The opinion
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Spencer v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-966.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-966
THE STATE EX REL . SPENCER v. STARK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as State ex rel. Spencer v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip
Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-966.]
Elections—Prohibition—R.C. 3513.05—Writ sought to prevent board of elections
from placing candidate on May 2026 primary-election ballot for
Republican Party nomination for office of U.S. Representative for Sixth
Ohio Congressional District—R.C. 3513.05 conveys that board of elections
with whom a protest against candidacy is filed may consider whether
candidate “has not fully complied with” R.C. Ch. 3513—Board of elections
did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law in denying
protest against candidacy, because board correctly determined signature-
validity issues involving candidate’s petition at protest hearing—Writ
denied.
(No. 2026-0257—Submitted March 16, 2026—Decided March 20, 2026.)
IN PROHIBITION.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
__________________
The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relator, David Spencer, asks for a writ
of prohibition to prevent respondents, the Stark County Board of Elections and its
members, Dimitrios Pousoulides, Janet Weir Creighton, R. Shane Jackson, and
James F. Mathews (collectively, “the Stark County board”), from placing
respondent Jullie Kelley on the May 5, 2026 primary-election ballot as a candidate
for the Republican Party nomination for the office of U.S. Representative for the
Sixth Ohio Congressional District. Spencer protested Kelley’s candidacy,
contending that Kelley’s candidate petition was one signature short of qualifying
for the ballot. Because the Stark County board did not abuse its discretion or clearly
disregard applicable law in denying Spencer’s protest, we deny the writ.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} In January 2026, Kelley filed a declaration of candidacy and petition
with the Stark County board, seeking to be a candidate on the May 5, 2026 primary-
election ballot for the Republican Party nomination for a seat in the U.S. House of
Representatives representing the Sixth Ohio Congressional District. Ohio’s sixth
congressional district encompasses territory in the following ten counties: Belmont,
Carroll, Columbiana, Harrison, Holmes, Jefferson, Mahoning, Stark, Tuscarawas,
and Wayne. Kelley’s candidate petition consisted of part-petitions purportedly
signed by electors from Carroll, Columbiana, Mahoning, and Stark Counties.
{¶ 3} As required by R.C. 3513.05, the Stark County board transmitted to
the boards of elections in Carroll, Columbiana, and Mahoning Counties the part-
petitions containing purported signatures of electors from the respective counties.
In accordance with R.C. 3513.05’s 12th paragraph, each one of those boards
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January Term, 2026
examined and determined the validity of the signatures on its respective part-
petition and returned its determinations to the Stark County board. The Stark
County board also examined and determined the validity of the signatures on its
respective part-petition. Kelley’s candidate petition contained 62 total signatures,
of which 49 were valid based on the determinations of each board. The Stark
County board summarized the results of the signature review conducted by the four
boards as follows:
49 Good
5 Wrong District
2 Not Registered
1 Not Registered at Address given
1 N/A [Candidate]
1 Illegible [not the signature of the person registered at this
address]
3 Not Genuine
(Bracketed text in original.)
{¶ 4} Two of the three “not genuine” signatures had been declared invalid
by the Carroll County board: a signature by a person named Richard Smith and
another by a person named Brandy Clayton. The third “not genuine” signature was
by a person named Kimberly Brummel from Stark County. The “illegible”
signature was by a person who had listed a voting address in Carroll County where
the Carroll County board’s records showed a person named Alexis George was
registered.
{¶ 5} The Stark County board discussed Kelley’s candidate petition at its
February 17, 2026 regular meeting. According to its director, the Stark County
board’s common practice is to review signatures invalidated as “not genuine” when
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
a candidate’s petition has an insufficient number of signatures to qualify for the
ballot. Before the meeting, the Stark County board obtained the voter-registration
files of Smith, Clayton, and George from the Carroll County board.
