The opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
24-405
LUTHER CHARLES
VERSUS
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPELINE, LLC, ET AL.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 20-C-3122-B
HONORABLE JAMES PAUL DOHERTY JR., DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
GUY E. BRADBERRY
JUDGE
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Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Charles G. Fitzgerald, and Guy E.
Bradberry, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Nicholas A. Blanda
Jason A. Weaver
Anderson Blanda & Saltzman
2010 West Pinhook Road
Lafayette, Louisiana 70508
(337) 233-3366
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Luther Charles
John F. Jakuback
Forrest E. Guedry
Amanda Collura-Day
Kean Miller LLP
Post Office Box 3513
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-3513
(225) 387-0999
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company, LLC
The Williams Companies, Inc.
Trevor C. Davies
Michael L. Ballero
Wanek Kirsch Davies LLC
1340 Poydras Street, Suite 2000
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
(504) 324-6493
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Tucker Energy Solutions, LLC
Ryan T. Morrow
9100 Bluebonnet Centre Boulevard, Suite 300
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809
(337) 244-0030
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Blue Fin Services, LLC
Gate Holdings, LLC
Blue Fin Rental and Completion Services, LLC
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
Brad J. Brumfield
Post Office Box 7217
London, Kentucky 40742
(225) 923-7393
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Blue Fin Services, LLC
Gate Holdings, LLC
Blue Fin Rental and Completion Services, LLC
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
D. Scott Rainwater
George O. Luce
Taylor, Wellons, Politz & Duhe, LLC
4041 Essen Lane, Suite 500
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70809
(225) 387-9888
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Blue Fin Services, LLC
Alexis Polk Joachim
Pipes Miles Beckman, LLC
1100 Poydras Street, Suite 3300
New Orleans, Louisiana 70163
(504) 322-7070
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company
Pierre M. Legrand
Legrand Law Firm, LLC
2450 Severn Avenue, Suite 206
Metairie, Louisiana 70001
(504) 304-9499
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Hydrochem, LLC
Daniel C. Palmintier
Assistant Attorney General
Louisiana Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General
556 Jefferson Street, 4th Floor
Lafayette, Louisiana 70501
(337) 262-1700
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
Aldric C. Poirier, Jr.
David B. Parnell, Jr.
Blue Williams, LLC
1060 West Causeway Approach
Mandeville, Louisiana 70471
(985) 626-0058
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Old Republic General Insurance Company
Thomas Kent Ledyard Morrison
Phelps Dunbar, LLP
365 Canal Street, Suite 2000
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130-6534
(504) 566-1311
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Indian Harbor Insurance Company
David I. Clay, II
Degan, Blanchard & Nash, APLC
400 Poydras Street, Suite 2600
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
(504) 529-3333
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Indian Harbor Insurance Company
Peter F. Caviness
Falgoust and Caviness, LLP
505 South Court Street
Opelousas, Louisiana 70570-5001
(337) 942-5812
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Thisco Partnership
BRADBERRY, Judge.
Defendants Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company, LLC and The Williams
Companies, Inc. (collectively “Williams”) filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging statutory employer immunity. Defendant Tucker Energy Solutions, LLC
(Tucker) also filed a motion for summary judgment on the same issue. The trial
court granted the motions for summary judgment, finding Defendants were the
statutory employers of Plaintiff Luther Charles, and therefore, were immune from
tort liability, pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1061, and dismissed the case against them with
prejudice. Luther Charles now appeals both judgments. For the following reasons,
we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 22, 2019, Luther Charles was injured in a workplace accident
while he was in the course and scope of his employment with Hydrochem, LLC. Mr.
Charles was driving a water truck on a narrow levee road located within the
Thistlethwaite Wildlife Management area in Washington, Louisiana, when his truck
rolled off the road, resulting in his injuries. At the time, he was transporting water
from a nearby lake to a pipeline facility referred to as Station 54, which is owned by
Williams.
The Station 54 facility was being serviced in accordance with a contract
entered into by Williams and Tucker (the Williams-Tucker Contract) on July 8,
2019. Tucker served as the general contractor on the construction project. It had an
existing contractual relationship with Blue Fin Services, LLC (Blue Fin) in the
form of a Master Service Agreement (MSA) dated March 21, 2018, to provide
services in furtherance of work performed on the Station 54 project. Blue Fin then
hired Hydrochem to perform certain work on Station 54. Hydrochem was the
direct employer of Mr. Charles.
