The opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
17-66 consolidated with 16-1064
DERRICK DEAN, M.D.
VERSUS
ST. MARY EMERGENCY GROUP, LLC, ET AL.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 20155856
HONORABLE DAVID MICHAEL SMITH, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, John E. Conery, and David E.
Chatelain, Judges.1
AFFIRMED.
Chatelain, J., concurs and assigns additional reasons.
Regel Louis Bisso
Robert G. Miller, Jr.
Bisso & Miller
3925 North I-10 Service Rd, W., #227
Metairie, LA 70002
(504) 830-3401
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Derrick Dean, M.D.
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Honorable David E. Chatelain participated in this decision by appointment of the
Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.
R. Joshua Koch, Jr.
Koch & Schmidt, LLC
650 Poydras Street, Suite 2660
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 208-9040
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Derrick Dean, M.D.
James L. Pate
Kenneth Wayne Jones, Jr.
Neuner Pate
P.O. Drawer 52828
Lafayette, LA 70505-2828
(337) 237-7000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Westport Insurance Corporation
Celia R. Cangelosi
Attorney at Law
5551 Corporate Boulevard, Suite 101
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-3036
(225) 231-1453
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLANT:
Louisiana Board of Pharmacy
James H. Gibson
Stacy N. Kennedy
Allen & Gooch
P. O. Drawer 81129
Lafayette, LA 70598-1129
(337) 291-1000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
The Gachassin Law Firm
Julie Ann Savoy
Lisa Eve Mayer
Sara R. Buggs
Neuner Pate
1001 W. Pinhook Road, Suite 200
Lafayette, LA 70503
(337) 237-7000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
The Schumacher Group of Louisiana, Inc.
St. Mary Emergency Group, LLC
GREMILLION, Judge.
The appellant, the Louisiana Board of Pharmacy (the Board), appeals the
trial court’s judgment granting the defendants-appellees, Gachassin Law Firm and
Julie Ann Savoy’s (Gachassin), motion to compel the Board to provide a
physician’s login and search history of the prescription monitoring program (PMP).
For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dr. Derrick Dean was sued by the family of Kenneth Scully following
Scully’s death after admission to the emergency room in which Dr. Dean was
working. Dr. Dean employed the Gachassin Law Firm, for whom Savoy is
employed as an attorney, to defend him from the medical malpractice suit filed
against him. However, before the medical review panel convened, the matter was
settled with Scully’s family for $450,000.
Thereafter, Dr. Dean sued Gachassin for legal malpractice. Gachassin
sought to compel the Board to “disclose the date, time and portal location of Dr.
Dean’s access of the online database concerning Mr. Scully for the time period of
2013 through the present date.” The PMP is a repository of information collected
by the Board that monitors the dispensation of controlled substances and other
drugs of concern in the state. Gachassin sought the information for purposes of
showing inconsistencies in the times Dr. Dean claimed to have accessed the
database relative to the settlement reached with Scully’s family.
The trial court granted Gachassin’s motion to compel. The Board filed a
supervisory writ with this court in 16-1064. The Board also filed the instant appeal
seeking reversal of the trial court’s grant of the motion to compel. We have
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consolidated the writ application and appeal. The Board’s sole assignment of error
is that the trial court erred in granting the motion to compel filed by Gachassin.
DISCUSSION
This case presents a question of law: Whether a physician’s login time,
portal location, and search history of an individual patient qualifies as “prescription
monitoring information” subject to the limitations of La.R.S. 40:1007, an issue of
first consideration. The trial court reasoned that the login information did not
qualify as “prescription monitoring information” as follows:
But here what they’re looking for is the information only upon when
the doctor accessed the program. When did he open the door? I’m
not looking for any information in the closet; they just want to know
when he opened the door.
