Skipper

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

ESTELENE SKIPPER PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 1:25-cv-01060

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Estelene Skipper (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social

Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her applications for

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title II

and XVI of the Act.

The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all

proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and

conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 6.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court

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issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.

1. Background:

Plaintiff protectively filed her disability application for DIB and SSI on February 9, 2022.

(Tr. 13). In these applications, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to depression and nerve damage

in leg and arm. (Tr. 323). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of June 30, 2020. (Tr. 17). These

applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. Id.

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___” The transcript

pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr” and refer to the document filed at ECF

No. 8. These references are to the page number of the transcript itself and not the ECF page

number.

After these denials, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, and this hearing request

was granted. (Tr. 136-206). Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on January 3, 2024. (Tr.

51-76). Plaintiff was present and was represented by Randolph Baltz at this hearing. Id. Plaintiff

and a Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified at this hearing. Id. Plaintiff also had a supplemental

hearing on June 4, 2024. (Tr. 36-50).

On July 11, 2024, after the administrative hearings, the ALJ entered a fully unfavorable

decision denying Plaintiff’s applications. (Tr. 17-26). In this decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff

met the insured requirements of the Act through June 30, 2020. (Tr. 20, Finding 1). The ALJ also

found Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since June 30, 2020. (Tr.

20, Finding 2).

The ALJ then determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: depression,

anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), obesity, chronic pain, neuropathy, and cervical

and lumbar degenerative disc disease. (Tr. 20, Finding 3). Despite being severe, the ALJ also

determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or

medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1

(“Listings”). (Tr. 20, Finding 4).

In this decision, the ALJ indicted he evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and

determined her Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 22-25, Finding 5). Specifically, the

ALJ found Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work except can never climb ladders, ropes,

scaffolds; can occasionally balancing on level and unlevel surfaces; can have frequent exposure to

hazards, dangerous machinery, equipment and unprotected heights; can understand, remember and

carry out detailed (but not complex) tasks, no work at a forced pace, assembly line or production

rate jobs; and only occasional dealings with the public. Id.

The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 25, Finding 6). The

ALJ determined Plaintiff had no PRW. Id. However, the ALJ found there were jobs in significant

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 25, Finding 10). With the help

of the VE, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform the representative occupations of (1) merchandise

marker with approximately 136,000 jobs in the nation, (2) office helper with approximately

190,000 jobs in the nation, and (3) laundry sorter with approximately 175,000 jobs in the nation .

Id. Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been disabled from June 30,

2020, through the date of this decision. (Tr. 26, Finding 11).

Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable disability

determination. On June 3, 2025, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s disability

determination. (Tr. 1-6). On July 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 3. The

Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court. ECF No. 6. This case is now ready for

decision.

2. Applicable Law:

In reviewing this case, the Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a

preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).

As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision,

the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would

have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently.

See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is

possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents

the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d

1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least

one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See 42

U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998). The

Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff

must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve

consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses

the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently

engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;

(3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling

impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education,

and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to

perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the

burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that

the claimant can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact

finder only considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC

if the final stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

3. Discussion:

In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial

evidence in the record. ECF No. 10, Pgs. 2-20. Specifically, Plaintiff raises the following

arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ erred in the RFC determination and (2) the ALJ erred in

considering her subjective complaints of pain. Id. Upon review, the Court finds the ALJ did not

fully consider her subjective complaints when evaluating her disability. Accordingly, the Court

will only address this issue for reversal.

In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the

five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529

and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.1 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007). The factors

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to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and

intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness,

and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.

The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective

complaints of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor if the ALJ

acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective

allegations. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). If the ALJ properly applies

1 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis

of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for

relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your

pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping

on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required

the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007).

Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints are not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference.

See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully

support them [the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility

determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any

inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th

Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find

a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but

whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.

See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).

In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski. Instead,

the ALJ based the credibility determination almost entirely upon the fact that Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints were not supported by her medical records. (Tr. 22-25). The ALJ did not provide

sufficient reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. In his opinion, the ALJ

discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints for the following reasons:

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to

cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the

reasons explained in this decision.

(Tr. 24). Indeed, although the ALJ referenced “other evidence,” he did not specifically provide

what that “other evidence” was.

Based upon this review, the Court finds the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints was improper. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding a claimant’s subjective

complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully

support them [the subjective complaints]”). Accordingly, because the ALJ provided an

insufficient basis for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints during the relevant time period,

this case must be reversed and remanded.

4. Conclusion:

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s decision is not supported by

substantial evidence in the record. As such, this case is reversed and remanded for further findings

consistent with this opinion. A judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.

This Court reverses and remands only for the purpose of fully considering the Polaski

factors and supplying valid reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. This opinion

should not be interpreted as requiring Plaintiff be awarded disability benefits upon remand.

ENTERED this 19th day of March 2026.

Spencer G. Singleton

/s/

HONORABLE SPENCER G. SINGLETON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE