The opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
19-28
NEIL S. KAVANAGH
VERSUS
ROY EUGENE HEBRON
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 263,744
HONORABLE MONIQUE FREEMAN RAULS, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
PER CURIAM
**********
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Elizabeth A. Pickett
and Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Charles David Elliott
Charles Elliott & Associates
720 Murray Street
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 704-6511
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT APPELLANT:
Roy Eugene Hebron
B. Gene Taylor, III
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 6118
Alexandria, LA 71307-6118
(318) 445-6471
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF APPELLEE:
Neil S. Kavanagh
PER CURIAM.
The defendant, Roy Eugene Hebron (Hebron), appeals the trial court’s
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Neil S. Kavanagh (Kavanagh), on his request for
injunctive relief regarding whether Hebron could take or hold public office under
newly enacted La.Const. art. 1, § 10.1 with a felony conviction in 2011 and a
sentence ending in December 2017. Finding no legal error or abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court, we affirm the judgment.
I.
ISSUES
We must decide:
(1) whether the trial court erred in applying La.Const. art. 1,
§ 10.1; and
(2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting
the injunction requested by Kavanagh to prevent
Hebron from taking and holding public office in
January 2019.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kavanaugh, Mayor of Ball, Louisiana, along with Hebron and Gene
Decker, were opposing candidates in the November 6, 2018 mayoral election in
Ball. Hebron won the election with 56% of the 1450 votes cast, and Kavanagh
came in second. Also on November 6, 2018, Louisiana citizens voted statewide to
approve a new constitutional amendment, La. Const. art. 1, § 10.1, which prohibits
a convicted felon from holding public office until more than five years have
elapsed since the completion of his sentence. The amendment was approved with
over a million Louisiana citizens voting in favor of its enactment into law. In Ball,
Louisiana, the amendment passed with 60% of the electorate voting it into law.
Pursuant to La.Const. art 13, § 1(C), the effective date of the new constitutional
amendment was twenty days after the Governor proclaimed it law, which occurred
in this case on November 21, 2018. The parties stipulated that the effective date of
La. Const. art. 1, § 10.1, was December 12, 2018. Kavanagh filed suit against
Hebron on December 17, 2018, seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction
to prevent Hebron from taking or holding office in January 2019.
The trial court heard the matter on December 21, 2018. The record
reveals that in 2011, while Hebron was the sitting Mayor of Ball, he was convicted
of conspiracy to defraud The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in
the town’s application for disaster relief funds. Hebron served four years in prison
and three years of probation, all of which were completed on December 18, 2017.
Thus, when the new law became effective on December 12, 2018, less than one
year had elapsed since the completion of Hebron’s sentence for the felony
conviction.
At the end of the hearing on December 21, 2018, the trial judge found
that the new amendment, La.Const. art. 1, § 10.1, applied to Hebron. She indicated
that proceedings for a declaratory judgment would be held separately at a later
time. The trial court then signed a judgment in open court granting Kavanagh’s
injunction to prevent Hebron from taking and holding public office in January
2019. The December 21, 2018 judgment also denied Hebron’s motion to strike
and his exceptions of prematurity, no cause of action, no right of action, improper
cumulation of actions, non-joinder of parties, and unauthorized use of summary
proceedings. The trial court’s judgment also ordered Kavanagh to remain in office
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as mayor, pursuant to La.R.S. 42:2, until further order of the court and/or further
proceedings in accordance with law. While Kavanagh and the trial court agreed
that this suit did not fall under the Election Code,1 Hebron’s appeal requested an
expedited hearing, which we granted. For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
III.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
An appellate court may not set aside a trial court’s findings of fact in
the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Stobart v. State,
through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993); Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840
(La.1989). “A trial court’s determination as to whether to issue a preliminary
injunctionis subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review.” Ryan v.
Calcasieu Par. Police Jury, 17-16, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/26/18), 256 So.3d 1044,
1048 (quoting Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church v. Jones, 11-961, p. 4
(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/12), 84 So.3d 674, 678.) “Questions of law involving the
correct interpretation of legislation are reviewed de novo, without deference to the
legal conclusions of the trial court.” State v. Merrill, 14-530, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir.
6/11/14), 140 So.3d 1237, 1239 writ denied, 14-1227 (La. 9/19/14), 149 So.3d 249
(citing Durio v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 11–0084 (La. 10/25/11), 74 So.3d 1159).
