The opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
23-348
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
GERALD LYNN ARTIS
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ALLEN, 2019-0348
HONORABLE E. DAVID DESHOTELS, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
CHARLES G. FITZGERALD
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Van H. Kyzar, Jonathan W. Perry, and Charles G. Fitzgerald,
Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Chad M. Ikerd
Louisiana Appellate Project
600 Jefferson Street, Suite 903
Lafayette, Louisiana 70501
(337) 366-8994
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Gerald Lynn Artis
Jeff M. Landry
Attorney General
Christopher N. Walters
Grant L. Willis
Assistant Attorneys General
Post Office Box 94005
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9005
(225) 326-6200
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana
FITZGERALD, Judge.
Gerald Lynn Artis (Defendant) appeals his convictions and sentences for
armed robbery and aggravated second degree battery.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 2018, Truman Doyle was beaten and robbed after leaving the
Coushatta Casino in Kinder, Louisiana. Defendant and three accomplices were
ultimately arrested. Defendant, in particular, was charged with one count of armed
robbery in violation of La.R.S. 14:64 and one count of aggravated second degree
battery in violation of La.R.S. 14:34.7.
Defendant, in turn, filed a motion to sever trial which was granted. Defendant
then moved to suppress evidence, but this motion was denied.
The matter proceeded to jury trial in November 2022. At the close of
evidence, the jury unanimously found Defendant guilty as charged. A few weeks
later, Defendant moved for a new trial. This motion was denied before the
imposition of sentence.
In February 2023, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-seven years
at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for
armed robbery and ten years at hard labor for aggravated second degree battery. The
sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Defendant now appeals his convictions
and sentences.
On appeal, Defendant asserts two assignments of error:
1. The State failed to sufficiently prove that [Defendant] was guilty
of Armed Robbery and Aggravated Second Degree Battery.
2. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence
seized during the arrest of [Defendant], as his arrest was
accomplished by using an illegal “ping” of his cellphone to
determine his location, which constituted a warrantless search.
The State’s use of an emergency ping through the phone
company was not justified under the facts of this case. Thus, the
evidence should have been suppressed. The Court further erred
in not granting a motion for a new trial based on the same
erroneous ruling.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Errors Patent
Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, we find no errors patent on the face of
the record.
II. Assignment of Error Number 1
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove his identity
as the perpetrator of the armed robbery and aggravated second degree battery
committed against the victim: there was no forensic evidence tying him to the scene
of the crime and no identification of him by the victim.
The State, on the other hand, argues as follows:
This case presents a straightforward criminal prosecution in
which the State presented to the jury numerous surveillance camera
videos, physical evidence, and multiple witnesses, including several co-
defendants who were present and witnessed Defendant [Artis] strike the
victim twice in the back of the head with a four-way tire iron and then
take the victim’s wallet before leaving the victim for dead in a roadside
ditch.
A. Standard of Review
A sufficiency of the evidence claim is reviewed on appeal under the standard
set forth by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). In that case,
the United States Supreme Court explained that “the relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 319 (emphasis in original).
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Commenting on Jackson, the Louisiana Supreme Court cautioned that “[t]his
standard, now legislatively embodied in La.C.Cr.P. art. 821, does not provide the
appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for
that of the fact-finder.” State v. Pigford, 05-477, p. 6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517,
521. Put simply, a reviewing court must afford great deference to a jury’s decision
to accept or reject the testimony. State v. Allen, 36,180 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828
So.2d 622, writs denied, 02-2595 (La. 3/28/03), 840 So.2d 566, 02-2997 (La.
6/27/03), 847 So.2d 1255, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S.Ct. 1404 (2004).
“Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which
depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of
the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.” Id. at 626.
And importantly, when the key issue in a case is the defendant’s identity, “the
State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification.” State v.
Hughes, 05-992, p. 5 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051 (citing State v. Weary,
03-3067 (La. 4/24/06), 931 So.2d 297, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1062, 127 S.Ct. 682
(2006); State v. Neal, 00-674 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, cert. denied, 535 U.S.
