The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
March 19, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellee, 12:24 PM
v No. 368476
Wayne Circuit Court
CHRISTOPHER LEWIS GREER, LC No. 22-005699-01-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: RICK, P.J., and YATES and MARIANI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Christopher Lewis Greer, lived in an apartment with Dominique Parchman and
her sister, Shyanna Hall. On January 5, 2022, Parchman and Hall were both killed in the apartment
by gunshots. Defendant was charged with killing them, and a jury found him guilty of two counts
of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), possession of a firearm by a person with a “specified
felony” conviction (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f(2), and three counts of carrying a firearm
in the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b(1). For his crimes, defendant was
sentenced to serve life in prison without parole for each of the first-degree murder convictions and
additional prison terms for his other four offenses of conviction. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant and Parchman had been in a dating relationship for many years, and they shared
an apartment with Parchman’s sister at the time that Parchman and her sister were killed. On the
day of the shootings, January 5, 2022, Parchman had a long telephone conversation with her sister-
in-law, Shantarius Walters. During that telephone call, Walters heard defendant repeatedly enter
and leave the room where Parchman was on the phone. Defendant kept pestering and questioning
Parchman. After Walters heard defendant yelling and “carrying on,” she heard a “thud” followed
by gunshots. After that, Walters heard “two gasps for air and then it stopped.”
Because Walters heard gunshots, she called Parchman’s sister, Shantinique, and told her to
go to the apartment. Shantinique took her gun and pocket knives in a backpack, but she never took
the knives out of her backpack. As Shantinique entered the apartment, Hall was moaning in pain.
When Hall saw Shantinique, Hall “started crying” and said defendant “shot them.” Parchman was
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not moving and had a faint pulse. Shantinique called the police and waited in the apartment until
they arrived. Shantinique did not see any knives in the area where she found Hall and Parchman.
When police officers arrived on the scene, they took Shantinique’s two pocket knives, but
no other knives were “found out in the open” in the apartment. A subsequent medical examination
determined that Parchman had eight gunshot wounds on her back, left shoulder, left thumb, thighs,
and right lower leg, and Hall had six gunshot wounds on her chest, left shoulder, stomach, and left
thigh. Those gunshot wounds caused the deaths of Parchman and Hall.
After the shooting, defendant left his gun at his brother’s house. When defendant learned
that Parchman and Hall had died, he drove to Arkansas “to work odd jobs to save some money for
a lawyer.” On January 11, 2022, defendant was charged with the murders of Parchman and Hall.
He was arrested in Arkansas in June 2022 and brought back to Michigan to face the charges.
At trial, defendant testified that he and Parchman argued “about cheating or . . . something
of the sort.” He said that Parchman and Hall blocked him from leaving through the front and back
doors of the apartment. Defendant claimed that Parchman pulled out a pocket knife from a clip on
her shorts, and Hall had a knife in her hand. According to defendant, Parchman said: “I’m gonna
kill you.” Defendant replied, “say that again.” Then Parchman and Hall charged him. He claimed
Parchman held a knife “in a stabbing motion . . . .” Defendant fired his gun at Parchman and Hall,
then “froze up and . . . just continued to keep shooting.” He stated that he could not “run past them
because if I run past I had to pass one of them and they was [sic] gonna stab me.” Surveillance
video from the hallway outside the apartment did not depict how the shooting took place because
the apartment door was closed, but the video recording revealed that the first two shots were fired
at 9:15:38 p.m., and at least 11 more shots were fired between 9:15:52 p.m. and 9:16:23 p.m.
During defendant’s trial, the trial court admitted a certified copy of defendant’s July 2008
conviction for attempted carrying a concealed weapon. In its instructions to the jury, the trial court
told the jurors that they could consider second-degree murder as a lesser included offense of first-
degree murder, and the trial court also gave the jury instructions on self-defense, but the trial court
did not instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury
that, to convict defendant of felon-in-possession, the jury had to find that defendant had previously
been convicted of the crime of “attempt [sic] carrying a concealed weapon, specified felony.”