{¶ 6} At the February 17 meeting, the Stark County board discussed the
signatures of Smith, Clayton, Brummel, and George. According to the meeting
minutes, Board Member Mathews stated that “for three of the [invalid] signatures,
there is not sufficient information to identify the voter” but that “[t]he signature of
Richard Smith is the one that requires some discussion.” Mathews stated that
Smith’s “‘do over’ signature looks a little closer to the signature on record,” a
sentiment with which Board Member Jackson agreed. The “do-over” refers to
Smith apparently crossing out his first name and signing the candidate petition
again. The Stark County board determined that Smith’s signature was valid but did
not accept the signatures of Clayton, Brummel, or George. As a result of accepting
Smith’s signature as valid, the Stark County board determined that Kelley’s
candidate petition contained the required number of valid signatures (50) and
certified Kelley for placement on the May 5, 2026 primary-election ballot.
{¶ 7} On February 20, Spencer filed a written protest with the Stark County
board in accordance with R.C. 3501.39 and 3513.05, challenging the Stark County
board’s certification placing Kelley’s name on the primary-election ballot. Spencer
contended that the Stark County board’s own records showed that only 49
signatures on Kelley’s candidate petition were validated, one less than the threshold
required for certification to the ballot. Spencer also protested that other signatures
were improperly counted, including signatures of several persons who “appear[ed]
to be registered Democrats or [were] otherwise not qualified to participate in the
Republican primary.”
{¶ 8} The Stark County board held a hearing on Spencer’s protest on March
3. At the hearing, Spencer argued that the Stark County board lacked authority
under R.C. 3513.05 to revisit or make a contrary determination regarding the
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January Term, 2026
genuineness of a signature from a different county. Spencer also presented
evidence to support his claim that a person named David Lucas signed the Carroll
County part-petition even though he was a member of the Democratic Party.
{¶ 9} Kelley also appeared and presented evidence at the protest hearing.
Kelley testified regarding Smith’s signature and presented an unsworn statement
from Clayton, in which Clayton stated that she had, in fact, signed Kelley’s
candidate petition.1 Finally, Kelley presented a sworn affidavit from Brummel, in
which Brummel attested that she had signed Kelley’s candidate petition.
{¶ 10} Following a deliberation, the Stark County board denied Spencer’s
protest. The Stark County board stood by its validation of Smith’s signature and
determined that Clayton’s signature was valid, notwithstanding the determination
by the Carroll County board that these signatures were invalid. The Stark County
board agreed with Spencer that Lucas’s signature on the Carroll County part-
petition was invalid. It also determined that Brummel’s signature on the Stark
County part-petition was valid. The Stark County board therefore determined that
Kelley’s candidate petition had 51 valid signatures.
{¶ 11} Spencer filed this action on March 5, seeking a writ of prohibition to
prevent the Stark County board from certifying or placing Kelley on the May 5,
2026 primary-election ballot as a candidate for the Republican Party nomination
for the office of U.S. Representative for the Sixth Ohio Congressional District.
Spencer further requests that this court order the Stark County board to vacate its
decision certifying Kelley for placement on the ballot and to notify all other boards
of elections within Ohio’s sixth congressional district that Kelley’s certification as
a candidate has been vacated. This court set an expedited schedule for the
respondents to file an answer to the complaint and for the parties to submit evidence
and merit briefs. 2026-Ohio-752.
1. Clayton’s written statement was signed before a notary but did not contain a jurat indicating that
she had signed the statement under oath.
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 12} Spencer must establish three elements to obtain a writ of prohibition:
(1) the respondents’ exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the
respondents’ lack of authority to exercise that power, and (3) the absence of an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Save Your
Courthouse Commt. v. Medina, 2019-Ohio-3737, ¶ 23. The third element is
satisfied in this case because of the proximity of the primary election. See State ex
rel. McCord v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2005-Ohio-4758, ¶ 29 (no adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law when election was less than two months
away).