Mr. Charles filed suit against multiple Defendants, including Williams and
Tucker, for injuries he sustained as a result of the vehicle accident. In response,
Williams and Tucker filed separate motions for summary judgment, wherein they
both alleged that they were the statutory employer of Mr. Charles and, as such, were
immune from tort liability in this case. The motions for summary judgment were
heard on March 4, 2024. The trial court granted the motions, finding Williams and
Tucker were immune from tort liability as the statutory employers of Mr. Charles
pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1061 and dismissing Mr. Charles’s claims against them with
prejudice.
Mr. Charles now appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. Given the evidentiary record before the trial court, it erred in holding
that [Williams] and [Tucker] were the statutory employers of the
Plaintiff on the day in question.
2. Given the evidentiary record before the trial court, it erred in
dismissing all claims asserted by Plaintiff against Defendants,
[Williams] and [Tucker].
LAW AND DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Appellate courts review the grant of a motion for summary judgment by the
trial court using a de novo review standard. Litel Expls., LLC v. Aegis Dev. Co.,
LLC, 21-741 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/22), 337 So.3d 940, writ denied, 22-756 (La.
9/27/22), 346 So.3d 787. “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to
material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Walker
2
v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 24-232, pp. 2–3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/4/24), 394 So.3d 310, 313
(quoting La.Code Civ.P. art 966(A)(3)), writ denied, 24-1223 (La. 12/27/24), 397
So.3d 1215.
II. Statutory Employer Status
Williams and Tucker claim that they are the statutory employers of Mr.
Charles and are, therefore, immune from tort liability in accordance with La.R.S.
23:1061(A). Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1061(A) sets forth the concept of
statutory employer, stating:
(1) Subject to the provisions of Paragraphs (2) and (3) of this
Subsection, when any “principal” as defined in R.S. 23:1032(A)(2),
undertakes to execute any work, which is a part of his trade, business,
or occupation and contracts with any person, in this Section referred to
as the “contractor”, for the execution by or under the contractor of the
whole or any part of the work undertaken by the principal, the principal,
as a statutory employer, shall be granted the exclusive remedy
protections of R.S. 23:1032 and shall be liable to pay to any employee
employed in the execution of the work or to his dependent, any
compensation under this Chapter which he would have been liable to
pay if the employee had been immediately employed by him; and where
compensation is claimed from, or proceedings are taken against, the
principal, then, in the application of this Chapter reference to the
principal shall be substituted for reference to the employer, except that
the amount of compensation shall be calculated with reference to the
earnings of the employee under the employer by whom he is
immediately employed. For purposes of this Section, work shall be
considered part of the principal’s trade, business, or occupation if it is
an integral part of or essential to the ability of the principal to generate
that individual principal’s goods, products, or services.
(2) A statutory employer relationship shall exist whenever the
services or work provided by the immediate employer is contemplated
by or included in a contract between the principal and any person or
entity other than the employee’s immediate employer.
(3) Except in those instances covered by Paragraph (2) of this
Subsection, a statutory employer relationship shall not exist between
the principal and the contractor’s employees, whether they are direct
employees or statutory employees, unless there is a written contract
between the principal and a contractor which is the employee’s
immediate employer or his statutory employer, which recognizes the
principal as a statutory employer. When the contract recognizes a
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statutory employer relationship, there shall be a rebuttable presumption
of a statutory employer relationship between the principal and the
contractor’s employees, whether direct or statutory employees. This
presumption may be overcome only by showing that the work is not an
integral part of or essential to the ability of the principal to generate that
individual principal’s goods, products, or services.
In Allen v. State ex rel. Ernest N. Morial-New Orleans Exhibition Hall
Authority, 02-1072, pp. 5–8 (La. 4/9/03), 842 So.2d 373, 377–79 (footnote omitted)
(alteration in original) (emphasis added), the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the
purpose of enacting workers’ compensation legislation, explaining:
Workers’ compensation legislation was enacted in the early
decades of the twentieth century, not to abrogate existing tort remedies
that afforded protection to workers, but to provide social insurance to
compensate victims of industrial accidents because it was widely
believed that the limited rights of recovery under tort law were
inadequate to protect these individuals. Roberts v. Sewerage and Water
Board of New Orleans, 92–2048 (La.3/21/94), 634 So.2d 341, 345,
citing Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir.1979).
The legislation reflects a compromise between the competing interests
of employers and employees: the employer gives up the defense it
would otherwise enjoy in cases where it is not at fault, while the
employee surrenders his or her right to full damages, accepting instead
a more modest claim for essentials, payable regardless of fault and with
a minimum of delay. Id.
