The opinion
FILED
Mar 20, 2026
10:53 AM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Henry Martin Docket No. 2025-60-2682
v. State File No. 2304-2024
Kirby Building Systems, LLC, et al.
Appeal from the Court of Workers’
Compensation Claims
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge
Affirmed and Certified as Final
This appeal involves an employee who reached maximum medical improvement with no
permanent impairment after suffering a compensable injury to his thumb. The employee
requested that the court enter an order reflecting that, although he was not entitled to any
disability benefits, he remained entitled to reasonable and necessary future medical
treatment causally related to the work injury. The employer argued that the employee’s
petition was improperly filed because there was no current dispute for the court to address.
The employee responded that a court order was necessary to ensure his right to future
medical treatment was not lost due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Following
a compensation hearing, the trial court agreed with the employee and entered an order
reflecting the employee was entitled to future medical benefits that are reasonable,
necessary, and causally related to the work injury. The employer has appealed. Having
carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s order, conclude the employer’s
appeal is frivolous, award attorneys’ fees for the frivolous appeal, and certify the order as
final.
Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding Judge
Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.
W. Troy Hart and Tiffany Hranicky, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant,
Kirby Building Systems, LLC
Adam Brock-Dagnan, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Henry Martin
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Factual and Procedural Background
The underlying facts of this case are undisputed. On January 7, 2024, Henry Martin
(“Employee”) injured his thumb in the course and scope of his employment with Kirby
Building Systems, LLC (“Employer”). Employer accepted the claim as compensable, and
Employee received medical treatment for his injury from his authorized treating physician,
Dr. Todd Rubin. On May 3, 2024, Dr. Rubin completed a Final Medical Report, or Form
C-30A, certifying that Employee had reached maximum medical improvement (“MMI”)
and retained no permanent medical impairment.
Almost one year later, on April 28, 2025, Employee filed a petition for benefit
determination (“PBD”), stating “Employee never received a final medical report, so we are
requesting the same and resolution of all permanency-related issues.” Employee also
checked boxes on the PBD identifying his entitlement to permanent disability benefits as a
disputed issue. The Bureau mediator assigned to the case issued a dispute certification
notice (“DCN”) in August indicating that, although a dispute existed related to Employee’s
compensation rate, Employee was not owed any monetary benefits. Employee’s
entitlement to additional medical benefits was also identified as a disputed issue on the
DCN, but both parties acknowledged that Employee was still receiving authorized medical
treatment at that time. Employer noted “[n]o denied medical treatment” as a defense on
the DCN. Employer also emailed the mediator asking that the DCN be supplemented to
reflect that there were no current disputes regarding medical benefits and that Employee
was apparently seeking an order to ensure his “statutory right” to lifetime medical benefits
for his work-related thumb injury.
At a September 15 scheduling hearing, the trial court set the case for trial in October,
and, on September 19, the parties stipulated that: (1) there are no disputes regarding
temporary disability benefits; (2) there are no pending treatment denials; and (3) Employee
is unaware of any outstanding expenses on this claim.
On September 25, 2025, Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting
there was no dispute necessitating a trial and the case was not “ripe” for adjudication.
Employee filed his response in opposition to Employer’s motion on October 21. The court
conducted a compensation hearing on October 29, 2025, to address both the pending
motion and Employee’s request for future medical benefits. 1 Employee, citing Tennessee
Code Annotated section 50-6-203, argued that if he did not receive authorized treatment
within one year of the date of his last authorized treatment or Employer’s last voluntary
payment of benefits, any future request for medical treatment could be barred by the statute
of limitations. In response, Employer contended that Tennessee Code Annotated section
50-6-204 already guarantees an injured worker the right to open medical benefits, making
1
No testimony was presented during the compensation hearing, and no evidence was admitted other than
the stipulations of the parties.
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such an order unnecessary. Employer also asserted that because there are no current
disputes between the parties, the matter is not ripe for adjudication.