A. Prohibition Claim Against Kelley
{¶ 13} Spencer sued Kelley as a respondent. Though Kelley has not
appeared in this case, Spencer has not shown entitlement to relief against her.
Spencer has neither alleged nor shown that Kelley exercised judicial or quasi-
judicial power. Indeed, Kelley is the candidate whom Spencer is challenging; she
did not hear or consider Spencer’s protest. Accordingly, we deny the writ regarding
Spencer’s claim against Kelley. See Campaign to Elect Larry Carver Sheriff v.
Campaign to Elect Anthony Stankiewicz Sheriff, 2004-Ohio-812, ¶ 10, 19.
B. Prohibition Claim Against the Stark County Board
{¶ 14} A board of elections exercises quasi-judicial power when it conducts
a protest hearing pursuant to statute. Save Your Courthouse Commt. at ¶ 29.
Spencer’s entitlement to a writ of prohibition against the Stark County board
therefore turns on whether its exercise of quasi-judicial power was unauthorized by
law. On that issue, we determine whether the Stark County board engaged in fraud
or corruption, abused its discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable law.
State ex rel. Miller Diversified Holdings, L.L.C. v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections,
2009-Ohio-4980, ¶ 16. There is no allegation of fraud or corruption here.
Therefore, the relevant inquiry is whether the Stark County board abused its
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January Term, 2026
discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law in denying Spencer’s protest and
certifying Kelley for placement on the primary-election ballot.
{¶ 15} Spencer argues that the Stark County board exceeded its legal
authority under R.C. 3513.05 by revisiting and overturning the signature-validity
determination of the Carroll County board. Spencer contends in his merit brief that
under R.C. 3513.05, the determination of signature validity “is within the exclusive
bailiwick or authority of the board of elections [where] the person whose signature
at issue is registered.”
1. Petition certification and protest procedure
{¶ 16} Under R.C. 3513.05, a person desiring to become a candidate for a
party nomination for a congressional office must file a declaration of candidacy and
petition no later than 4:00 p.m. on the 90th day before the day of the primary
election. To be valid, the petition must contain the signatures of at least 50 qualified
electors who are members of the same political party as the candidate. Id. When,
as here, the declaration of candidacy is for a congressional district that encompasses
territory in more than one county, the petition must be filed with the board of
elections of the most populous county within the district. Id. Stark County is the
most populous county in Ohio’s sixth congressional district. See Ohio Secretary of
State, County Populations and Filing Locations, Ohio Congressional Districts,
available at https://www.ohiosos.gov/assets/uscongressionaldistricts-2026-2032-
adopted-2025-10-31-mostpopulouscounty.pdf (accessed Mar. 20, 2026)
[https://perma.cc/4B8A-L6HQ].
{¶ 17} The board of elections with which the petition is filed shall promptly
transmit to the board of elections of each other county within the district the petition
papers that “purport to contain signatures of electors” from those counties. R.C.
3513.05. Each board receiving petitions
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
shall, not later than the seventy-eighth day before the day of [the]
primary election, examine and determine the validity or invalidity
of the signatures on the petition papers so transmitted to or filed with
it . . . and shall return to each other board all petition papers
transmitted to it by such board, together with its certification of its
determination as to the validity or invalidity of the signatures
thereon. All other matters affecting the validity or invalidity of such
petition papers shall be determined by . . . the board with whom such
petition papers were filed.
(Emphasis added.) Id.
{¶ 18} If the candidate’s petition is determined to be valid, any qualified
elector who is a member of the same political party as the candidate and who is
eligible to vote at the primary election may file a protest against the person’s
candidacy for a party nomination. Id. The protest is heard by the board of elections
with whom the candidate filed her declaration of candidacy and petition—i.e., the
Stark County board in this case. See id.; see also R.C. 3501.39(A)(1) (providing
that a board of elections “shall accept” any petition described in R.C. 3501.38,
including declarations of candidacy, nominating petitions, and other petitions filed
with a board of elections, unless a written protest against the petition or candidacy
“is filed, a hearing is held, and a determination is made . . . that the petition is
invalid, in accordance with any section of the Revised Code providing a protest
procedure”).