940, 122 S.Ct. 1323 (2002)). “Positive identification by only one witness is
sufficient to support a conviction. It is the factfinder who weighs the respective
credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those
determinations.” Id. (citations omitted).
B. Summary of the Trial Evidence
Detective Scotty Paul, formerly with the Allen Parish Sheriff’s Department,
was assigned to investigate the incident. Oversimplifying slightly, Detective Paul
testified that on the night of December 9, 2018, Defendant and Leah Langley arrived
together in Leah’s car at the Coushatta Casino; that in the early morning hours of
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December 10, Leah and the victim left the casino together in the victim’s truck; that
unbeknownst to the victim, Defendant was following them in Leah’s vehicle; that
soon thereafter, Leah picked up her niece, Jennifer Buffalohead; that at this same
time, Defendant picked up Jennifer’s boyfriend, Craig Fife; that Defendant then
resumed following the victim’s truck; that at some point thereafter, both vehicles
came to a stop; that the victim then exited his truck and was hit in the back of the
head with a tire iron; that the victim’s wallet containing approximately $2,000.00
was taken from his person; that the victim was left for dead in a ditch; and that
Defendant and his three accomplices committed these criminal acts.
Video recordings were admitted into evidence in conjunction with Detective
Paul’s testimony. The video footage shows Defendant and Leah arriving together at
the casino on the evening of December 9, 2018. Several hours later, at 1:49 a.m.,
the footage shows Defendant and Leah walking behind the victim. Ten minutes
later, it shows the victim with his arm around Leah. And ten minutes after that, it
shows Leah talking to Defendant and then returning to the victim. The video footage
at 3:03 a.m. shows Leah walking up to Defendant at one of the casino bars. She
grabs two drinks and walks back to the victim.
By 3:48 a.m., the video footage shows the victim stumbling. Two minutes
later, it shows Leah having an animated conversation with Defendant at the bar. And
by 4:07 a.m., the footage shows the victim and Leah leaving the casino after the
victim appears to cash out his winnings. The footage shows them getting into the
victim’s truck: Leah is the driver, and the victim is the passenger. And at the same
time, it shows Defendant leaving the casino in Leah’s vehicle.
At 4:18 a.m., the video footage shows the victim’s truck arriving at Feather
Fuel gas station. Leah and the victim exit the truck and go inside the gas station.
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Three minutes later, Defendant arrives at Feather Fuel. Defendant eventually pulls
up next to a gas pump. Twenty-two minutes later, the footage shows Leah and the
victim leaving the gas station, heading north on U.S. Highway 165 with Defendant
following closely behind them.
Turning now to the testimony of the three accomplices. Leah, who was
admittedly given immunity for her testimony, explained to the jury that she and
Defendant drove her car to the casino on the night of December 9, 2018. She and
Defendant observed the victim at one of the slot machines, and Defendant
encouraged her to have a drink with the victim. Leah explained that she sat with the
victim and consumed drinks with him while he played on the machine.
Leah then admitted leaving the casino with the victim, driving his truck, being
followed by Defendant, and then picking up her niece, Jennifer. As to what
happened next, Leah testified as follows:
We took off and then we—the road is like you keep going down
the road there is a stop sign we took a left, and it—the road curves back
this way. So, we followed that road and then I noticed that my car was
trying to stop us. Jennifer was driving so we go up a little ways and
then she stops. And when she stops[, Craig,] who was in my car, he
gets out and goes over to her on the driver’s side. And asked what she
was doing, what was going on, you know he was confused about what
was suppose to be taking place. So, then they kind of get into an
argument, and then she gets out. Because she gets out then I get out
and get into the driver’s side and then I put the truck in drive. I drove
just a little ways, and then I stopped because I’m confused about what’s
suppose to be happening with—what’s going on. So, I stop and I get
out and then I go to my car which is behind us, and that’s whenever I
go and I ask [Defendant to] roll[] down the window. And I ask what
are we suppose to be doing with –what is you know going on? And
then from there [Defendant] tells [Craig] to get out and start some kind
of conflict or you know conversation[] . . . with [the victim]. So, [Craig]
is reluctant to do that but he got out anyway and while he was having
words with [the victim]. [Defendant] gets out of the driver[’]s side of
my car, I get in the driver’s side, so he proceeds to go to [the victim’s]
truck. He climbs in the back of the truck, and gets something in his
hand. And then he climbs back out of the back of truck, and goes
around the driver side of the truck and goes through the front, comes
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around, and comes back up so [the victim] can’t see him. And then he
hits [the victim] in the head not once but two times.
