The opinion
Filed 3/20/26 P. v. Brown CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085360
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD299573)
v.
CALVIN BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Theodore M. Weathers, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Kehoe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Starting in the early morning hours of July 3, 2023, Calvin Brown went
on a crime spree, stealing multiple vehicles and other items, shooting at
several individuals, and evading arrest. A jury found him guilty of 26 of 31
alleged counts, and made true findings on numerous associated
enhancements. Brown asserts there was insufficient evidence to support one
of four counts of carjacking, and that the trial court should have either stayed
the sentence on count 23 (carjacking) or on count 27 (assault with a semi-
automatic firearm) pursuant to Penal Code section 6541 because the crimes
occurred during an indivisible course of conduct with a single objective. We
find no error and affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The day before the crime spree, on July 2, Brown exchanged several
text messages with the mother of his infant daughter. Brown was upset
about not getting to see the child and was, at times, threatening towards the
child’s mother.
Unable to see his daughter, Brown decided to “block[ ] things out” by
“partaking in some drug use.” He got into an altercation with an
acquaintance and vandalized the individual’s car. Not long after, at about
3:40 a.m. on July 3, Brown stole a car at gunpoint, in what would be the first
in a series of carjackings.
Brown met up with a female, Rolaena Blunt, and the two continued to
use drugs over the next two days. Brown also continued to argue with his
child’s mother. He made additional threats and eventually, on July 5,
appeared at the home where his daughter and her mother lived, hoping to see
the child one more time before leaving town. They were not home but Brown
shot at other individuals and a dog that were in the home. Brown then went
to another house where he thought the mother might be, and fired shots
there as well.
At that point, Brown was concerned that he “just did two shootings”
and needed to leave town immediately. Having not slept in two days, Brown
drove off in the stolen vehicle, dozed off, and crashed. After impact, Brown
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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jumped out of the vehicle, hopped a fence, and approached another vehicle,
occupied by Ernesto A. and Jose A., pointed his firearm at the window and
told Ernesto to give him the keys and get out of the car. Ernesto and Jose
complied and Brown drove away in the car. This incident is the subject of the
carjacking charges in counts 20 and 21 and is discussed in further detail post.
The second stolen car began to stall about 15 minutes later and lost
power. Brown jumped out, ran up the street, and approached another
vehicle. As he approached, the occupant, Gabriel F., exited. Brown
approached Gabriel, with his firearm in his hand. Brown raised the firearm
toward Gabriel and instructed him to get out of the vehicle. Gabriel
complied. As Brown was leaving, Gabriel flagged down another vehicle,
driven by Jake W. Gabriel got into Jake’s vehicle and they followed Brown,
who soon turned onto a dead-end street. As the vehicle approached, Brown
stepped out and fired four shots at them. Gabriel and Jake ducked down and,
when the shooting ceased, Jake reversed and exited the street. Worried that
Gabriel had called the police, Brown parked the car and fled on foot. This
incident is the subject of the carjacking charge in count 23 and the assault
with a semi-automatic firearm charge in count 27, and is also discussed in
further detail post.
Brown was arrested not long after. The People charged Brown with 31
separate counts:
Counts 1, 29: ................................ vandalism
Counts 2, 20-21, 23: .................... carjacking
Counts 3, 11, 14, 19, 22, 24, 31: . possession of a firearm by a felon
Count 4: ....................................... hit and run
Count 5: ....................................... evading with reckless driving
Count 6: ....................................... residential burglary
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Counts 7-8, 12, 25-26: ................. attempted murder
Counts 9-10, 13, 16-18, 27-28: ....assault with a semi-automatic firearm
Count 15: ..................................... robbery
Count 30: ..................................... carrying a loaded firearm
On the five counts of attempted murder, the jury found Brown not
guilty on three and was unable to reach a verdict on the other two. The jury
found Brown guilty on all remaining charges, and found numerous associated
allegations to be true.
Prior to sentencing, at the People’s request, the trial court dismissed
six of the seven counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (11, 14, 19, 22, 24,
and 31) as each was based on possession of the same firearm used during the
various incidents leading to the other charges.
The trial court then sentenced Brown to an aggregate term of 59 years
8 months on the remaining charges.
Brown filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Brown’s arguments on appeal are limited to just three of the numerous
counts upon which he was convicted and sentenced. He asserts that there
was insufficient evidence to support the conviction on count 21; and, that the
trial court should have stayed either the sentence on count 23 or count 27
because they were part of a single indivisible course of conduct. We are not
persuaded by either argument.
A. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Conviction for Count 21
The jury convicted Brown on one count of carjacking as to the driver
Ernesto A. (count 20) and one count of carjacking as to the passenger Jose A.
(count 21). Brown contends there was not sufficient evidence to support the
conviction for carjacking Jose A. in count 21.
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“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, . . . we
“examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is
reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People
v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215.) “ ‘We do not reweigh evidence or
reevaluate a witness’s credibility.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s
findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary
finding.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
The substantial evidence standard of review is a deferential standard.
“ ‘When a trial court’s factual determination is attacked on the ground that
there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court
begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record,
there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will
support the determination.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998)
18 Cal.4th 667, 681.) An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
under the foregoing standards “bears an enormous burden.” (People
v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330.)
Carjacking is defined as “the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the
possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from
the person or immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against
his or her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily
deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession,
accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 215, subd. (a).) “[A] completed
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carjacking occurs whether the perpetrator drives off with the carjacking
victim in the car or forcibly removes the victim from the car before driving
off.” (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1062 (Lopez).) “ ‘In the usual
case of carjacking involving multiple occupants, all are subjected to a threat
of violence, all are exposed to the high level of risk which concerned the
Legislature, and all are compelled to surrender their places in the vehicle and
suffer a loss of transportation. All are properly deemed victims of the
carjacking.’ ” (People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th 853, 859 (Hill).)
Here, Ernesto testified at trial; Jose did not. Brown asserts that, as a
result, there was not substantial evidence that the gun was ever pointed at
Jose, or that Jose was afraid at any point during the carjacking. Not so.
Ernesto testified that, on the day of the carjacking, he and Jose were in the
car, relaxing under a tree. Ernesto was sitting in the driver’s seat and Jose
was in the passenger seat. Brown approached the vehicle, carrying a
backpack. Brown took a gun from the backpack and pointed it at Ernesto’s
head. The barrel was approximately one foot from Ernesto’s head. Brown
attempted to open the driver’s side door, but it was locked. He then said give
me the keys and throw your phone. He also said, two or three times, that he
would kill Ernesto if he did not comply. Ernesto got out of the car and Brown
got into the driver’s seat. Ernesto felt “that I was dead,” or going to die,
during the altercation.
While Brown was holding the gun to Ernesto’s head, his female
companion, Blunt went around to the passenger side of the car and took
Jose’s phone. Jose got out of the car and Blunt got into the passenger seat.
Before leaving, Brown told Ernesto to throw his phone over a nearby fence,
presumably so that Ernesto could not call the police. Jose had another
phone, which they used to call 911. Both Ernesto and Jose could be heard
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talking on the call, which was played for the jury. Brown turned around and
came back. Ernesto dropped the phone so Brown would not see. Brown
pointed the gun at Ernesto and asked for his phone. Ernesto said that he had
thrown it over the fence and Brown left.
From this evidence, we have no trouble concluding that the jury could
infer that Jose was aware of what was happening and was also removed from
the car using force or fear. Brown suggests that Jose may have been asleep
when the carjacking occurred. To the contrary, Blunt took Jose’s phone and
got into the passenger seat, where Jose had been sitting, all while Brown was
holding the gun to Ernesto’s head, in the seat right next to Jose. There is no
other explanation for Jose giving the woman his phone and getting out of the
car, other than that he also felt forced and/or afraid, based on the gun being
held to Ernesto’s head. (See, e.g., People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 690
[“Fear may be inferred from the circumstances in which a crime is committed
or property is taken”].) A reasonable jury easily could have inferred that the
force or fear used “was directed at both” Ernesto and Jose. (See Hill, supra,
23 Cal.4th at p. 857.)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude there was substantial evidence to
support the conviction for carjacking as to Jose in count 21.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Imposing Sentences on Both
Counts 23 and 27
Brown next asserts that the trial court erred by sentencing him to
consecutive terms of one-third the middle term on each of counts 23
(carjacking) and 27 (assault with a semi-automatic firearm).2 The assault
2 In addition, the court sentenced Brown to additional 3 years 4 months
on count 23, based on the enhancement in section 12022.53, subdivision (b)
and an additional 1 year 4 months on count 27, based on the enhancement in
section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
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was based on Brown shooting the gun when Gabriel and Jake followed him
onto the dead-end road. Brown contends the trial court should have stayed
one of the sentences under section 654.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act
or omission be punished under more than one provision.”
“Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under
section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an
‘act or omission’ may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course
of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective.”
(People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) If we conclude, as we do
here, “that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of
conduct . . . we then consider whether that course of conduct reflects a single
‘ “intent and objective” ’ or multiple intents and objectives.” (Ibid.)
“The determination of whether there was more than one objective is a
factual determination, which will not be reversed on appeal unless
unsupported by the evidence presented at trial.” (People v. Saffle (1992)
4 Cal.App.4th 434, 438.) “ ‘We review the trial court’s determination in the
light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every
fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People
v. Vang (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 912, 916.)
