City of Phila. v. J.S., Aplts.

[J-9-2025]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, : No. 34 EAP 2024

:

Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the

: Commonwealth Court entered on

: December 21, 2023, at No. 1272 CD

v. : 2021, reversing and remanding the

: Order of the Court of Common Pleas

: of Philadelphia County, Civil

J.S., SR. AND C.S., ADMINISTRATORS : Division, entered on October 21,

OF THE ESTATE OF J.S., : 2021, at No. 210700175.

:

Appellants : ARGUED: September 9, 2025

OPINION

JUSTICE McCAFFERY DECIDED: March 26, 2026

It is ingrained in our jurisprudence, and presumably known to legislators,

that suit will not lie against the government unless there has been a clear

waiver of immunity for the subject matter in question.[1]

In this discretionary appeal, we consider the parameters of the sexual abuse

exception to general governmental immunity from tort claims codified in Section

8542(b)(9) of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA).2 See 42 Pa.C.S. §

8542(b)(9). Enacted in 2019, Section 8542(b)(9) waives tort immunity in certain

circumstances — “[t]he following acts by a local agency or any of its employees may

result in the imposition of liability on a local agency; … (9) Sexual abuse. – Conduct which

1 Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 285

(2012) (emphasis omitted).

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8564.

constitutes an offense enumerated under [42 Pa.C.S. §] 5551(7) (relating to no limitation

applicable) if the injuries to the plaintiff were caused by actions or omissions of the local

agency which constitute negligence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(9). Section 5551(7) lists nine

sexual offenses for which there is no statute of limitations provided the victim was a minor

at the time of the abuse. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5551(7).

We must determine whether this legislatively-granted waiver of immunity applies

when the victim of the sexual abuse is an adult, or whether it is limited to sexual abuse

committed against minor victims. We hold the unambiguous language of Section

8542(b)(9) waives immunity of political subdivisions or their employees only if the plaintiff

was a minor at the time of the sexual abuse.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 6, 2021, J.S. filed a civil action against the City of Philadelphia (the City)

— as operator of the Department of Prisons — and various unnamed prison employees,3

asserting claims of sexual abuse, battery, and civil conspiracy. The allegations, as set

forth in the complaint, describe a prolonged assault while J.S. was incarcerated, which

are as follows.4

On July 30, 2019, J.S. was arrested by Philadelphia police. After being processed

and arraigned at police headquarters, J.S. was transported to the Curran-Fromhold

Correctional Facility (CFCF) when he was unable to post bail. He arrived at CFCF at

3 J.S. referred to these employees as “John Does 1-20 and Jane Does 1-20[.]” Complaint,

7/6/2021, at ¶ 4.

4 As this appeal is from an order sustaining preliminary objections and dismissing J.S.’s

complaint, we “accept as true all well-pleaded, material, and relevant facts alleged in the

complaint and every inference that is fairly deducible from those facts.” Kleinbard LLC v.

Office of District Attorney of Lancaster County, 328 A.3d 21, 26 (Pa. 2024) (citation

omitted).

[J-9-2025] - 2

approximately 4:29 a.m. on July 31st and was placed in a waiting cell. J.S. claims that

sometime before 5:37 a.m., while he remained in that cell, numerous prison employees

“viciously assaulted” him “because he was a homosexual.” Complaint, 7/6/2021, at ¶¶

21, 24, 26. Specifically, J.S. contends he was “subjected to indecent contact” when the

offenders “forced” an “unknown object” into “and used [it] to puncture [his] buttocks.” Id.

at ¶ 22. J.S. was transported to the hospital, where he was intubated. He avers that “[a]s

a result of this conduct, [he] suffered two rib fractures, an acute kidney injury, a gluteal

abrasion, multiple bruises and laceration, a head injury resulting in hair loss[,] and

puncture wounds on his body.” Id. at ¶ 25.

The only cause of action in J.S.’s complaint implicating the City was Count III,

which asserted sexual abuse. See Complaint at ¶¶ 48-58. J.S. alleged the City was

negligent in failing to, inter alia, train, screen, and monitor its employees, appropriately

staff the prison, and protect the inmates. The City filed preliminary objections on August

3, 2021, asserting it was immune from tort liability under the PSTCA. While

acknowledging that the Act provides an exception for negligent acts and omissions

constituting sexual abuse, the City insisted that the exception applies only if the victim

was a minor at the time of the alleged abuse. Because J.S. was not a minor when the

alleged abuse occurred,5 the City asked the trial court to dismiss it from the action with

prejudice. See Preliminary Objections, 8/3/2021, at 3 (unpaginated). J.S. filed a

response in opposition, and accompanying memorandum of law, arguing that the City’s

interpretation of the statute was incorrect, and the sexual abuse exception to

governmental immunity in the PSTCA is not limited to the sexual abuse of minor victims.

On October 6, 2021, after additional briefing by both parties, the trial court entered

an order overruling the City’s preliminary objections and directing the City to file an answer

5 J.S. acknowledged in his complaint that he is an “adult individual.” Complaint at ¶ 1.

[J-9-2025] - 3

to the complaint. The City filed a timely motion for reconsideration, asking the trial court

to either reconsider its decision and enter judgment in favor of the City, or amend its order

to permit an immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b).6 Although

J.S. opposed the motion, on October 21, 2021, the court amended its prior order to

include the requisite Section 702(b) language. See Order, 10/21/2021.

Thereafter, the City petitioned the Commonwealth Court for permission to appeal.

The Court granted the petition to consider whether the new sexual abuse exception to

governmental immunity in Section 8542(b)(9) applies only if the victim was a minor at the

time of the abuse. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court abruptly changed

course, and acknowledged that, upon further review, it agreed with the City that Section

8542(b)(9) waived immunity only if the victim was a minor. For that reason, the trial court

requested the Commonwealth Court reverse the decision on appeal — which the

Commonwealth Court agreed to in a unanimous, unreported, en banc decision. See City

of Philadelphia v. J.S., 311 A.3d 62 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (en banc) (unreported).

The Commonwealth Court concluded that “[b]y its plain terms, Section 8542(b)(9)

… specifically incorporates the provisions of Section 5551(7)[, which,] by its plain terms,

… is specifically limited to crimes involving a ‘victim [who] was under eighteen years of

age at the time of the offense.’” J.S., 311 A.3d at *3. In other words, the Commonwealth

Court determined the sexual abuse exception was unambiguous and applied only if the

plaintiff was a minor at the time of the abuse. For persuasive support, the Court cited its

recent unreported decision in Caldwell v. Dep’t of Corrections, 252 A.3d 708 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2021) (unreported), and the federal district court decision in Jean v. City of Philadelphia,

6 When a trial court enters an interlocutory order that it believes “involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that

an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of

the matter,” Section 702(b) directs the court to state so in its order. 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b).

It is then up to the appellate court, “in its discretion, [to] permit an appeal[.]” Id.

[J-9-2025] - 4

604 F. Supp. 3d 271 (E.D. Pa. 2022). Caldwell considered an identical sexual assault

exception in the Sovereign Immunity Act7 and concluded that the immunity exception

applied only if the plaintiff was a minor at the time of the sexual abuse. See J.S., 311

A.3d at *3 (citation omitted). Observing that this Court has interpreted the PSTCA and

the Sovereign Immunity Act “consistently, as they deal with indistinguishable subject

matter[,]” the Commonwealth Court opined “no convincing reason has been advanced to

distinguish [Caldwell from] this case.” Id. (citing Finn v. City of Philadelphia, 664 A.2d

1342, 1344 (Pa. 1995)). As for Jean, the Court noted in a parenthetical that Jean

interpreted the “age qualifier” in Section 5551(7) as “essential to what constitutes an

‘offense’ under that section.” Id. (citing Jean, 604 F. Supp. 3d at 275).

Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court’s order and

remanded for further proceedings.

II. ISSUE

J.S.8 petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal, which we granted to consider

the following issue:

Whether the Commonwealth Court incorrectly concluded that the Sexual

Abuse Exception to the Local Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (42

Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(9)) is only applicable to plaintiffs who were minors at the

time they were victimized?

City of Philadelphia v. J.S., 316 A.3d 619 (Pa. 2024).

7 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521-8528.The Sovereign Immunity Act provides tort immunity to the

Commonwealth except in very limited circumstances. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521-8522.

8 During the pendency of the Commonwealth Court appeal, J.S. passed away. The

executors of his estate — J.S., Sr. and C.S. — were substituted as parties pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 502(a) (“If a party dies … while a matter is … pending in an appellate court,

the personal representative of the deceased party may be substituted as a party[.]”). For

ease of discussion, however, we continue to refer to the appellant/plaintiff as J.S.

[J-9-2025] - 5

III. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

Before the 1970s, both governmental and sovereign immunity operated as

judicially-created doctrines grounded in Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution: “Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such

courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.” PA. CONST. art. I, §

11 (emphasis added). Following a judicial attempt to abolish governmental and sovereign

immunity,9 the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed legislation reaffirming the broad

grant of tort immunity to the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions. See 1978,

Sept. 28, P.L. 788, No. 152, § 1, imd. effective. The Legislature declared:

Pursuant to section 11 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, it is

hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the

Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of

their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official

immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General

Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity. When the General

Assembly specifically waives sovereign immunity, a claim against the

Commonwealth and its officials and employees shall be brought only in

such manner and in such courts and in such cases as directed by the

provisions of Title 42 (relating to judiciary and judicial procedure) or 62

(relating to procurement) unless otherwise specifically authorized by

statute.

1 Pa.C.S. § 2310 (emphasis added). Accompanying this declaration, the Legislature

enacted the predecessor to our present Sovereign Immunity Act. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§

5110-5111 (repealed).

Subsequently, in 1980, the General Assembly enacted both the current Sovereign

Immunity Act and the PSTCA. Both statutes provide broad immunity from tort liability to

9 In 1973, this Court abrogated the judicially-created doctrine of governmental immunity

in Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Education, 305 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1973). Five years later,

in July 1978, we issued a similar opinion abolishing sovereign immunity. In Mayle v.

Pennsylvania Dep’t of Highways, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1978), we held that “the doctrine [of

sovereign immunity] is unfair and unsuited to the times[;] the doctrine’s day has long since

passed.” Id. at 710.

[J-9-2025] - 6

the government.10 Both statutes also create a list of enumerated exceptions where the

General Assembly agreed to waive that broad immunity, thereby exposing the

Commonwealth or a local agency to liability for its own negligent acts or those of its

employees. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8522(b), 8542(b). Nevertheless, governmental immunity

remains the “absolute rule” and any exceptions “must be narrowly interpreted given the

expressed legislative intent to insulate political subdivisions [and the Commonwealth]

from tort liability.” Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 523 A.2d 1118, 1123 (Pa. 1997)

(citations omitted). See also Jones, 772 A.2d at 440 (“Because the legislature’s intent in

both the Sovereign Immunity and Tort Claims Acts is to shield government from liability,

except as provided for in the statutes themselves, we apply a rule of strict construction in

interpreting [the] exceptions.”) (citation omitted); Lockwood v. City of Pittsburgh, 751 A.2d

1136 (Pa. 2000) (“Because of the clear intent to insulate government from exposure to

tort liability, the exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed.”) (citation omitted).

In 2019, both statutes were amended to include the sexual abuse exception at

issue before us. See 2019 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2019-87 (H.B. 962) (House Bill 962). This

same legislation also added subsection (7) to Section 5551 of the Judicial Code, which

eliminated the statute of limitations for certain sexual crimes committed against minor

victims. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5551(7).

Although the short title to House Bill 962 broadly declared its intent to “reform[ ]

remedies for victims of sexual abuse[,]”11 the legislative history leading to its enactment

reveals an overriding concern for child sexual abuse reform after the institutional

10 The PSTCA focuses on local governmental agencies and their employees. See 42

Pa.C.S. § 8541. While the present dispute arises under the PSTCA, we have held that it

should be “interpreted consistently” with the Sovereign Immunity Act, since both statutes

“deal with indistinguishable subject matter.” Finn, 664 A.2d at 1344. Accord Jones v.

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 772 A.2d 435, 440 (Pa. 2001).

11 2019 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2019-87 (H.B. 962).

[J-9-2025] - 7

scandals that came to light in the early to mid-2010s. The Bill’s prime sponsor,

Representative Mark Rozzi, declared that “[m]uch has happened over the years to bring

attention to the hidden epidemic of childhood sexual abuse[,]” before referencing the

grand jury reports exposing the Catholic archdiocese and private school scandals.

Legislative Journal-House, 203rd Session of the General Assembly (House Journal),

4/10/2019, at 510. He explained that “we now know, without any doubt, the extent of the

abuse and cover up that has plagued our State and that the statute of limitations reform

must move forward.” Id. Moreover, Representative Rozzi highlighted the Bill would

“waive sovereign immunity for public entities guilty of covering up childhood sexual abuse”

to provide for “absolute parity in the handling of sexual abuse claims between public and

private institutions.” Id.

House Bill 963 was also under consideration at that time.12 That Bill proposed to

add a constitutional amendment which would allow individuals who had been sexually

abused as minors, but for whom the limitations period had expired, a period of two years

to commence an action from the time of its enactment. See Joint Resolution No. 2 of

2019, Nov. 25, 2019. Speaking in support of both Bills, Representative Jim Gregory

emphasized the Bills offered “a two-part, but unified, endeavor to address weaknesses in

Pennsylvania’s civil and criminal statutes relating to sexual abuse of children” particularly

with respect to the “statutes of limitations and governmental immunity.” House Journal,

4/10/2019, at 510. Representative Bryan Cutler agreed, declaring that even after the Bills

pass, “[w]e all must do our part to try and eradicate sexual abuse of children from the face

of the earth[,]” and there should “never again … be an opening in our laws where the

perpetrators are left to be held unaccountable.” Id. at 512. After House Bill 962 passed

12 House Bill 963 was enacted as Joint Resolution No. 2 of 2019, Nov. 25, 2019.

[J-9-2025] - 8

the Senate with several amendments not relevant here,13 Representative Tom Murt spoke

in support of the amended Bill, clarifying that “[t]he ability of victims to sue is about justice,

not money” and concerns the “accountability of institutions that covered up child sexual

abuse or enabled abusers to commit their crimes against innocent children.” House

Journal, 11/21/2019, at 1935. Thus, the focus of the legislation was related to the sexual

abuse of minors.

IV. SEXUAL ABUSE EXCEPTION

Section 8542 of the PSTCA waives governmental immunity in certain, limited

circumstances. It explains that a local agency may be liable for damages resulting from

an injury to a person or property when three prerequisites are met: (1) the damages

would be recoverable under the common law or a statute if the defendant were not

protected by governmental immunity; (2) “[t]he injury was caused by the negligent acts of

the local agency or an employee thereof acting within the scope of his office or duties[;]”

and (3) the negligent act which caused the injury is one of the acts listed in subsection

(b). 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(a)(1)-(2). The negligent act at issue here is the sexual abuse

exception listed in subsection (b)(9):

(9) Sexual abuse.--Conduct which constitutes an offense enumerated

under section 5551(7) (relating to no limitation applicable) if the injuries

to the plaintiff were caused by actions or omissions of the local agency

which constitute negligence.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(9) (emphasis added).

At the same time the sexual abuse exception was added to Section 8542, the

General Assembly enacted an identical provision in the Sovereign Immunity Act. See 42

13 It merits mention that one proposed Senate amendment would have eliminated the

criminal statute of limitations for survivors of sexual abuse “regardless of age.” Legislative

Journal-Senate, 203rd Session of the General Assembly (Senate Journal), 11/20/2019,

at 1108. That amendment, however, did not pass. See id. at 1109.

[J-9-2025] - 9

Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(10). As part of this reform, the Legislature amended Section 5551 of

the Judicial Code to include subsection (7) — the statutory provision referenced in Section

8542(b)(9).

Section 5551 lists offenses for which there is no statute of limitations, including

murder and homicide by vehicle. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5551. Subsection (7) provides that

“[a] prosecution … may be commenced at any time [for]:

(7) An offense under any of the following provisions of 18 Pa.C.S.

(relating to crimes and offenses), or a conspiracy or solicitation to commit

an offense under any of the following provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. if the offense

results from the conspiracy or solicitation, if the victim was under 18 years

of age at the time of the offense:

Section 3011(b) (relating to trafficking in individuals).

Section 3012 (relating to involuntary servitude) as it relates to sexual

servitude.

Section 3121 (relating to rape).

Section 3122.1 (relating to statutory sexual assault).

Section 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse).

Section 3124.1 (relating to sexual assault).

Section 3124.2 (relating to institutional sexual assault).

Section 3125 (relating to aggravated indecent assault).

Section 4302 (relating to incest).

42 Pa.C.S. § 5551(7) (emphases added). Thus, subsection (7) added nine additional

sexual offenses to the list of crimes for which there is no limitations period, but only if the

victim was a minor at the time of the offense.

Accordingly, the issue before us is whether Section 8542(b)(9)’s reference to the

“[c]onduct which constitutes an offense enumerated under Section 5551(7)[,]” includes

the age limitation or just the conduct which constitutes the offense. 42 Pa.C.S. §

8542(b)(9). This question is one of statutory interpretation.

[J-9-2025] - 10

V. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Statutory interpretation involves a question of law; therefore, our scope of review

is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo. See U.S. Venture, Inc. v.

Commonwealth, 255 A.3d 321, 334 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). In such cases, “our

foundational premise is to bring about the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.”

Green Analytics North, LLC v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Health, 343 A.3d 1086, 1093 (Pa.

2025) (citation omitted). See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); Commonwealth v. Hardy, 337 A.3d

385, 404 (Pa. 2025) (“The object of all statutory interpretation is ‘to ascertain and

effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.’”) (citation omitted).

It is axiomatic that the plain language of a statute, generally, “provides the best

indication of legislative intent.” Ursinus College v. Prevailing Wage Act Bd., 310 A.3d

154, 170 (Pa. 2024) (citation omitted). In determining the plain meaning of a statutory

provision, we consider “the statutory language in context and give words and phrases

their common and approved usage.” Green Analytics, 343 A.3d at 1093 (citation omitted).

Indeed, the Statutory Construction Act informs that “[w]hen the words of a statute are

clear and free from all ambiguity,” we must not disregard the language “under the pretext

of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). So, when the language is clear and

unambiguous, we need not resort to the other factors for interpreting statutory language

set forth in Section 1921(c). See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). Nonetheless, we do not interpret

statutory text in isolation; rather we view it “with reference to the context in which it

appears.” Commonwealth v. Kingston, 143 A.3d 917, 922 (Pa. 2016).

A contextual reading of statutory language requires us to look beyond the specific

provision at issue and read it in the context of the overall statutory scheme, construing

[J-9-2025] - 11

the statute as a whole in a manner that gives effect to all the provisions, if possible.14 See

1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); Matos v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 334 A.3d 288, 306 (Pa. 2025). While

we have recognized the “tension” of considering both the common meaning of the words

at issue and the statutory provision in context, “both commands are mere tools in service

of identifying [legislative] intent.” Green Analytics, 343 A.3d at 1093. While an ambiguous

statute is one where “there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text[,]”15 we

have cautioned that “we must not overlabor to detect or manufacture ambiguity where the

language reveals none.” Reibenstein v. Barax, 286 A.3d 222, 230 (Pa. 2022) (citation

omitted).

VI. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

Turning to the issue before us, both parties insist that the statutory language in

Section 8542(b)(9) is unambiguous, and that their interpretation of the language

controls. J.S. focuses on the phrase “[c]onduct which constitutes an offense[.]” J.S.’s

Brief at 16 (emphasis added) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(9)). Citing to the Legislative

Drafting Manual16 in the Pennsylvania Administrative Code, he maintains the General

14 The Concurring Opinion bemoans our consideration of “context” in a statutory

interpretation question involving plain and unambiguous language. Concurring Opinion

at 2 n.2. Nevertheless, Justice Wecht admits that “a statutory provision must be

understood within the content of the broader statutory scheme within which it exists[.]” Id.

