citing ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (citing

). “This reading preserves the distinction between

‘seeking admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’

ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning.” ,

2025 WL 3188399, at *6; , 2025 WL 3709045,

at *4 (quoting ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4

(quoting ). It also comports with the Supreme Court’s

finding in that Ҥ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking

entry into the United States.” , 583 U.S. at 297;

, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting ); ,

2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting and ). “In

sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates that it applies to

individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those

already within the country.” , 2026 WL 296215, at *4;

, 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (considering the statutory

context of § 1225(b)(2) and concluding that this provision “contemplates

inspection and detention at or immediately following border crossing”).

By contrast, as the Supreme Court has previously recognized,

“§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.” ,

583 U.S. at 303; , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting

). “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by

permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants

for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” and it

“permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” ,

583 U.S. at 303; , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting

); , 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (“Unlike

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) provides for bond or conditional parole.”) (citing

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)). “[U]nder Section 1226(a) and its implementing

regulations, [an alien discretionarily detained pending removal

proceedings] is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge

at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence

that he poses a danger to the community[] or . . . that he is a flight risk,

if it seeks to continue detaining him.” , 804 F. Supp. 3d

265, 277 (D. Mass. 2025);14 , ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2025

WL 3564652, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2025) (“Noncitizens who are arrested

after having lived in the United States for a while do not generally have

to be detained. They are instead entitled to a bond hearing before an

immigration court.”) (citing ) (citations and footnote omitted).

, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (“[I]f an individual is

detained attempting to enter the country illegally or while otherwise

presenting themselves for inspection and entry, they are subject to

mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225. If they are arrested after

having already entered the country, they are subject to detention under

14 We note that, applying First Circuit precedent, the court

stated that the government may prove that an alien is a danger to the

community by clear and convincing evidence, or that he is a flight risk by

the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. , 804 F.

Supp. 3d at 277 (citing , 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir.

2021)). The Third Circuit, however, has held that the government must

prove either dangerousness flight risk by clear and convincing

evidence. , 965 F.3d 203, 213–14 (3d Cir.

2020) (“When the Government seeks to take more than just money from

a party, we typically hold the Government to a standard of proof higher

than a preponderance of the evidence.”);

, 12 F.4th 321, 333 n.9 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[I]t is

a ‘settled rule that when a party stands to lose his liberty, even

temporarily, we hold the Government’ to a ‘clear and convincing evidence’

standard in the context of civil detention . . . .”) (quoting );

, 547 F. Supp. 3d 462, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2021)

(quoting ).

§ 1226 and are entitled to a bond hearing.”).

Here, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to the detention of

Hayat. We find that Hayat is no longer seeking admission into the United

States—at the time of his arrest and detention, he was not actively

attempting to come into the United States at a border or port of entry.

Rather, he is already here, having resided within the United States for

an extended period of time. , 2025 WL 3188399, at *1

(finding that petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two

years was not “seeking admission” but “already here”);

, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (citing ). Thus, Hayat may

only be properly detained pursuant to § 1226(a), and therefore he is

entitled to a bond hearing. , 2026 WL 296215, at *5.

, No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4

(M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (“The overwhelming majority of federal district

courts that have addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find

that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously

entered the United States and are currently residing in the United

States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary detention

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond

hearing.”); at *4 & n.7 (collecting Third Circuit district court cases).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the petitioner is

currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2), and thus he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.

Accordingly, the petition will be granted, and the government will be

ordered to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing

within twenty-one days or to release him from custody. The petitioner’s

motion for preliminary injunctive relief will be denied as moot.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: February 27, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge