Bernard Charles Seidling

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THIS ORDER IS SIGNED AND ENTERED. = ee 4

“®Diaaion of 8

Hon. Rachel M. Blise

United States Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

In re: Case No. 22-11191-rmb

Bernard Charles Seidling, Chapter 7

Debtor.

DECISION AND ORDER SUSTAINING DEBTOR’S OBJECTION

TO CLAIM NO. 13 OF THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS THAKE

Debtor Bernard Seidling purchased real property from Amanda Taylor, one of

five heirs of Douglas Thake, via warranty deed. The Estate of Douglas Thake (the

“Estate’) filed a proof of claim in Seidling’s bankruptcy case asserting that Seidling

is liable for civil theft and seeking the value of the property, plus punitive damages

and attorney’s fees and costs. The Estate contends that Taylor’s transfer of the

property to herself through a Transfer by Affidavit was invalid, as was Taylor’s

transfer of the property from herself to Seidling. Seidling’s objection to the claim

presents the legal issues whether a single heir can use the Transfer by Affidavit

procedure outlined in section 867.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes to take legal title to

real property and whether that heir can transfer the real property to a third party.

The Court concludes that the Transfer by Affidavit was valid under section 867.03,

and that Taylor had the ability to transfer the property at issue to Seidling.

Therefore, Seidling is not liable for civil theft under the theory presented by the

Estate, and the Estate’s claim must be disallowed.

BACKGROUND

The following facts appear to be undisputed. Douglas Thake died intestate

on November 15, 2015. Thake was divorced and had five adult children, including

Amanda Taylor. Under the Wisconsin intestacy rules, any property in Thake’s

estate should have been distributed equally among the five heirs. See Wis. Stat.

§ 852.01(b). At the time of his death, Thake was the sole owner of the real property

located at 10136 Olker Rd., Hayward, WI 54843 (the “Property”). The parties

identified no other assets of any value in Thake’s estate.

On April 11, 2016, Taylor executed and recorded a “Transfer by Affidavit

($50,000 and under)” with the Register of Deeds for Sawyer County, Wisconsin. A

Transfer by Affidavit may be used to transfer property “when a decedent leaves

property subject to administration in [Wisconsin] that does not exceed $50,000.”

Wis. Stat. § 867.03(1g). The parties do not appear to dispute that the value of the

Property, together with any other assets owned by Douglas Thake, was $50,000 or

less.1

1 In its proof of claim, the Estate asserts that the Property was worth $87,000 on the petition date in

2022. While the Estate does argue that the Transfer by Affidavit was invalid, the Estate does not

assert that it is invalid because the value of Thake’s estate was more than $50,000 in 2016 when

Taylor executed and recorded the Transfer by Affidavit. The Court therefore has assumed that the

Estate agrees the value of the Property was less than $50,000 in 2016.

On June 28, 2017, Taylor executed a Warranty Deed through which she

conveyed the Property to LCO Trust II. This Court previously held that LCO Trust

II is the alter ego of Seidling, and that Seidling owns all property titled in the name

of LCO Trust II. See Block v. Seidling (In re Seidling), Adv. No. 23-00032-rmb, 2024

WL 3934127, *23 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. Aug. 23, 2024). Seidling says she received

“valuable consideration,” though the consideration she received is unclear. It may

be that Seidling gave Taylor a discount on her purchase of different real property

from him as a sort of trade. See Dkt. No. 634 at 1. The Estate does not argue that

the transfer to LCO Trust II was void for lack of consideration.

On June 10, 2018, Seidling entered an Option to Purchase Trust with Chad

Raasch, pursuant to which he purported to convey to Raasch an option to purchase

LCO Trust II. The same day, Seidling and Raasch signed a Rental/Lease

Agreement for the Property. Neither agreement with Raasch was recorded. On

April 27, 2021, Seidling transferred the Property to Florida Land Trust. He

transferred the Property back to LCO Trust II on August 16, 2021. The reasons for

these transfers are unknown.

In February 2021, one or more of Thake’s other children opened a probate

proceeding in Sawyer County, Wisconsin, Case No. 2021PR000015. On August 23,

2021, the Estate sued Taylor, Raasch, Seidling, LCO Trust II, Florida Land Trust,

and several other entities with a potential interest in the Property in Sawyer

County, Wisconsin Circuit Court, Case No. 2021CV000115. The Estate sought a

declaratory judgment that the Transfer by Affidavit transferring the Property to

Taylor was ineffective and that title to the Property remained with the Estate.