That is simply what we did. Our analysis does not, as he fears, “squint at [the] law” to

determine the intent of the Legislature. Id. Rather, we focus on the unambiguous

statutory language, which, unsurprisingly, both parties assert unambiguously supports

their disparate interpretations. Even unambiguous language must be viewed in context.

See Kingston, 143 A.3d at 922. Indeed, as Chief Justice Roberts opined: “Our duty, after

all, is ‘to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.’” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486

(2015) (citation omitted).

15 Kornfeind v. New Werner Holding Co., Inc., 280 A.3d 918, 925 (Pa. 2022) (citation

omitted).

16 101 Pa. Code §§ 13.1-19.515.

[J-9-2025] - 12

Assembly cross-referenced the offenses listed in Section 5551(7) only for purposes of

“brevity and to avoid redundancy[.]” Id. at 18 (citing 101 Pa. Code 15.93 (calling for

“[b]revity” in drafting statutes)). J.S. argues the “conduct” which constitutes each of the

enumerated offenses does not include an age limitation. Id. at 21. Rather, “the age of

the victim is an attendant circumstance which implicates the applicability of the statute of

limitations” — it “is not part of the ‘conduct’ that amounts to an offense under the Crimes

Code.” Id. Acknowledging the word “conduct” is not defined in the Judicial Code, he

references the definition in the Crimes Code,17 which describes “[c]onduct” as “[a]n action

or omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where relevant, a series of acts and

omissions.” Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted) (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 103). In J.S.’s view, whether

the victim was a minor or adult at the time of the offense is irrelevant “because the

conduct required to constitute … the offenses enumerated in Section 5551(7) remains

the same[.]” Id. at 22 (emphasis in original). He insists that if the General Assembly

intended to limit the sexual abuse immunity exception to minor victims, it would have done

so explicitly — e.g., by naming the subsection “Sexual Abuse of minors[.]” Id. at 18

(emphasis in original).

J.S. also contends the Commonwealth Court’s reliance on Caldwell and Jean is

misplaced. He emphasizes that Caldwell is an unpublished Commonwealth Court

decision, and “did [not] involve a claim under Section 8542(b)(9).” J.S.’s Brief at 24. Thus,

any seemingly relevant language in that case is dicta. As for Jean, J.S. concedes that

district court “rejected the exact argument” he advances here, however, he contends the

Jean Court conducted only a “brief and unremarkable” analysis of the statutory text and

“failed to grasp the distinction between conduct constituting an offense and attendant

circumstances[.]” Id. at 25. J.S. explains that the age limitation in Section 5551(7) is

17 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-1111.

[J-9-2025] - 13

relevant to the statute of limitations, not to the commission of the enumerated sexual

offenses. See id. at 26 (asserting that “conduct amounting to a Rape” does not cease to

“constitute a Rape after the statute of limitations has expired”) (emphasis omitted).

Accordingly, J.S. contends that neither Caldwell nor Jean “should be regarded by this

Court as persuasive authority on the issue to be decided here.”18 Id. at 27.

The City, however, argues Section 8542(b)(9) is unambiguous for the opposite

reason — the General Assembly clearly intended the sexual abuse immunity exception

to apply only if the victim was a minor at the time of the offense. It insists Section

5551(7)’s age qualifier is its “key substantive provision” — the statute of limitations for the

enumerated sexual crimes is extended “only if the victim was under 18 years old at the

time of the offense.” City’s Brief at 9 (emphasis in original). It maintains the General

Assembly incorporated Section 5551(7) into Section 8542(b)(9) “without reservation,

signaling that the legislature intended to incorporate the ‘under 18’ requirement as well.”

Id.

The City’s interpretation focuses on context. It emphasizes that “the overriding

policy and purpose” of the PSTCA is “to limit public liability for private tort claims[,]” and,

therefore, the exceptions to this broad grant of immunity must be narrowly construed.

18 The Pennsylvania Association for Justice filed an amicus brief in support of J.S.,

concurring with his assertion that Section 8542(b)(9) references the “[c]onduct which

constitutes an offense enumerated under” Section 5551(7), and does not “specify that the

victim must be under 18 when the act occurred.” Amicus Brief at 6, 10. Amicus notes

that the General Assembly explicitly included an age limitation when necessary, citing the

immunity exception for liquor store sales in Section 8522(b)(7). See id. at 12 (citing 42

Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(7) (waiving sovereign immunity for the “sale of liquor at Pennsylvania

liquor stores by employees of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board … if such sale is

made to any minor …”) (emphasis added)).

Furthermore, Amicus agrees Caldwell is not controlling and fears that limiting the

sexual abuse immunity exception to minor victims will “insulate[] not only prison guards

but all other local agency employees from liability for crimes where the victims are

frequently adults[.]” Id. at 12-13.

