Ryan Steinhoff v. Matthew Malovrh

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-1252

RYAN STEINHOFF,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MATTHEW MALOVRH, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:21-cv-00664-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 2026 — DECIDED MARCH 24, 2026

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. On October 28, 2018, law enforce-

ment officers executed a search warrant for methampheta-

mine on a rural property in Wisconsin. They believed that

Ryan Steinhoff, an alleged drug dealer with a history of vio-

lent crime, lived on the property. When officers found Stein-

hoff in a camper during the search, he at first appeared coop-

erative and exited as instructed. But an officer quickly tackled

him to the ground and, somewhere in the scuffle, the barrel of

2 No. 24-1252

another officer’s M16 rifle hit Steinhoff’s head, leaving a gash

requiring stitches. The record contains body-camera footage

of the incident, but we cannot tell whether the blow to the

head was intentional, as Steinhoff would have it, or acci-

dental, as the second officer insists.

In the end, we affirm the district court’s award of qualified

immunity to the first officer but reverse as to the second be-

cause disputed facts require Steinhoff’s Fourth Amendment

excessive force claim to go to a jury.

I

A

In 2018, the Taylor County Sheriff’s Department investi-

gated a methamphetamine trafficking operation involving

Ryan Steinhoff. On October 27, Detective Cody Kowalczyk

applied for a warrant to search a property in Medford, Wis-

consin, where he believed Steinhoff and others involved in

the operation were living. The warrant application explained

that law enforcement had arranged a controlled purchase of

methamphetamine from Steinhoff earlier that month, that

Steinhoff had a history of violent crime, and that his mental

health was under evaluation in a pending misdemeanor case.

A Taylor County judge approved the application and au-

thorized a search for evidence of methamphetamine posses-

sion in violation of Wisconsin law. The property in question

contained a two-story main residence and multiple small out-

buildings. Due to the property’s size and the number of indi-

viduals believed to be present, law enforcement assembled a

SWAT team of officers from Taylor County and neighboring

Clark County to conduct the search. The team included De-

tective Kowalczyk, Clark County Drug Investigator Matthew

No. 24-1252 3

Malovrh, Clark County Patrol Captain Charles Ramberg, and

Clark County Deputy Joshua Niemi.

The SWAT team assembled early on the morning of Octo-

ber 28, 2018. Detective Kowalczyk and another officer briefed

everyone on the investigation, the plan for executing the war-

rant, and the criminal histories of individuals they might en-

counter during the search, including Steinhoff. They in-

formed the team that Steinhoff had prior convictions, includ-

ing for robbery with use of force, aggravated battery, and re-

sisting an officer. The briefing also cautioned that Steinhoff

and others might try to flee.

Just before 6:00 a.m. and under the cover of darkness, the

team initiated the search. After clearing the main residence

with Taylor County law enforcement, Detective Kowalczyk

went to assist the Clark County team at the southern end of

the property. In that area, Captain Ramberg saw three camp-

ers and noticed a light on in one. Law enforcement ap-

proached it and announced their presence. Upon opening the

door, Captain Ramberg saw a blanket hanging in the door-

way, which Steinhoff was standing behind. An officer pulled

the blanket down, and someone ordered Steinhoff to show his

hands. The officers could see that his hands were empty, and

nobody observed any visible sign of a weapon.

The rest of Steinhoff’s encounter with law enforcement

comes from Deputy Niemi’s body-camera. But the footage is

dark, grainy, at times obscured, and does not clearly depict

the takedown of Steinhoff. And it all happened in a matter of

seconds.

The video shows that as Deputy Niemi approached the

camper, Detective Kowalczyk, Investigator Malovrh, and

4 No. 24-1252

Captain Ramberg surrounded the doorway. The latter two

carried rifles. The officers ordered Steinhoff to come out and

show his hands. Steinhoff exited the camper as an officer di-

rected him to “get out,” and “turn around.” Once down the

camper stairs, Steinhoff began to turn around and raise his

hands. He then stopped with his back to the officers, partially

facing an open field.

But from there the video is too dark, and the takedown too

swift, to know exactly what happened next. Steinhoff claims

he stopped and stood still with his hands up, while Detective

Kowalczyk and Investigator Malovrh contend that he began

walking away toward the field, as if to flee. Regardless, the

footage shows that Detective Kowalczyk tackled Steinhoff

from behind about three seconds after he exited the camper.