Seidling filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on July 26, 2022, and the case

was converted to chapter 7 on October 3, 2022. On May 9, 2023, the Estate filed a

proof of claim that the Clerk assigned as Claim No. 13. The Estate filed an

amended claim on October 28, 2024, which is listed in the Claims Register as Claim

13-3. The Estate claims that it is owed a total of $528,970.52. According to the

Estate, Seidling committed civil theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.20 in receiving the

Property. The Estate says the Property was worth $87,000 on the petition date, and

that Seidling is liable for that amount. The Estate also seeks punitive damages in

the amount of $261,000 (three times the value of the property) and attorney’s fees

and costs of $180,970.522 pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.446.

Seidling objected to the Estate’s claim, and his objection was amended

several times. In the amended objection filed on December 26, 2023, Seidling

asserts that LCO Trust II validly purchased the Property from Taylor, and that the

value of the Property was only $2,500 in 2017 when Taylor transferred the Property

to LCO Trust II. Dkt. No. 472.

The Court ordered briefing on the claim objection and received briefs from the

Estate and Seidling. Dkt. Nos. 826, 883, 901, 917, 947, 1190, 1205. The Court also

2 The basis for the remaining $180,970.52 of the claim is unclear. None of the information filed with

the claim indicates that the attorney’s fees and costs total that amount. A document that appears to

be a ledger of attorney’s fees has a total of $112,995.52. Without a full explanation, the Court has

presumed that the entire $180,970.52 is attributable to attorney’s fees and costs.

held hearings on the objection on July 27, 2023; July 11, 2024; and July 24, 2025.

Dkt. Nos. 359, 576, 1174.

JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this chapter 11 case and contested matter

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the order of reference from the district court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). See General Order No. 161 (W.D. Wis. June 12,

1984) (available at https://www.wiwd.uscourts.gov/administrative-orders) (last

visited March 17, 2026).

This matter is a core proceeding because it involves allowance of claims

against the estate. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). In addition, the Estate’s claim and

Seidling’s objection to that claim implicate issues related to whether the Property is

part of the bankruptcy estate. The district court, and this Court by the order of

reference, has “exclusive jurisdiction . . . of all of the property, wherever located, of

the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate.” 11

U.S.C. § 1334(e)(2); see also Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer, Collier on

Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01 (16th ed. 2026) (“Likewise, the district court has exclusive

jurisdiction to determine whether property is property of the estate to begin with.”).

To the extent the determination whether the Property was validly transferred

requires consideration of issues impacted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern

v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), the parties have consented to this Court’s final

adjudication of these issues by their silence. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008, 7012; see

also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 683 (2015) (“Nothing in the

Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be

express.”).

DISCUSSION

I

Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that proofs of claim filed by

creditors are “deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.” 11 U.S.C.

§ 502(a). Upon an objection, a bankruptcy court must disallow a claim that “is

unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement

or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or

unmatured.” Id. § 502(b)(1).

A timely and properly filed proof of claim is “prima facie evidence of the

claim’s validity and amount.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f). That is, the claim itself

gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the claim is valid. “A party objecting to

the proof of claim has the initial burden to produce some evidence or legal point to

overcome this rebuttable presumption.” In re Pierport Dev. & Realty, Inc., 491 B.R.

544, 547 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013). “The burden then shifts back to the claimant to

meet the objection and establish the claim.” Id.

II

The Property was titled in the name of LCO Trust II (which is really

Seidling) on the petition date. For present purposes, the Court will disregard the

transfer to Florida Land Trust back in 2021.

The Estate attacks both relevant transfers of the Property. First, the Estate

argues that the Transfer by Affidavit was ineffective to transfer the Property to

Taylor under Wisconsin law. Second, the Estate argues that the transfer from

Taylor to Seidling a/k/a LCO Trust II was invalid because Taylor could transfer only

her share of the Property to a third party and she could not transfer the entire

Property. The Court considers whether each of the transfers was improper or

invalid as a matter of law based on what section 867.03 allows.