[J-9-2025] - 14

City’s Brief at 10-11 (citations omitted). Importantly, the City highlights that both Section

5551(7) and Section 8542(b)(9) were enacted as part of the same legislative package,

House Bill 962. And, Section 5551(7) was added for the sole purpose of eliminating the

statute of limitations for certain sexual crimes committed against minors. See id. at 16.

The City argues that J.S. is asking this Court “to ignore the very purpose of Section

5551(7)” by disregarding the age limitation in that provision. Id. at 17-18. It declares that

a plain language reading supports its interpretation: “As [Section 8542(b)(9)] incorporated

Section 5551(7) without reservation, and Section 5551(7) is expressly limited to sex

crimes perpetrated against children, [Section 8542(b)(2)] is also limited to crimes against

children.” Id. at 21. The City maintains that J.S.’s analysis relies on the definition of the

word “conduct” in a different statute (the Crimes Code), which does not apply to the

Judicial Code.

Furthermore, the City asserts its plain reading of Section 8542(b)(9) supports the

established statutory presumption that “the General Assembly intends to favor the public

interest as against any private interest.” City’s Brief at 19 (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(5)).

As for Amicus’s policy argument — that this interpretation will insulate prison guards and

other agency employees — the City emphasizes that agency employees are still liable

for criminal conduct, as well as conduct that occurs outside their scope of employment.

See id. at 20-21.

VII. ANALYSIS

We begin, as always, with the statutory text at issue. See Green Analytics, 343

A.3d at 1093. Here, our focus is on two provisions — Section 8542(b)(9) and Section

5551(7).

[J-9-2025] - 15

Section 8542(b)(9) provides an exception to the broad governmental immunity

from tort claims if the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the negligent “actions or omissions

of the local agency” (or its employees), leading to “[c]onduct which constitutes an offense

enumerated under section 5551(7) (relating to no limitation applicable)[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. §

8542(b)(9). Section 8542(b)(9)’s reference to Section 5551(7) is unqualified.

Section 5551(7) lists nine sexual offenses for which there is no statute of

limitations, provided the victim was a minor at the time of the offense. See 42 Pa.C.S. §

5551(7). We agree with the City that the “key substantive provision” in Section 5551(7)

is the age qualifier. City’s Brief at 9. The clear purpose of Section 5551(7) is to lift the

statute of limitations for minor victims of the listed offenses. In other words, Section

5551(7) explicitly adds a requirement that the victim be a minor at the time of the crime.

While J.S. concedes Section 5551(7) “concerns the criminal statute of limitations

for certain sexual offenses[,]” he disregards, or at the very least downplays, that fact in

his textual analysis. J.S.’s Brief at 17. Rather, J.S. hyper focuses on the word “conduct”

in Section 8542(b)(9) to manufacture an ambiguity in the provision where there is none.19

Pursuant to Section 5551(7), the listed crimes all contain an additional element, namely,

that “the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. §

5551(7). Otherwise, the age provision is simply meaningless. Thus, when the General

Assembly referred to the “[c]onduct which constitutes an offense enumerated under

section 5551(7) (relating to no limitation applicable)[,]” in the sexual abuse exception, the

only reasonable interpretation is that the General Assembly intended the immunity

exception to apply to those offenses listed in Section 5551(7) only if the victim was a

minor at the time of the offense. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(9).

19 Ironically, despite reading an ambiguity into the statute, J.S. maintains the provision is

unambiguous.

[J-9-2025] - 16

Contextually, this interpretation simply makes sense. Through its enactment of

Section 2310, the Sovereign Immunity Act, and the PSTCA, the Pennsylvania General

Assembly clearly directed that broad governmental immunity is the “absolute rule.”

Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1123. See also 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310 (“[I]t is hereby … the intent of the

General Assembly that the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within

the scope of their duties, shall continue to … remain immune from suit except as the

General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.”); 42 Pa.C.S. § 8521(a) (“Except

as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no provision of this title shall constitute a waiver

of sovereign immunity[.]”); 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541 (“Except as otherwise provided in this

subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to

a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any

other person.”). Accordingly, we must interpret narrowly the specific, legislatively-

granted exceptions to this broad immunity.

In Mascaro, we refused to extend Section 8542(b)(3)’s real property exception20 to

permit an action against a city agency for negligently maintaining a detention center from

which a prisoner escaped. See Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1119, 1124. The prisoner later

burglarized the plaintiffs’ home and sexually assaulted the wife and child. See id.

Narrowly interpreting the exception, this Court held that it “applied only … where it is

alleged that the artificial condition or defect of the land itself causes the injury, not merely

when it facilitates the injury by the acts of others, whose acts are outside the statute’s

scope of liability.” Id. at 1124 (emphasis in original). See also Snyder v. Harmon, 562

A.2d 307, 309, 313 (Pa. 1989) (narrowly interpreting the same exception in the Sovereign

Immunity Act; holding the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation was immune from

20 This exception waives governmental immunity if the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from

“[t]he care, custody or control of real property in the possession of the local agency[.]” 42

Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(3).

[J-9-2025] - 17

negligence action alleging it failed to warn or protect public from privately-owned strip

mine pit located 12-feet from the road because claims were not premised upon “an

artificial condition or defect of the [Commonwealth-owned] land itself”).