The legislatures that adopted the early workers’ compensation
acts feared that employers would attempt to circumvent the absolute
liability those statutes imposed by interjecting between themselves and
their workers intermediary entities which would fail to meet workers’
compensation obligations. Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan,
Jr., The Employer’s Tort Immunity: A Case Study in Post–Modern
Immunity, 57 La.L.Rev. 467, 488 (1997). To assure a compensation
remedy to injured workers, these legislatures provided that some
principals were by statute deemed, for purposes of liability for workers’
compensation benefits, the employers of employees of other entities. Id.
The legislative approaches to what is commonly referred to as the
“statutory employer” doctrine varied.
Louisiana adopted a broad version of the statutory employer
doctrine. The Louisiana Act expressly extends the employer’s
compensation obligation and its corresponding tort immunity to
“principals.” . . .
….
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It has long been recognized that these provisions present
alternative bases for imposing the workers’ compensation obligation on
entities that are not direct employers. See, 14 Wex S. Malone & H.
Alston Johnson, III, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Workers’
Compensation Law and Practice § 364 at 173 (2002) (“[T]here are
alternative bases for the compensation obligation in La. R.S. 23:1061,
so as to make the availability of the compensation remedy broad enough
to cover two different methods of doing business.”). A “principal” (or
statutory employer) for purposes of the Act is any person who
undertakes to carry out any work which is a part of his trade, business
or occupation by means of a contract with another (the “trade, business
or occupation” defense); or, any person who has contracted to perform
work and sub-lets any portion to another (the “two contract” theory of
the statutory employer defense). Wex S. Malone, Principal’s Liability
for Workmen’s Compensation to Employees of Contractor, 10
La.L.Rev. 25, 27 (1949). As to the “two contract” theory of the statutory
employer defense, it is irrelevant whether the subcontractor’s work is
part of the work ordinarily performed by the principal. In fact, the law
presumes the contract to be within the trade, business or occupation of
the principal. See, Berry [v. Holston Well Serv., Inc.], 488 So.2d [934
(La. 1986,] (and cases cited therein). The “two contract” defense
applies when: (1) the principal enters into a contract with a third
party; (2) pursuant to that contract, work must be performed; and
(3) in order for the principal to fulfill its contractual obligation to
perform the work, the principal enters into a subcontract for all or
part of the work performed. Id.; Beddingfield v. Standard
Construction Company, 560 So.2d 490, 491–492 (La.App. 1 Cir.1990);
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Schwegmann Westside
Expressway, Inc., 516 So.2d 412, 413 (La.App. 1 Cir.1987).
There are two ways in which a principal can become a statutory employer: (1)
the principal can contract with another for the execution of work that is part of the
principal’s trade, business or occupation; or (2) the principal can contract with
another to perform all or any part of the work which the principal is contractually
obligated to perform. Rosier v. H.A. Lott, Inc., 563 So.2d 1321 (La.App. 3 Cir.),
writ denied, 568 So.2d 1058 (La.1990). “The latter situation is commonly referred
to as the ‘two-contract’ statutory employment defense to tort actions.” Id. at 1323.
Mr. Charles argues that Williams and Tucker cannot carry their burden that
they are his statutory employers under the two-contract theory of statutory employer
tort immunity in accordance with La.R.S. 23:1061(A)(2). It is Williams’s position
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that it is a statutory employer under the first way—the principal can contract with
another for the execution of work that is part of the principal’s trade, business or
occupation. Specifically, Williams argues that it is a principal who entered into a
contract with Tucker to test the integrity of the facilities that Williams uses in storing
and transporting natural gas. Storing and transporting natural gas to end users across
the country is part of Williams’s trade, business, or occupation, and the work
contemplated in the Williams-Tucker contract is an integral part of Williams’s
ability to generate its goods, products, or services. See La.R.S. 23:1061(A)(3).
Mr. Charles points out that Williams cannot be his statutory employer in this
way “unless there is a written contract between the principal and a contractor which
is the employee’s immediate employer or his statutory employer, which recognizes
the principal as a statutory employer.” La.R.S. 23:1061(A)(3). It is undisputed that
Hydrochem does not have a written contract with either Williams, Tucker, or Blue
Fin. However, Williams does have a written contract with Tucker. Therefore,
pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1061(A)(3), Williams, as the principal, can be considered the
statutory employer of Mr. Charles if Tucker is determined to be Mr. Charles’s
statutory employer.