In its November 5, 2025 compensation order, the court rejected Employer’s ripeness
argument, finding that the dispute had matured to the point where it warranted a judicial
determination. It denied Employer’s motion for summary judgment and concluded that
Employee was entitled to an order memorializing his entitlement to reasonable, necessary,
and work-related future medical benefits with Dr. Rubin for his thumb injury. Employer
has appealed.
Standard of Review
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the court’s
factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2025). When the trial judge has had the opportunity
to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give considerable
deference to credibility determinations made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp.
of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “when it comes to deposition
testimony, an appellate panel is in the same position as the trial court to make credibility
determinations.” Edwards v. Peoplease, LLC, No. W2024-01034-SC-R3-WC, 2025 Tenn.
LEXIS 514, at *18 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2025). Thus, when medical proof is presented by
deposition, “the reviewing court may draw its own conclusions about the weight and
credibility of the expert testimony.” Id. Moreover, the interpretation and application of
statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption
of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone
N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our
obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in
accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor
either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2025).
Analysis
Employer raises several issues on appeal, which we have restated as follows:
whether the trial court erred by (1) concluding Employee’s PBD was properly filed despite
the absence of any existing disputes; (2) determining Employee’s claim was ripe for
adjudication; (3) denying summary judgment even though no justiciable controversy
existed; and (4) entering an order in Employee’s favor given “this is not necessary to
preserve future medical benefits for a compensable injury in Tennessee.” Finally,
Employer asserts that this action would “undermine the workers’ compensation system and
invite abuse.” Conversely, Employee contends the trial court’s order should be affirmed
in its entirety.
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Petition for Benefit Determination
Employer contends Employee’s filing of his PBD was “statutorily improper and
jurisdictionally defective” because the existence of a “dispute” is an absolute prerequisite
to filing a PBD. Employer further asserts that the DCN was not properly issued because
the “statutory condition precedent to judicial involvement was not satisfied. Jurisdiction
cannot be created by filing a [PBD] without controversy, and the trial court therefore lacked
authority to adjudicate the claim.” Employer provides no basis for this argument other than
to point out that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203(a) requires a DCN to be
issued prior to any hearing for benefits.
In response, Employee argues that his PBD is proper pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-203(b)(2), which provides as follows:
In instances when the employer has voluntarily paid workers’ compensation
benefits, within one (1) year following the accident resulting in injury, the
right to compensation is forever barred, unless a petition for benefit
determination is filed with the bureau on a form prescribed by the
administrator within one (1) year from the latter of the date of the last
authorized treatment or the time the employer ceased to make payments of
compensation to or on behalf of the employee.
Id. (emphasis added). Here, Dr. Rubin opined that Employee had reached MMI on May 3,
2024, assigned a 0% permanent impairment rating, and released him from care. Employee
filed his PBD almost one year later, on April 28, 2025, as mandated by subsection
203(b)(2). Although Employee acknowledged that he is not entitled to disability benefits
as a result of his injury, he asserts a statutory entitlement to future medical benefits.
Employer’s position in this case is untenable. As noted in Tenn. Comp. R. and
Regs. 0800-02-21-.02(23)(a), a “petition for benefit determination” is defined as “a written
request for the bureau to assist in resolution of disputed issues and is the document that
initiates the litigation process as described in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
203.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, by the express terms of this definition, the filing of a PBD
accomplishes two related but distinct functions: (1) it brings to the Bureau’s attention the
existence of a dispute; and (2) it initiates the litigation process within the time limits
described in subsection 203(b). Moreover, a “dispute” underlying the filing of a PBD can
be factual or legal in nature, or both. Clearly, a legal dispute has arisen in this case given
that Employee believes his statutory right to future medical benefits is dependent on his
timely filing of a PBD as required by subsection 203(b), whereas Employer apparently
takes the position that Employee is statutorily entitled to future medical benefits regardless
of the provisions of section 203.