We also narrowly interpreted Section 8542(b)(6)’s “streets” exception, which

“exposes a local agency to liability for … [a] dangerous condition of streets[.]”21

Lockwood, 751 A.2d at 1139 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(6)(i)). In that case, the

decedent was a passenger in a car driven by a drunk driver. See id. at 1137-1138. The

driver failed to negotiate a sharp curve in the road, and the car traveled down an

embankment and struck a tree; the decedent suffered fatal injuries. See id. The

administrator of decedent’s estate sued the City, asserting it negligently maintained its

roadways — specifically, that the absence of a guardrail at the sharp turn created a

“foreseeable risk of injury and was a substantial factor in causing” decedent’s death. Id.

at 1138. This Court again held the City was immune from tort liability, and the “streets”

exception in the PSTCA did not apply: “[T]he City’s failure to install a guardrail along the

curve in the road where the accident occurred is not a dangerous condition of

streets[.]”22 Id. at 1140 (emphasis added).

21 Section 8542(b)(6) provides an exception to governmental immunity if, inter alia, the

plaintiff’s injuries were caused by “[a] dangerous condition of streets owned by the local

agency” so long as the plaintiff establishes “the dangerous condition created a reasonably

foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred and that the local agency had

actual notice or could reasonably be charged with notice … of the dangerous condition”

in sufficient time to “have taken measures to protect against” it. 42 Pa.C.S. §

8542(b)(6)(i).

22 Lockwood was decided the same day as Dean v. Com., Dep’t of Transp., 751 A.2d

1130 (Pa. 2000), which considered (and rejected) the same immunity exception in the

Sovereign Immunity Act. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4). Dean also involved a claim that

the Commonwealth was negligent in failing to install a guardrail where a motor vehicle

accident occurred. See Dean, 751 A.2d at 1131. The Dean Court explained that “the

absence of a guardrail cannot be said to be a dangerous condition of the real estate that

resulted in a reasonably foreseeable injury[.]” Id. at 1134.

[J-9-2025] - 18

Even when this Court has held that an immunity exception applied, and the

plaintiff’s tort action against a city or governmental agency could proceed, we have done

so based upon a textual, plain language interpretation of the exception at issue. See

Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, 191 A.3d 799, 808-810 (Pa. 2018) (plaintiff alleged

government employee parked a vehicle “in the roadway” before the vehicle was struck by

third party, which caused the vehicle to move forward and strike plaintiff; vehicle liability

exception in PSTCA, which waives immunity for tort claims resulting from the “operation

of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of [a] local agency[,] does not require

the vehicle to be in motion to impose liability”) (emphasis added; citation omitted);

Brewington for Brewington v. City of Philadelphia, 199 A.3d 348, 350-351, 357 (Pa. 2018)

(child injured when he tripped during gym class and hit his head on concrete gym wall;

PSTCA’s real property exception, which waives immunity when an injury results from the

“care, custody or control of real property in the possession of” agency, applicable as the

wall “constitutes real property”) (citation omitted).

Turning back to the sexual abuse exception, prior case law supports our

conclusion. Every court that has considered the age limitation question has concluded

that the exception applies only if the victim was under the age of 18 at the time of the

sexual abuse. After J.S., the Commonwealth Court issued an en banc ruling in West v.

Pittsburgh Public Schools, 327 A.3d 340 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (en banc), reaffirming its

determination that the sexual abuse exception applies only if the victim was a minor. See

id. at 346-347. The Court rejected a policy argument that the exception should extend to

the victim in that case, a 19-year-old intellectually disabled student who was sexually

assaulted by a substitute bus driver on her way home from school. See id. at 342, 347.

Two Commonwealth Court judges filed concurring opinions, recognizing the Court was

bound by the plain language of the statute, but urging the General Assembly to take

[J-9-2025] - 19

action. See id. at 348 (“This case reveals a glaring and inequitable oversight in the

[PSTCA].”) (McCullough, J., concurring); id. at 353-354 (Wallace, J., concurring).

Moreover, two separate federal district courts in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

found that a plain reading of the statute compelled the same result — that is, the immunity

exception applies only if the victim was a minor at the time of the sexual assault. See

Kahler v. County of Delaware, Pennsylvania, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___, 2025 WL

2778092, *8 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (Perez, J.) (County was immune from negligent

supervision claim brought by former Delaware County Department of Emergency

Services employee who alleged she was sexually assaulted by supervisor when plaintiff

“was not a minor” at the time of alleged assault); Jean v. City of Philadelphia, 604 F. Supp.

3d 271, 275 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (Robreno, J.) (City was immune from negligence claim

brought by administrator of estate of inmate who was sexually assaulted by cellmate;

“under the plain language of the statute, the sexual assault exception to governmental

immunity, as stated in [S]ection 8542(b)(9) …, only applies when the victim was under

eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged sexual assault.”).

Notably, the Third Circuit and several federal district courts have, in the same

manner, applied the age limitation to the sexual abuse exception in Section 8522(b)(10)

of the Sovereign Immunity Act. See Brown v. Maxwell, 2024 WL 1209517, *1, *4 (3d. Cir.