Transfer by Affidavit to Taylor

The Estate argues that Taylor could not transfer the Property to herself

using the Transfer by Affidavit process under Wisconsin law. It further argues that

if she could transfer any portion of the Property to herself, she could transfer only

her 1/5 share of the Estate. The Estate’s argument is based on a misunderstanding

of Wisconsin’s probate laws as well as the “transfer by affidavit” mechanism under

section 867.03 of the Wisconsin Probate Code.

Under the probate laws of other jurisdictions, it is often the case that the

property of a decedent who dies intestate passes automatically to the decedent’s

heirs according to the intestacy succession laws of that state. Indeed, as explained

in In re Higgins, No. 23-22024-rmb, 2023 WL 8823920 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Dec. 20,

2023), this was the law in Wisconsin prior to the adoption of Wisconsin’s probate

code in 1971. Before then, legal title to a decedent’s personal property could be

passed only by a personal representative of the decedent’s estate, but legal title to

real property passed automatically to the heirs. See Riedi v. Heinzl, 3 N.W.2d 366,

369 (Wis. 1942) (“It is elementary that real estate descends directly to the heirs as

of the date of death where the deceased owner dies intestate[.]”); Palmer v.

O’Rourke, 110 N.W. 389, 390 (Wis. 1907) (“Upon the death of any person possessed

of personal estate the legal title thereto and right to possession thereof vests in his

personal representative and can only reach the heirs, ultimately entitled thereto by

due course of administration.”); see also In re Omernik’s Estate, 332 N.W.2d 307,

310 (Wis. 1983) (“Prior to 1971, a personal representative [of a decedent’s estate]

only had title to the decedent’s personal property.”). Under that precedent, in this

case each of Thake’s children would automatically have legal title to a 1/5 share of

the Property, even in the absence of a formal instrument transferring title.

Since 1971, however, the personal representative of a decedent’s estate

“succeeds to the interest of the decedent in all property of the decedent.” Wis. Stat.

§ 857.01 (emphasis added); see also Shovers v. Shovers, 2006 WI App 108, ¶ 37, 718

N.W.2d 130, 137. In other words, title to real property no longer passes

automatically to a decedent’s heirs. Instead, “[u]pon the death of a person, the title

to his property remains suspended until the appointment of a personal

representative, at which time it passes to that personal representative.” Shovers,

2006 WI App 108, ¶ 37. Until a personal representative is appointed and transfers

the property, “[h]eirs and legatees obtain no legal title to the property, but are

beneficially interested in the estate and possess an equitable title subject to

administration and payment of debts.” Id. Generally, “[t]itle can pass to those

ultimately entitled to share in the property only after administration and by the

final decree of the proper court administering the estate.” Id.

Wisconsin law allows property in an estate to be transferred to an heir

through informal procedures and without appointment of a personal representative

in certain limited circumstances, one of which is through a Transfer by Affidavit. In

2016, when Taylor executed and recorded the Transfer by Affidavit, the pertinent

portion of the statute provided:

(1g) Generally. When a decedent leaves property subject to

administration in this state which does not exceed $50,000 in

value, any heir of the decedent, trustee of a revocable trust

created by the decedent, or person who was guardian of the

decedent at the time of the decedent's death may collect any

money due the decedent, receive the property of the decedent,

and have any evidence of interest, obligation to, or right of the

decedent transferred to the affiant if the heir, trustee, or

guardian provides to the person owing the money, having

custody of the property, or acting as registrar or transfer agent

of the evidences of interest, obligation to, or right, or, if the

property is an interest in or lien on real property, provides to the

register of deeds preliminary to the recording required under

sub. (2m), proof of prior mailed notice under sub. (1m) if

applicable and an affidavit in duplicate showing all of the

following:

(a) A description of and the value of the property to be

transferred.

(b) The total value of the decedent’s property subject to

administration in this state at the date of decedent’s

death.

(c) Whether the decedent or the decedent’s spouse ever

received services provided as a benefit under a long-term

care program, as defined in s. 49.496(1)(bk), medical

assistance under subch. IV of ch. 49, long-term

community support services funded under s. 46.27(7), or

aid under s. 49.68, 49.683, 49.685, or 49.875 [s. 49.7851].

[ . . . ]

(2) Release of liability of transferor. Upon the transfer to

the heir, trustee, or person who was guardian of the decedent at

the time of the decedent's death furnishing the affidavit with an

attached proof of mail delivery if required under sub. (1m)(b),

the transferor is released to the same extent as if the transfer

had been made to the personal representative of the estate of

the decedent.

