Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

DRE HEALTH CORPORATION, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:22-cv-00031-RK

)

BERKLEY EQUITY LIMITED and )

ANTHONY LYONS, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff DRE Health Corporation’s motion to pierce Berkley Equity

Limited’s corporate veil and hold Defendant Anthony Lyons personally liable for any judgment

entered against Berkley. (Doc. 306.) This motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 307, 333, 334, 339.)

After careful consideration and review, the Court ORDERS that DRE Health Corporation’s

motion to pierce Berkley Equity Limited’s corporate veil is GRANTED.

Background

This case arises from a business dispute between Plaintiff DRE Health Corporation

(“DRE”), a producer and seller of personal protective equipment, and Defendants Berkley Equity

Limited (“Berkley”) and Anthony Lyons, Berkley’s owner-operator, who sought to purchase

millions of face masks from DRE.

This case has a complex procedural and factual history, which the Court has addressed

more fully in previous orders and its Order on DRE’s Omnibus Post-Trial and Sanctions Motions.

(Doc. 345.) In brief, DRE filed suit against Berkley and Lyons on January 18, 2022. (Doc. 1.)

DRE asserted breach of contract claims alleging that it produced or otherwise made available

masks for pick up and payment in accordance with the parties’ agreement and that Berkley never

picked up or paid for any masks. Further, DRE asserted misrepresentation-based claims alleging

that Defendants made false representations to DRE to induce it into entering the agreement. (See

generally Doc. 1.) On December 6, 2024, the Court entered an Order granting in part DRE’s

motion for summary judgment finding in favor of DRE on its breach of contract claims against

Berkley and concluding that DRE suffered at least $14,400,000 in damages as a result. (Doc. 217.)

Finally, this case culminated in a jury trial which began on January 13, 2025, and continued

through January 27, 2025, when the jury returned verdicts in favor of Defendants on all issues and

claims that proceeded to trial. (See generally Doc. 326.)

For purposes of resolving DRE’s motion to pierce Berkely’s corporate veil, the Court notes

the following relevant facts, which both parties stipulated as uncontroverted:

4. Berkley is a “shell company.”

5. Lyons is and was at all relevant times the Chairman of Berkley.

6. Lyons is and was at all relevant times the sole owner of Berkley.

. . . .

9. On September 2, 2021, Lyons executed the Sale and Purchase Agreement

[“SPA”] on behalf of Berkley pursuant to which Berkley would purchase large

quantities of blue and black surgical DRE DMF17 masks from DRE.

10. Berkley had zero assets at the time it entered into the SPA.

. . . .

19. The total value of the Boxed Production Invoice was $184,800,000.[1]

(Doc. 227 at 1-3.)

Lyons’ trial testimony corroborates the above stipulated facts and provides additional

relevant facts. For example, Lyons testified that Berkley does not have a board of directors, (Doc.

319 at 757:12-758:6),2 or any employees, (id. at 758:7-8). Berkley also does not have any financial

statements. (Id. at 760:8-9.) Lyons confirmed that Berkley was a shell company with no assets at

the time it entered the SPA, or anytime thereafter. (See Doc. 319 at 742:2-6, 755:8-12; 758:10 (It’s

a shell company. I think that speaks for itself.”).) Further, Lyons testified that he directly funded

Berkley’s obligations—such as the $3 million initial deposit paid to DRE—from his personal bank

account. (Doc. 319 at 758:12-17.)

Further facts are set forth as necessary below.

1 This amount does not include the $11,000,000 due under the smaller invoice. (Pl. Ex. 3.) The

two invoices total $195,800,000.

2 The trial transcript appears in ten volumes on the Court’s case management and electronic filing

system at Docs. 317-326. When referring to the trial transcript, the Court references the Doc. number

assigned in the CM/ECF filing system, for example Doc. 317 for January 13, 2025 (the first day of trial).

The Court does not reference the page number assigned by CM/ECF, however. Instead, the references to

page numbers in the trial transcript refer to the consecutive pagination across all ten volumes of the

transcript.

Legal Standard

In the Eighth Circuit, “[w]hether to pierce a corporate veil is a legal determination that is

governed by state law.” Depositors Ins. v. Hall’s Rest., Inc., 717 F. App’x 653, 653 (8th Cir. 2018)

(citing Stoebner v. Lingenfelter, 115 F.3d 576, 579 (8th Cir. 1997)). Under Missouri law,3 the party

moving to pierce the corporate veil must show:

(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination,

not only of finances, but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction

attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate

mind, will or existence of its own; and

(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong,

to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest

and unjust act in contravention of plaintiff’s legal rights; and

(3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or

unjust loss complained of.

Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 306 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Collet v. Am. Nat’l

Stores, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 273, 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).4

Further, the Court concludes that this motion is best construed as a Rule 50(b) renewed

motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether to pierce Berkley’s corporate veil,

as this case was submitted to a jury.5 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50; see also Weitz Co. v. MH Washington,

631 F.3d 510, 519-521 (8th Cir. 2011) (treating district court’s ruling that a defendant was either

an alter ego of or in a principal/agent relationship with another defendant as a Rule 50 judgment

as a matter of law). “The grounds for [a] renewed motion under Rule 50(b) are limited to those

asserted in [an] earlier Rule 50(a) motion.” See Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg.

Co., 381 F.3d 811, 821 (8th Cir. 2004). Here, the Court finds that DRE properly asserted its

3 DRE cites Missouri law in support of its motion, and both parties submitted jury instructions

applying Missouri law to the issue of piercing the corporate veil. (Doc. 242 at 50, 56; Doc. 252 at 24-26.)

Thus, it appears that the parties agree that Missouri substantive law governs this issue. Further, DRE’s

Terms & Conditions, which are incorporated in the parties’ agreement, also state that Missouri law governs

conflicts arising out of the agreement. (Pl. Ex. 2 at § 20.2.)

4 Both parties proposed jury instructions on the question of piercing the corporate veil. (Doc. 242

at 50, 55-56; Doc. 252 at 24-26.) A veil piercing instruction was omitted from the final jury instructions at

the parties’ request and with the understanding that the parties could assert their arguments to the Court in

a post-trial motion. (Doc. 323 at 1730:5-11.)

5 DRE refers to the Court’s “equitable powers” as permitting it to decide the motion. (Doc. 306 at

1.) DRE does not suggest a standard by which the Court should review the facts in resolving the motion.

argument that the Court should pierce Berkley’s corporate veil and hold Lyons personally liable

for any judgment entered against Berkley in a Rule 50(a) motion prior to the submission of the

case to the jury. (See Doc. 273.)

When deciding a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court may “direct

entry of judgment as a matter of law” against the nonmoving party, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(3), where

“a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that

issue,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). See also ContiTech USA, Inc. v. McLaughlin Freight Servs., Inc., No.

3:20-cv-00075-SMR-SBJ, 2023 WL 2300398, at *3 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 25, 2023) (“The substantive

standards for a Rule 50(a) motion and Rule 50(b) motion are the same.” (citing Walmart, Inc. v.

Cuker Interactive, LLC, 949 F.3d 1101, 1108 (8th Cir. 2020))). The Court “should review all of

the evidence in the record and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,

without making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Duban v. Waverly Sales

Co., 760 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 2014).

Discussion

DRE argues that the parties’ stipulation of uncontroverted facts in addition to Lyons’ trial

testimony entitles DRE to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of piercing the corporate veil.

In their briefing in opposition to the motion, (Docs. 333, 334), Defendants only argue that the

uncontroverted facts asserted by DRE are insufficient to establish the elements of piercing the

corporate veil under Missouri law. Defendants do not dispute any of the facts in DRE’s motion,

nor do they point the Court to any facts in the record from which the Court should draw an

inference in Defendants’ favor which would defeat DRE’s motion or any facts which counsel

against piercing the corporate veil.

At trial, defense counsel additionally argued that DRE’s veil piercing theory should fail

because DRE did not plead it in the complaint. (Doc. 317 at 39:10-40:17; Doc. 323 at 1692:3-10.)

Defense counsel relied on Blanks v. Flour Corp., 450 S.W.3d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014), in so

arguing. However, pleading matters in federal court are generally considered procedural and are

thus governed by federal pleading standards. See Council Tower Ass’n v. Axis Specialty Ins., 630

F.3d 725, 730 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying federal pleading standards and Missouri substantive law

to review district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim). It does not appear that there is any

federal rule requiring a party to explicitly plead a theory of piercing the corporate veil.6 Further,

given Defendants submitted jury instructions pertaining to the issue of piercing the corporate veil,

(Doc. 252 at 24-26), it appears the parties were on notice that the issue was being tried and

consented to such. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2) (“When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried

by the parties’ express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the

pleadings. . . . [F]ailure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of that issue.”). And finally,

Defendants failed to reassert this argument in opposition to DRE’s post-trial motion to pierce the

corporate veil. (See generally Docs. 333, 334.) Therefore, the Court proceeds to consider DRE’s

motion to pierce Berkley’s corporate veil on the merits.

I. Control over Corporate Entity

DRE argues that Lyons has complete control over Berkley because, inter alia, he is the sole

owner of Berkley, Berkley did not observe any corporate formalities, and Berkley is a shell

company with no assets. (Doc. 307 at 4-5.) Defendants do not contest these facts, nor could they.

Instead, Defendants argue that each fact is merely one factor in determining whether complete

control over the entity exists, and that no single fact is dispositive of the issue of control. (Doc.

334 at 3.) However, Defendants do not point to any factor under Missouri law which weighs

against finding of complete control in this case.

To start, Lyons is and always has been the sole owner of Berkley. (Doc. 319 at 741:24-

742:1; Doc. 227 at ¶ 6.) He also is and has been at all relevant times the Chairman of Berkley.

(Doc. 320 at 984:23-24; Doc. 227 at ¶ 5.) “Factors relevant to a determination whether control by

a person . . . over another corporation was to the extent required for the corporate veil to be pierced

include the ownership and creation of both corporations [and] the management of the corporations

. . . .” Favazza v. Path Media Holdings, LLC, No. 4:12-cv-01561-TCM, 2014 WL 1846109, at *7

(E.D. Mo. May 8, 2014) (citation omitted). Because Lyons is the sole owner and Chairman of

Berkley, the ownership and management factors favor finding that complete control exists to

satisfy the first element of piercing the corporate veil.

6 For example, federal courts only require separate claims for relief to be pleaded in separate counts.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (“[E]ach claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence. . . must be stated in a

separate count.”). Therefore, federal courts have found that piercing the corporate veil is not a separate

cause of action for which relief can be granted, rather it is a theory to impose liability on an individual for

the acts of an entity. See Oginsky v. Paragon Props. of Costa Rica LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1373 (S.D.

Fla. 2011).

Additionally, Berkley does not observe any corporate formalities. See Commonwealth

Land Title Ins. v. Miceli, 480 S.W.3d 354, 372 n.10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (“[A] factor to be

considered in the dominion and control inquiry is whether there was a failure to observe corporate

formalities.”). For example, Berkley does not have a board of directors, (Doc. 319 at 757:12-

758:6), any employees, (id. at 758:7-8), or any financial statements, (id. at 760:8-9). Further,

Berkley is a shell company and did not have any assets at the time it entered the SPA, or anytime

before or after entering the SPA for that matter. (See Doc. 319 at 755:8-12, 742:2-6; Doc. 227 at

¶¶ 4, 10.) Rather, Lyons directly funded Berkley’s obligations—such as the $3 million initial

deposit—from his personal bank account. (Doc. 319 at 758:12-17.) See Garrett v. Albright, No.