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The Tennessee Supreme Court’s Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel
has directed courts to avoid any statutory construction that places one statute in conflict
with another. See, e.g., Lane v. Rich Prods., No. M2004-00566-WC-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn.
LEXIS 477, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel May 18, 2005). Instead, we must “seek
the most reasonable construction which avoids statutory conflict and provides for
harmonious operation of the laws.” Id. at *9-10 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). Moreover, we must “presume that the legislature did not intend an absurdity.”
Id. at *10.
Employer’s position, if accepted, would create an absurdity in the workers’
compensation law. Employer essentially asks us to validate a strategy of denying the
existence of a “dispute” in a compensable claim up to the date the statute of limitations
expires due to the lack of any authorized medical treatment during the relevant one-year
period then, presumably, agree that Employer has the right to deny any further medical
benefits due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. In the alternative, were we to
accept Employer’s position that no dispute exists in a compensable claim where medical
benefits are being provided and take that argument to its logical conclusion, an employee
in an accepted claim would be required to seek medical care within one year of every
authorized medical appointment or the issuance of a medical payment made by the
employer, or risk losing entitlement to all future medical benefits. That could, of course,
result in an employee seeking potentially unwarranted medical care and the employer or
its insurer incurring medical bills for wholly avoidable visits. Such a result is absurd on its
face.
Although section 50-6-204 contemplates an injured worker’s right to future
reasonable and necessary medical care, nothing in that section serves to toll the statute of
limitations set out in subsection 203(b). Historically, both before and after the passage of
the 2013 Workers’ Compensation Reform Act, trial courts in workers’ compensation cases
were obligated to address as a necessary element of any final judgment the employee’s
entitlement to future medical benefits. We conclude it is a necessary function of the Court
of Workers’ Compensation Claims to address issues regarding an injured worker’s
entitlement to medical benefits, including future medical benefits. Accordingly, we further
conclude Employee’s PBD was neither “statutorily” nor “jurisdictionally” defective.
Ripeness Doctrine
Employer next argues that the case is not ripe for adjudication because no dispute
currently exists. Employee, on the other hand, argues that his right to future medical
benefits is limited in duration without a court order securing those rights and that filing a
PBD is the first step to obtaining that court order, whether through settlement or trial. As
the trial court noted, the ripeness doctrine focuses on whether a dispute has matured to the
point that it warrants a judicial decision. The court relied on the two-part test set out by
the Tennessee Supreme Court in B&B Enterprises of Wilson County, LLC v. City of
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Lebanon, S.W.3d 839 (Tenn. 2010). That test requires the court to determine, first, whether
the issues in the case are ones appropriate for judicial resolution and, second, whether the
court’s refusal to act will cause hardship to the parties. Id. at 848-49.
We agree with the trial court that the current dispute has matured to the point of
warranting judicial resolution. Simply put, Employee asserts that a court order establishing
his right to future medical treatment that is reasonable, necessary, and causally related to
his work injury is needed to preserve that right. As noted above, in the absence of a
properly entered judgment awarding him future medical benefits, Employee risks waiving
his right to that treatment if he does not seek authorized treatment during any relevant
twelve-month period. Although Employer has not denied any recommended treatment to
date, Employee’s right to future medical treatment will be “forever barred” pursuant to
section 50-6-203(b)(2) if he does not meet the requirements of that section, namely, the
timely filing of a PBD. We conclude the case became ripe for adjudication when Employee
reached MMI, his last medical bill was paid, and he sought to secure his right to future
medical benefits. Further, we agree with the court that its refusal to act would result in
hardship to Employee presently and in the future, given that his right to future medical
benefits may be forfeited without a court judgment securing that right.