When entering into the respective contracts in this case, Defendants
contemplated the statutory employer status of the companies. Article 15 of the
Williams-Tucker Contract addresses the issue of statutory employers. It states, in
pertinent part (emphasis added):
For Work in the state of Louisiana, in all cases where [Tucker’s]
employees (defined to include [Tucker’s] direct, borrowed, special, or
statutory employees) are covered by the Louisiana Worker’s
Compensation Act, La Rev. Stat. Ann. 23:1021 et seq., [Williams] and
[Tucker] agree that pursuant to Section 23:1061 (A) (1) all Work
performed by [Tucker] and its employees under the terms and
conditions of this Contract is an integral part of [Williams’s] ability to
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generate its goods, products and services. Additionally, [Williams] and
[Tucker] agree that for purposes of Section 23:1061 (A) (3) [Williams]
is the principal or statutory employer of [Tucker’s] employees.
Irrespective of [Williams’s] status as the statutory employer or special
employer of [Tucker’s] employees, Section 23:1031(C), [Tucker] shall
remain primarily responsible for the payment of Louisiana Worker’s
Compensation benefits to its employees, and shall not be entitled to
seek contribution for any such payments from [Williams].
The MSA has similar language included that applies to Tucker and Blue Fin.
It states:
In all cases where BLUE FIN’S employees (including BLUE FIN’S
borrowed, direct, special, or statutory employees) are covered by the
Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Act, La. Rev. Stat. 23:1021 et seq,
BLUE FIN and [Tucker] agree that the Work performed by BLUE FIN
and its employees pursuant to this Contract or Agreement is an integral
part of and is essential to the ability of BLUE FIN to generate BLUE
FIN’s Goods or Services. BLUE FIN and [Tucker] expressly agree that
while BLUE FIN and any of its employees, agents, or BLUE FINs are
performing Work under this Contract that BLUE FIN will be
considered a Statutory Employer within the meaning set forth in La.
Rev. Stat. 23:1061 and those employees, agents, and employees of
BLUE FIN (herein after called “Statutory Employee”) shall be
considered a Statutory Employee as the meaning is set forth in La. Rev.
Stat. 23:1061.
“When the contract recognizes a statutory employer relationship, there shall
be a rebuttable presumption of a statutory employer relationship between the
principal and the contractor’s employees, whether direct or statutory employees.”
La.R.S. 23:1061(A)(3).
Mr. Charles focuses his argument on the MSA between Tucker and Blue Fin.
The MSA was executed to be a standing agreement between Tucker and Blue Fin
governing work to be performed in the future by Blue Fin for Tucker. It is under
this MSA that Tucker hired Blue Fin to perform work on the Station 54 facility.
Mr. Charles first argues that the MSA does not mandate either party to
perform work—the second prong necessary to satisfy the two-contract defense. He
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maintains that the MSA does not define the particular work Tucker hired Blue Fin
to perform nor does it bind Blue Fin to actually perform work.
Mr. Charles cites Fee v. Southern Packaging, Inc., 18-1364, 18-1365 (La.App.
1 Cir. 5/24/19), 277 So.3d 787, for the proposition that the contract must obligate
the performance of work. In Fee, the plaintiff was injured in the course and scope
of his employment with a logging company. The logging company was hired by a
timber dealer to harvest timber from certain land. Southern Packaging had a timber
deed from the family that owned the land, which had an option to harvest the timber
within two years. Southern then hired the timber dealer. The insurer of the logging
company went bankrupt, prompting the plaintiff to file a claim in Workers’
Compensation Court (WCC) against the timber dealer and Southern Packaging,
alleging that they were both his statutory employers. The appellate court affirmed
the WCC’s decision that the timber dealer was not the statutory employer of the
plaintiff, finding that the timber dealer was merely a middleman hired to serve as the
banker to facilitate the movement of funds between Southern Packaging and the
logging company. However, the appellate court reversed the WCC’s ruling that
Southern Packaging was the statutory employer of the plaintiff. In finding that
Southern Packaging was not the statutory employer of the plaintiff, the appellate
court found that Southern Packaging and the family that owned the land agreed to a
purchase price of the timber with a right to harvest; however, Southern Packaging
was not obligated to harvest the timber.
The appellate court in Fee explained that “[t]he purpose behind the two
contract theory is to establish a compensation obligation on the part of the principal
who contractually obligates itself to a party for the performance of work and who
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then subcontracts with intermediaries whose employees perform any part of that
work.” Id. at 798.
