Morgan

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

KEVIN MORGAN, *

Plaintiff, *

v * Civil Action No. MJM-24-909

CHARLES CO. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, et al., *

Defendants. *

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KEVIN MORGAN, *

Plaintiff, *

v * Civil Action No. MJM-25-009

L. LEAPLEY, et al., *

Defendants. *

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Self-represented plaintiff Kevin Morgan filed two civil rights lawsuits concerning a use of

force against him at the Charles County Detention Center (“CCDC”) on January 31, 2022. Both

civil actions name as defendants PFC Troy Conner, PFC David Garrison, Officer Robert Calhoun,

and Officer Luke Leapley. In Civil Action MJM-24-909, Morgan also names Charles County

Sheriff’s Office and the Charles County Detention Center as defendants. The Amended Complaint

in Civil Action MJM-24-909, ECF No. 7, concerns the same allegations and claims as the

Complaint filed in Civil Action MJM-25-009, ECF No. 1, and the defendants have filed identical

Motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment in each case. Civ. No. 24-909, ECF No. 51; Civ.

No. 25-009, ECF No. 20. The two cases shall be consolidated for purposes of dispositive review.

For ease of reference, all pending motions in Civil Action 25-0091 shall be denied without

prejudice to the motions pending in Civil Action 24-909, and the motions addressed herein will

refer only to those filed in Civil Action 24-909.

Morgan has filed motions for summary judgment in his favor and opposes both dismissal

of the Complaint and summary judgment in favor of the defendants. ECF Nos. 44 & 56 (motions

for summary judgment); ECF Nos. 46, 59 & 60 (oppositions in response). In addition, Morgan

has filed motions for discovery, ECF Nos. 34 & 43; for appointment of counsel, ECF No. 40; and

for leave to amend, ECF Nos. 55 & 57.

The issues pending before the Court are fully briefed; there is no need for a hearing. See

D. Md. Local R. 105.6 (2025). For the reasons that follow, the Amended Complaint shall be

DISMISSED as to defendants Charles County Sheriff’s Office and Charles County Detention

Center and summary judgment shall be GRANTED in favor of defendants Conner, Garrison,

Calhoun, and Leapley.

I. BACKGROUND

At the time he filed suit, Morgan was confined at CCDC. He alleges that on January 31,

2022, at approximately 11:00 p.m., PFC Conner and PFC Garrison served him with a warrant for

collection of his DNA. ECF No. 7 at 4. At the time the warrant was served, Morgan was restrained

with a handcuff on his left hand that was secured to the wall of a room he refers to as “PB 3.” Id.

He states that while he was reading the warrant, Conner began trying to “stick [a] long Q-Tip in

[his] mouth.” Id. Morgan pushed back in his chair because Conner was “in [his] space.” Id. As

1 Motions pending in Civil Action 25-009 include Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 13; Defendants’

Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 20; Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Physical Exhibit, ECF No.

23; Morgan’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 24; Morgan’s Motion to Amend/Add Defendant, ECF No. 26;

Morgan’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 27; and Morgan’s Motion for Leave to Amend, ECF No.

28, all of which shall be denied without prejudice to consideration of the corresponding motions filed in Civil Action

24-909, which are identical.

he pushed away, Morgan moved Conner’s hand away and stood up. Id. In response, Morgan

claims that Conner pushed him so hard against the wall that he knocked the wind out of him. Id.

At that time, Morgan alleges that Garrison grabbed his right arm and bent it to the point it “felt

like he was trying to break it.” Id. Shortly thereafter, Officer Leapley entered the room and

punched Morgan in the face; and Officer Calhoun came into the room next and grabbed Morgan’s

head and put him in a chokehold. Id. Morgan describes feeling Calhoun putting all his weight on

his head and feeling like he was trying to pull his head away from his body. Id. at 5. He states he

was in so much pain that he feared for his life. Id. at 5. Morgan claims that he remained restrained

to the wall the entire time this force was being used. Id.

After he was released from the wall, Morgan recalls that he was handcuffed behind his

back and taken to a bench where Sgt. Conrad collected the DNA sample. ECF No. 7 at 5. Morgan

states he was never charged with anything related to this incident2 and never heard anything again

from Conner or Garrison. Id. He claims that his back, neck, arms, and face were in pain for days

and that he had never been through anything like this incident before in his life. Id.