The jury convicted defendant of all counts, and the trial court sentenced defendant to prison
terms for his six offenses. After defendant filed this appeal of right, he moved in the trial court for
a new trial or a Ginther1 hearing, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because
the evidence supported a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Defendant contended he was
prejudiced because a reasonable jury could have found that he acted out of passion after Parchman
provoked him. Defendant’s appellate counsel attached an offer of proof, alleging that trial counsel
told appellate counsel that he did not consider voluntary manslaughter when investigating the case.
Trial counsel allegedly admitted that he should have presented a theory of voluntary manslaughter,
and he “agreed that leaving voluntary manslaughter out of the jury instructions was not a strategic
decision.” The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, ruling that defendant’s testimony, even
1
See People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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if true, did not show he acted out of passion or based on provocation. Defendant was not deprived
of effective assistance of counsel because not advancing the theory of voluntary manslaughter was
objectively reasonable.2 Defendant challenges his convictions, but not his sentences, on appeal.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he claims he was denied effective assistance
of counsel because his trial attorney should have presented a voluntary manslaughter theory at trial
and asked for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Second, he argues that the trial record
lacks sufficient evidence to support a felon-in-possession charge, so that conviction and the felony-
firearm conviction related to that charge cannot stand. We shall address these two issues in turn.
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant insists that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel because his
trial attorney failed to advance a voluntary manslaughter theory at trial and failed to request a jury
instruction on voluntary manslaughter. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raises a mixed
question of fact and constitutional law. People v Hoang, 328 Mich App 45, 63; 935 NW2d 396
(2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We review a trial court’s findings of fact for clear
error, whereas constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. Id.
To obtain a new trial, defendant must first show that his counsel’s performance “fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness . . . .” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 51; 826 NW2d
136 (2012) (citations omitted). Second, defendant must show that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced him, meaning that there must be “a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different” if defense counsel had satisfied the constitutional standard of effective assistance.
Id. (citations omitted). Defendant has not satisfied either of those two requirements.
1. DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE
Defendant argues his counsel mishandled the issue of voluntary manslaughter in presenting
the case to the jury and by failing to ask for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Pursuant
to settled Michigan law, manslaughter “is a necessarily included lesser offense of murder.” People
v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 137; 712 NW2d 419 (2006). The one element distinguishing murder from
manslaughter is malice, i.e., “an intent to kill, an intent to commit great bodily harm, or an intent
to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily
harm was the probable result.” Id. at 138 (quotation marks and citations omitted). For a killing to
be considered voluntary manslaughter, not murder, “the defendant must kill in the heat of passion,
the passion must be caused by adequate provocation, and there cannot be a lapse of time during
2
Defendant moved to remand for a Ginther hearing, relying on the same offer of proof he filed in
the trial court, but this Court denied defendant’s motion to remand “without prejudice to a case
call panel of this Court determining that remand is necessary.” People v Greer, unpublished order
of the Court of Appeals, entered September 4, 2025 (Docket No. 368476). For the reasons stated
in this opinion, we continue to see no need for a remand to properly adjudicate defendant’s claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
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which a reasonable person could control their passions.” People v Yeager, 511 Mich 478, 489;
999 NW2d 490 (2023). If a defendant is charged with murder, a trial court must give an instruction
on voluntary manslaughter if one is supported by a rational view of the evidence. Id. at 490.
Defense counsel’s failure “to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793
NW2d 120 (2010). In defendant’s case, any effort to rely on the theory of voluntary manslaughter
would have been futile because a rational view of the evidence plainly did not support a voluntary
manslaughter instruction. See Yeager, 511 Mich at 490. Defendant said that Parchman and Hall
blocked the doors of the apartment and displayed knives. Parchman purportedly threatened to kill
defendant, then charged at him before he shot Parchman and Hall. Citing Yeager, defendant claims
he shot Parchman and Hall in the heat of passion caused by adequate provocation. In Yeager, the
decedent “physically assaulted [the] defendant, took her car and used it to attempt to run her over,
and repeatedly threatened to kill [the] defendant,” id. at 491-492, so our Supreme Court ruled that
a rational view of the evidence supported a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Id. at 494. Here,
in contrast, defendant never claimed that Hall threatened to kill him or provoked him. Defendant
argued with Hall, but such “verbal exchanges . . . are not usually sufficient to constitute adequate
provocation.” People v Roper, 286 Mich App 77, 88; 777 NW2d 483 (2009) (citation omitted).