2024) (unreported) (Department of Corrections employees immune from negligence

action brought by transgender prisoner who was sexually assaulted by cell mate;

“[b]ecause [plaintiff] does not assert that she was [under] 18 [at the time of the assault],

the ‘sexual abuse’ exemption is inapplicable.”); Doe v. East Stroudsburg Univ. of

Pennsylvania, 2023 WL 7548028, *1, *6 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (unreported) (University immune

from state law tort claims arising from student’s sexual assault by another student;

plaintiff’s claims “do not fit within [the sexual abuse immunity] exception because she was

[J-9-2025] - 20

not under the age of eighteen at the time of the conduct.”); Cunning v. West Chester

Univ., 2021 WL 765729, *1-*2 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (unreported) (University immune from

negligence claims arising from graduate assistant’s sexual assault of student; “by its clear

terms, [Section] 5551(7) applies only to instances in which the ‘victim … was under 18

years of age at the time of the offense,’ and [p]laintiff acknowledges that she was already

twenty years old when her relationship with [the graduate assistant] began.”) (citations

omitted).23 The sexual abuse immunity exception in both statutes includes identical

language — compare 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(10) with 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(9) — and we

read the PSTCA “consistently” with the Sovereign Immunity Act as they both “deal with

the same subject matter[.]” Jones, 772 A.2d at 440 (citation omitted). While we recognize

that none of these decisions are controlling or precedential, the courts’ consistent

interpretation of the sexual abuse immunity exception in both the PSTCA and Sovereign

Immunity Act certainly lends credence to the City’s plain meaning argument.24

We also reject J.S.’s contention that the only reason the General Assembly

referenced Section 5551(7) in Section 8542(b)(9) was for purposes of brevity and to avoid

redundancy — “there is no need to repeatedly define a term if said term is defined

elsewhere in the consolidated statutes.” J.S.’s Brief at 18 (citation omitted). Indeed, J.S.

cites to the “Brevity” provision in the Legislative Drafting Manual for support. See id.

23 Although the Commonwealth Court relied on its prior decision in Caldwell for persuasive

support, we agree with J.S. that the reference to the age limitation in that case was dicta.

See Caldwell, 252 A.3d at *6 n.8. In Caldwell, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, he was

sexually abused by correctional officers while he was in prison. Id. at *2. Although the

court noted the plaintiff could not circumvent sovereign immunity via the sexual abuse

exception because he “was not a minor[,]” the primary reason for the Court’s ruling was

that the plaintiff did not allege any negligence claims, rather he “asserted intentional

acts[.]” Id. at *6 n.8, *7.

24 Although not dispositive, the legislative history which we summarized above and

preceded the enactment of the sexual abuse exception, further bolsters our determination

that the exception plainly incorporates Section 5551(7)’s age limitation.

[J-9-2025] - 21

(citing 101 Pa. Code § 15.93). However, that provision does not instruct legislators to

cross-reference provisions in other statutes for purposes of brevity. Rather, it provides:

No unnecessary word must be used. The courts seek to give effect to every

word. An unnecessary word may defeat the true purpose of a statute. If a

word has the same meaning as a phrase, the word should be used. The

shortest sentences which bring out the meaning intended should be used.

Compound sentences should be avoided.

101 Pa. Code § 15.93(a). Further, subsection (b) directs that “[p]reciseness must not be

sacrificed to simplicity[,]” and legislators should “[b]e sure [to] say what [they] want to say

and that it is neither too comprehensive nor too restricted.” 101 Pa. Code § 15.93(b).

Here, contrary to J.S.’s assertion, by applying Section 5551(7)’s age limitation to the

sexual abuse immunity exception, we do not read additional language into that provision

that does not appear in the text — instead, we refuse to ignore Section 8542(b)(9)’s

explicit reference to Section 5551(7), which functions only if the victim of sexual abuse

was a minor.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we conclude that a plain reading of the sexual abuse exception to the

PSTCA unambiguously incorporates the age limitation in Section 5551(7) when it refers

to “[c]onduct which constitutes an offense enumerated under Section 5551(7) (relating to

no limitation applicable)[.]”25 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(9). Therefore, if a plaintiff is injured

by conduct constituting one of the sexual offenses enumerated under Section 5551(7),

and the negligent acts or omissions of a local agency or its employees resulted in the

25 Whether or not we agree with policy decision to waive immunity only if the victim is a

minor is irrelevant. “It is the chief function of the General Assembly to set public policy[,]”

and we may not use our judicial review power “as a means to substitute our own public

policy judgments for those of the General Assembly.” Crawford v. Commonwealth, 326

A.3d 850, 857 (Pa. 2024) (citations omitted).

[J-9-2025] - 22

abuse, the local agency and its employees remain immune from liability under the PSTCA

unless the plaintiff was a minor at the time of the offense.

Order affirmed.

Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue and Mundy join the opinion. Justice

Dougherty joins the opinion except for Section III & footnote 24.

Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion in which Justice Brobson joins.

[J-9-2025] - 23