{¶ 19} At a protest hearing, the board of elections must “hear the protest
and determine the validity or invalidity of the declaration of candidacy and
petition.” R.C. 3513.05. The board must determine that the declaration of
candidacy and petition are invalid if it finds “that such candidate is not an elector
of the state, district, county, or political subdivision in which the candidate seeks a
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January Term, 2026
party nomination or election to an office or position.” Id. The board must also
determine that the declaration of candidacy and petition are invalid if it finds that
the candidate “has not fully complied” with R.C. Ch. 3513. Id.
2. The authority of the board of elections of the most populous county of a
multicounty congressional district
{¶ 20} The thrust of Spencer’s prohibition claim is that the Stark County
board exceeded the authority granted to it by R.C. 3513.05 when it reviewed—and
overrode—the Carroll County board’s determination of the validity of two
signatures of electors from Carroll County. Spencer relies principally on the final
two sentences of R.C. 3513.05’s 12th paragraph, which addresses the process by
which candidate petitions in multicounty congressional districts are reviewed.
{¶ 21} After receiving part-petitions from the board of elections of the most
populous county of a multicounty congressional district, each individual board of
elections must examine the signatures on the part-petitions, ascertain their validity,
and then return the petition papers to the board of elections that sent them, “together
with its certification of its determination as to the validity or invalidity of the
signatures thereon.” R.C. 3513.05. “All other matters affecting the validity or
invalidity of such petition papers shall be determined by . . . the board with whom
such petition papers were filed.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Spencer argues that the
emphasized language makes clear that the Stark County board does not have the
power to revisit the Carroll County board’s determination of the validity of
signatures of electors from Carroll County.
{¶ 22} Analysis of Spencer’s statutory argument begins with the plain
language of the statute. See Total Renal Care, Inc. v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-5685,
¶ 13. In this review, we are required to “read words and phrases in context and
construe them in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.” State ex
rel. Russell v. Thornton, 2006-Ohio-5858, ¶ 11.
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 23} Under the process set forth in R.C. 3513.05’s 12th paragraph, the
Carroll County board performed its statutory duty of examining the signatures on
the part-petitions transmitted to it and returned those part-petitions to the Stark
County board with its certification of its determination that there were 43 valid
signatures and 6 invalid signatures, including the invalid signatures of Smith and
Clayton. The Carroll County board could make no other determination with respect
to the validity or invalidity of Kelley’s petition papers because under R.C.
3513.05’s 12th paragraph, “[a]ll other matters affecting the validity or invalidity of
such petition papers” were committed to the authority of the Stark County board.
{¶ 24} But the phrase “[a]ll other matters” in the statute also limits the
authority of the Stark County board—i.e., the board of elections of the most
populous county of a multicounty congressional district—at the precertification
stage of reviewing a candidate’s petition. “Evaluating the context in which a word
is written is essential to a fair reading of the text.” Great Lakes Bar Control, Inc.
v. Testa, 2018-Ohio-5207, ¶ 9. And the context here demonstrates a division of
responsibility regarding part-petitions filed by a candidate for a party nomination
for a congressional office representing a multicounty congressional district.
{¶ 25} The individual boards of elections receiving part-petitions must
determine the validity of signatures on those part-petitions, and the board of
elections of the most populous county of a multicounty congressional district
determines “[a]ll other matters” related to the validity of the petition. R.C. 3513.05.
