The opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
CA 15-298
PATRICK JEANSONNE, ET AL.
VERSUS
CITY OF MARKSVILLE, ET AL.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF AVOYELLES, NO. 2013-8845-A
HONORABLE MARK A. JEANSONNE, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
DAVID KENT SAVOIE
JUDGE
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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Phyllis M. Keaty, and David Kent Savoie,
Judges.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND RENDERED.
Aaron Broussard
Broussard & Hart, LLC
1301 Common Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 439-2450
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES:
Patrick Jeansonne
Connie Jeansonne
Jacob Jeansonne
Derrick M. Whittington
Whittington Law Firm
P. O. Box 127
Marksville, LA 71351
(318) 253-5852
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS:
City of Marksville
Ellis J. Walker
Derrick Stafford
SAVOIE, Judge.
Following a criminal trial wherein Patrick Jeansonne was convicted of
disturbing the peace under La.R.S. 14:103, a jury in the instant civil action found
that Mr. Jeansonne had been arrested without probable cause and awarded $5,000
in damages. In addition, the jury separately awarded Mr. Jeansonne $20,000 in
damages after finding that the arresting officer had filed a false report and $25,000
in damages after finding that the arresting officer testified falsely in connection
with the criminal trial. The conviction has not been overturned. Defendants appeal.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the award of $5,000 in damages for
false arrest. We further find that Mr. Jeansonne failed to state a cause of action
arising out of the arresting officer’s alleged false report and false testimony during
trial, and we dismiss those claims with prejudice.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 4, 2012, Plaintiff Patrick Jeansonne, along with his wife and son,
were travelling in a Jeep Liberty from a camp in Innis, Louisiana to a
veterinarian’s office located on South Preston Street in Marksville, Louisiana.
According to the Jeansonnes, their English bulldog was suffering from heat
exhaustion and near death. Mrs. Jeansonne was driving the vehicle, and Mr.
Jeansonne was in the back with the dog. The Jeansonnes’ son was also riding in the
vehicle.
Meanwhile, the City of Marksville was holding an annual Fourth of July
parade, and police officer Lieutenant Derrick Stafford had blocked off the
intersection of South Preston Street and Action Road to prevent traffic from
coming onto the parade route. When the Jeansonnes’ vehicle approached the
blocked intersection, Mrs. Jeansonne attempted to drive through the intersection,
but Officer Stafford refused to let her through.
According to Officer Stafford’s testimony, Mr. Jeansonne was irate and
shouted expletives following Officer Stafford’s refusal to let the Jeansonnes’
vehicle through. Officer Stafford also claims Mr. Jeansonne’s actions constituted
the crime of disturbing the peace under La.R.S. 14:103.
Because the Jeansonnes were not permitted to drive through the blocked
intersection, Mr. Jeansonne got out of the vehicle and carried the dog
approximately fifty yards to the veterinarian’s office on South Preston Street. Mr.
Jeansonne testified that after he arrived at the veterinarian’s office with the dog,
and the dog was stabilized, he called 911 to complain about Officer Stafford’s
handling of the situation. Mr. Jeansonne claims that Officer Stafford heard his
complaint on the police radio, and then directed Officer Nicholas Biebee, who had
responded to the complaint, to arrest him at the veterinarian’s office in retaliation
for calling in the complaint. Officer Stafford denies this, and testified that he had
informed Mr. Jeansonne that he was under arrest at the scene, but did not detain
him because he could not leave his post during the parade, and he knew that Mr.
Jeansonne was going to the veterinarian’s office.
Ultimately, Officer Biebee placed Mr. Jeansonne under arrest at the
veterinarian’s office and placed handcuffs on him. Officer Stafford arrived shortly
thereafter, and, according to his testimony, he added his handcuffs to Officer
Biebee’s to extend the length. Officer Stafford then drove Mr. Jeansonne to the
Marksville police station, issued Mr. Jeansonne a summons for disturbing the
peace, and released him. A criminal proceeding followed.
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While the criminal proceeding was pending, the Jeansonnes filed the instant
civil suit asserting claims against the City of Marksville, Ellis Walker in his
capacity as Chief of Police, and Officer Stafford for false arrest, excessive force,
and various other negligence claims, including Mrs. Jeansonne’s and the
Jeansonnes’ son’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
damages allegedly incurred from witnessing injury to Mr. Jeansonne.