The Fee case is distinguishable from the present case in that the contract at
issue there was an option to harvest timber. The MSA between Tucker and Blue Fin
is a standing agreement similar to the one found in Allen, 842 So.2d 373. In Allen,
the New Orleans Convention Center entered into a long-term contract with Aramark
to provide catering services for conventions and other events. Approximately five
years later, the convention center entered into a contract with ACE Hardware
Corporation to provide a venue for their convention. While the issue in Allen was
whether there is a temporal requirement to the two-contract defense (there is not),
the appellate court found:
[N]o reason has been advanced, nor can we fathom one, to support a
finding that a principal who has a long-standing agreement with a
supplier to provide labor and/or services in connection with jobs for
which the principal contracts should be treated differently, for the
purposes of the compensation obligation, than one who enters separate
contracts with the supplier after first contracting with a third party to
perform certain work.
Id. at 382.
As such, a standing agreement like the MSA in this case is acceptable as one
of the contracts in the two-contract defense theory. We reject Mr. Charles’s position
that additional documentation is required regarding who, what, when, and price
when the MSA is invoked as a contract. The MSA states:
BLUE FIN is engaged in the business of performing oilfield services
and in the course of such activity, regularly and customarily enters into
contracts with companies and individuals to perform work and/or
provide services, equipment, machinery, materials or supplies, all of
which is defined to be the Work (‘Work’).
The MSA goes on to discuss the Work throughout the contract including in
paragraph three entitled “Performance of the Work.” Plaintiff also contends that the
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MSA does not obligate Tucker to hire from Blue Fin or for Blue Fin to accept the
work. While true, in the present case, it is clear that Tucker did hire Blue Fin and
Blue Fin did accept the work. In so doing, the MSA served as the binding document
between the parties. This argument has no merit.
Mr. Charles next argues that the scope of the work contemplated by Tucker
and Blue Fin is too ambiguous. Specifically, he contends the MSA states that Blue
Fin is in the business of “performing oilfield services,” and it does not utilize the
words “hydrotesting,” pipelines,” or “water.” Mr. Charles maintains that this is fatal
to Defendants’ claims that they are the statutory employers of Mr. Charles because
there is ambiguity as to whether the hydrotesting performed by Blue Fin is
considered “oilfield services.” Further, Mr. Charles notes that in a previously filed
motion for summary judgment, Tucker argued that the Williams-Tucker contract
met the definition of a construction contract under the Louisiana Anti-Indemnity Act
(LAIA). This runs counter to Tucker’s claim in its current motion for summary
judgment that the MSA is an oilfield services contract, according to Mr. Charles. He
argues that this discrepancy creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr.
Charles was providing oilfield services or construction services on the day of the
accident.
In support of his argument, Mr. Charles cites LFI Fort Pierce, Inc. v. Acme
Steel Buildings, Inc., 16-71 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/17/16), 200 So.3d 939, writ denied,
16-1684 (La. 11/29/16), 210 So.3d 804, for the proposition that the scope of the work
must be more detailed. In LFI Fort Pierce, Inc., the plaintiff was operating a scissor-
lift on a construction site when an accident occurred. The plaintiff was a direct
employee of LFI, a temporary staffing company who provides workers for lease to
other companies. Acme was a subcontractor on the construction site, performing
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work for the general contractor CC & D. Acme had contracted with LFI for
temporary labor in furtherance of its contract with CC & D. As a result of the
accident, LFI and its workers’ compensation insurer paid workers’ compensation
benefits to the plaintiff. LFI and its insurer then filed a petition for damages against
Acme and its insurer for reimbursement of the benefits paid to the plaintiff. The
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Acme is the statutory
employer of the plaintiff, and, therefore, they are immune from tort liability arising
out of this accident. The trial court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the
claims against them. LFI and its insurer appealed.
LFI and its insurer asserted that there were genuine issues of material fact
regarding Acme’s statutory employer status. The appellate court first looked at the
contracts between the parties. There was no written contract between CC & D and
Acme.
In order to establish a contract, the appellate court looked at the evidence
submitted by Acme, which included excerpts from a deposition with an Acme
representative and a purchase order. The representative stated that the agreement
between CC & D did not discuss whether temporary labor would be used, but Acme
knew that it would need to hire additional labor in order to complete the work. Next,
the appellate court looked at the contract between Acme and LFI. This contract was
evidenced by a credit application and a work order ticket. It “stated that LFI is a
‘Temporary Employment Service, which hires its own employees and assigns them
to customers to support or supplement the customer’s work force.’” Id. at 947.
