The opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
08-0323
WILLIAM E. PETERS, ET AL.
VERSUS
ALLEN PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.
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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF ALLEN, NO. C-2005-603
HONORABLE ROBERT BRINKMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE
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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE
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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Oswald A. Decuir, Jimmie C. Peters, Elizabeth
A. Pickett, and James T. Genovese, Judges.
Genovese, J. dissents.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
William J. Barnes, II
A Professional Law Corporation
Post Office Box 66
Greenwell Springs, LA 70739
(225) 262-2212
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
William E. Peters
Robert L. Hammonds
Patrick A. Joseph
Hammonds and Sills
Post Office Box 65236
Baton Rouge, LA 70896
(225) 923-3462
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Allen Parish School Board
Linda Thompson
Louisiana Risk Management Agency
PETERS, J.
William E. Peters1 appeals the trial court’s grant of a peremptory exception of
no cause of action dismissing his individual claims against the Allen Parish School
Board (School Board); Linda Thompson, the principal of Oakdale Middle School;
and Louisiana Risk Management Association (Risk Management), the School
Board’s insurer. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court judgment and
remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
The peremptory exception of no cause of action is provided for in La.Code
Civ.P. art. 927(A)(4) and presents the appellate court with a question of law that we
review de novo. Jones v. Tezeno, 99-1693 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/00), 758 So.2d 896.
Its purpose is to test the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s petition by determining
whether the plaintiff has a remedy in law based on the facts alleged. Everything on
Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru S., Inc., 616 So.2d 1234 (La.1993). “No evidence may
be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails
to state a cause of action.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 931. “[F]or the purposes of
determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition
must be accepted as true. Simply, if the petition alleges sufficient facts to establish
a case cognizable in law, an exception of no cause of action must fail.” Jones, 758
So.2d at 899 (citations omitted). “Every reasonable interpretation must be accorded
the language of the petition in favor of maintaining its sufficiency and affording the
plaintiff the opportunity of presenting evidence at trial.” Industrial Cos. Inc. v.
Durbin, 02-665, p. 7 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1207, 1213 (citations omitted).
Mr. Peters filed his original petition for damages on December 9, 2005, and
amended his original petition on two occasions—February 10, 2006, and August 28,
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The plaintiff, William E. Peters, is not related to Judge Jimmie C. Peters.
2006. The original and supplemental petitions establish the defendants as: the
School Board, Ms. Thompson, Crystal Cheney, and Risk Management.2 This appeal
arises from the trial court’s grant of a peremptory exception of no cause of action
after an August 10, 2007 hearing. In granting the exception, the trial court dismissed
Mr. Peters’ claim for damages against the School Board, Ms. Thompson, and Risk
Management. Mr. Peters asserts two assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in sustaining the exception of no cause of
action against the claim by William E. Peters for his personal
damages, or otherwise dismissing his suit for injuries he
sustained.
2. The trial court erred in its analysis of Mr. Peters’ damage claim,
and by finding that Appellant could not present a damage claim
by law.
Accepting the well-pleaded facts of Mr. Peters’ petition and supplemental
petitions as true, we find that they establish the following:
• Ms. Cheney is the biological mother of two minor children, Adrian
Morgan Brown (born June 30, 1991) and Jacob Ryan Brown (born May
16, 1994). In December of 2004, both children were enrolled in the
Allen Parish School system and were attending Oakdale Middle School.
Ms. Thompson was, at that time, the principal of the Oakdale Middle
School. Both children had been enrolled in the Allen Parish School
system “for three (3) consecutive school years: since 2001.”
• Mr. Peters had been granted “provisional custody” of the children by
a written document entitled “Provisional Custody by Mandate,” and had
supplied that document to the school officials at Oakdale Middle
School. In fact, Mr. Peters had advised school officials in writing that
“he alone had custody of the minor children and that they were to be
released only to” him, Becky Peters, Shirley Peters, Lisa Winn, and Tara
Kennedy. Mr. Peters specifically alleged that
a. [Mr. Peters] was the only parent or guardian listed on emergency
forms required for the purpose of enrollment;
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Initially, Mr. Peters named Coregis Insurance Company as the School Board insurer, but
later substituted Louisiana Risk Management Association for that defendant.
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b. On the school records there was an “alarm” indicating that
William Peters had custody of the minor children;
c. There were policies in effect by the School Board and mandated
by Louisiana Law indicating that the forms were to be signed by
Mr. Peters as guardian; he consistently provided said forms to the
Home Room teacher and the forms were appropriately
disseminated by the school;
d. No one else was authorized at any time to make decisions for the
children with regard to issues such as medical care, corporal
discipline and check-in and check-out procedures.
• On December 13, 2004, Crystal Cheney appeared at Oakdale Middle
School to check the children out. Ms. Thompson telephoned Mr. Peters
to obtain permission to allow Ms. Cheney to check out the children. In
that telephone conversation, Mr. Peters “directed Ms. Thompson that
under no circumstances was she to release the minor children to Ms.