When the boards of elections of the less populated counties returned the part-
petitions to the Stark County board with their certifications of the validity and
invalidity of the signatures on those part-petitions, the Stark County board could
not revisit the signature-validity determinations of those boards. The Stark County
board could determine that a part-petition returned from another board of elections
was invalid for another reason, but the validity or invalidity of signatures of electors
from other counties was outside of this purview. Thus, Spencer is correct that at
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January Term, 2026
the February 17, 2026 regular meeting at which the Stark County board approved
Kelley’s candidate petition, the Stark County board should not have determined
that Smith’s signature was valid.
3. The Stark County board correctly determined the signature-validity issues at
the protest hearing
{¶ 26} Our conclusion that the Stark County board exceeded its authority at
the precertification stage does not end the matter. When Spencer filed his written
protest against Kelley’s candidacy, the Stark County board, i.e., “the election
officials with whom the declaration of candidacy and petition was filed,” R.C.
3513.05, was required to hold a hearing on the protest. With respect to the protest
hearing, R.C. 3513.05’s 13th paragraph dictates:
At the time fixed [for the protest hearing], such election officials
shall hear the protest and determine the validity or invalidity of the
declaration of candidacy and petition. If they find that such
candidate is not an elector of the state, district, county, or political
subdivision in which the candidate seeks a party nomination . . . or
has not fully complied with [R.C. Ch. 3513], the candidate’s
declaration of candidacy and petition shall be determined to be
invalid and shall be rejected; otherwise, it shall be determined to be
valid. That determination shall be final.
{¶ 27} As contemplated by the statute, Kelley appeared at the protest
hearing. See id. (person whose candidacy is protested shall be provided notice of
the protest hearing). Kelley presented evidence to support the validity of the two
signatures that the Carroll County board had found not genuine and of the signature
that the Stark County board had found not genuine. Spencer does not argue that
the Stark County board erred in allowing Kelley to present evidence. (Indeed,
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Spencer himself presented evidence at the protest hearing that the Carroll County
board’s validation of Lucas’s signature was erroneous.) However, Spencer
contends that the Stark County board’s authority at the protest stage is the same as
it is at the precertification stage. That is, Spencer argues that in considering the
validity of a candidate’s petition at a protest hearing, the board of elections tasked
with deciding the protest is not permitted under R.C. 3513.05 to revisit or make a
contrary determination regarding the validity of a purported signature of an elector
from a different county In other words, Spencer posits that in hearing and
considering his protest, the Stark County board was required to give absolute
deference to the Carroll County board’s signature-validity determination. We
disagree with Spencer on this point because R.C. 3513.05 conveys that the board
of elections with whom a protest against candidacy is filed may consider, relevant
here, whether the candidate “has not fully complied with” R.C. Ch. 3513.
{¶ 28} Under R.C. 3513.05, the Stark County board was required to “hear
the protest and determine the validity or invalidity of the declaration of candidacy
and petition.” If the Stark County board had concluded that Kelley had not fully
complied with R.C. Ch. 3513, it had to declare that her declaration of candidacy
and petition was invalid; otherwise, it had to determine that Kelley’s declaration of
candidacy and petition was valid. See R.C. 3513.05. This grant of authority to the
Stark County board at the protest hearing necessarily included the authority to
determine whether the signatures on the part-petitions of electors from other
counties in Ohio’s sixth congressional district were valid. Unlike the
precertification duties set forth in R.C. 3513.05’s 12th paragraph, the duties of the
board of elections of the most populous county of a multicounty congressional
district are not limited to examining issues other than signature validity when it
considers a protest filed under R.C. 3513.05’s 13th paragraph that is based on
allegedly invalid signatures.
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January Term, 2026
{¶ 29} Although the statute’s language and structure alone are enough to
reject Spencer’s position, this court’s decision in State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner,
2010-Ohio-1374, further confirms that Spencer is not entitled to a writ of
prohibition against the Stark County board. Owens involved a candidate for the
Constitution Party nomination for the office of attorney general. Owens filed his
declaration of candidacy and petition with the secretary of state in accordance with
R.C. 3513.05. As directed by R.C. 3513.05, the secretary transmitted Owens’s part-
petitions to the pertinent county boards of elections for an examination of the
signatures of electors from the respective counties. The secretary determined that
Owens did not qualify for the ballot, because his petition lacked enough valid
signatures. Owens contended that the Franklin County Board of Elections
incorrectly invalidated many of the signatures and that a correct determination of
those signatures would have qualified him for the ballot.
