The opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
05-190
ROGERS BROWN
VERSUS
MICHAEL J. NEUSTROM, LAFAYETTE PARISH SHERIFF
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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 2004-1170
HONORABLE THOMAS R. DUPLANTIER, DISTRICT JUDGE
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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE
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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Michael G. Sullivan, and
Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Robin L. Jones
Stephen J. Oats
Oats & Hudson
100 E. Vermilion, Suite 400
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 233-1100
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee:
Michael J. Neustrom, Lafayette Parish Sheriff
Rogers Brown
In Proper Person
Louisiana State Penitentiary
Angola, LA 70712
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant
Rogers Brown
Pickett, Judge.
The plaintiff, Rogers Brown, appeals a judgment of the trial court granting
the defendant’s Exception of Prescription and dismissing his suit with prejudice.
For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
In September 1998, the Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office arrested the plaintiff,
Rogers Brown, in connection with its investigation into the death of John K. Bernard.
On September 29, 1998, sheriff’s deputies seized Brown’s yellow four-door Cadillac
from his mother’s house in connection with the investigation.
On January 28, 2002, Brown pled guilty to manslaughter in the death of
Bernard. On May 13, 2002, he was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment and is
currently incarcerated at the Louisiana State Penitentiary.
On March 9, 2002, Brown filed a Petition to Release Property against Michael
Neustrom, the Sheriff of Lafayette Parish, in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court for
Lafayette Parish, seeking to have the yellow Cadillac released to his mother. In
response, Sheriff Neustrom filed a Peremptory Exception of Prescription, alleging
that Brown’s cause of action was prescribed pursuant to La.R.S. 15:41(B).
At the time that the vehicle was seized1, La.R.S. 15:41 stated, in pertinent part:
A. If there is a specific statute concerning the disposition of the
seized property, the property shall be disposed of in accordance with the
provisions thereof.
B. If there is no such specific statute, the following governs the
disposition of property seized in connection with a criminal proceeding,
which is not to be used as evidence or is no longer needed as evidence:
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The two year time period in Section B(2) was amended to six months by 1999 La. Acts No.
1195, § 1. As the property was seized before the change, we will apply the previous law.
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(1) The seized property shall be returned to the
owner, unless a statute declares the property to be
contraband, in which event the court shall order the
property destroyed if the court determines that its
destruction is in the public interest; otherwise, Paragraph
(2) of this Section shall apply.
(2) If the seized property is contraband, and the court
determines that it should not be destroyed, or if the owner
of noncontraband property does not claim it within two
years after its seizure, the court shall order:
(a) A sale of the property at a
nonjudicial public sale or auction, if the court
concludes that such a sale will probably result
in a bid greater than the costs of the sale. The
proceeds of the sale shall be administered by
the court and used exclusively for the
maintenance, renovation, preservation, or
improvement of the court building, facilities,
or records system.
(b) If the court concludes that the cost
of a public sale would probably exceed the
highest bid, the court may order the property
transferred to a public or a nonprofit
institution or destroyed or may make such
other court ordered disposition as it deems
appropriate.
Sheriff Neustrom alleges that on June 25, 2003, pursuant to a request by the Sheriff’s
Office, Assistant District Attorney Daniel Landry signed an “Evidence Disposition
Form,” authorizing the Sheriff’s Office to dispose of “all remaining evidence” in the
criminal case concerning Brown. Pursuant to this authorization, according to Lt.
Frank Durand, the Sheriff’s Office released the Cadillac to “a private individual for
disposal and/or destruction.”
Sheriff Neustrom argues that any right Brown had to the return of the property
prescribed two years from the date it was seized, September 29, 2000, or at the latest
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on June 25, 2003, when the District Attorney’s Office authorized disposal of the
vehicle.
The trial court rendered its judgment sustaining the Exception of Prescription
and dismissing the plaintiff’s suit with prejudice on June 4, 2004. Brown now
appeals that judgment.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The plaintiff-appellant, Rogers Brown, appearing pro se, asserts four
assignments of error:
1. [T]he trial court erred by granting defendant[’s] peremptory exception of
prescription.
2. [T]he trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff[’s] civil action with prejudice at
plaintiff’s cost.
3. [T]he trial court erred in his reasons for Judgment, when he states plaintiff did
not claim his property within two years.
4. Did the trial court err in his Judgment when no one notified plaintiff that his
property was released by the sheriff’s office[?]
DISCUSSION
The Sheriff advocates the position that La.R.S. 15:41(B) sets forth a time limit
for claiming property and states that failure to claim property within the two-year time
limit causes the claim to prescribe. That argument is not, however, supported by the
language of the statute. First, Section A does not apply because there is no specific
statute governing the disposition of the vehicle. Subsection B(1) states:
B. If there is no such specific statute, the following governs the
disposition of property seized in connection with a criminal proceeding,
which is not to be used as evidence or is no longer needed as evidence:
(1) The seized property shall be returned to the
owner, unless a statute declares the property to be
contraband, in which event the court shall order the
property destroyed if the court determines that its
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destruction is in the public interest; otherwise, Paragraph
(2) of this Section shall apply.
The facts here support a finding that the vehicle no longer had any usefulness as
evidence once Brown pled guilty to manslaughter. Thus, subsection B(1) requires
that the property be returned to the owner unless it is contraband. There is no
evidence that the vehicle is contraband, therefore the vehicle should have been
returned to Brown once the Sheriff or District Attorney no longer intended to use it
as evidence. Since the vehicle was not returned to Brown, we now move to
subsection B(2). Subsection B(2) states:
(2) If the seized property is contraband, and the court determines that it
should not be destroyed, or if the owner of noncontraband property does
not claim it within two years after its seizure, the court shall order:
(a) A sale of the property at a nonjudicial public sale
or auction, if the court concludes that such a sale will
probably result in a bid greater than the costs of the sale.
The proceeds of the sale shall be administered by the court
and used exclusively for the maintenance, renovation,
preservation, or improvement of the court building,
facilities, or records system.
(b) If the court concludes that the cost of a public
sale would probably exceed the highest bid, the court may
order the property transferred to a public or a nonprofit
institution or destroyed or may make such other court
ordered disposition as it deems appropriate.
As discussed, the vehicle is not contraband; therefore, the second clause applies.
There is no evidence that Brown claimed the property within two years of the date it
was seized. In this case, the statute requires that the court order the property be sold
or disposed of as it deems appropriate. The evidence in this case shows only that the
District Attorney’s Office authorized the Sheriff’s Office to dispose of the vehicle.
The statute clearly requires the court to issue an order disposing of the property. Had
the court ordered the disposal of the property after the two-year time period had
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elapsed, then Brown’s claim would not be viable. The Sheriff’s Office defense that
the District Attorney’s Office authorized the disposal of the vehicle cannot hold up,
since the District Attorney is not a court.
The first circuit reached the same conclusion in Taiae v. City of Baton Rouge,
00-195 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/22/01), 808 So.2d 677. In Taiae, the Border Patrol seized
cash from the plaintiff in connection with a criminal proceeding. The cash was turned
over to the Baton Rouge City Police Department. The plaintiff was never charged
with a crime. The Baton Rouge police, however, deposited the cash into the general
treasury of the City Parish of East Baton Rouge. The plaintiff filed a conversion
action. The district court held that the claim had prescribed, but the first circuit
reversed. In its opinion, the court discussed La.R.S. 15:41:
Aside from the theory of conversion, we note there are several
statutes that deal with the disposition of seized property. If there is a
specific statute concerning the disposition of seized property, the
property shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions thereof.
La. R.S. 15:41(A). If there is no such specific statute, the disposition of
property seized in connection with a criminal proceeding, but which is
not to be used as evidence, is governed by the provisions of La. R.S.
15:41(B). The involvement of the United States Border Patrol and the
seizure of cash from Mr. Taiae's person necessarily implies the money
was seized “in connection with a criminal proceeding.” The fact that
Mr. Taiae was not charged with a crime herein indicates the money was
“not used as evidence.” Therefore, La. R.S. 15:41(B) is applicable to
the facts herein.
Under former La. R.S. 15:41(B)(2)(a), if the owner of
noncontraband property did not claim it within two years after its
seizure, the court was required to order a sale of the property at a
nonjudicial public sale or auction. The proceeds of the sale were to be
administered by the court and used exclusively for the maintenance,
renovation, preservation, or improvement of the court building,
facilities, or records system. The two-year time period referenced in
former La. R.S. 15:41(B)(2) is a minimum period before which a
court may not act to dispose of seized property. It does not set an
outside time limit within which an owner of noncontraband
property must assert a claim for the property's return. State v.
Baynes, 96-0292 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/31/96), 678 So.2d 959, 961-962.
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Therefore, Mr. Taiae is not precluded from asserting his claim for return
of the seized money under former La. R.S. 15:41(B)(2).
Taiae, 808 So.2d at 680-81 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Prescription statutes are to be strictly construed against prescription. Lima v.
Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624 (La.1992). The party pleading prescription ordinarily bears
the burden of proving that prescription has extinguished the obligation. Compton v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 01-386 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/01), 796 So.2d 896. As
the Sheriff has not met this burden, the judgment sustaining the Exception of
Prescription is reversed.
Since we find merit in the appellant’s first three assignments of error, we find
it unnecessary to discuss the appellant’s fourth assignment of error.
This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of this
appeal are assessed to the Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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