4:06-cv-04137-NKL, 2008 WL 920310, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 1, 2008) (applying Missouri law

and noting undercapitalization is relevant to the question of control); see also Commonwealth Land

Title Ins., 480 S.W.3d at 372 n.10 (“Commingling of assets is one factor indicating the corporate

form has been ignored.”).

Finally, Lyons’ trial testimony supports finding that he has complete control over Berkley,

as he effectually admitted to being Berkley itself:

Q. What is your position at Berkley?

[Lyons]. I don’t really have a position at Berkley. It’s just—it’s a shell company.

And you’re looking at it. You’re looking at me.

(Doc. 319 at 742:12-15; see also Doc. 324 at 1865:19-20 (“Q. Okay. And you’re Berkley. Right?

[Lyons]. I am Berkley.”).) As a result, the Court finds DRE has shown, based on the

uncontroverted facts and Lyons’ trial testimony, that Lyons exercised complete control over

Berkley, and the first element of piercing the corporate veil under Missouri law is established as a

matter of law.

II. Fraud or Wrongdoing

The Court next considers whether the control Lyons exercised over Berkley was “used by

the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other positive

legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiff’s legal rights.” Radaszewski,

981 F.2d at 306 (quoting Collet, 708 S.W.2d at 284). Defendants argue that the jury verdict in

favor of Defendants on DRE’s misrepresentation-based claims demonstrates DRE cannot establish

the second element required to pierce the corporate veil. (Doc. 333 at 3.) However, even if this

were the case, “[t]he plaintiff need not show actual fraud; injustice or inequitable consequences

are sufficient to justify piercing the veil.” Sisson, 2022 WL 497347, at *8 (citing K.C. Roofing

Ctr. v. On Top Roofing, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)). “Examples of such

wrongs as would satisfy this standard include actual torts, violations of statutory duties,

undercapitalization, or the stripping of assets from the subservient corporation.” Collet, 708

S.W.2d at 286.

DRE argues that Lyons used his control over Berkley to commit fraud, wrong, and

contravene DRE’s rights, specifically by (1) using Berkley to enter the SPA which obligated

Berkley to pay $195,800,0007 while never infusing Berkley with any assets, leaving it woefully

undercapitalized; (2) purposefully establishing this structure with Berkley to avoid personal

liability for the obligations incurred by Berkley; and (3) sending a $1.9 billion proof of funds to

DRE from a third-party bank account that neither Lyons nor Berkley had access to or control over.

(Doc. 307 at 5-6.)8 Defendants respond that undercapitalization alone is insufficient to pierce the

corporate veil and the provision of proof of funds from a third-party account does not rise to the

level of wrongdoing required to pierce the corporate veil.

As a general matter, under Missouri law “[i]nadequate capitalization is circumstantial

evidence tending to show an improper purpose or reckless disregard for the rights of others[.]”

Sisson, 2022 WL 497347, at *9 (citing 66, Inc. v. Crestwood Commons Redev. Corp., 998 S.W.2d

32, 41 (Mo. 1999)); see also Weitz Co., 631 F.3d at 521 (“Making a corporation a supplemental

part of an economic unit and operating it without sufficient funds to meet obligations to those who

must deal with it would be circumstantial evidence tending to show either an improper purpose or

reckless disregard of the rights of others.” (quoting Collet, 708 S.W.2d at 287)). Accordingly,

“[u]ndercapitalizing a subsidiary, which we take to mean creating it and putting it in business

without a reasonably sufficient supply of money, has become a sort of proxy under Missouri law

for the second Collet element.” Radaszewski, 981 F.2d at 308.

In Collet, the court found that the dominant corporation severely undercapitalized and

stripped assets from its subservient corporation, leaving the subservient corporation’s “creditors

7 This amount includes $184,800,000 due under the larger invoice, (Doc. 227 at 3), and $11,000,000

due under the smaller invoice, (Pl. Ex. 3).