While the instant civil suit was pending, a criminal trial was held on August
29, 2013. Evidence at the criminal trial consisted of testimony by Officer Stafford,
Officer Biebee, and Nicholas Scallan, a lay witness who videoed portions of the
parade and the incident in question. In addition, clips of the video taken by Mr.
Scallan, an audio recording of the dispatch radio traffic, and Officer Stafford’s
offense report were admitted into evidence. None of the Jeansonnes testified.
Primarily at issue during the criminal trial was the credibility of Officer
Stafford’s testimony as to what Mr. Jeansonne said and did at the time of the
incident. Ultimately, the criminal court found Mr. Jeansonne guilty of disturbing
the peace under La.R.S. 14:103 and sentenced him.
Mr. Jeansonne applied to this court for a supervisory writ in connection with
the conviction, and the writ was denied. No other writs or appeals were taken in
connection with the conviction, and there is no indication that a motion for new
trial or any applications for post-conviction relief have been requested. Mr.
Jeansonne’s attorney testified during the civil trial of the instant matter that he did
not seek further review of the criminal conviction because of the unlikelihood that
the conviction would be overturned.
Trial of the instant civil matter was scheduled for Monday, October 27, 2014.
On October 24, 2014, which was the Friday before trial, the Jeansonnes filed a
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Fourth Supplemental and Amending Petition adding allegations that Officer
Stafford filed a false police report and testified falsely at the criminal trial and that
these falsifications led to Mr. Jeansonne’s wrongful conviction. There was no
indication that any new information had become available since the trial of the
criminal matter.
Also on October 24, 2014, Defendants asserted an exception of no cause of
action claiming that Mr. Jeansonne’s conviction precluded the civil action. The
exception was heard on October 27, 2014, prior to the start of the trial, and it was
denied. The trial judge found that the conviction did not conclusively preclude the
Jeansonnes’ claim for false arrest and that the allegations regarding Officer
Stafford’s falsifications sufficiently equated to a fraud claim. After the Jeansonnes
presented their case at trial, the Defendants moved for directed verdict, and their
motion was denied.
Ultimately, (1) the jury found that Officer Stafford lacked probable cause to
arrest Mr. Jeansonne, and awarded $5,000 in damages, (2) the jury found that
Officer Stafford knowingly filed a false police report and awarded $20,000 in
damages, and (3) the jury found that Officer Stafford knowingly testified falsely at
trial, and awarded $25,000 in damages. The jury did not find any excessive force
on the part of Officer Stafford and did not award any damages to Mrs. Jeansonne
or the Jeansonnes’ son.
The Defendants now appeal arguing that (1) their no cause of action
exception should have been granted, (2) probable cause existed for Mr.
Jeansonne’s arrest, and (3) the damages awarded were excessive.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1: NO CAUSE OF ACTION
“The standard or review for sustaining or denying a peremptory exception of
no cause of action is de novo because it raises a question of law.” Hebert v.
Shelton, 08-1275, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/09), 11 So.3d 1197, 1201.
The function of the peremptory exception of no cause of action
is to question whether the law extends a remedy to anyone under the
factual allegations of the petition. The peremptory exception of no
cause of action is designed to test the legal sufficiency of the petition
by determining whether [the] plaintiff is afforded a remedy in law
based on the facts alleged in the pleading. No evidence may be
introduced to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails
to state a cause of action. The exception is triable on the face of the
papers and for the purposes of determining the issues raised by the
exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as
true.
Fink v. Bryant, 01-987, pp. 3-4 (La. 11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346, 348-349 (citations
omitted).
Louisiana has a system of fact pleading, and “[t]he mere conclusion of the
pleader unsupported by facts does not set forth a cause or right of action.”
Montalvo v. Sondes, 93-2813, p. 6 (La. 5/23/94), 637 So.2d 127, 131.
When a petition is based on several separate and distinct causes of action
arising out of separate and distinct transactions or occurrences, a partial judgment
on an exception of no cause of action may be rendered to dismiss one action, while
leaving the other actions to be tried on the merits. Everything on Wheels Subaru,
Inc. v. Subaru S., Inc., 616 So.2d 1234 (La.1993).