As Leah recalled, the victim fell to the ground unconscious. She testified that
this was when she saw Defendant take the victim’s wallet from his person.
Defendant then drove the victim’s truck down the road and wiped the steering wheel.
During cross-examination, Leah admitted receiving some of the stolen money.
She also admitted that her trial testimony differed somewhat from her original
statement to police, explaining that she was scared, shocked, and confused when she
made that statement. Leah then emphasized that her court testimony was the entire
truth.
Leah’s niece, Jennifer, was also called by the State. Like Leah, Jennifer
admitted that her trial testimony differed from her original police statement in which
she denied seeing anything. She explained that at the time of her original statement,
she was afraid and under the influence of drugs. She then explained that on the night
in question, she and Leah exchanged text messages about robbing the victim. She
confirmed that Leah and the victim picked her up in the victim’s truck. She
confirmed that her then-boyfriend, Craig, and Defendant were following them in
Leah’s car. Jennifer recalled that when both vehicles came to a stop, she exited the
truck and got into the other vehicle. She testified that this is when Defendant told
Craig “[t]o basically go distract [the victim].”
Jennifer testified that she saw Defendant strike the victim from behind with
the tire tool—not once but twice, that she saw the victim stumble to the ground, and
that she saw Defendant take the victim’s wallet from his person. Like Leah, Jennifer
admitted receiving some of the stolen funds. But unlike Leah, Jennifer did not
receive immunity for her testimony; she pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of simple
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robbery for her role in this incident. According to Jennifer, her charges were not
reduced in exchange for her testimony.
The third accomplice, Craig, was dating Jennifer at the time of the incident.
Craig testified that he watched Defendant strike the victim twice in the back of the
head with a “four[-]way tire tool.” He also testified that he saw Defendant take the
victim’s wallet from his person. And like Jennifer, Craig explained that his charges
were not reduced in exchange for his testimony. Indeed, Craig pleaded guilty to
armed robbery and aggravated second degree battery for his role in this event.
Several other witnesses were called by the State, including the victim, other
police officers, Defendant’s former girlfriend, and several experts. Text messages
and real evidence, including the tire iron and the victim’s DNA, were also admitted
at trial.
C. Aggravated Second Degree Battery—Sufficiency of the Evidence
A “battery” is defined as “the intentional use of force or violence upon the
person of another[.]” La.R.S. 14:33. More particularly, an “aggravated second
degree battery” is defined as “a battery committed with a dangerous weapon when
the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury.” La.R.S. 14:34.7(A).
Defendant here does not argue that the State failed to establish any of the
essential statutory elements of this crime. Rather, he argues that the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt his identity as the perpetrator.
As a matter of law, the State is required to prove Defendant’s identity as the
perpetrator. State v. Draughn, 05-1825 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, cert. denied,
552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537 (2007). In State v. Holmes, 05-1248, pp. 8–9 (La.App.
4 Cir. 5/10/06), 931 So.2d 1157, 1162, the fourth circuit explained as follows:
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When a key issue at trial is whether the defendant was the
perpetrator of the crime, the State is required to negate any reasonable
probability of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bright, 1998-0398 (La.4/11/00);
776 So.2d 1134, 1147. The fact-finder weighs the respective
credibilities of the witnesses, and a reviewing court will generally not
second-guess those determinations. State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King,
436 So.2d 559 (La.1983). However, the touchstone of Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)[,] is
rationality and that “irrational decisions to convict will be overturned,
rational decisions to convict will be upheld, and the actual fact finder’s
discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent necessary to
guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.” State v.
Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La.1988). The trier of fact makes
credibility determinations, and may, within the bounds of rationality,
accept or reject the testimony of any witnesses. State v. Hampton, 98-
0331 (La.4/23/99); 750 So.2d 867, 880.
Thus, for this court to affirm Defendant’s conviction, we must determine
whether, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant
knowingly struck the victim with a tire iron on December 10, 2018.
In State v. Higgins, 03-1980, p. 6 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1226, cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182 (2005), the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that
“in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical
evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to
support a factual conclusion.”
Here, multiple eyewitnesses testified against Defendant. And while Leah
received immunity for her testimony, Jennifer and Craig did not receive any sort of
plea agreement for their testimony. The jury was made aware of these facts, and
defense counsel questioned Leah, Jennifer, and Craig about their credibility. And in
the end, the jury chose to believe their testimony about Defendant’s involvement in
this event.
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Put simply, all three accomplices identified Defendant at trial. All three
testified that they saw Defendant strike the victim twice in the back of the head with
a tire iron. And all three provided details and facts about the incident that matched
the other evidence adduced at trial, including the testimony of other witnesses, the
video recordings, and the text messages.
As summarized by the supreme court in State v. Neal, 796 So.2d at 658–59
(citations omitted):
[T]he jurisprudence in Louisiana generally holds that an accomplice is
qualified to testify against a co-perpetrator even if the prosecution
offers him inducements to testify; such inducements would merely
affect the witness’s credibility. As the United States Fifth Circuit has
found, “a conviction may be based even on uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice or of someone making a plea bargain with the
government, provided that the testimony is not incredible or otherwise
insubstantial on its face.” United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1405
(5th Cir.1991).
Based on the above, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of the crime of
aggravated second degree battery. It was the jury’s prerogative to assess the
credibility of the witnesses and to accept or reject their testimony. We will not
second guess the jury’s credibility determinations nor will we impinge on its role as
fact finder. Accordingly, Defendant’s conviction for this offense is affirmed.
D. Armed Robbery—Sufficiency of the Evidence
“Armed robbery” is defined as “the taking of anything of value belonging to
another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by
use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.” La.R.S.
14:64(A). In addition, La.R.S. 14:64(B) states in relevant part that “[w]hoever
commits the crime of armed robbery shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less
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than ten years and for not more than ninety-nine years, without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence.”
Once again, Defendant does not argue that the State failed to establish any of
the essential statutory elements of this crime; he argues that the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt his identity as the perpetrator. Yet all three accomplices
testified that Defendant hit the victim with a tire iron and then took his wallet. And
the victim testified that he had approximately $2,000.00 in his wallet when it was
taken from his person.
For the reasons given in our previous discussion as to the sufficiency of
evidence for the aggravated second degree battery conviction, we conclude that a
rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
Defendant was guilty of the crime of armed robbery. Thus, Defendant’s conviction
for this offense is also affirmed.
III. Assignment of Error Number 2
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his pre-trial motion to
suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his cellphone location.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial
premised on the same argument. We review this assignment for abuse of discretion.
State v. Adams, 22-271 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/10/23), 364 So.3d 1272.
The hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress was held in April 2022. At
the hearing, the State and Defendant stipulated that the Allen Parish Sheriff’s Office
applied for an emergency cell ping on December 12, 2018; that upon obtaining the
ping, the detectives learned that Defendant was in Alexandria; and that Defendant
was ultimately arrested by the Rapides Parish Sheriff’s Office that same day.
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Several witnesses then testified, including Detective Gregory Quirk, who was
the chief of detectives at the Allen Parish Sheriff’s Office in December 2018.
Detective Quirk explained that he investigated the December 10, 2018 incident, and
that he had arrested three of the four suspects: Defendant remained at large.
According to Detective Quirk, even though there was probable cause to arrest
Defendant, they were unable to find him. When asked about the exigency of the
situation, the detective explained:
Well, an emergency ping is a ping that is done, basically, for a
location of a fugitive wanted in a crime. The nature of this crime was
a robbery, elderly abused person, aggravated battery committed to
injuries—he was in ICU. His life was—didn’t know if he was gonna
make it. So, it warranted enough to at least make the attempt to do an
emergency ping.
Detective Quirk then explained why his department did not first apply for a
search warrant:
[W]e did not because every phone carrier division has a law
enforcement division. If you think there is a life and death situation to
the public or anything—public—then we can make a call to their law
enforcement division of the phone carrier and ask them, give them the
circumstances of a case, and ask them to do an emergency ping for a
location of the suspect that we are looking for. And they are either
gonna grant it—they are gonna grant with the facts that it is enough to
warrant the emergency ping, or they are not. And if they are not, then
the next step would be to apply for the search warrant, but the chances
—if you don’t have enough for the emergency ping then your chances
of applying with search warrant is gonna be slim also.
Detective Quirk further explained that since the other suspects showed
Defendant was involved in the crime, Defendant could be a risk to the public. The
only intent behind the emergency ping, according to Detective Quirk, was to locate
the person of Defendant.
Detective Paul testified next. When asked if it was important to locate
Defendant, Detective Paul replied: “Due to the seriousness of the crime, yes.”
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Detective Paul testified that he was concerned for the public’s safety and
Defendant’s safety. According to the detective, the emergency ping was good for
twenty-four hours. If the phone company approves the emergency ping, “they email
you a GPS location basically every fifteen minutes when the phone pings and it
shows you a location.”
Detective Paul explained that they received a location for Defendant within
thirty minutes of the cellphone company’s approval of their request. Upon learning
that Defendant was in Alexandria, the detective contacted the Rapides Parish
Sheriff’s Office and faxed the arrest warrant to them. When asked if he was trying
to obtain other information from Defendant’s cellphone, Detective Paul answered:
“No. I was just trying to locate him to get the arrest warrant served.” Defendant
was ultimately found, arrested, and booked into the Rapides Parish Detention Center.
Later, he was transported back to Allen Parish.
According to Detective Paul, three cellphones were seized when Defendant
was arrested. These phones were right beside Defendant at the time of his arrest.
The detective did not search the phones until the search warrants were obtained.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied the motion to suppress for
the following reasons:
In the Court’s opinion once this horrible crime occurred, the police
investigation went to the casino, they found video tape that shows Ms.
Leah Langley with the defendant in this case, Mr. Gerald Artis. Upon
talking to—initially talking to Ms. Langley, my appreciation is that her
rights were read to her. She immediately or soon thereafter implicated
co-defendant, Mr. Artis. Based on that information the warrants were
presented to the judge at the time, which was Judge Davis, who was the
judge in 2018, who signed pretty much all of these warrants . . . . But
in my opinion, in the Court’s opinion, once that warrant for the arrest
of Mr. Artis was signed, that was the game changer. Now it is an
attempt to locate Mr. Artis. In a situation where the victim in this case,
Mr. Doyle, is hanging on, you know, for his life, and may or may not
make it. But once the arrest warrant was signed, based on probable
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cause, abundant probable cause, then in my opinion Mr. Artis or
defendant would lose some of that expectation of privacy that the
Fourth Amendment talks about. The Fourth Amendment, it talks about
people having a right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall be issued upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing a person that
is to be searched or the person or things to be seized. So, the police
officer, the search was for the defendant, for Mr. Artis, not for
communications, communications that may have been revealed through
the phone, through these phones. Also, kind of as an abundance of
precaution before they seized Mr. Artis, went through the trouble in
Rapides Parish of obtaining a search warrant to go in or enter into the
house, which I think was a good move there as well. Once Mr. Artis
was seized and the cell phones were seized then other search warrants
were obtained based on probable cause to look for the communications
that may exist[] in those cell phones. In the Court’s opinion the police
did a good job being cautious [by] applying for multiple, multiple
search warrants in this case. Additionally the court will make a
comment, now days everybody has got a cell phone in their pocket. To
think that we are hiding in this society, people know where we are. Find
a friend is available. Jealous spouses know where their spouses, other
spouses are. You have got parents who know where their children are.
No telling how many people know where we are when we have these
cell phones in our pockets. And that is new technology is changing
every day. People are losing expectations of privacy by holding and
carrying these phones with us everywhere we go. So, at least our
locations may be available. I still appreciate that we are protected in
what is in our phones, the constitution protects that. But our locations[,
it’s] getting to where everybody knows where we are. And the Court
does take that into consideration as well. Finally, Mr. Doyle so badly
beaten in the hospital, there is an emergency situation to try to find Mr.
Artis. The Court does not neglect that as well. So, for those reasons
the Court denies the Motion to Suppress, not only to suppress the
immediate cell phones that were seized, but any fruits of the poisonous
tree. Making additional comment that additional search warrants were
applied for and obtained to get those cell phone dumps.[ 1]
On appeal, Defendant points to Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ----, 138
S.Ct. 2206 (2018), arguing that he “had a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy
in his private cell-site location information[.]” And instead of securing a search
warrant, “the police sought to use the ‘exigent circumstances’ exception to the
1
In January 2023, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion for new trial which was based
on the same argument.
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Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., simply because it was more
expedient.” But the State failed to prove exigent circumstances for the cellphone
ping since there was no showing that he was committing or going to commit another
crime and no showing that he was a danger to himself or others. This is Defendant’s
argument.
The State disagrees, contending that the trial court correctly found the
existence of exigent circumstances. After all, the “ping” was requested and used by
police less than forty-eight hours after the victim was viciously attacked, robbed,
and left for dead; the victim was in ICU and his survival was in question, making a
homicide charge possible; the investigation indicated that Defendant was the “ring
leader” in the crime; there was evidence that Defendant was fleeing from authorities;
the police knew that Defendant had a prior criminal history; and the request for the
“ping” was limited in time and scope.
In State v. Isaac, 17-87, pp. 12–13 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/25/17), 229 So.3d 1030,
1040–41, writ denied, 17-2106 (La. 6/15/18), 257 So.3d 679, the fifth circuit
analyzed when exigent circumstances exist:
Exigent circumstances have been described as an “emergency or
dangerous situation” and as circumstances “in which police action
literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime.”
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378, 63
L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505, 93 S.Ct.
2796, 2802, 37 L.Ed.2d 757 (1973). Exigent circumstances may arise
from the need to prevent the offender’s escape, to minimize the
possibility of a violent confrontation which could cause injury to the
officers and the public, and to preserve evidence from destruction or
concealment. State v. Brisban, 00-3437 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So.2d 923.
“The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the
course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives
or the lives of others.” Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 298–99, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1646, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); Riley
v. California, [573] U.S. [373], 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494, 189 L.Ed.2d 430
(2014).
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In our view, the trial court did not err in finding that exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless procurement of Defendant’s cell-site information.
Defendant was attempting to flee from the investigation of this violent crime,
creating an exigency to preserve evidence and protect the public. In addition, the
scope of the information sought and obtained by police was limited to Defendant’s
location. The police received the “ping” location to execute a valid arrest warrant,
not to obtain other information.
In the end, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s
motion to suppress. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying
Defendant’s motion for new trial. This assignment is therefore without merit.
DISPOSITION
For the above reasons, Defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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