Then Investigator Malovrh helped restrain him on the

ground, including by placing his knee on Steinhoff while De-

tective Kowalczyk handcuffed him.

At some point during the encounter, a rifle barrel struck

Steinhoff’s ear, causing a cut that required at least nine

stitches. Steinhoff testified that he saw the rifle barrel swing

toward the side of his head and hit him while he was still

standing. The video also contains an audible “clink” as Detec-

tive Kowalczyk begins the takedown, with Steinhoff main-

taining that the sound is that of the rifle hitting him in the

head.

Based on these events, Steinhoff believes that Investigator

Malovrh intentionally struck him in the head with his rifle just

as the takedown began. Investigator Malovrh denies any in-

volvement in the initial tackle and believes that if his rifle hit

Steinhoff at all, it was by accident while assisting Detective

Kowalczyk after Steinhoff fell.

No. 24-1252 5

B

Steinhoff invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sued Detective

Kowalczyk, Investigator Malovrh, and Captain Ramberg for

using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment

during the takedown, when the rifle struck him, and when

Investigator Malovrh placed his knee on his neck, head, or

upper back while he was handcuffed. He added Clark and

Taylor Counties as defendants for indemnification purposes.

The officer defendants moved for summary judgment and

claimed qualified immunity. Steinhoff moved for partial sum-

mary judgment against Detective Kowalczyk.

The district court entered summary judgment for Captain

Ramberg because Steinhoff conceded that the officer did not

use excessive force against him. It also denied Investigator

Malovrh summary judgment on the limited aspect of the

claim that he used excessive force when he kneeled on Stein-

hoff. That claim went to trial where a jury found for Investi-

gator Malovrh. Neither of those claims are on appeal.

Moving to Detective Kowalczyk, the district court ob-

served that, even assuming Steinhoff did not try to flee, a jury

would “almost certainly” find that “an objective officer’s use

of force in taking Steinhoff to the ground and subdu[ing] him

was not unreasonable” given the “murky dynamics” of an

early morning drug raid. The district court further concluded

that Detective Kowalczyk was entitled to qualified immunity

because Steinhoff did not identify clearly established law

“prohibiting the use of a takedown under the dynamic cir-

cumstances presented.”

Finally, the district court concluded that no reasonable

jury could find that Investigator Malovrh intentionally hit

6 No. 24-1252

Steinhoff with his rifle. Even if he accidentally hit Steinhoff,

the district court determined that this unintentional use of

force would not have been excessive and therefore granted

summary judgment without reaching qualified immunity.

Steinhoff now asks us to reverse the district court’s entry

of summary judgment for Detective Kowalczyk and Investi-

gator Malovrh related to the tackle and rifle strike and, sepa-

rately, the denial of his corresponding motion against Detec-

tive Kowalczyk.

II

A

We review a district court’s award of summary judgment

on qualified immunity grounds by examining the facts anew

and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-

moving party, here Steinhoff. See Neita v. City of Chicago, 148

F.4th 916, 930 (7th Cir. 2025).

When an officer invokes qualified immunity, the burden

falls to the plaintiff to show not only that the officer’s conduct

violated a federal right, but also that the right was clearly es-

tablished at the time of the alleged violation. See District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018). We may address

these prongs in any order. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 236 (2009).

The Fourth Amendment governs the use of force during

the execution of a search warrant. See Muehler v. Mena, 544

U.S. 93, 98–99 (2005). “[O]fficers executing a search warrant

for contraband have the authority” to detain persons on the

premises during the search, id. at 98, to further certain law en-

forcement interests: “officer safety, facilitating the completion

of the search, and preventing flight,” Bailey v. United States,

No. 24-1252 7

568 U.S. 186, 194 (2013). Inherent in the power to detain is the

“authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention.”

Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98–99.