Cause of Action for False Arrest:
The Jeansonnes alleged in their petition that Officer Stafford’s warrantless
arrest of Mr. Jeansonne for a misdemeanor was not made immediately or in close
pursuit of the offense in violation of La.Code Crim.P. art. 213(1). Therefore, on
the face of the petition, we find that Mr. Jeansonne adequately pled a claim for
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false arrest, which has two elements: (1) detention of a person; and (2) the
unlawfulness of the detention. Touchton v. Kroger Co., 512 So.2d 520 (La.App. 3
Cir. 1987).
Defendants argue that Mr. Jeansonne’s conviction, as alleged in the petition,
conclusively establishes probable cause and, therefore, automatically precludes a
claim for false arrest. Defendants cite Gibson v. State, 99-1730 (La. 4/11/00), 758
So.2d 782, cert denied, 531 U.S. 1052, 121 S.Ct. 656 (2000) in support of their
argument. However, as Mr. Jeansonne notes, the statement in Gibson, Id. at 791,
that “[a]fter indictment or conviction, the defendant can no longer allege lack of
probable cause,” upon which Defendants rely, was later recognized as dicta by the
Louisiana Supreme Court on application for rehearing because the Gibson court
found that probable cause existed under the facts. Therefore, that statement in
Gibson is not controlling. As noted by Justice Lemmon in his concurring opinion
in Gibson, Id. at 792,
The critical issue is whether the police had probable cause to arrest
plaintiff at the time he was arrested, and not whether the State had
sufficient evidence to convict him . . . .
. . . [I]f probable cause had not existed at the critical time and an
investigation subsequent to the arrest had developed evidence to
support the eventual conviction, plaintiff would be entitled to some
amount of damages for wrongful arrest.
We therefore find that Defendants’ exception was properly denied as to Mr.
Jeansonne’s claim for false arrest.
Cause of Action Based on Alleged Falsifications by the Arresting Officer:
The Jeansonnes’ Fourth Supplemental and Amending Petition contains the
following allegations concerning falsifications by Officer Stafford (emphasis in
original):
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27.
PATRICK JEANSONNE was taken in DERRICK
STAFFORD’s car to the Marksville Police Station and booked for
Disturbing the Peace, a misdemeanor. DERRICK STAFFORD
made a false report of the events of the parade.
28.
PATRICK JEANSONNE was charged with misdemeanor
charges and no felonies.
....
35.
On August 29, 2013, a bench trial was held before the
Honorable William J. Bennett on the misdemeanor charge of
Disturbing the Peace. DERRICK STAFFORD knowingly testified
falsely at the criminal trial. As a result, PATRICK JEANSONNE
was wrongfully convicted.
36.
Due to the blatant actions and inactions of LT. DERRICK
STAFFORD, . . . stemming from the July 4, 2012 incident, PATRICK
JEANSONNE, CONNIE JEANSONNE, and their minor child
JACOB JEANSONNE, have continued to suffer violations of their
rights, reputations, and character up to the present.
In denying Defendants’ exception of no cause of action, the trial judge
suggested that these allegations sufficiently established a cause of action for fraud.
However, a tort claim based on fraud requires a misrepresentation of material fact
made with the intent to deceive, when there was reasonable or justifiable reliance
by the plaintiff and resulting injury. Chateau Homes by RJM, Inc., v. Aucoin, 11-
1118 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/12), 97 So.3d 398, writ denied, 12-1526 (La. 10/12/12),
98 So.3d 872; Sys. Eng’g and Sec., Inc. v. Sci. & Eng’g Ass’ns, Inc., 06-974
(La.App. 4 Cir. 6/20/07), 962 So.2d 1089. The Jeansonnes’ petition fails to allege
that the Jeansonnes reasonably relied on Officer Stafford’s representations, and,
therefore, it does not state a separate cause of action for fraud.
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The Jeansonnes’ allegations also do not constitute a claim for malicious
prosecution because the Jeansonnes have failed to allege that the criminal
proceeding resulted in a finding that Mr. Jeansonne was not guilty, which is an
essential element to such a claim. See Miller v. Desoto Reg’l. Health Sys., 13-639
(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/13), 128 So.3d 649, writ denied, 14-294 (La. 4/11/14), 138
So.3d 609. Moreover, any emotional distress suffered from the alleged wrongful
conviction would be an element of damages arising out of a claim for malicious
prosecution, had one been properly pled, and would not give rise to a cause of
action separate and apart from a claim for malicious prosecution. Jenkins v.