Nothing in this contract specified that it was “for the performance of any of the jobs
or services that Acme had contracted with CC & D to provide.” Id. The appellate
court found “that the contract between CC & D and Acme is ambiguous as to
11
whether or not it included or contemplated the services or work that LFI provided to
Acme (i.e. temporary labor).” Id. Therefore, they found that genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether Acme was the statutory employer of the plaintiff.
LFI Fort Pierce, Inc. is distinguishable from the case before us. LFI was
providing general laborers to Acme, rather than specialized workers. The contract
between LFI and Acme was a general contract that could have applied to any trade
or business. In the present case, the Williams-Tucker contract is entitled
“FACILITY MOIDIFICATIONS AND INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT
HYDROTEST.” Tucker utilized the Blue Fin MSA in furtherance of its contract
with Williams for hydrotesting, amongst other things. Blue Fin then hired
Hydrochem, who is in the business of hauling water to jobsites for hydrotesting. We
find that this direct line of contracts is not ambiguous. The contracts were clearly
entered into in the furtherance of the Williams-Tucker contract for hydrotesting at
the Station 54 facility.
Additionally, the court in LFI Fort Pierce, Inc. found genuine issues of
material facts existed because the CC & D contract with Acme was ambiguous as to
whether temporary labor would be used. In the present case, the Tucker-Blue Fin
MSA contemplated Blue Fin’s use of a third party to complete the work it was hired
to do. There is specific language included in the MSA about Blue Fin’s statutory
employer status, which can only be applicable if Blue Fin hired a third party to
complete the work. We find LFI Fort Pierce, Inc. inapplicable to the case at bar.
We disagree with Charles’s argument that, because Tucker argued in a
previous motion that the Williams-Tucker contract is a construction contract for the
purposes of the LAIA, Tucker cannot now argue that it is an oilfield services contract.
The title of the contract explains that it was entered into for the purpose of facility
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modifications (construction contract) and hydrotesting (oilfield services contract).
There is no reason given by Mr. Charles as to why the contract must be regarded as
one or the other, and we can think of none. For the reasons stated above, we do not
find that the scope of the work contemplated by Tucker and Blue Fin is ambiguous.
Finally, Mr. Charles argues that the second contract in the two-contract theory
is missing, and consequently, Tucker is barred from invoking the two-contract
theory. The second contract to which Mr. Charles is referring is the contract between
Blue Fin and Hydrochem. It is undisputed that a written contract does not exist
between these two parties. However, there is no requirement that the contracts used
to satisfy the two-contract theory must be in writing. See Rasmussen v. Mann’s
Const. Co., 08-987 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/09)(2009 WL 250905)(unpublished opinion).
Again, Mr. Charles relies on LFI Fort Pierce, Inc., this time for the
proposition that Tucker has not provided proper documentation to prove a second
contract exists. Mr. Charles states in brief that the court in LFI Fort Pierce, Inc.
found “that given the type of documents offered and the testimony presented to the
Court, there was a genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment was not
appropriate.” This is a misrepresentation of the holding. In fact, the court explains
that Acme submitted deposition testimony and a purchase order in order to establish
a contract between CC & D and Acme. The appellate court does not state that this
evidence is insufficient. Rather, the court stated “that the contract between CC &
D and Acme is ambiguous[.]” LFI Fort Pierce, Inc., 200 So.3d at 947 (emphasis
added). Clearly, the court found that a contract did exist but found summary
judgment was inappropriate on other grounds that we have already stated do not
apply to this case.
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In the present case, similar evidence was presented to establish a contract
between Blue Fin and Hydrochem. This evidence included the deposition testimony
of Victor Russell, Blue Fin’s project manager, emails regarding the starting date and
cost of the work, and waybills and purchase orders about specific loads of water
hauled. We find this evidence sufficiently establishes a contract between Blue Fin
and Hydrochem.
After reviewing the contracts, evidence and law related to this case, we find
that the requirements of the two-contract defense have been satisfied, and Tucker is
the statutory employer of Mr. Charles. It follows that Williams is also the statutory
employer of Mr. Charles since Williams is a principal that entered into a written
contract with Tucker, who we have determined to be Mr. Charles’s statutory
employer. La.R.S. 23:1061(A)(3).
DECREE
The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed
to Luther Charles.
AFFIRMED.
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