1
Kavanagh’s petition did not invoke the Election Code articles in Title 18, and he
asserted at trial that he did not object to Hebron’s candidacy in July 2018 because the
constitutional amendment was not in law at that time to prohibit Hebron from qualifying to run.
See, e.g., La.R.S. 18:491–93 addressing candidacy. Kavanagh further stated that he was not
asserting fraud or irregularities in the conduct of the election held in November 2018. See, e.g.,
La.R.S. 18:1401–06 on contesting an election. Neither the trial court nor the parties have treated
their filings as submissions under the Election Code; nor does this court.
3
IV.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Louisiana Constitution Article 1, Section 10.1
Louisiana Constitution Article I § 10.1, entitled, Disqualification from
Seeking or Holding an Elective Office or Appointment, was added by Acts 2018,
No. 719, § 1. It provides (emphasis added):
(A) Disqualification. The following persons shall
not be permitted to qualify as a candidate for elective
public office or hold elective public office or
appointment of honor, trust, or profit in this state:
(1) A person actually under an order of
imprisonment for conviction of a felony.
(2) A person who has been convicted within this
state of a felony and who has exhausted all legal
remedies, or who has been convicted under the laws of
any other state or of the United States or of any foreign
government or country of a crime which, if committed in
this state, would be a felony and who has exhausted all
legal remedies and has not afterwards been pardoned
either by the governor of this state or by the officer of the
state, nation, government, or country having such
authority to pardon in the place where the person was
convicted and sentenced.
(B) Exception. The provisions of Paragraph (A) of
this Section shall not prohibit a person convicted of a
felony from qualifying as a candidate for elective public
office or holding such elective public office or
appointment of honor, trust, or profit if more than five
years have elapsed since the completion of his original
sentence for the conviction.
(C) The provisions of Paragraph (A) of this
Section shall not prohibit a person from being employed
by the state or a political subdivision.
The Historical and Statutory notes state:
Constitution Art. 13, § 1(C) provides in part, “If a
majority of the electors voting on the proposed
constitutional amendment approve it, the governor shall
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proclaim its adoption, and it shall become part of this
constitution, effective twenty days after the
proclamation...”
Hebron contends that La.Const. art 1, § 10.1(A)(2) requires that the
same felony conviction for the federal FEMA violations must also be prosecutable
as a felony in Louisiana. He not only asserts that Louisiana must have a statute
making it a state crime to violate the FEMA statutes, he also asserts that the state
statute must have the exact same elements as the FEMA statute. We disagree. The
amendment contains no such language nor the standard asserted by Hebron. More
specifically, La.Const. art. 1, § 10.1(A)(2) states that the crime must be “a crime
which, if committed in this state, would be a felony.” The new amendment is
almost identical in language to its predecessor, La.Const. art. 1, § 10, entitled
“Right to Vote; Disqualification from Seeking or Holding an Elective Office,”
which otherwise provided a longer waiting period for convicted felons, as follows
(emphasis added):
(A) Right to Vote. Every citizen of the state, upon
reaching eighteen years of age, shall have the right to
register and vote, except that this right may be suspended
while a person is interdicted and judicially declared
mentally incompetent or is under an order of
imprisonment for conviction of a felony.
(B) Disqualification. The following persons shall
not be permitted to qualify as a candidate for elective
public office or take public elective office or
appointment of honor, trust, or profit in this state:
(1) A person who has been convicted within this
state of a felony and who has exhausted all legal
remedies, or who has been convicted under the laws of
any other state or of the United States or of any foreign
government or country of a crime which, if committed in
this state, would be a felony and who has exhausted all
legal remedies and has not afterwards been pardoned
either by the governor of this state or by the officer of the
state, nation, government or country having such
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authority to pardon in the place where the person was
convicted and sentenced.
(2) A person actually under an order of
imprisonment for conviction of a felony.
(C) Exception. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Paragraph (B) of this Section, a person who desires to
qualify as a candidate for or hold an elective office, who
has been convicted of a felony and who has served his
sentence, but has not been pardoned for such felony, shall
be permitted to qualify as a candidate for or hold such
office if the date of his qualifying for such office is more
than fifteen years after the date of the completion of his
original sentence.
The predecessor amendment was effective from 1998 until 2016,
when it was declared null and void because the procedures for amending the
constitution in 1997-98 had not been followed. Shepherd v. Schedler, 15-1750
(La. 1/27/16), 209 So.3d 752, on reh’g (May 2, 2016).