As with other Fourth Amendment seizures, we ask

whether “the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in

light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” Gra-

ham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). We consider, for in-

stance, “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or oth-

ers, and whether he is actively resisting” or “attempting to

evade” detention “by flight.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100,

103 (2018) (per curiam) (cleaned up). The reasonableness in-

quiry also accounts for “the fact that police officers are often

forced to make split-second judgments” about the proper use

of force in dynamic situations. Id. (cleaned up). This last ob-

servation is front and center of our analysis here because “the

execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of

transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic

efforts to conceal or destroy evidence.” Michigan v. Summers,

452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981).

As for the second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry,

a constitutional right is clearly established if existing prece-

dent “place[s] the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021). Put

another way, the law in place at the time of the challenged

conduct must demonstrate that “a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Smith v.

Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 742 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

Time and again the Supreme Court has emphasized the

necessity of defining clearly established law with specificity.

See, e.g., Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. ----, 2026 WL 795469, at *2

8 No. 24-1252

(Mar. 23, 2026); Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63–64. With Fourth Amend-

ment excessive force claims, the Court has further under-

scored that precedent at the time of the challenged conduct

must “‘squarely govern[]’ the specific facts at issue” to create

clearly established law because “[u]se of excessive force is an

area of the law ‘in which the result depends very much on the

facts of each case.’” Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104–05 (quoting Mul-

lenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015) (per curiam)).

B

We begin with the claim against Detective Kowalczyk.

The video evidence does not definitively show whether,

upon exiting the camper, Steinhoff tried to flee. So we assume

for the purpose of Detective Kowalczyk’s summary judgment

motion that Steinhoff complied with the SWAT team’s orders

to turn around and, presumably, to stay put. But even so, we

cannot conclude that Detective Kowalczyk violated clearly es-

tablished law when he tackled Steinhoff.

What stands out most are the circumstances in which the

takedown occurred—a search for evidence of drug possession

involving individuals with a history of violence and risk of

flight. This is precisely the kind of dangerous situation that

requires officers to make the split-second judgments that of-

ten justify the protection of qualified immunity. See Summers,

452 U.S. at 702; see also Muehler, 544 U.S. at 99 (reiterating that

“the risk of harm to officers and occupants is minimized ‘if

the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the

situation’” (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703)).

The SWAT team knew that it would need to secure multi-

ple people who might try to flee, resist, or destroy evidence,

and that there might be firearms present. See Muehler, 452 U.S.

No. 24-1252 9

at 108 (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that executing a

search warrant in a dangerous context may justify “over-

whelming force and surprise in order to secure the premises

as promptly as possible”). Swift action was essential. We are

not aware of any clearly established law that would have put

Detective Kowalczyk on notice that his action in tackling

Steinhoff amounted to a Fourth Amendment violation.

Steinhoff disagrees, relying in large part on Alicea v.

Thomas, 815 F.3d 283 (7th Cir. 2016), and Miller v. Gonzalez, 761

F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2014), for the proposition that an officer can-

not use substantial force against a non-resisting suspect. Al-

icea involved the pursuit of a felony-burglary suspect who

fled from law enforcement and ended up in an empty above-

ground pool in a backyard. See 815 F.3d at 286, 288. We con-

cluded that an officer used excessive force when he assisted

his dog into the pool and commanded him to bite and hold

the suspect after the person had already complied with the

officer’s command (at gunpoint) to raise his hands. See id. at

286, 289–90. We emphasized that it was broad daylight and

that the suspect would have had to vault out of the pool to

escape, giving the officer plenty of time to apprehend him. See

id. at 289–90.

Miller presents a similar fact pattern. Officers investigating

a stabbing came upon a man who admitted that he was on

probation for burglary and disorderly conduct. See 761 F.3d

at 824. The man, now a suspect, fled, eventually hopping a

fence into an enclosed yard. See id. An officer held him at gun-

point and ordered him to the ground. See id. at 825. After the

suspect was on his stomach for about 10 seconds, the officer

jumped over the fence and landed on him, breaking his jaw.

See id. at 825, 828. We held that this use of force was excessive

10 No. 24-1252

and not protected by qualified immunity because the suspect

was already prone and subdued at gunpoint. See id. at 829–

30.

Neither Alicea nor Miller help Steinhoff. Neither concerned

the execution of a search warrant for drugs across a large

property where officers expected to encounter armed, violent,

or flight-ready individuals. They only involved a single sus-

pect. And that suspect was boxed in at a distance from law

enforcement, giving the officer time to reassess the threat

level and calibrate his use of force. In short, the officers in Al-

icea and Miller were not under pressure to make rapid deci-

sions to control a potentially dangerous situation. This case is

the opposite in every way.