As to Parchman, defendant claimed she charged at him while holding a knife, but the only knives
found in the apartment were Shantinique’s pocket knives. Defendant did not present evidence of
a repeated series of assaults and threats akin to the “adequate provocation” in Yeager, 511 Mich at
491-492, so a rational view of the evidence did not show that either Parchman or Hall adequately
provoked defendant. Hence, a request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction would have been
meritless. Accordingly, defendant has not established that his trial attorney performed deficiently.
See Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 201.
2. PREJUDICE
Even if defense counsel performed deficiently, defendant has not shown that his attorney’s
failure to pursue a voluntary manslaughter defense or request a voluntary manslaughter instruction
prejudiced him. Defendant has to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that the outcome would
have been different.” Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 51 (citations omitted). We can find no reasonable
probability that the jury would have convicted defendant of voluntary manslaughter, as opposed
to first-degree murder. “The elements of first-degree murder are (1) the intentional killing of a
human (2) with premeditation and deliberation.” People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 265-266; 893
NW2d 140 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he circumstances of the killing[,]”
including “an interval of time between the initial homicidal thought and ultimate action,” can
establish premeditation. Id. at 266 (quotation marks and citation omitted); People v Oros, 502
Mich 229, 242; 917 NW2d 559 (2018). Here, the evidence demonstrated that defendant acted with
premeditation when he shot Parchman and Hall. Parchman had eight gunshot wounds, and Hall
had six gunshot wounds. Surveillance video contained sounds revealing that defendant fired at
least 13 shots. Notably, the first two shots and the remaining shots were separated by a gap of 15
seconds, “which would allow a reasonable person time to subject the nature of his or her action to
a second look.” Oros, 502 Mich at 242 (quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).
Therefore, the evidence indicated that defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation. He
has not shown any probability that the jury would have convicted him of voluntary manslaughter,
as opposed to first-degree murder, if they had been given that option.
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B. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF FELON-IN-POSSESSION
Defendant insists that his felon-in-possession conviction must be reversed because his prior
conviction of attempted CCW cannot constitute a “specified felony” under MCL 750.224f(2). We
must review defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. People v Hawkins,
245 Mich App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001); see also People v Montague, 338 Mich App 29,
44; 979 NW2d 406 (2021). In doing so, however, we must review all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, and consider “whether there was sufficient evidence to justify
a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Harris, 495 Mich 120,
126; 845 NW2d 477 (2014). That standard obligates us to draw reasonable inferences in favor of
sustaining the conviction.3 Oros, 502 Mich at 239. If our analysis requires us to interpret statutes,
we review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. People v Ambrose, 317 Mich App 556, 560;
895 NW2d 198 (2016) (citation omitted).
Defendant was convicted of felon-in-possession under MCL 750.224f(2) on the theory that
he had previously committed a “specified felony.” Pursuant to that statute, “[a] person convicted
of a specified felony shall not possess . . . a firearm in this state” until five years after the term of
imprisonment for the crime has ended.4 People v Pierce, 272 Mich App 394, 396; 725 NW2d 691
(2006). A crime constitutes a “specified felony” when “[a]n element of that felony is the unlawful
possession or distribution of a firearm.” MCL 750.224f(d)(iii).
To decide whether attempted CCW constitutes a “specified felony,” we must first consider
whether the crime of CCW is a “specified felony,” and then we must analyze whether the attempt
to commit CCW should be treated just like the offense of CCW itself. In defining the offense of
CCW, MCL 750.227(2) states: “A person shall not carry a pistol concealed on or about his or her
person, or, whether concealed or otherwise, in a vehicle operated or occupied by the person, . . .
without a license to carry the pistol . . . .” To obtain a CCW conviction, a prosecutor “need only
show that the defendant knowingly carried a pistol in an automobile or on his or her person . . . .”