During the effective period of La.Const. art. 1, § 10, the Louisiana
Supreme Court heard the contention at issue in this case in Touchet v. Broussard,
10-380 (La. 3/3/10), 31 So. 3d 986. There, Touchet, a qualified elector of
Abbeville, filed a petition under La.Const. art. 1, § 10, challenging the candidacy
of Broussard for a city council position and asserting that Broussard had a felony
conviction for aiding and abetting an illegal gambling business in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1955(a) and (2). Touchet further asserted that Broussard had not been
pardoned by the governor, nor had fifteen years passed since his federal
conviction. The trial court found that in Broussard’s federal plea agreement he had
admitted guilt to the Louisiana felony offense of gambling as defined in La.R.S.
14:90, but a panel of this court of appeal reversed, finding that the Louisiana
statute was not equivalent to the federal statute. Overturning the third circuit, the
supreme court stated:
6
The court of appeal concluded that “Louisiana law
does not contain an aiding and abetting statute
comparable to the federal statute, and Mr. Touchet has
pointed the court to no comparable Louisiana
felony.” Id. However, the court of appeal’s ruling ignores
a basic principle of Louisiana statutory criminal law that
all persons who aid and abet in the commission of a
crime are principals. See La. R.S. 14:24 (“All persons
concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present
or absent, and whether they directly commit the act
constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission,
or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to
commit the crime, are principals”). Thus, it is
unnecessary for La. R.S. 14:90, or any other criminal
statute, to additionally contain any aiding or abetting
provisions as those actors are already considered
principals to the crime.
Id. at 991.
In the present case, Hebron pled guilty to count 1 of the indictment
against himself and four others for Conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to defraud
FEMA of disaster relief funds following Hurricane Gustav in 2008. Counts 2 and
3 were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement, dated February 5, 2011, which
required Hebron to appear in open court, plead guilty to count 1 of the indictment,
and resign his position as Mayor of Ball, Louisiana.
The federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. 371, states as follows:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud the
United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
Count 1 of the indictment states that the defendants “did knowingly
and willfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree together to commit
offenses against the United States” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1040 “by knowingly
and fraudulently making materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and
7
representations to FEMA in an application for benefits authorized, transmitted,
transferred, disbursed and paid with FEMA funds . . . .” Count 1 further states that
the object of the conspiracy was to defraud FEMA and for the defendants to
unlawfully enrich themselves. The manner and means used by the defendants were
overstating the hours worked and overstating the usage of Ball vehicles and
equipment during the emergency response to Gustav. One of the overt acts, among
others, was attending a meeting of Ball employees and knowingly signing false
timesheets for submission to FEMA for reimbursement.2
In Louisiana, the criminal conspiracy statute, La.R.S. 14:26 (emphasis
added), provides:
A. Criminal conspiracy is the agreement or
combination of two or more persons for the specific
purpose of committing any crime; provided that an
agreement or combination to commit a crime shall not
amount to a criminal conspiracy unless, in addition to
such agreement or combination, one or more of such
parties does an act in furtherance of the object of the
agreement or combination.
B. If the intended basic crime has been
consummated, the conspirators may be tried for either the
conspiracy or the completed offense, and a conviction for
one shall not bar prosecution for the other.
C. Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to
commit any crime shall be fined or imprisoned, or both,
in the same manner as for the offense contemplated by
the conspirators; provided, however, whoever is a party
to a criminal conspiracy to commit a crime punishable by
death or life imprisonment shall be imprisoned at hard
labor for not more than thirty years.
2
In the opinion from the United States Fifth Circuit in United States v. Hebron, 11-30513
(5th Cir. 2012), 684 F.3d 554, wherein Hebron appealed his sentence, the court affirmed, finding
that the district court did not err in accepting an intended loss calculation of $320,000 from
FEMA for reimbursement requests following Hurricane Rita in 2005 and Hurricane Gustav in
2008, though it agreed to provable fraud of less than $200,000 in the plea agreement. The
FEMA claim also involved billing FEMA almost $10,000 for dumpsters following Hurricane
Gustav while at the same time seeking and receiving reimbursement from Keep Louisiana
Beautiful, Inc., a non-profit organization, for the same dumpsters.
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D. Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to
commit any other crime shall be fined or imprisoned, or
both, in the same manner as for the offense contemplated
by the conspirators; but such fine or imprisonment shall
not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half the
longest term of imprisonment prescribed for such
offense, or both.