Cheney and that he was forthwith coming to the school.” However,
before Mr. Peters arrived some twenty minutes later, Ms. Thompson had
allowed Ms. Cheney to remove the children. At some point, the Allen
Parish School Board caused Ms. Cheney to execute a document
terminating Mr. Peters’ custodial rights.
In concluding that the pleadings did not state a cause of action, the trial court
primarily considered the paragraph of the pleadings setting forth Mr. Peters’ itemized
damages. That paragraph states:
As a result of the incident, Petitioner has suffered from physical,
mental and emotional injuries as well as alienation of affection with the
minor children. He has experienced depression, anxiety, worry and an
inability to sleep. Moreover, he has been forced to travel on numerous
occasions out of the State of Louisiana. Hence, Petitioner is entitled to
recover for these damages as well as all other injuries and damages, such
as lost wages and inconvenience.
The trial court concluded that Louisiana law does not provide a remedy for alienation
of affection, that Mr. Peters did not have a consortium claim under La.Civ.Code arts.
2315 and 2315.2, and that he did not have a bystander claim under La.Civ.Code art.
2315.6.
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We agree with the trial court’s analysis with regard to those theories of
recovery. However, Mr. Peters also asserted that he sustained out-of-pocket expenses
arising from the incident, and that he suffered physical, mental, and emotional injuries
in the form of depression, anxiety, worry, and inability to sleep. These damage
claims are in addition to his claims for alienation of affection, loss of consortium, and
bystander damages.
Under La.Civ.Code art. 2315, an individual is entitled to recover the damages
he sustains as a result of another’s fault. That provision “contemplates responsibility
founded on fault, namely, negligence or intentional misconduct.” Hero Lands Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 310 So.2d 93, 97 (La.1975). In considering whether a cause of action
has been set forth based on a negligence or intentional tort theory of recovery under
the facts of this case, we must first determine whether a duty was owed by the school
defendants to Mr. Peters.
A duty represents a legally enforceable obligation to conform to a
particular standard of conduct. Louisiana courts have traditionally
applied a duty-risk analysis to determine whether a plaintiff has stated
a cause of action in tort against a particular defendant. This approach
is most helpful in cases where the only issue is whether the defendant
stands in any relationship to the plaintiff as to create any legally
recognized obligation of conduct for the plaintiff’s benefit. The
existence of duty is a question of law for the court to decide from the
facts surrounding the occurrence in question. When no duty exists, a
court will dismiss a petition as a matter of law for failure to state a cause
of action.
Byers v. Edmondson, 97-831, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/15/98), 712 So.2d 681, 687,
writ denied, 98-1596 (La. 10/9/98), 726 So.2d 29, cert. denied 119 S.Ct. 1143, 526
U.S. 1005 (citations omitted).
This court has already held that a school’s duty of reasonable supervision of
its students includes “the duty to make the appropriate supervisory decisions
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concerning a student’s departure from campus during regular school hours,” and that
allowing a student to leave the campus in violation of the school’s established policy
is a violation of that duty. D.C. v. St. Landry Parish School Bd., 00-1304, p. 5
(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/01), 802 So.2d 19, 23, writ denied, 01-981 (La. 5/25/01), 793
So.2d 169. In his pleadings, Mr. Peters asserted that Oakdale Middle School had a
policy that “[o]nly those individuals whose legitimate signatures appear on the check
out form will be allowed to check out a student at Oakdale Middle School,” and that
he was listed on the school’s check out form as the only individual who had the
authority to check the children out of school. Thus, accepting the facts in Mr. Peters’
petitions as true, Ms. Thompson’s decision to allow Ms. Cheney to check the children
out of school violated the school’s policy and her duty to both the children and Mr.
Peters, causing Mr. Peters physical, mental, and emotional injuries and out-of-pocket
expenses.
Affording Mr. Peters’ petitions every reasonable interpretation in favor of
maintaining their sufficiency, we conclude that Mr. Peters has stated a cause of action
on the face of his pleadings and the trial court erred in granting the defendants’
peremptory exception of no cause of action.
CONCLUSION
Following our de novo review of the record, accepting as true the well-pleaded
facts in Mr. Peters’ petition, and according the language of his petition every
reasonable interpretation in favor of maintaining the sufficiency of the petition, we
conclude that Mr. Peters does state a cause of action to support his claims against the
school defendants. We reverse the trial court’s judgment granting the peremptory
exception of no cause of action in favor of the Allen Parish School Board, Linda
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Thompson, and Coregis Insurance Company against Mr. Peters’ individual claims and
remand for further proceedings. We assess all costs of this appeal against the Allen
Parish School Board, Linda Thompson, and Coregis Insurance Company. Pursuant
to the requirement of La.R.S. 13:5112(A), we find that the total costs are in the
monetary amount of $1,196.00.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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