People v Brown, 330 Mich App 223, 230; 946 NW2d 852 (2019). This Court has determined that
CCW is a “specified felony.” People v Hughes, ___ Mich App___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)
3
The prosecution claims defendant stipulated to the admission of his prior conviction of attempted
CCW, so he waived the challenge he now presents on appeal. A defendant waives appellate review
of an issue if “defense counsel clearly expresse[d] satisfaction with a trial court’s decision[ ]” at
trial. People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 503; 803 NW2d 200 (2011). In People v Green, 228
Mich App 684, 691; 580 NW2d 444 (1998), the defendant waived his challenge to his felon-in-
possession conviction because the parties stipulated to his earlier felony conviction, and he did not
object to the trial court’s instruction about that stipulation. Defendant did not waive his challenge
in this case because defense counsel did not affirmatively stipulate to his earlier felony conviction.
Defense counsel simply did not object to the admission of a certified copy of the conviction. More
significantly, defense counsel did not agree that defendant’s prior conviction of attempted CCW
qualified as a specified felony.
4
Additionally, the person’s right to possess a firearm must have been restored under MCL 28.424.
MCL 750.224f(2)(b).
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(Docket No. 367172) (citations omitted); slip op at 9 n 7.5 Accordingly, we must begin our analysis
by recognizing that the offense of CCW is a “specified felony.”
The attempt statute proscribes any “attempt to commit an offense prohibited by law . . . .”
MCL 750.92. Hence, to obtain a conviction under that statute for attempted CCW, the prosecution
simply must prove that the defendant “attempt[ed] to commit” the offense of CCW. Proof of the
completed act of actually carrying a concealed weapon is not necessary. In unpublished decisions,
however, this Court has expressly concluded that attempted CCW is a “specified felony.” People
v Gordon, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 27, 2006 (Docket
No. 261838), p 2; People v Turner, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
June 14, 2004 (Docket No. 246712), p 1.6 Those unpublished decisions relied on People v Parker,
230 Mich App 677, 584 NW2d 753 (1998), for the proposition that an attempt to commit a crime
that is a “specified felony” must be treated just the same as the commission of the crime itself, so
an attempt to commit a “specified felony” is, itself, necessarily a specified felony. Id. at 685-687.
This Court arrived at that conclusion in Parker by citing the definition of a “felony” in the
felon-in-possession statute, which explains that “ ‘[f]elony’ means a violation of a law of this state,
or of another state, or of the United States that is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
1 year, or an attempt to violate such a law.” MCL 750.224f(10)(b) (emphasis added). This Court
read that language to mean that a “specified felony” includes not only the offense itself that meets
the definition of a “specified felony” in MCL 750.224f(10)(d), but also an attempt to commit that
offense. Parker, 230 Mich App at 686-687. As Parker observed, “if an individual is convicted of
the attempted violation of law, and that attempt involved” an offense that qualifies as a “specified
felony” under the statutory definition of that term, “then such an individual has been convicted of
a specified felony under MCL 750.224f[.]” Id. Applying the holding of Parker, we conclude that
defendant’s prior conviction of attempted CCW was a “specified felony” that rendered him subject
to prosecution for, and conviction of, felon-in-possession under MCR 750.224(f)(2). Hence, the
record contains sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of felon-in-possession under
MCL 750.224(f)(2).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
5
Defendant relies on this Court’s unpublished opinion in People v McGee, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 28, 2023 (Docket No. 363282), pp 7-8, for the
proposition that CCW is not a “specified felony.” We are bound, however, by this Court’s contrary
conclusion in Hughes, which is a published opinion. See MCR 7.215(C) (contrasting unpublished
and published opinions in terms of their precedential effect).
6
“Unpublished authorities are not binding on this Court but may be considered as persuasive
authority.” People v Swenor, 336 Mich App 550, 563 n 7; 971 NW2d 33 (2021) (citation omitted).
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