Defendants agree that Garrison and Conner came to CCDC to collect a DNA sample from

Morgan pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant. They do not dispute that Morgan was handcuffed

by his left arm to the back wall of “Professional Booth 3” at CCDC when they met with him to

collect the DNA sample. ECF No. 51-4 at 1, ¶ 4. Conner provided the warrant to Morgan and

described him as being “extremely disagreeable,” as he began questioning the legitimacy of the

warrant. Id. According to Conner, Morgan was attempting to stall the DNA collection process by

2 In the investigation that followed the incident it was established that a Jail Incident Report was served on

Morgan by Sgt. Conrad on February 1, 2022, and sent to the adjustment hearing officer, Cpl. Martin for resolution.

ECF No. 51-2 at 15. However, the report mistakenly indicated Morgan’s first name as Kenneth, not Kevin. Id.

Kenneth Morgan is Kevin Morgan’s twin brother. Id. Although Martin asked Conrad to fix the error and serve the

corrected report, Conrad informed Martin that service of a corrected report could not be accomplished by the required

deadline. Id. The adjustment hearing therefore did not take place due to the error in the name used on the initial

report.

“talking in circles” and asking the same questions repeatedly. Id. Conner recalls telling Morgan

that they could have correctional officers retrieve the DNA sample if necessary. When Conner and

Garrison started to leave the room, Morgan told them to get the correctional officers. Id. Morgan

then changed his mind and indicated his consent for the collection. Id.

Conner states that after Morgan agreed to cooperate with the collection, he swatted

Conner’s hands away and told him not to touch him and that he could collect the sample himself.

ECF No. 51-4 at 1, ¶ 5. Morgan then tried to grab the swabs from Conner and bite down on them.

Id. Conner explained to Morgan that he was not allowed to let him collect his own sample, and

that if he could, he would, but he could not do that. Id. Morgan’s response to Conner was to state

“several times, ‘if you touch me again, I’m going to hit you in your face,’” while he “balled his

fist a couple times.” Id. at 1–2, ¶ 6. When Morgan stood up, he had balled his fist and tried to

take a swing at Conner but was unsuccessful. Id. at 2. At that time, Conner states that he “shoved

[Morgan] at his torso into the wall to prevent Morgan from hitting [him], or spitting [on him,] or

kicking [him].” Id. Conner states that he did not do anything outside of normal tactics and did not

see Leapley, Calhoun, or Garrison do anything inappropriate. Id.

Similarly, Garrison describes Morgan as questioning the warrant when he and Conner

served it on him, and when it was suggested that correctional officers could retrieve the sample,

Morgan said “to just take his DNA.” ECF No. 51-1 at 1, ¶ 4. Garrison states that because Morgan

bit at the stick, was jerking his hands, and made a fist a few times during the DNA collection, he

believed Morgan was going to hit Conner. Id. at ¶ 5. Morgan stood up, and Conner attempted to

get him under control and secure him to the wall. Id. Garrison recalls that he grabbed Morgan’s

free hand and arm as Morgan struggled and secured Morgan’s arm behind his back to keep him

from hitting Conner. Id. Garrison explains that he placed Morgan’s “free hand and arm behind

his back in the lower part of the back where [officers] have been trained for arrests.” Id. Garrison

denies jerking or tweaking Morgan’s arm or doing anything to cause him harm. Id. He adds that

Calhoun secured Morgan’s head and upper body to keep him from flailing, which Garrison

characterizes as “nothing out of the ordinary.” Id. at ¶ 6. Leapley helped Garrison secure Morgan’s

free arm. Id. at ¶ 7.

Leapley adds that he heard and saw officers struggling with Morgan in Professional Booth

3 on the date in question, and he called a “signal 13 for officers in need of assistance.” ECF No.