Baldwin, 00-802 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/29/01), 801 So.2d 485.
In addition, the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized the long-standing
rule that an adverse witness in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding is absolutely
immune from civil liability in a defamation or retaliation suit, regardless of malice
or falsity. Marrogi v. Howard, 01-1106 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So.2d 1118. The
Marrogi court recognized that:
The court in the 1869 Louisiana Supreme Court decision, Terry v.
Fellows, [21 La. Ann. 375, 376-377 (La.1869),] further explained that
“[w]itnesses, like jurors, appear in court in obedience to the authority
of the law, and therefore may be considered as well as jurors to be
acting in discharge of a public duty, and though [they are liable to
prosecution for perjury or conspiracy to give false testimony], they are
not responsible in a civil action for any reflections thrown out in
delivering their testimony.” . . . .
In general, witness immunity is an “absolute privilege” because
the privilege protects the witness from civil suit regardless of malice
or falsity.
Marrogi, at 1125 (internal citations omitted).
The Marrogi court also approvingly cited the case of Lauga v. McDougall,
463 So.2d 754 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1985), wherein the immunity was found to apply to
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a police officer who testified in a criminal proceeding, even if the testimony was
actually false.
While Defendants did not specifically assert absolute immunity as a basis
upon which to grant their exception, absolute immunity that is apparent on the face
of a petition may properly form the basis of sustaining an exception of no cause of
action. Lauga, Id.; Connolly v. Stone, 01-929 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/15/02), 807 So.2d
979; and Miller, 128 So.3d 649. Moreover, an exception of no cause of action may
be raised by an appellate court. La.Code. Civ.P. art. 928.
Because the Jeansonnes’ Fourth Supplemental and Amending Petition does
not adequately allege a cause of action arising out of Officer Stafford’s alleged
false report and false testimony at trial, we reverse the denial of Defendants’
exception of no cause of action with regard to Mr. Jeansonne’s claims for filing a
false report and giving false testimony, and dismiss those claims. It was error for
separate claims on these grounds to proceed to the jury.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2: PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST
Defendants argue that the jury’s finding that Officer Stafford arrested Mr.
Jeansonne without probable cause is not supported by the record. We disagree.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated the following with respect to
probable cause:
An officer satisfies his duty of good faith in making an arrest if the
arrest is based on probable cause. Probable cause exists when the facts
and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge, and of
which he has reasonable and trustworthy information, are sufficient to
justify a man of average caution in the belief that the person to be
arrested has committed or is committing an offense.
Gibson, 758 So.2d at 788.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court has also set forth the following standard for
reviewing a jury’s findings of fact:
A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s or a jury’s
finding of fact in the absence of “manifest error” or unless it is
“clearly wrong.” [There is] a two-part test for the reversal of a
factfinder’s determinations:
1) The appellate court must find from the record that a
reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial
court, and
2) [T]he appellate court must further determine that the record
establishes that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly
erroneous).
This test dictates that a reviewing court must do more than
simply review the record for some evidence which supports or
controverts the trial court’s finding. The reviewing court must review
the record in its entirety to determine whether the trial court’s finding
was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.
Stobart v. State, through Dep’t. of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993)
(citations omitted).
It is undisputed that Mr. Jeansonne was arrested without a warrant. While
La.Code Crim.P. art. 213(A)(1) allows a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor
committed in the presence of the arresting officer, the arrest must be made
immediately or in close pursuit. Therefore, in the instant matter, if Officer Stafford
did not arrest Mr. Jeansonne for his conduct at the parade route immediately or in
close pursuit, he could not later arrest Mr. Jeansonne absent probable cause for the
arrest of some other crime.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 201 defines arrest as “the
taking of one person into custody by another,” and provides that, “[t]o constitute
arrest there must be an actual restraint of the person.” It is undisputed that Officer
Stafford did not physically restrain Mr. Jeansonne at the parade route.
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Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to find that
Officer Stafford did not arrest, or actually restrain, Mr. Jeansonne immediately, or
in close pursuit, following his actions at the parade route.