8 DRE does not argue that Berkley’s breach of contract establishes the second element of piercing

the corporate veil, and the Court notes that breach of contract alone is insufficient to establish the second

element of piercing the corporate veil under Missouri law. Weitz Co., 631 F.3d at 522 (“Missouri law does

not state that a breach of contract by the controlled corporation caused by the dominant corporation satisfies

Collet’s second prong . . . .”).

with recourse to an amount of assets far less than the amount necessary or usual in that industry.”

Collet, 708 S.W.2d at 286-87. The court concluded that this course of conduct “made it impossible

for Stores to operate and satisfy its obligations, and justifie[d] piercing the corporate veil.” Id. at

287. Here, the uncontroverted record before the Court clearly shows that Berkley was operating

at all times with no assets, making it undercapitalized insofar as it was unable to meet the

obligations it entered into—including the SPA. Instead, as monies became due—such as the $3

million initial deposit—Lyons drew funds from his personal accounts to make those payments.

This course of conduct left Berkley unable to meet its obligations without an infusion of funds

from its owner and controller, Lyons.

Again, Defendants emphasize that undercapitalization alone is insufficient to establish the

second element of piercing the corporate veil, and that Missouri caselaw requires further evidence

of fraud or wrongdoing. (Doc. 334 at 4.) The Court finds that this argument overstates Missouri

caselaw. Admittedly, in Collet, the court noted both that the subservient corporation was

undercapitalized and the dominant corporation had stripped assets from it. However, unlike in

Collet where the subservient corporation had at least some assets which could be stripped, Lyons’

undercapitalization of Berkley was so severe that there were no assets at all. Thus, the lack of

asset stripping (in the absence of any assets to strip) is an unpersuasive argument against finding

wrongdoing here.

Similarly, in Sisson, the evidence showed undercapitalization as well as an intent to make

the undercapitalized corporation “precisely so they would be in a position where they could not

afford to pay—or be legally compelled to pay—the rent.” 2022 WL 497347, at *9. Defendants

argue that DRE has not shown that Lyons acted with intent to deceive or avoid obligations.

Drawing inferences that can be drawn from the record in Defendants’ favor, the Court agrees that

an inference can be made that Lyons did not intentionally undercapitalize Berkley so that it would

not be able to fulfill its obligations to DRE. Lyons’ testimony indicates that he set up Berkley, in

part, because of its limited liability. (Doc. 320 at 949:23-950:3 (“[Lyons]. And there was definitely

a limited liability aspect. The whole point of anybody doing business in a company is the . . .

limited liability aspect . . . .”); 952:4-11 (“Q. All right. And so just because the original seed

money came out of your personal account, you didn’t in any way accept or expose yourself to

personal liability, did you? [Lyons]. No. That’s . . . the point of the LLC. Q. And so . . . there’s

nothing wrong with that. You’re trying to insulate yourself from being personally sued for

something? [Lyons]. Exactly why I keep questioning how I can be here.”).) However, drawing

inferences in Defendants’ favor, the record does not conclusively establish that Lyons’

undercapitalized Berkley or set up a limited liability company with the intent to render Berkley

incapable of paying its obligations to DRE.

Regardless, under Missouri caselaw, the undercapitalization alone is sufficient and tends

to show a “reckless disregard for the rights of others.” Sisson, 2022 WL 497347, at *9 (citing 66,

Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 41). Cases in which the court pierces the corporate veil where both

undercapitalization and further wrongdoing are present do not foreclose the possibility of piercing

the corporate veil where undercapitalization alone is present. See Collet, 708 S.W.2d at 286

(“Examples of such wrongs as would satisfy this standard include actual torts, violations of

statutory duties, undercapitalization, or the stripping of assets from the subservient corporation.”

(emphasis added)).

