Opinion

Barbara Richard v. Calcasieu Parish School Board

Court
Louisiana Court of Appeal
Filed
Dec 28, 2011
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.7%

The opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-469

BARBARA RICHARD

VERSUS

CALCASIEU PARISH SCHOOL BOARD

************

APPEAL FROM THE

OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DISTICT 3

PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 07-03060

SAM LOWERY, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

************

ON REHEARING

************

JAMES T. GENOVESE

JUDGE

************

Court composed of John D. Saunders, J. David Painter, and James T. Genovese,

Judges.

REHEARING GRANTED; AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART, AND RENDERED.

Christopher M. Trahan

Raggio, Cappel, Chozen & Berniard

1011 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 500

Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601

(337) 436-9481

COUNSEL FOR DEFEDANT/APPELLANT:

Calcasieu Parish School Board

Mark Zimmerman

4216 Lake Street

Lake Charles, Louisiana 70605

(337) 474-1644

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:

Barbara Richard

GENOVESE, Judge.

We revisit this case pursuant to the application for rehearing by the

employer, Calcasieu Parish School Board (School Board), relative to the workers’

compensation claim of the employee, Barbara Richard. We grant this rehearing

solely on the issue of whether the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) erred in

restoring Ms. Richard’s workers’ compensation benefits to temporary total

disability (TTD) status. In our original opinion, we affirmed the decision of the

WCJ reinstating TTD benefits to Ms. Richard. Pertinent hereto is the decision of

this court by another panel rendered the same day as the instant case entitled James

Sharp v. Landscape Management Services, 11-340 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/11), ___

So.3d ___.

In the instant case, we affirmed the WCJ’s reinstatement of TTD benefits in

favor of Ms. Richard and his award of $7,000.00 in attorney fees, plus we awarded

$3,500.00 in attorney fees for work done on appeal. However, the sole issue

before us on this rehearing is whether Ms. Richard is entitled to TTD benefits or

supplemental earnings benefits (SEB).

The law pertaining to SEB was recently set forth by our supreme court in

Poissenot v. St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Office, 09-2793, pp. 4-6 (La. 1/9/11), 56

So.3d 170, 174-75 (footnote omitted):

“The purpose of [SEBs] is to compensate the injured employee

for the wage earning capacity he has lost as a result of his accident.”

Banks v. Industrial Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 96-2840

(La.7/1/97), 696 So.2d 551, 556. An employee is entitled to receive

SEBs if he sustains a work-related injury that results in his inability to

earn ninety percent (90%) or more of his average pre-injury wage.

La. R.S. 23:1221(3)(a). Initially, the employee bears the burden of

proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the injury resulted

in his inability to earn that amount under the facts and circumstances

of the individual case. Banks, supra at 556. “In determining if an

injured employee has made out a prima facie case of entitlement to

[SEBs], the trial court may and should take into account all those

factors which might bear on an employee’s ability to earn a wage.”

Daigle v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 545 So.2d 1005, 1009 (La.1989)

(quoting Gaspard v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 483 So.2d

1037, 1039 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985)). It is only when the employee

overcomes this initial step that the burden shifts to the employer to

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employee is

physically able to perform a certain job and that the job was offered to

the employee or that the job was available to the employee in his or

the employee’s community or reasonable geographic location. La.

R.S. 23:1221(3)(c)(i); Banks, supra at 556; Daigle, supra at 1009.

The analysis is necessarily a facts and circumstances one in

which the court is mindful of the jurisprudential tenet that workers’

compensation is to be liberally construed in favor of coverage.

Daigle, supra at 1007. Further, factual findings in workers’

compensation cases are subject to the manifest error or clearly wrong

standard of appellate review. Smith v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections,

93-1305 (La.2/28/94), 633 So.2d 129, 132; Freeman v. Poulan/Weed

Eater, 93-1530 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 733, 737-38. In applying the

manifest error-clearly wrong standard, the appellate court must

determine not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but

whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Freeman,

supra at 737-38; Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and

Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993); Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d

1120, 1127 (La.1987). “In determining whether a [WCJ’s] finding

that an employee has met his initial burden of proving entitlement to

SEBs is manifestly erroneous, a reviewing court must examine all

evidence that bears upon the employee’s inability to earn 90% or

more of his pre-injury wages.” Seal v. Gaylord Container Corp.,

97-0688 (La.12/2/97), 704 So.2d 1161, 1166.

As set forth in Poissenot, as quoted in Sharp, and La.R.S. 23:1221(1),

Ms. Richard bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence,

unaided by any presumption of disability, that she is physically unable to engage in

any employment as a result of a work-related injury in order to be awarded TTD

benefits. The record clearly indicates that the most current functional capacity

evaluation (FCE) performed on Ms. Richard was completed on October 17, 2009.

The FCE indicated that she was capable of performing a sedentary level job.

Therefore, it was not error for the School Board to convert Ms. Richard’s benefits

to SEB, and the WCJ erred in reinstating Ms. Richard’s TTD benefits.

However, once it was determined that SEB were the appropriate benefits

payable to Ms. Richard, then the burden shifted to the School Board to establish by

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a preponderance of the evidence that a particular job was available to her and that

she was physically able to perform that particular job. Given the restrictions

placed on Ms. Richard by Dr. Bernauer as set forth in the record, the jobs

presented to Ms. Richard were not jobs that were actually physically available to

her. Therefore, the SEB are to be paid based on a zero earning capacity.

DISPOSITION

The WCJ erred in restoring Ms. Richard to TTD benefits status. Our

original judgment and that of the WCJ restoring Ms. Richard to TTD benefits

status are reversed, and judgment is now rendered awarding Ms. Richard SEB at a

zero earning capacity rate as of May 1, 2010. All other aspects of our original

judgment are affirmed.

REHEARING GRANTED; AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART, AND RENDERED.

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