(2g) Obligation of affiant. (a) By accepting the decedent’s

property under this section the heir, trustee, or guardian

assumes a duty to apply the property transferred for the

payment of obligations according to priorities established under

s. 859.25 and to distribute any balance to those persons

designated in the appropriate governing instrument, as defined

in s. 854.01, of the decedent or if there is no governing

instrument, according to the rules of intestate succession under

ch. 852, subject to par. (b). An heir or guardian may publish a

notice to creditors in the same manner and with the same effect

as a trustee under s. 701.0508. This paragraph does not prohibit

any appropriate person from requesting administration of the

decedent’s estate under s. 856.07 or ch. 865.

[ . . . ]

(2m) Recording of affidavit. (a) If an affidavit under sub. (1g)

describes an interest in or lien on real property a certified copy

or duplicate original of the affidavit shall be recorded in the

office of the register of deeds in each county in this state in

which the real property is located.

(b) For purposes of a transfer under this section of an interest in

or lien on real property, the recording of the affidavit copy or

duplicate original constitutes the transfer to the affiant under

sub. (1g) of the evidence of the interest in or lien on real

property.

Wis. Stat. § 867.03 (eff. July 14, 2015 to Dec. 1, 2017).

For present purposes, the import of the statute is this: one heir may transfer

title to all a decedent’s property, including his real property, to herself through an

affidavit recorded with the appropriate register of deeds if the gross value of the

decedent’s estate is less than $50,000. By accepting the property, the heir to whom

the property is transferred undertakes the obligation to pay the creditors of the

decedent and distribute the remainder of the estate to any heirs entitled to receive a

portion under the provisions of any governing instrument or according to the rules

of intestate succession.

There is no dispute that, as one of the five children of Thake, Taylor is an

heir of the Estate; that the value of the Property (combined with Thake’s other

assets) was $50,000 or less when Thake died; and that Taylor otherwise complied

with the technical or procedural requirements imposed by section 867.03.3 In other

words, the only issue in dispute is the legal effect of the Transfer by Affidavit (i.e.,

to what extent Taylor transferred to herself an interest in the Property). Based on

the plain language of the statute, Taylor could execute and record a Transfer by

Affidavit to transfer the Property to herself. When she did so, she undertook a

corresponding obligation to ensure that the remaining heirs received the portion of

the estate to which they were entitled. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the

Transfer by Affidavit was sufficient to transfer legal title to the Property to Taylor.

The Estate contends that section 867.03 does not allow an heir to receive real

property in its entirety, and instead allows an affiant heir to receive only the share

of the decedent’s real property corresponding to the heir’s presumptive interest in

the estate. See Dkt. No. 1190 at 2-3. The Estate argues:

Nothing in the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 867.03 allows an

heir to transfer more than their proper share of an estate to

themselves. This statute only allows an heir to “collect” property

subject to a statutory duty to “distribute any balance . . .

3 The Estate initially argued that Taylor did not comply with the service requirements of section

867.03. See Dkt. No. 901. This argument was premised on the current version of the statute, see Wis.

Stat. § 867.03(1p); the version in effect in 2016 did not have the same notice requirements. In its

additional brief, the Estate again argues that Taylor “never followed the statutory procedures

required by the Transfer by Affidavit statutes.” See Dkt. No. 1190 at 5. The Estate does not explain

in its supplemental brief what procedures in the 2016 statute that Taylor did not follow.

according to the rules if [sic] intestate succession.” Therefore,

the “Transfer by Affidavit” could not effectuate any transfer of

the 4/5 interest in the Property which did not belong to Amanda

Taylor under Wis. Stat. § 852.01(1)(b) [sic]

Dkt. 1190 at 3.

The Estate misreads the statute. The statute plainly allows an affiant heir to

“receive the property of the decedent.” Wis. Stat. § 867.03(1g). It does not say that

an affiant heir may receive only her presumptive share of the property of the

decedent, or that “consent from the remaining heirs would be required to effectuate

a 100% transfer to [the affiant].” Dkt. No. 1190 at 3. In exchange for “accepting the

decedent’s property,” an affiant such as Taylor “assumes a duty to apply the

property transferred for the payment of obligations according to priorities

established under s. 859.25 and to distribute any balance,” in the case of intestacy,

“according to the rules of intestate succession.” Wis. Stat. § 867.03(2g). If an

affiant heir could receive only her share of the decedent’s property, why would she

have an obligation to distribute any property to the other heirs? The Estate makes

no effort to answer this question.4

Moreover, in addition to heirs (who are presumptively entitled to some share

of the estate), the statute allows a qualifying trustee or guardian to accomplish a

transfer of the decedent’s property through affidavit. See Wis. Stat. § 867.03(1g).