Nor is this case like Radaszewski, where the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the

second element to pierce the corporate veil was established by undercapitalization alone. 981 F.2d

at 311. Importantly, Radaszewski did not reject the principle that “Missouri courts will disregard

the existence of a corporate entity that is operated while undercapitalized.” Id. at 308. Instead,

the court found that the defendant was properly capitalized because it held an insurance policy that

satisfied applicable federal regulations in the industry. Id. at 310. No such insurance policy exists

in this case, nor have Defendants provided any other evidence or argument that Berkley was

somehow properly capitalized at any point of its existence. Defendants’ reliance on Garrett is

similarly misplaced, as that case applies Radaszewski and concludes that the subservient

corporations were properly capitalized. See Garrett v. Albright, No. 4:06-cv-04137-NKL, 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58298, at *11 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 9, 2007), vacated on other grounds, 2008 WL

268993, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 30, 2008) (“All of [defendant’s] subsidiaries are sufficiently

capitalized under federal motor carrier regulations and the Court will not consider Plaintiffs [sic]

continued assertions that [defendant’s] subsidiaries are undercapitalized.”).

The Court thus finds that DRE has established the second element for piercing the

corporate veil because Lyons undercapitalized Berkley to the extent that it could not fulfill its

obligations, which is sufficient “evidence tending to show an improper purpose or reckless

disregard for the rights of others[.]” Sisson, 2022 WL 497347, at *9 (citing 66, Inc., 998 S.W.2d

at 41). Thus, the Court need not reach DRE’s additional argument regarding the $1.9 billion proof

of funds. However, the Court is skeptical that the $1.9 billion proof of funds would support the

second element, considering the Rule 50(b) standard. The stipulated facts assert that Max Dobi

sent the $1.9 billion proof of funds to DRE, not Lyons. (Doc. 227 at ¶ 24.) At trial, Lyons denied

knowledge of this incident. (Doc. 320 at 898:9-900:10.) Thus, drawing inferences in favor of

Defendants, the proof of funds was not sent or directed to be sent by Lyons and therefore does not

provide a basis to conclude that Lyons used Berkley to commit a fraud or wrong.

III. Causation

Finally, “[t]he aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or

unjust loss complained of.” Radaszewski, 981 F.2d at 306 (quoting Collet, 708 S.W.2d at 284).

DRE points to the Court’s December 6, 2024 Summary Judgment Order as establishing at least

$14,400,000 of damages suffered by DRE because of Berkley’s breaches of contract. Additionally,

the Court’s ruling on DRE’s Omnibus Post-Trial Motion recognizes that DRE established

unrebutted benefit-of-the-bargain damages related to Berkley’s breaches of contract. (Doc. 345.)

Defendants argue that even if Berkley’s breaches of contract caused significant financial harm to

DRE, such breaches are attributable to Berkley and not Lyons. (Doc. 334 at 4.)

Under Missouri law, “when the action of the dominant corporate [sic] renders the

subservient corporation insolvent, then the requisite injury and causal connection is established.”

Collet, 708 S.W.2d at 287 (finding causation where dominant corporation maintained subservient

corporation in insolvent condition, and the subservient corporation’s insolvency rendered it unable

to meet its obligations to creditors). Here, as in Collet, Lyons—the dominant entity—operated

Berkley without any assets, rendering it insolvent and unable to meet its obligations as they came

due. Therefore, the injury that DRE suffered when Berkley did not fulfill its obligations was

proximately caused by Lyons’ control and conduct. Id.; see also Sansone v. Moseley, 912 S.W.2d

666, 669-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (finding causation where subservient corporation was insolvent,

and thus unable to meet its obligations, due to undercapitalization and asset stripping by its owner);

Real Estate Investors Four, Inc. v. Am. Design Grp., 46 S.W.3d 51, 58-59 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)

(finding causation where subservient corporation was insolvent, and thus unable to meet its

obligations, due to undercapitalization by dominant corporation).

Thus, the Court concludes that DRE has established the three elements necessary to pierce

Berkley’s corporate veil and hold Lyons personally liable for any judgments entered against

Berkley in this case.

Conclusion

Accordingly, after careful consideration and for the reasons explained above, the Court

ORDERS that DRE Health Corporation’s motion to pierce Berkley Equity Limited’s corporate

veil, (Doc. 306), is GRANTED, and Defendant Anthony Lyons shall be held personally liable for

any judgment entered against Berkley in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark

ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATED: March 20, 2026