51-6 at 1, ¶ 3. Leapley, accompanied by Calhoun, ran into the room where they saw Conner and

Garrison actively struggling with Morgan against the wall as Morgan was attempting to push them

off. Id. Leapley explains that he tried to get Morgan against the wall, and “[Morgan’s] face was

the only spot [he] could get to and when [he] realized it was [Morgan’s] face, [Leapley] changed

the position of [his] hands.” Id. Leapley denies striking or punching Morgan or doing anything

to cause him harm, but states that Morgan was resisting. Id. He adds that he did not see anyone

else do anything inappropriate or outside the parameters of normal tactics. Id. at ¶ 4.

Calhoun states that when he entered the room with Leapley, he believed Morgan was going

to spit so his reaction was to “put Morgan’s head down.” ECF No. 51-7 at 1, ¶ 3. Calhoun put

Morgan in a bear hug and had him “wrapped around the shoulder and under [Calhoun’s] arm.” Id.

Calhoun explains that he was “very careful not to put Morgan in a chokehold.” Id. When Morgan

tried to stand up, Calhoun recalls that he “dropped his weight to keep him from standing up.” Id.

After ten to fifteen seconds, Calhoun states that Morgan stopped trying to stand and he transitioned

from a bear hug to just placing his hands on Morgan’s head. Id. According to Calhoun, he was

“attempting to assist with gaining control” while remaining “mindful that [Morgan] was

handcuffed by his left arm to the back wall, so [the officers] could not safely take him to the

ground.” Id. Calhoun adds that neither he, nor any of the other officers present, did anything

inappropriate or outside of normal tactics. Id. at ¶ 4.

The video recording of the interaction between Morgan and the officers confirms that a use

of force occurred. ECF No. 50-1 (physical exhibit filed separately). However, it also confirms

that Morgan was given time to read the warrant while Garrison and Conner stood by and waited

for him to finish. Although the video submitted to the Court does not have sound, Morgan appears

to speak to the officers while reviewing the warrant, and Garrison and Conner respond several

times. Eventually, Conner approaches Morgan to swab the inside of his mouth, whereupon Morgan

sits back away from Conner, appearing to object. Conner takes a half-step back and appears to

speak to Morgan, while Garrison remains positioned on the opposite side of the table observing.

Conner steps away from Morgan, crosses his ankles and places his right hand on the wall in a

relaxed stance as though he was having a casual conversation with Morgan. Morgan appears to

be speaking about the warrant as he holds up pages of the warrant and looks toward Garrison as

he speaks and then looks back at the papers he was holding. During the conversation, Morgan

makes hand gestures as if discussing how the swab will be administered. Garrison begins to gather

the items he and Conner brought into the room for the DNA collection, and they both turn as if to

leave the room. Garrison and Conner appear to continue talking to Morgan as they continue

preparing to leave. When Garrison opens the door to leave, Morgan says something, Garrison

closes the door, and then he and Conner come back into the room.

Upon his return, Conner immediately begins to swab the inside of Morgan’s mouth. After

completing the first swab, Conner attempts to swab the inside of Morgan’s mouth with a second

swab. After Conner inserts the swab into Morgan’s mouth, Morgan grabs Conner’s hand and

pushes it away. When Conner attempts to do it again, Morgan repeatedly moves his face away,

indicating he does not want to cooperate with the procedure. There appears to be words exchanged

between Morgan and Conner just before Morgan stands up, taking on what appears to be a fighting

stance. Conner places his hands on Morgan’s shoulders and pushes him back down into the chair.

Then, Conner holds onto Morgan’s arm and stands in a lunge stance. Garrison then comes around

to the other side of the table and grabs Morgan’s wrist. It is difficult to see what Garrison is doing

as he draws closer to Morgan, but he is on Morgan’s right side, near his free arm. Morgan continues

to struggle against Conner and Garrison as they attempt to pin him against the wall.

As the struggle continues, two additional officers enter the room. The first officer to enter

the room, Calhoun, positions himself beside Conner and reaches behind Morgan, while the second

officer, Leapley, positions himself in front of Morgan between Garrison and Conner. Leapley

places his hand on the side of Morgan’s head but does not appear to strike Morgan. Next, Morgan’s

body folds forward toward the floor. Calhoun reaches down around Morgan’s torso and places

him in a bear hug with Morgan’s head pointed into Calhoun’s abdomen area. Garrison and Leapley

assist Calhoun in gaining control of Morgan by holding his free arm against the lower part of his

back, as Morgan continues to struggle and Calhoun positions himself in front of Morgan. A fifth

officer then enters the room to begin unlocking the restraint from Morgan’s left wrist. Morgan

remains physically restrained while he is released from the wall, and Garrison and the fifth officer

place cuffs on Morgan’s wrists, behind his back. After he is restrained in handcuffs, he is released

from the bear hug and taken out of the room by the officers.

In his second motion for summary judgment, Morgan maintains that because he did not

make any aggressive moves toward Conner such as swinging his fist or kicking him, Conner’s act

of forcing him against the wall was unjustified under the circumstances. ECF No. 56-1 at 2. He

explains that he was confused and asked for a lawyer because he believed his constitutional rights

were being violated, but Conner and Garrison told him a lawyer would not help him. Id. Morgan

claims that the warrant contained a statement regarding his twin brother and explained that any

DNA taken from him would also match his twin brother. Id. Morgan states that he did not

understand the warrant and was upset because he believed Conner and Garrison were not being

honest with him, and he verbally refused to submit to the test. Id. At that point, Morgan recalls

that he was told that correctional officers would “use the restraint chair” to retrieve the sample if

necessary. Id. Morgan does not claim that he changed his mind about consenting to the test; rather,

he claims that Garrison and Conner came back after they had started to leave and forcefully tried

to stick the swab in his mouth. Id.

Morgan further claims that when Leapley entered the room, he did not simply touch

Morgan’s face but hit his face. ECF No. 56-1 at 3. Morgan further claims that Calhoun put him

in a chokehold or headlock, not a bear hug. Id. at 3–4. He claims the force that Leapley and

Calhoun used against him was also inappropriate because he remained chained to the wall and he

never tried to spit on, kick, or head-butt any of the officers. Id.

II. NON-DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

A. Motion to Appoint Counsel

In his motion for representation (ECF No. 40), Morgan states that he remains incarcerated

in CCDC, he is indigent, and he is confused about how to litigate his case. He asserts that his case

is not frivolous or a waste of the Court’s time.

There is no absolute right to appointment of counsel in a civil case. See Miller v. Simmons,

814 F.2d 962, 966 (4th Cir. 1987). A federal district court judge’s power to appoint counsel under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) is a discretionary one and may be considered where an indigent claimant

presents exceptional circumstances. See Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975);

Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982). Exceptional circumstances exist where a “pro

se litigant has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present it.” Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d

160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296,

298 (1989) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize compulsory appointment of counsel);

see also Jenkins v. Woodard, 109 F.4th 242, 248 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[A] district court must conduct

a fact specific, two-part inquiry to assess whether a case presents exceptional circumstances before

it decides whether to appoint counsel[,]” to include deciding “whether the plaintiff has a colorable

claim” and, “considering the claim’s objective complexity and the plaintiff’s subjective abilities,

whether the plaintiff lacks the capacity to present it.” (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)). Exceptional circumstances include when a litigant “is barely able to read and write,”

Whisenant, 739 F.2d at 162, or clearly “has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present it,”

Berry v. Gutierrez, 587 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (E.D. Va. 2008) (citing Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F.

Supp. 909, 947 (M.D.N.C. 1984)).

Morgan has established that he has the capacity to present his claim and that he is able to

comprehend the legal principles involved in the case. Exceptional circumstances do not exist to

justify appointment of counsel for Morgan. Therefore, his motion shall be denied.

B. Motions for Discovery

In Morgan’s first motion for discovery, he seeks to obtain the video surveillance depicting

the incident; all documents related to the incident; the search warrant requiring his DNA; Internal

Affairs reports and the outcome of any investigations; and all request slips, grievances, and

appeals. ECF No. 34 at 2. In his second such motion, Morgan adds an inquiry about what occurred

with his DNA after it was collected and no charges were filed against him. ECF No. 43 at 3.