There was also evidence that Officer Stafford did not chase or immediately
pursue Mr. Jeansonne following the events at the parade. Testimony at trial, as
well as the police dispatch recording, support a finding that Officer Stafford did
not ask Officer Biebee to detain Mr. Jeansonne at the veterinarian’s office until
after Mr. Jeansonne had called to complain about Officer Stafford and Officer
Stafford heard the complaint over the dispatch radio. Officer Stafford did not
physically restrain Mr. Jeansonne until after he arrived at the veterinarian’s office,
added his cuffs to Officer Biebee’s, and then drove Mr. Jeansonne to the police
station in the police vehicle.
Therefore, because there was evidence to support a finding that Officer
Stafford did not immediately, or in close pursuit, arrest (i.e., restrain) Mr.
Jeansonne following the alleged commission of the crime of disturbing the peace at
the parade route, and because there was no evidence indicating that Mr. Jeansonne
committed any other crime at the veterinarian’s office or otherwise, we cannot say
that the jury was manifestly erroneous in finding that Officer Stafford lacked
probable cause to arrest Mr. Jeansonne at the veterinarian’s office.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 3: EXCESSIVE DAMAGES
In their third assignment of error, Defendants argue generally that the total
of $50,000 in damages awarded by the jury was excessive. Because we dismissed
Mr. Jeansonne’s claims based on Officer Stafford’s alleged false report and false
testimony at trial, we pretermit the issue of whether the $20,000 damage award and
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$25,000 damage award for those respective claims were excessive. We consider
only whether the $5,000 in damages awarded for false arrest was excessive.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has provided the standard of review for an
award of general damages:
Vast discretion is accorded the trier of fact in fixing general damage
awards. La. Civ.Code art. 2324.1; Hollenbeck v. Oceaneering Int.,
Inc., 96-0377, p. 13 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/8/96); 685 So.2d 163, 172.
This vast discretion is such that an appellate court should rarely
disturb an award of general damages. Youn v. Maritime Overseas
Corp., 623 So.2d 1257, 1261 (La.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114,
114 S.Ct. 1059, 127 L.Ed.2d 379 (1994). Thus, the role of the
appellate court in reviewing general damage awards is not to decide
what it considers to be an appropriate award, but rather to review the
exercise of discretion by the trier of fact. Youn, 623 So.2d at 1260. As
we explained in Youn:
Reasonable persons frequently disagree about the
measure of general damages in a particular case. It is
only when the award is, in either direction, beyond that
which a reasonable trier of fact could assess for the
effects of the particular injury to the particular plaintiff
under the particular circumstances that the appellate court
should increase or decrease the award.
Id. at 1261.
The initial inquiry, in reviewing an award of general damages,
is whether the trier of fact abused its discretion in assessing the
amount of damages. Cone v. National Emergency Serv. Inc., 99–0934
(La.10/29/99), 747 So.2d 1085, 1089; Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498
(La.1979). Only after a determination that the trier of fact has abused
its “much discretion” is a resort to prior awards appropriate and then
only for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point which
is reasonably within that discretion. Coco v. Winston Indus., Inc., 341
So.2d 332 (La.1976).
Duncan v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 00-66, pp. 13-14 (La. 10/30/00), 773
So.2d 670, 682-683.
In the instant matter, Mr. Jeansonne was arrested at the veterinarian’s office
without probable cause, handcuffed in front of his family and other witnesses, and
taken to the Marksville police station in Officer Stafford’s vehicle. He was issued a
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summons and thereafter released. The evidence suggests he was detained for less
than an hour. We cannot say that under these facts, the jury abused its vast
discretion in awarding Mr. Jeansonne $5,000 in damages for false arrest.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendants’
exception of no cause of action as to Mr. Jeansonne’s claim for false arrest. We
further affirm the jury’s award of $5,000 in damages for false arrest.
As to Mr. Jeansonne’s claims arising out Officer Stafford’s allegedly false
report and false testimony at the criminal trial, we partially reverse the trial court’s
denial of Defendants’ exception of no cause of action, render judgment in favor of
Defendants partially sustaining their exception of no cause of action as to those
claims, and dismiss those claims with prejudice.
Costs of this appeal are assessed equally between Plaintiffs-Appellees and
Defendants-Appellants.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND RENDERED.
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