There is no requirement that such a trustee or guardian be entitled to a share of the

4 The Estate makes a non-sensical argument about a court’s ability to impose a constructive trust

under Wisconsin law. See Dkt. No. 1190 at 3-4. The Estate does not explain how the question

whether a court could impose a constructive trust on the estate property that Taylor received

pursuant to the Transfer by Affidavit is relevant to whether the statute permitted Taylor to receive

the property at all.

decedent’s estate. So it cannot be that the statute limits the scope of property

transferred through affidavit to that portion of the estate to which the affiant has

an interest.

The more reasonable interpretation of the statute is that section 867.03 is

intended to allow an affiant to function as a sort of personal representative of the

estate for the purpose of administering property valued at or below $50,000 for the

benefit of the estate. This procedure is practical for estates with such a value,

where the costs of a full probate proceeding are high in relation to the value of the

estate. Indeed, the statute states that “[u]pon transfer to the [affiant] . . . the

transferor is released to the same extent as if the transfer had been made to the

personal representative of the estate of the decedent.” Wis. Stat. § 867.03(2)

(emphasis added). If an affiant functions like a personal representative for the

limited purpose of administering certain low-value estates, then, like a personal

representative, the affiant should receive all, not just part, of the property in the

estate. See Wis. Stat. § 857.01 (“Upon his or her letters being issued by the court,

the personal representative succeeds to the interest of the decedent in all property

of the decedent.”) (emphasis added).

From a policy perspective, it might be understandable to question the

propriety of a mechanism that places the power to administer a decedent’s property

in the hands of a single, self-volunteering heir. But the statute includes guardrails

against abuse of this mechanism: it limits the value of the property that qualifies

for transfer by affidavit to $50,000, it imposes a legal duty upon the affiant to

distribute property to other heirs, and it expressly preserves the right of another

heir to initiate formal probate proceedings. See Wis. Stat. § 867.03(2g)(a). The

weighing of the utility of the transfer by affidavit mechanism in hastening the

resolution of small estates and lessening the costs of administering such estates

against the risks presented by a single volunteer heir assuming control of estate

property is a task that is properly left to the legislature. The state legislature made

the policy choice, and the language it chose to use in the statute is clear.5 This

Court’s role is limited to interpreting and enforcing that language.

In sum, section 867.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes enables an affiant to receive

the entire estate of a decedent by recording a Transfer by Affidavit, and the

mechanism does not limit an affiant heir to receiving just her share. The Estate

does not advance any other argument that the Property was not transferred from

Thake’s estate to Taylor under the Transfer by Affidavit. Therefore, the Court

concludes that Taylor obtained valid legal title to the property when she recorded

the Transfer by Affidavit.6

5 The Wisconsin state legislature has continued to refine the transfer by affidavit procedure in recent

years, reflecting that the legislature has, indeed, weighed and considered the benefits and risks of

the procedure. For example, the current version of the statute includes additional notice

requirements before real property can be transferred using a transfer by affidavit, and it limits the

persons to whom real property can be transferred. See Wis. Stat. § 867.03(1h), (1j), (1p) (2026).

6 An additional matter bears mentioning due to the Estate’s insistence that the other heirs have an

interest in the Property. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted in Shovers that the heirs to an

estate do not take legal title to the property in the estate, but they have a beneficial interest in the

estate. Shovers, 2006 WI App 108, ¶ 37. As explained in Higgins, that beneficial interest does not

attach to the property itself; it attaches to the estate. Higgins, 2023 WL 8823920 at *7 (“[T]he

debtor’s interest in his probate estate is not the same thing as an interest in the Property.”). The

heirs to the Estate did not have a beneficial interest in the Property itself. Rather they have or may

have had a beneficial interest in the Estate, which includes all the property received by Taylor

through the Transfer by Affidavit.