In addition to the criminal conspiracy statute, La.R.S. 14:26,
Louisiana has a government benefits fraud statute, La.R.S. 14:70.9, which states:
A. The crime of government benefits fraud is the
act of any person who, with intent to defraud the state or
any person or entity through any government benefits
administered by any state department, agency, or political
subdivision, does any of the following:
(1) Presents for allowance or payment any false or
fraudulent claim for furnishing services, merchandise, or
payments.
(2) Knowingly submits false information for the
purpose of obtaining greater compensation than that to
which he is legally entitled for furnishing services,
merchandise, or payments.
(3) Knowingly submits false information for the
purpose of obtaining authorization for furnishing
services, merchandise, or payments.
(4) Knowingly makes or causes to be made a false
statement or representation of material fact on an
application or form for assistance, goods, services, or
payments when the false statement or representation is
made for the purpose of determining the person's
eligibility to receive benefits or payments.
(5) Knowingly conceals or fails to disclose any
material fact affecting the applicant's or recipient's initial
or continued eligibility to receive benefits or payments.
B. Whoever commits the crime of government
benefits fraud shall be imprisoned, with or without hard
labor, for not more than five years, may be fined not
more than ten thousand dollars, or both imprisoned and
fined.
C. For the purpose of this Section, government
benefits include any record, voucher, payment, money or
thing of value, good, service, right, or privilege provided
or administered by a state government entity.
9
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:70.9 was enacted in 2018. But well
before the enactment of La.R.S. 14:70.9, the theft of government benefits was a
crime under the very broad theft statute pertaining to thefts without violence,
La.R.S. 14:67. See State v. Judeh, 08-519 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/12/08), 2 So.3d 434,
where the defendant was convicted of theft by fraudulent conduct for falsifying her
job status and income on an application for benefits from the Office of Family
Support, thereby receiving benefits from the State to which she was not entitled.
The theft statute broadly applies to many forms of theft, including fraudulent
invoicing, billing, and collection of money for items and labor not performed. See
State v. Hampton, 27,703 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/28/96), 670 So.2d 1349, writ denied,
96-1063 (La. 11/15/96), 682 So.2d 758.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:67 (emphasis added) provides in
pertinent part:
A. Theft is the misappropriation or taking of
anything of value which belongs to another, either
without the consent of the other to the misappropriation
or taking, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices,
or representations. An intent to deprive the other
permanently of whatever may be the subject of the
misappropriation or taking is essential.
B. (1) Whoever commits the crime of theft when
the misappropriation or taking amounts to a value of
twenty-five thousand dollars or more shall be imprisoned
at hard labor for not more than twenty years, or may be
fined not more than fifty thousand dollars, or both.
....
C. When there has been a misappropriation or
taking by a number of distinct acts of the offender, the
aggregate of the amount of the misappropriations or
taking shall determine the grade of the offense.
....
10
Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:2(A)(4), a felony in Louisiana is any crime for
which an offender may be sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor. Thus, it is
disingenuous to contend that the fraud perpetrated upon FEMA by Hebron would
not be a felony if perpetrated upon the State of Louisiana in an application for
government benefits. In addition to serving the four-year imprisonment and three-
year probationary terms, Hebron was required to pay $25,000 in fines and
$105,556 in restitution in connection with the federal offenses. He was also
required to resign his position as mayor. He did not complete serving his
probationary period until December 18, 2017, less than one year from the effective
date of La.Const. art. 1, § 10.1, on December 12, 2018, and slightly over one year
from the date in January 2019 that Hebron would be required to assume and hold
the office of mayor, well under the five-year limitation established by the new
amendment. Therefore, under La.Const. art. 1, § 10.1, Hebron was prohibited
from assuming and holding the office of Mayor of Ball in January 2019, and the
trial court did not err in so finding.
Injunctive Relief and Standing
Hebron contends that the Election Code in Title 18 provides detailed
procedures for elections and for contesting elections, but that it contains no
provision allowing for an injunction against a successful candidate to prevent that
candidate from taking office. Therefore, Hebron contends, Kavanagh did not have
standing or a right of action to bring the suit. Kavanagh asserts and has always
asserted that his request for an injunction does not fall under the Election Code.
He correctly points out that the Election Code provides registered voters with time-
sensitive procedures for challenging a candidate’s qualifications to run, and for
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contesting the election after the fact due to fraud or irregularity in the conduct of
the election. See La.R.S. 18:491–93, and La.R.S. 18:1401–06, respectively. But
as repeatedly asserted by Kavanagh, the Election Code does not provide the basis
for his suit, as the constitutional amendment at issue did not become effective until
December 12, 2018, and did not bar Hebron from qualifying to run back in July
2018. Nor did Kavanagh bring suit to challenge the election for fraud or
irregularity in the election process.