We review questions of law de novo. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Jessen, 98-1685
(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/31/99), 732 So.2d 699. We construe evidentiary privileges
narrowly because they prevent the search for truth. Renfro v. Burlington Northern
and Sante Fe RR, 06-952 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/06), 945 So.2d 857, writ denied, 07-
0303 (La. 4/27/07), 955 So.2d 684.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1007(A)(emphasis added) titled “Access to
Prescription Monitoring Information” provides:
A. Except as provided in Subsections C, D, E, F, G, H, and I of this
Section, prescription monitoring information submitted to the board
shall be protected health information, not subject to public or open
records law, including but not limited to R.S. 44:1 et seq., and not
subject to disclosure. Prescription monitoring information shall not be
available for civil subpoena from the board nor shall such
information be disclosed, discoverable, or compelled to be produced
in any civil proceeding nor shall such records be deemed admissible
as evidence in any civil proceeding for any reason. Notwithstanding
this provision, law enforcement and professional licensing,
certification, or regulatory agencies may utilize prescription
monitoring information in the course of any investigation and
subsequent criminal and administrative proceedings, but only in
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accordance with federal and state law and the requirements of this
Part.
B. The board shall maintain procedures to ensure that the privacy and
confidentiality of patients and patient information collected, recorded,
transmitted, and maintained is not disclosed to persons or entities
except as in Subsections C, D, E, F, G, H, and I of this Section.
C. The board shall review the prescription monitoring information. If
there is reasonable suspicion to believe a breach of professional or
occupational standards may have occurred, the board shall notify the
appropriate professional licensing agency with jurisdiction over
prescribers or dispensers and shall provide prescription monitoring
information required for an investigation.
D. The board shall provide prescription monitoring information to
public or private entities, whether located in or outside of the state, for
public research, policy, or educational purposes, but only after
removing information that identifies or could be reasonably used to
identify prescribers, dispensers, and individual patients or persons
who received prescriptions from prescribers.
E. The following persons, after successful completion of the
educational courses identified in R.S. 40:1008, may access
prescription monitoring information at no cost and in the same or
similar manner, and for the same or similar purposes, as those persons
are authorized to access similar protected health information under
federal and state law and regulation:
(1) Persons authorized to prescribe or dispense controlled substances
or drugs of concern, or their delegates as defined by rule, for the
purpose of providing medical or pharmaceutical care for their patients,
or for verifying their prescribing records.
(2) Designated representatives from the professional licensing,
certification, or regulatory agencies of this state or another state
charged with administrative oversight of those professionals engaged
in the prescribing or dispensing of controlled substances or other
drugs of concern.
(3) Designated representatives from the Louisiana Medicaid program
regarding Medicaid program recipients.
(4) Designated representatives of the board and any vendor or
contractor establishing or maintaining the prescription monitoring
program.
F. The board may provide a report containing prescription monitoring
information upon application of local, state, out-of-state, and federal
law enforcement or prosecutorial officials engaged in the
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administration, investigation, or enforcement of the laws governing
controlled substances or other drugs of concern in compliance with
and as limited by the relevant requirements of any of the following:
(1) A court order or court-ordered warrant, or a subpoena or summons
issued by a judicial officer.
(2) A grand jury subpoena.
(3) An administrative request, including an administrative subpoena
or summons, a civil or an authorized investigative demand, or similar
process authorized under law, provided by law enforcement to the
board, and further, provided all of the following:
(a) The information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry.
(b) The request is specific and limited in scope to the extent
reasonably practicable in light of the purpose for which the
information is sought.
(c) De-identified information, or limited information that does not
identify or could not reasonably lead to the identification of an
individual patient, could not reasonably be used.
G. The board may provide prescription monitoring information in
response to queries from prescription monitoring programs located in
other states, through its participation in a secure interstate data
exchange system, and the information may be used by those programs
in a manner consistent with this Section.
H. The board may provide prescription monitoring information to
authorized users of the prescription monitoring program via a state
health information exchange or other third party conduit that has been
approved by the board.
I. The board may provide prescription monitoring information to an
individual who requests his personal prescription monitoring
information in accordance with procedures established by board
regulation.
J. The board and the advisory council shall be immune from civil
liability arising from inaccuracy of any of the information submitted
to the board pursuant to this Part.
“Prescription monitoring information” is defined in La.R.S. 40:1003(12) as
“data submitted to and maintained by the prescription monitoring program.”
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Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1006 sets forth the information to be submitted to
the PMP:
A. Each dispenser shall submit to the board information regarding
each prescription dispensed for a controlled substance or drug
monitored by the program. The information submitted for each
prescription shall include, at a minimum, data relative to the
identification of the following elements of the transaction:
(1) Prescriber information.
(2) Patient information.
(3) Prescription information.