{¶ 30} In an expedited election action, we granted a writ of mandamus
compelling the secretary of state to certify Owens’s candidacy for his party’s
nomination for the office of attorney general and to instruct the boards of elections
to place his name on the primary-election ballot. Owens at ¶ 38. In so doing, we
rejected the secretary’s argument that she was not subject to mandamus “for an
alleged error committed by a board of elections in determining the validity of part-
petition signatures sent to the board by the secretary.” Id. at ¶ 27. We held that an
aggrieved prospective candidate for statewide office, who is challenging the
secretary’s decision not to place his name as a candidate on the primary-election
ballot, correctly pursues mandamus relief against the secretary “even if he is
challenging an election board’s [signature] verification decision.” Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶ 31} Though Owens involved a candidate’s action for a writ of mandamus
to compel placement of the candidate on the primary-election ballot, our reasoning
in Owens confirms that the Stark County board did not exceed its authority when it
considered Spencer’s protest. When making the initial determination in Owens
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about whether the candidate qualified for the ballot, the secretary of state could not,
consistent with R.C. 3513.05’s 12th paragraph, override the Franklin County
board’s signature-validity determination. The precertification limitation on the
secretary’s power did not, however, prevent the aggrieved candidate from litigating
the signature-validity issue in a mandamus action seeking the candidate’s
placement on the ballot. Because it was ultimately the secretary’s duty to certify
the form of the ballots with the names of the candidates, the issue whether the
Franklin County board incorrectly determined signatures to be invalid was an
appropriate issue to be determined in a mandamus action filed against the secretary.
See Owens at ¶ 28-30. Thus, we granted a writ of mandamus ordering the secretary
to place Owens on the ballot when we determined, based on the evidence submitted
in that case, that the Franklin County board had incorrectly rejected many of the
signatures on the Franklin County part-petitions. Id. at ¶ 37-38.
{¶ 32} Just as the secretary of state in Owens had the ultimate responsibility
to determine the validity of a declaration of candidacy and petition for a statewide
office, so too did the Stark County board—i.e., the board of elections of the most
populous county of a multicounty congressional district—have the statutory
responsibility to decide at the protest hearing whether Kelley’s petition fully
complied with R.C. Ch. 3513. See R.C. 3513.05. The Stark County board also has
the statutory responsibility to certify to the board of elections of each county in
Ohio’s sixth congressional district the names of the candidates to be printed on the
primary-election ballot. Id. Accordingly, all matters related to the validity of
Kelley’s petition were correctly before the Stark County board for consideration
and decision at the protest hearing.
{¶ 33} For these reasons, the Stark County board correctly considered
Kelley’s evidence that three signatures, including two signatures of electors from
Carroll County, had been incorrectly invalidated. Spencer raises no issue with
respect to the evidence Kelley presented establishing that these three signatures
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were valid. Because including those signatures resulted in Kelley’s qualifying for
the primary-election ballot, the Stark County board correctly denied Spencer’s
protest.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 34} The Stark County board did not abuse its discretion or clearly
disregard applicable law in denying Spencer’s protest and certifying Kelley for
placement on the May 5, 2026 primary-election ballot. We therefore deny the writ.
Writ denied.
__________________
The Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman and Curt C. Hartman, for relator.
Kyle L. Stone, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Deborah A. Dawson
and Jessica L. Logothetides, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondents Stark
County Board of Elections, Dimitrios Pousoulides, Janet Weir Creighton, R. Shane
Jackson, and James F. Mathews.
__________________
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