Formal discovery has not been conducted in this case. The Fourth Circuit has emphasized

that discovery is “broadly favored” in advance of reaching summary judgment, and district courts

are to afford pro se plaintiffs leniency in regard to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56(d). Farabee v. Gardella, 131 F.4th 185, 193–95 (4th Cir. 2025). When a court is

presented with a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56(d) provides the following:

If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it

cannot present facts to justify its opposition, the court may:

(1) Defer considering the motion or deny it;

(2) Allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or

(3) Issue any other appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Ordinarily, summary judgment is inappropriate “where the parties have not

had an opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Kolon Industries,

Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448–49. Nevertheless, a plaintiff “cannot simply demand discovery for the

sake of discovery.” Hamilton v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 807 F. Supp. 3d 331, 342 (D.

Md. 2011).

Analyzed under foregoing standards, Morgan’s requests, to the extent they are not moot,

must be denied. Morgan’s request for the video surveillance is moot as it has been provided to

him and filed with the Court in connection with the parties’ dispositive motions. Additionally,

Defendants have filed with the Court, and served on Morgan, the Internal Affairs investigative

report generated in the wake of the incident giving rise to this lawsuit, making that part of Morgan’s

request for discovery moot as well. ECF Nos. 51-2 & 51-9. The search warrant and any

information regarding the use of Morgan’s DNA are not relevant to the question of whether the

force used by Defendants was excessive. Further, Defendants have not raised the affirmative

defense that Morgan failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and, therefore, any need to

demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies is obviated. Morgan’s motions for discovery

shall be denied.

C. Motions to Amend

Morgan filed motions to amend his Complaint to add Charles County as a defendant. ECF

Nos. 55 & 57. Morgan states that he was told by the Court that Charles County Sheriff’s Office

was not a proper defendant and therefore wants to name Charles County as a defendant instead.

Id. He does not include any allegations against the county.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), “[a] party may amend its pleading once

as a matter of course no later than: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to

which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days

after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).

“In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent

or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15 dictates that “[t]he court should freely give

leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). If the proposed amendment appears to

be futile, this Court has the discretion to deny leave to amend. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426

(4th Cir. 2006). A proposed amendment is futile when it is “clearly insufficient or frivolous on its

face.” Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 510 (4th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).

When a defendant is named in the caption of a complaint but no specific allegations are

raised against it, it is entitled to dismissal from suit. Further, to impose liability on a municipality,

such as Charles County, there must be something more than just an allegation that its employees

engaged in wrongdoing. “A municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978); see also Simons v. Montgomery County Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1985).

The Monell Court explained that “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy, inflicts the injury the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694; see

also Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004). There is no such allegation here.

Therefore, the Court finds Morgan’s proposed amendment to be futile, and his motions to amend

shall be denied.

III. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

A. Standard of Review

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim or, alternatively, for

summary judgment. ECF No. 51. To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead enough factual allegations “to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 570 (2007). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

663 (2009). A complaint need not include “detailed factual allegations,” but it must set forth

“enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the]

actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555–56 (internal quotation marks omitted). When considering a motion to dismiss, a

court must take the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences

in favor of the plaintiff. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016). At the same time,

“a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Retfalvi v. United States,

930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

“[P]ro se filings are ‘h[e]ld to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” Folkes v. Nelsen, 34 F.4th 258, 272 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520 (1972)). Accordingly, the Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally. Bing v. Brivo

Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1376 (2021). But “liberal

construction does not require [the Court] to attempt to ‘discern the unexpressed intent of the

plaintiff[;]’” the Court need only “determine the actual meaning of the words used in the

complaint.” Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Laber v. Harvey, 438

F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). Thus, a pro se complaint “still ‘must contain enough

facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Thomas v. The Salvation Army S.

Territory, 841 F.3d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting King, 825 F.3d at 212, 214 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570)).

Ordinarily, a court “is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or to resolve factual

disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 510 F.3d 442, 450

(4th Cir. 2007). If the court considers matters outside the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(d), “the

motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). If the

court converts the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment in this fashion, “[a]ll

parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the

motion.” Id. A court may not convert a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment sua sponte

unless it provides notice to the parties that it will do so. See Laughlin v. Metro Washington Airports

Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that a district court “clearly has an obligation to

notify parties regarding any court-instituted changes” in the posture of a motion, including

conversion under Rule 12(d)). However, when the movant expressly captions its motion “in the

alternative” as one for summary judgment and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court’s

consideration, the parties are deemed to have notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur,

and the court need not “notify parties of the obvious.” Id.