(4) Controlled substance or drug information.
(5) Dispenser information.
Louisiana Administrative Code 46:2913 additionally provides a detailed
listing of the information that shall be included for each prescription submitted as
follows:
1. Prescriber information:
a. last and first name of prescriber;
b. United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
registration number, and suffix if applicable, or in the
alternative, the national provider identifier (NPI) number, as
issued by the United States Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS).
2. Patient information
a. last and first name of human patient and middle initial or
name if available, or in the event of a veterinary prescription,
the client's name and patient's animal species;
b. complete address of patient;
c. date of birth of patient;
d. identification number of patient;
e. gender code;
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f. species code.
3. Prescription information:
a. identification number of prescription;
b. date of issuance;
c. date of fulfillment;
d. number of refills authorized on original prescription and
refill number;
e. method of payment for prescription (cash, insurance, or
government subsidy).
4. Drug information:
a. National Drug Code (NDC) number;
b. quantity dispensed;
c. days supply.
5. Dispenser information:
a. DEA registration number, or in the alternative, the national
provider identifier (NPI) number.
The Board argues that a physician’s login and search history is “data
submitted to and maintained by the prescription monitoring program.” We
disagree. A timestamp, portal location identifier, and search query is not data
submitted to the PMP. The data which is submitted is that found in La.R.S.
40:1006. The term “submitted” when read in combination with La.R.S. 40:1006
clearly implies the input of the listed information into the database. Further, a
plain reading of the statute indicates that prescription monitoring information is 1)
data submitted and 2) maintained. If the legislature intended to prohibit any and
all information maintained by the Board it could have used “or” in place of “and”
to broaden the exclusion.
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Moreover, even if we assumed it was data submitted, in this case, we find
this is not the substantive data that the legislature intended to protect. The Board
itself states in brief that the privilege from disclosure “fosters the legislative
purpose of collecting prescription monitoring information to use to combat doctor
shopping and thus ultimately combat drug use and addiction.” The collection of
information relating to a physician user’s portal location, login time, and search
history is not information submitted to the database and it serves no purpose in
combating doctor-shopping or drug abuse.
On the other hand, as plaintiff argues, the legislature intended for the
accessors and/or contributors of the program to have unfettered access without fear
of retribution via civil lawsuits. We agree that it is clear from La.R.S. 40:1007 that
the submitted prescription monitoring information will not be available for any
reason in civil lawsuits. Again however, under the specific facts of this case, we
find that that the information sought by Gachassin is not prescription monitoring
information referenced in La.R.S. 40:1007(A).
The Board argues that the search of a person’s name is, in and of itself,
revealing patient identity. We disagree. The search of a particular name reveals
nothing about the nature of the record contained therein. It implies nothing about
the person nor reveals any information about that person’s prescription drug use.
Arguably, nearly every United States citizen has been “a patient” at some point
between their birth and death. Thus, there is no significance in the revelation that a
person may be a patient.
We do not intend to create a bright-line rule that the date, time, and portal
location information collected by the Board is always exempt from the privilege
set forth in La.R.S. 40:1007. Rather, we find that under the narrowly presented
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facts of this particular legal malpractice case, the Board’s records pertaining to Dr.
Dean’s search history of Kenneth Scully, including the date, time, and portal
location, are not privileged information under La.R.S. 40:1007.
This information is highly relevant to the defendants’ case and their ability
to defend themselves from the legal malpractice suit. The information sought is
not prescription monitoring information. It reveals no confidential information
submitted to the database. It merely reveals the time, location, and search query of
the doctor. Accordingly, we find the information sought in Gachassin’s motion to
compel is not privileged, and we affirm the trial court’s ruling granting the motion.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court granting the defendants-appellees’ motion to
compel is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the Louisiana
Pharmacy Board.
AFFIRMED.
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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
17-66 Consolidated with 16-1064
DERRICK DEAN, M.D.
Versus
ST. MARY EMERGENCY GROUP, LLC, ET AL.
CHATELAIN, J., concurring and assigning additional reasons.