Rather, Kavanagh, a registered voter, citizen, and current Mayor of
Ball, sought a preliminary injunction on December 17, 2018, to restrain Hebron
from illegally holding office in January 2019, and to prevent infringement on
Kavanagh’s statutory duty to continue to discharge the duties of his office until a
lawful successor was inducted into that office. See La.R.S. 42:2.
The Code of Civil Procedure states, “An injunction shall be issued in
cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result to the
applicant, or in other cases specifically provided by law. . . .” La.Code Civ.P. art.
3601(A). However:
A petitioner is entitled to injunctive relief without
the requisite showing of irreparable injury when the
conduct sought to be restrained is unconstitutional or
unlawful, i.e., when the conduct sought to be enjoined
constitutes a direct violation of a prohibitory law and/or a
violation of a constitutional right. Once a plaintiff has
made a prima facie showing that the conduct to be
enjoined is reprobated by law, the petitioner is entitled to
injunctive relief without the necessity of showing that no
other adequate legal remedy exists.
Jurisich v. Jenkins, 99-76, p. 4 (La. 10/19/99), 749 So.2d 597, 599 (citations
omitted).
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In spite of the above law, and in furtherance of his argument that the
Election Code provides no remedy for Kavanagh to seek an injunction, and he
therefore has no remedy, Hebron points to State v. Gibson, 12-1145 (La. 1/29/13),
107 So.3d 574, a case decided during the effective period of the predecessor
amendment, La.Const. art. 1, § 10. There, where the State brought suit against a
convicted felon after the election but before he was sworn into office, the
Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
The prohibition contained in Art. I, § 10 is two-fold.
Article I, § 10 not only sets forth qualifications for office
by prohibiting a felon from qualifying for public office
unless certain conditions are met, but it goes further by
expressly prohibiting such a felon from taking office.
Although the provisions of the Election Code do not
directly provide a method or cause of action for the State
to prevent Mr. Gibson from taking office in violation of
Art. I, § 10, we find the State can bring a direct action
pursuant to that constitutional provision. A cause of
action arises when Art. I, § 10 is violated because the
constitutional prohibition contained therein is self-
executing. A constitutional provision is self-executing
when it can be given effect without the aid of legislation,
and there is nothing to indicate that legislation is intended
to make it operative.
Gibson, 107 So.3d at 581-82.
After analyzing numerous statutes in the Election Code, the Gibson
court found that it provided no remedy for the State to bring suit under La.Const.
art. 1, § 10 after a certain time frame, but that the State was not confined to
traditional challenges under the Election Code. One of the statutes analyzed by the
Court in Gibson, was La.R.S. 18:495. Paragraph (A) of La. R.S. 18:495 gave the
State standing to immediately bring suit under La.Const. art. 1, § 10, if it learned
that a convicted felon filed a notice of candidacy, but Paragraph (B) of La.R.S.
18:495 required the State to file suit within the seven-day period after the close of
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the qualifying period. Thus, the ruling in Gibson was that the State was not bound
by the Election Code in enforcing a constitutional amendment. Similarly,
Paragraph (D) of La.R.S. 18:495 gives standing to registered voters to bring suit
under the same constitutional amendment, again couching it in terms of candidacy.
Similar to Gibson, there must be a remedy outside the Election Code for citizens to
protect their interests in the face of constitutional violations. While Hebron
characterizes the holding in Gibson as applying only to the State’s plenary power,
Gibson does not make that power exclusive to the State, nor does it foreclose a
right of action by a voter to seek injunctive relief in the face of a violation of
La.Const. art. 1, § 10.1 in this case.
Here, the constitutional amendment which became effective on
December 12, 2018, prohibits a person with a past felony conviction from holding
public office until more than five years have elapsed from the date he completed
his sentence. Hebron completed his sentence on December 18, 2017, thus he
would not be able to lawfully hold the office when required to do so in January
2019.3 Because we find that Kavanagh made a prima facie showing under
Jurisich, 749 So.2d 597, that Hebron’s taking the oath of public office and holding
the position of mayor in January 2019 is unconstitutional and reprobated by law
under La.Const. art. 1, § 10.1, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
granting of injunctive relief.
3
We further note that under the constitutional amendment now in effect, Hebron will not
be able to qualify to run for public office until December 19, 2022.
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V.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Costs of this appeal are assessed against the defendant, Roy Eugene Hebron.
AFFIRMED.
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