Steinhoff cites a host of other cases, but they are similarly

devoid of high-stakes drug raids often requiring quick police

action. And most involve uses of force on people who were

both compliant and suspected of non-violent crimes, or the

use of gratuitous force on someone who was already sub-

dued.

In the end, then, we affirm the district court’s award of

qualified immunity to Detective Kowalczyk and, accordingly,

its denial of Steinhoff’s cross-motion.

C

We see the analysis for Investigator Malovrh differently.

To our eye, Steinhoff’s primary contention is that Investigator

Malovrh intentionally hit him in the head with his rifle as De-

tective Kowalczyk tackled him. But describing an argument

is different from knowing what happened. And that is the cir-

cumstance we find ourselves in here.

No. 24-1252 11

Steinhoff did not claim to see who hit him. Nor does the

body-camera footage show what transpired during the

takedown. And while Investigator Malovrh claims he joined

in once Steinhoff was on the ground, Detective Kowalczyk

testified that Investigator Malovrh assisted from the start. We

cannot reach any conclusions on qualified immunity without

knowing the material facts. But there is enough circumstantial

evidence of an intentional use of excessive force to send this

question to trial.

A jury could find that Investigator Malovrh’s rifle hit

Steinhoff while he was standing, which is inconsistent with

Investigator Malovrh’s insistence that he only jumped into the

fray once Steinhoff was on the ground. Steinhoff testified that

he saw a rifle swing and hit him while he was still upright.

The audible “clink” in the video could corroborate that the

rifle made contact while he was standing. More, Captain

Ramberg was the only other officer nearby with a rifle, yet all

agree that he took no part in the takedown. That Investigator

Malovrh’s rifle allegedly hit Steinhoff while he was standing,

and with enough force to inflict a deep cut, further indicates

that the blow may have been intentional.

Lesser factors also inform our judgment. After the

takedown for instance, Steinhoff complained about what hap-

pened, saying, “my ear’s split with that gun you hit me with.”

Somebody responded, “[w]ell, don’t take off—try to take off

when we’re giving you orders.” But it is unclear which officer

made the comment. A jury could find that the officer, having

seen the incident, implicitly acknowledged that Investigator

Malovrh hit Steinhoff intentionally. See Miller, 761 F.3d at 828

(holding that a jury could conclude that an officer who

12 No. 24-1252

jumped onto a suspect intended to injure them when he re-

plied to the suspect’s complaint, “I told you not to run”).

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Steinhoff,

we cannot conclude that Investigator Malovrh is entitled to

qualified immunity at summary judgment. A blow to the

head with a rifle could qualify as deadly use of force because

it may pose a “substantial risk of serious bodily harm.” Becker

v. Elfreich, 821 F.3d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 2016); see Sallenger v.

Oakes, 473 F.3d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that blows

with fists and a flashlight to the back of a head may be deadly

force). And an officer cannot use deadly force against a non-

resisting suspect. See Gant v. Hartman, 924 F.3d 445, 451 (7th

Cir. 2019) (citing pre-2018 cases). Again, though, we do not

know what happened. Investigator Malovrh may reinvoke

qualified immunity at trial as the facts develop, including

through special interrogatories. See Smith, 10 F.4th at 749–50;

Strand v. Minchuk, 910 F.3d 909, 918–19 (7th Cir. 2018).

We recognize that Steinhoff has an alternative line of ar-

gument—that if Investigator Malovrh unintentionally hit him

with his rifle during an intentional and, in Steinhoff’s view,

excessive tackle, Investigator Malovrh is liable for a Fourth

Amendment violation. We do not pass upon this theory ex-

cept to observe that its viability can be also sorted out with

additional fact-finding at trial.

***

In the final analysis, we AFFIRM the district court’s entry

of qualified immunity to Detective Kowalczyk and the corre-

sponding denial of partial summary judgment for Steinhoff.

But we REVERSE the district court’s entry of summary

No. 24-1252 13

judgment for Investigator Malovrh. We REMAND the case

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.