From the outset, I find it important to remember the context within which
this case arose. The plaintiff, Dr. Derrick Dean (Dr. Dean), sued his attorneys,
Gachassin Law Firm and Julie Ann Savoy (collectively GLF), contending that the
medical malpractice case brought against him by the minor children of Kenneth
Scully (Mr. Scully) should not have been settled. In his legal malpractice action
against GLF, Dr. Dean contended that Mr. Scully died of a narcotic overdose, not
from any negligent treatment on his part.
During his deposition, Dr. Dean gave contradictory testimony concerning
when he learned of Mr. Scully’s narcotic prescription history. Dr. Dean initially
stated that he first learned of Mr. Scully’s narcotic prescription history almost a
year after Mr. Scully’s death when he accessed Mr. Scully’s prescription records
on the Pharmacy Board’s Prescription Monitoring Program (PMP). Later, he
stated he learned of Mr. Scully’s prescription history through the PMP in
connection with his examination and treatment of Mr. Scully – well prior to the
time he instructed GLF to settle the medical malpractice claim against him.
In light of this contradictory testimony, GLF served the Pharmacy Board
with a notice of records deposition and subpoena duces tecum, seeking only the
date, time and portal location of Dr. Dean’s access of the online database
concerning Mr. Scully. At that point, the Pharmacy Board declined to produce the
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requested information, citing La.R.S. 40:1007 which prohibits disclosure of
“prescription monitoring information submitted to the board.”
I agree wholeheartedly with the majority opinion and its factually limited
resolution of the issue now before us. This adjudication fully comports with like
questions regarding the scope of confidential records. See, e.g., Smith v. Lincoln
Gen. Hosp., 605 So.2d 1347 (holding that La. R.S. 13:3715.3(a) and La. R.S.
44:7(D) did not provide a hospital with blanket immunity from responding to
discovery requests which did not implicate the purpose of the legislatively enacted
privilege); see also Gauthreaux v. Frank, 95-1033 (La. 6/116/95), 656 So.2d 634;
Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., 93-2512 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730;
George v. Christus Health Southwestern Louisiana, 16-412 (La.App. 3 Cir.
10/12/16, 203 So.3d 541
However, I further concur, finding additional reasons to support the trial
court’s determination to allow GLF’s limited request for information of Dr. Dean’s
portal access to the PMP database. It is clear that La.R.S. 40:1007 equates
prescription monitoring information submitted to the board as “protected health
information.” Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 510 recognizes a health care
provider-patient privilege1 relative to confidential medical information and
provides in paragraph (B)(1) this general rule in civil proceedings:
In a non-criminal proceeding, a patient has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent another person from disclosing a confidential
communication for the purpose of advice, diagnosis or treatment of
his health condition between or among himself or his representative,
his health care provider, or their representatives.
1
Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 510 (D) states:
Who may claim the privilege. In both civil and criminal proceedings, the
privilege may be claimed by the patient or by his legal representative. The person
who was the physician, psychotherapist, or health care provider or his
representatives, at the time of the communication is presumed to have authority to
claim the privilege on behalf of the patient or deceased patient.
2
As delineated, in pertinent part, in La. Code Evid. art. 510(B)(2) (emphasis added):
Exceptions. There is no privilege under this Article in a non-criminal
proceeding as to a communication:
.. .
(c) When the communication is relevant to an issue of the
health condition of the patient . . . after the patient’s death, in any
proceeding in which a party deriving his right from the patient relies
on the patient’s health condition as an element of his claim or
defense.
Furthermore, La. Code Evid. art. 510(E) states:
The exceptions to the privilege set forth in Paragraph B(2) shall
constitute a waiver of the privilege only as to testimony at trial or to
discovery of the privileged communication by one of the discovery
methods authorized by Code of Civil Procedure Article 1421 et seq.[.]
Under the specific provisions of La. Civ.Code art. 1422, it is provided, in pertinent
part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It
is not ground for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
In the present case, Dr. Dean’s legal malpractice action has made his
knowledge of Mr. Scully’s prescription history a focal point in his legal
malpractice claim. As such, I find the limited claim of privilege has been waived
and portal access information relative to this patient is discoverable.
Therefore, under the specific facts of this litigation, the relevance of this
information for the impeachment of Dr. Dean’s testimony, and my appreciation
that the availability of this information does not impugn the stated purpose of the
prescription monitoring program, I, too, agree that the trial court properly granted
the motion to compel the Louisiana Board of Pharmacy to provide the limited
information GLF sought.
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