Defendants and Morgan each move for summary judgment in their favor. ECF Nos. 44,

51 & 57. Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes that “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To meet its burden, the party must identify “particular parts of materials in

the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” in support of

its position. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “[T]o avoid summary judgment, the opposing party must

set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Perkins v. Int’l Paper Co.,

936 F.3d 196, 205 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986)).

A dispute of fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The opposing party must identify

more than a “scintilla of evidence” in support of its position to defeat the motion for summary

judgment. Id. at 251. A plaintiff opposing summary judgment must present “evidence on which

the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. A party can establish the absence or

presence of a genuinely disputed fact through “particular parts of materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or

other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). The Court “should not weigh the evidence.” Perkins,

936 F.3d at 205 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). However, if “the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then summary judgment is

proper. Id. (quoting Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir.

1991)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, this Court “view[s] the facts and inferences drawn from the facts in the light

most favorable to . . . the nonmoving party.” Perkins, 936 F.3d at 205 (quoting Evans v. Techs.

Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1996)).

Summary judgment is generally improper “where the parties have not had an opportunity

for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont, 637 F.3d 435, 448–49. However, the non-moving party

cannot “complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party has

made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.”

Evans, 80 F.3d at 961. “If a party believes that more discovery is necessary for it to demonstrate a

genuine issue of material fact, the proper course is to file a [Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)] affidavit.”

Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002). A Rule 56(d)

affidavit specifies reasons the non-moving party “cannot present facts essential to justify its

opposition” to a summary judgment motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). “[F]ailure to file an affidavit . .

. is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate.”

Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 244 (quoting Evans, 80 F.3d at 961).

The Fourth Circuit has made clear that “it is appropriate to excuse ‘technical

noncompliance’ with Rule 56(d), especially with pro se plaintiffs where the district court is put on

‘fair notice of a potential dispute as to the sufficiency of the summary judgment record.’”

Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, 58 F.4th 104, 123 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511,

526 (4th Cir. 2021)). A pro se party, however, must still demonstrate that he seeks discovery and

that such discovery would be relevant to dispute the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also

Mohn v. Progressive Ins., 802 F. App’x 391, 396 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding that where a defendant

fails to submit affidavits as required by Rule 56(d), “his pro se status does not excuse this failure”)

(citation omitted)). Notwithstanding a plaintiff’s self-represented status, he must still “put the

court on notice that there [is] [a] possible dispute about the sufficiency of the evidence for [his]

claim[,]” and that discovery would aid “in developing essential facts …” Firewalker-Fields, 58

F.4th at 124. As already noted, Morgan’s requested discovery does not meet this standard and is

denied.

B. Analysis

At the time of the events forming the basis of his Complaint, Morgan was a pretrial

detainee. The Supreme Court held in Kingsley v. Hendrickson that “the appropriate standard for a

pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is solely an objective one.” 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). It

is enough that a pretrial detainee shows that the “force purposely or knowingly used against him

was objectively unreasonable,” id., regardless of an officer’s state of mind, id. at 395 (cited in

Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2016)). Pursuant to Kingsley, this Court must

consider whether under the “facts and circumstances” of this particular case, and from the

“perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” the force used against Morgan was objectively

excessive. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. This Court must also “account for the ‘legitimate interests

that stem from [the government’s] need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained,’

appropriately deferring to ‘policies and practices that in th[e] judgment’ of jail officials ‘are needed

to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.’” Id. (quoting Bell

v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979) (brackets in original)).

Here, Morgan admits he did not cooperate with the execution of a lawfully issued warrant

and that he verbally refused to do so. See ECF No. 56-1 at 2. And the video evidence confirms

his refusal to cooperate. None of his explanations are sufficient to justify his failure to cooperate

with the warrant. The officers who were there to carry out orders issued by a judge had no power

to alter the order, nor would they have any additional information to offer.