As affiant, Taylor undertook a corresponding obligation to distribute to the

appropriate creditors and heirs all the property in Thake’s estate that she received

pursuant to the Transfer by Affidavit. Whether Taylor complied with her obligation

is not before the Court.

Transfer by Deed to Seidling a/k/a LCO Trust II

The Estate also argues that section 867.03 does not authorize an affiant who

receives real property pursuant to a Transfer by Affidavit to effectuate a subsequent

transfer of the entire property to a third party. Dkt. No. 1190 at 3-4. According to

the Estate:

The “duty” under Wis. Stat. § 867.03(2g) does not transform the

affiant into a trustee with discretion over the entire estate.

Amanda Taylor’s s [sic] decision to deed the property to Seidling

was outside the scope of that limited duty and legally ineffective

beyond her own interest. Any claim that Amanda Taylor held

the property “in trust” is a post hoc judicial fiction not supported

by the affidavit or law. Therefore, the “Transfer by Affidavit”

does not create a constructive trust or fiduciary role on the part

of the affiant.

Id.

The statute clearly contemplates a single recipient of the decedent’s property,

and the Court already concluded that a Transfer by Affidavit transfers the whole of

the estate to the affiant. The statute also contemplates further transfers by the

affiant to accomplish the liquidation of low-value estates for the benefit of the heirs

because it affirmatively obligates the affiant to “apply the property transferred for

the payment of obligations” of the estate and to “distribute any balance” to the

decedent’s heirs. See Wis. Stat. § 867.03(2g)(a). Once Taylor had legal title to the

Property, she could pass that title to Seidling a/k/a LCO Trust II.

The Court concludes that section 867.03 allows an affiant to take title to real

property. As owner of the legal interest in the property, the affiant has authority to

transfer the real property to a third party via a deed or any other mechanism.

Therefore, Taylor had authority to transfer the Property to Seidling.7

If the other heirs of the Estate are unhappy with Taylor’s transfer to

Seidling, then perhaps they have a claim against her; that is not for this Court to

say. They do not, however, have a claim against Seidling based on a theory that the

transfers were invalid because section 867.03 did not allow Taylor to take title to

the Property or transfer the Property to a third party.

*****

The Estate has made vague assertions that Taylor and Seidling conspired to

deprive the other heirs of their interest in the Property. The Court does not address

whether the Estate or the other heirs may have a claim against Seidling based on

such an allegation. According to the Estate’s briefing in response to Seidling’s claim

objection, the Estate’s proof of claim is based on the theory that the transfers to

Taylor and then to Seidling were invalid or improper under the Transfer by

Affidavit procedure in section 867.03. As discussed herein, the Court concludes that

7 The Estate also argues that Seidling did not receive valid legal title to the Property because he is

not a bona fide purchaser. That issue is relevant only if the transfer to Taylor under the Transfer by

Affidavit was invalid; the Court would then have to consider whether an unsuspecting purchaser

could take good title to the Property. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 867.03(2m)(c) (2023-24) (“If an interest in

real property transferred under this section is acquired by a purchase or lender in good faith, for

value and without actual notice that the transfer was improper, the purchaser or lender takes title

free of any claims of the decedent’s estate and incurs no personal liability to the estate, whether or

not the transfer was proper.”). Taylor’s transfer of the Property to herself was not improper, so it is

unnecessary to address whether Seidling qualifies as a bona fide purchaser.

Taylor did obtain legal title to the Property through the recorded Transfer by

Affidavit and that Taylor could validly transfer legal title to the Property to Seidling

(a/k/a LCO Trust II) through the recorded Warranty Deed. The Estate therefore

does not have a claim against Seidling, and the Court will disallow the Estate’s

proof of claim.8

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Seidling’s objection to Claim No. 13 filed by the Estate of Douglas

Thake is SUSTAINED.

2. Claim No. 13 is DISALLOWED in full.

# # #

8 The Estate complains about Seidling’s conduct in state court litigation, Sawyer County Case No.

2021-CV-115. See Dkt. No. 330. This decision should not be read as a defense of his conduct. The

Estate also asserts that its claim against Seidling has merit and is not frivolous because it survived

three motions to dismiss in state court. Id. at 2. Just because a claim against Seidling survived a

motion to dismiss in state court does not necessarily mean that the Estate has an allowable claim

against Seidling’s bankruptcy estate.