Summary Judgment
Related to its motion for summary judgment, Employer argues that there are no
genuine issues of material fact necessitating a trial, as both parties agreed there were no
unpaid medical or temporary disability benefits, no pending treatment denials, and no
dispute as to causation or compensability. According to Employer, a dispute regarding
future medical benefits is speculative and is not sufficient to establish the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Employer also noted the parties’ stipulation that Employee
is not entitled to permanent disability benefits, asserting that the trial court’s denial of its
motion for summary judgment was error. Employee, again relying on Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-203(b)(2), argues that it is “not speculative that an injured worker
loses their right to medical treatment once they do not go back to the doctor after one (1)
year.” Furthermore, the DCN identified as a disputed issue Employee’s entitlement to
additional medical benefits. Thus, we discern no error by the trial court in denying
Employer’s motion.
Order for Medical Benefits
For the same reasons outlined above, we conclude the trial court did not err in
issuing an order requiring Employer to provide reasonable, necessary, and causally related
future medical benefits with Dr. Rubin for Employee’s work-related thumb injury.
Although a court order is not an absolute requirement to preserve statutory medical benefits
as long as an employee seeks authorized medical care within the appropriate time period,
injured workers face severe consequences if, in the absence of such an order, they do not
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seek medical treatment within any relevant twelve-month period. We disagree with
Employer’s characterization that Employee is merely seeking a court order “to extend or
circumvent” the finality of the statute of limitations framework set forth in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-203(b). 2 Instead, we conclude that Employee is attempting to
secure certain benefits to which he is entitled by statute after sustaining a compensable
work-related injury, which Employer asserts he does not have the right to do.
Alleged Abuse of the Workers’ Compensation System
Finally, Employer argues that allowing this order to stand “would undermine the
workers’ compensation system and invite abuse.” This argument is similarly specious.
Contrary to Employer’s arguments on appeal, Employee is not asking the court to resolve
“abstract questions” or “hypothetical disputes.” Rather, to ensure he does not foreclose his
right to future medical treatment made reasonably necessary by his compensable work
accident, Employee has asked the court for an order memorializing that entitlement.
Similar cases are routinely resolved through the exact process described by Employee.
Employer’s refusal to voluntarily agree to such an order in the present case is, frankly,
difficult to comprehend. Nonetheless, Employee timely sought assistance from the trial
court to secure the future medical benefits to which he is entitled as a matter of law. That
is the dispute that merited court action. We conclude the preponderance of the evidence
supports the trial court’s decision.
Frivolous Appeal
A frivolous appeal is one that is devoid of merit or brought solely for delay.
Yarbrough v. Protective Servs. Co. Inc., No. 2015-08-0574, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App.
Bd. LEXIS 3, at *11 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 25, 2016); see also Burnette v.
WestRock, No. 2016-01-0670, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 66, at *15 (Tenn.
Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 31, 2017) (“Stated another way, a frivolous appeal is one
that . . . had no reasonable chance of succeeding.”) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). Litigants “should not be required to endure the hassle and expense of baseless
litigation. Nor should appellate courts be required to waste time and resources on appeals
that have no realistic chance of success.” Yarbrough, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.
LEXIS 3, at *10-11 (internal citations omitted).
Here, Employer is appealing an order memorializing a benefit it concedes is owed
to Employee for his compensable injury. It argues that the order is unnecessary because
Employee is already entitled to these benefits, yet Employee has been forced to spend
considerable time and resources litigating this case and obtaining a court order securing his
entitlement to those same benefits. We conclude Employer had no reasonable chance of
2
Indeed, Employee could argue the converse, i.e., that Employer is seeking to artificially shorten or end its
obligation to provide future medical care, given Employee’s concerns about the statute of limitations.
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success on appeal, and that this appeal was brought solely for delay. We therefore conclude
this appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion pursuant to Tenn. Comp.
R. and Regs. 0800-02-22-.09(4) to award Employee attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$2,500.00.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order, conclude Employer’s
appeal is frivolous and award attorneys’ fees in the amount of $2,500.00, and certify the
order as final. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employer.
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