Morgan’s aggression toward Conner and Garrison, easily discernible on the video evidence

submitted, was a valid reason for the physical restraint by the officers that ensued. Morgan’s claim

that no force should have been used against him because he did not swing his fist, kick, or spit is

without merit. To determine if the officers’ actions in restraining Morgan were objectively

reasonable, this Court must examine ‘“the relationship between the need for the use of force and

the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff ’s injury; any effort made by the officer to

temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat

reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.’” Lombardo

v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 594 U.S. 464, 467 (2021) (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397). Here,

Morgan was actively resisting Conner’s attempt to collect his DNA and became threatening when

he stood up taking what appears to be a fighting stance. The scuffle continued due to Morgan’s

continued resistance, as seen in the video. The officer pinned Morgan against the wall in an effort

to prevent him from being harmed because he was handcuffed to the wall; as soon as he was

released from that restraint and he was safely handcuffed behind his back, he was released from

the physical hold Calhoun had on him. Morgan’s claim that Leapley hit him in the face is also not

supported by the video; rather, Leapley’s assertion that he placed his hand on Morgan’s face and

moved it quickly thereafter is supported by the video. Morgan did not sustain any notable injuries.

In all material respects, Defendants’ version of events is supported by the video and

Morgan’s are contradicted. Although the Court cannot resolve conflicting affidavits on summary

judgment, where a party’s contention is clearly contradicted by a video recording of the incident,

summary judgment is appropriate. See Witt v. W. Va State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276 (4th

Cir. 2011) (stating that “when a video ‘quite clearly contradicts the version of the story told by [the

plaintiff] . . . so that no reasonable jury would believe it, a court should not adopt [the plaintiff's]

version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.’”) (quoting Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)). Here, summary judgment in favor of Defendants Conner,

Garrison Leapley, and Calhoun shall be granted.

The remaining Defendants, Charles County Sheriff’s Office and Charles County Detention

Center, must be dismissed. The CCDC is not an entity that may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

which provides in pertinent part that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

of the United States or other person with the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . (emphasis supplied).

The detention center is not a “person” within the meaning of the statute and is therefore not a

proper defendant in this case. The motion to dismiss will be granted as to Charles County

Detention Center.

The Charles County Sheriff’s Office must be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity

grounds. As a matter of Maryland law, county sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are officials and/or

employees of the State, not the county. See Rucker v. Harford Cnty, 558 A.2d 399, 402 (Md. 1989).

Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state, its agencies, and

departments are immune from suits in federal court brought by its citizens or the citizens of another

state, unless it consents. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100

(1984). “It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its

agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id.

(citing Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U.S. 147 (1981) (per

curiam)). While the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain types of

cases brought in its courts, see Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-201(a), it has not waived its

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal court. “A State’s constitutional interest

in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued.”

Halderman, 465 U.S. at 100 (emphasis in original).

To the extent that Morgan is raising a state tort claim pursuant to the Maryland State Tort

Claims Act, this Court declines jurisdiction over such a claim. “When, as here, the federal claim

is dismissed early in the case, the federal courts are inclined to dismiss the state law claims without

prejudice rather than retain supplemental jurisdiction.” Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.

343, 350 (1988) (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726–727 (1966)).

Any claims of this kind shall be dismissed without prejudice.

Further, to the extent that Morgan is raising a claim based on respondeat superior for failure

to intervene on his behalf, the claim fails. Liability under § 1983 attaches only upon personal

participation by a defendant in the constitutional violation. It is well established that the doctrine

of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims. See Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 782 (no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983). Liability of supervisory officials “is not based on

ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather is premised on ‘a recognition that supervisory

indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the

constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.’” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d

228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)). To state a

claim for supervisory liability under § 1983 based on a subordinate’s conduct, the plaintiff must

allege that (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that subordinate’s conduct

“posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff” (2)

the supervisor responded in a manner that was so inadequate that it showed “deliberate indifference

to or tacit authorization” of the subordinate’s conduct; and (3) there was “an affirmative causal

link between the supervisor’s inaction” and the plaintiff’s constitutional injury. Timpson by &

through Timpson v. Anderson Cnty. Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., 31 F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir.

2022) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)). Morgan has failed to adequately

plead such a claim against any cognizable party. The Charles County Sheriff’s Office will be

dismissed from suit.

VI. CONCLUSION

By separate Order which follows, Defendants are granted summary judgment in these

consolidated cases and all other pending motions are denied.

_ 3/3/26_____ _____________________________

Date Matthew J. Maddox

United States District Judge