Because the trial court sentenced Brown on both counts 23 and 27, we
presume the trial court made an implied finding that section 654 did not
apply, and that the two crimes had separate objectives. (See People v. Kelly
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 886, 904 [“When there is no ‘explicit ruling by the trial
court at sentencing, we infer that the court made the finding appropriate to
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the sentence it imposed.’ ”].) Brown asserts the trial court’s implied finding
was not supported by the evidence and further argues that his intent when
he committed the second offense of assault with a semiautomatic firearm was
to escape. Even accepting that explanation, we conclude the two crimes had
separate objectives and that section 654 does not apply.
As discussed, ante, carjacking occurs when a defendant either “drives
off with the carjacking victim in the car or forcibly removes the victim from
the car before driving off.” (Lopez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1062.) “An assault
is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent
injury on the person of another.” (§ 240.) Section 245, subdivision (b) makes
it a felony to “commit[ ] an assault upon the person of another with a
semiautomatic firearm.”
While there have been cases in which an assailant assaulted the victim
with a gun in order to steal their car, such that the assault was part of the act
or conduct inherent in the carjacking itself, that is not the case here. Here,
Brown had already taken possession of the vehicle, after threatening Gabriel
with the same firearm on a different street when he committed the additional
act of shooting at Gabriel and Jake. His objective during the carjacking was
to obtain a car, and the trial court could fairly find that the principal object of
the carjacking had been achieved once he drove off. (See Lopez, supra,
31 Cal.4th at p. 1062.) It was only afterwards, when Brown accidentally
drove down a dead-end street and found himself confronted by Gabriel and
Jake (who was not even involved in the original carjacking), that he fired the
shots that served as the basis for the assault charge. (See People v. Cleveland
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 263, 272 [“ ‘Section [654] cannot, and should not, be
stretched to cover gratuitous violence or other criminal acts far beyond those
reasonably necessary to accomplish the original offense.’ ”].)
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Brown’s reliance on In re L.J. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 37 (In re L.J.) and
People v. Martin (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 776 (Martin) is misplaced.
The juvenile defendant in In re L.J. was attempting to evade police
when he came to the end of a dead-end street. (In re L.J., supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 42.) He turned around and drove his vehicle, at a
relatively low rate of speed, towards officers and struck three police vehicles
while attempting to evade the police. (Ibid.) The juvenile court sustained a
petition that alleged reckless evasion of a police officer (Veh. Code § 2800.2,
subd. (a)); assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer (§245, subd. (c));
and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§245, subd.
(a)(4)). (In re L.J., at p. 41.) L.J. asserted, and the appellate court agreed,
that the punishment for evading a police officer should be stayed because it
was based on the same course of conduct as the assault counts. (Id. at p. 44.)
The court explained: “The low speed of the [vehicle] (10 to 15 miles per hour),
together with the fact that the minor evidently slalomed between the three
police vehicles and struck them largely on the sides of the [vehicle] and not
head-on, indicates the minor was trying to get past the police vehicles rather
than targeting them.” (Ibid.)
Likewise, in Martin, the two charges at issue were evading arrest and
battery on a police officer. (Martin, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 780.) The
court found that the battery “does not appear to have been intentional, but
merely the result of appellant’s physical gyrations aimed at freeing himself.”
(Id. at p. 781.) Thus, the battery was incidental to the evading arrest
conviction and section 654 applied to stay the execution of sentence on one of
the two offenses. (Martin, at p. 781.)
To the contrary, here, there was no charge for evading police or arrest,
such that the assault could not have been incidental to the evasion. Rather,
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as we have explained, Brown already had possession of Gabriel’s car when he
shot at Gabriel and Jake. The trial court could readily conclude that shooting
at the victims was not integral to stealing the car, particularly given that the
shooting did not occur until well after the victims were out of the car, Brown
had taken possession, and had driven away. Likewise, the shooting was not
in close temporal or spatial proximity to the carjacking, which had already
concluded. Gabriel and Jake chased after Brown and he fired a “warning”
shot, or four, to get them to stop their pursuit.
As a final matter, Brown asserts the jury’s verdict of not guilty on the
attempted murder charges confirms that he did not have the intent to kill
Gabriel or Jake. This is beside the point. Assault does not require an intent
to kill, nor does the absence of an intent to kill somehow indicate whether the
assault was integral to the carjacking, or done to achieve the same object.
Here, the evidence suggests that when Brown fired the shots, he was
attempting to flee, to evade capture and/or to continue his crime spree, with
the car he had already stolen.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DATO, J.
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