The opinion
Filed 3/19/26 P. v. Ford CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172192
v. (San Francisco City & County
ALEXANDER FORD, Super. Ct. No.
CRI-21008589)
Defendant and Appellant.
Alexander Ford was convicted of one count of making a criminal threat
and sentenced to the middle term of two years, with 1,136 days credit for
time served. On appeal, he contends his sentence must be vacated and the
matter remanded for resentencing because the record does not demonstrate
that the trial court was aware of its obligation to apply the lower term
presumption under Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) because
what he describes as his “mental health issues” were a contributing factor in
the commission of the offense. The case law distinguishes, however, between
psychological trauma, which triggers the presumption, and mental illness,
which does not unless there is psychological trauma associated with it.
Because Ford has failed to address the distinction and identify evidence in
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
the record that he experienced psychological trauma based on his mental
illness, we find no error.
BACKGROUND
Ford was charged with making criminal threats (§ 422) and one count
of obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The information alleged
several circumstances in aggravation, including that the crime involved great
violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness and that Ford
engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious danger to society (Cal. Rules
of Court, rules 4.421(a)(1), (b)(1)).2
At trial, evidence was presented that while the victim was cleaning the
sidewalk outside of the restaurant where he worked, Ford approached him
from behind and hit him with “something cold on [his] neck.” When the
victim turned around, Ford began yelling, calling the victim names, and
saying that he would kill him. Ford pointed a gun, which was later
determined to be a replica, at the victim’s chest and told him that he hated
him and wanted to kill him. The interaction ended once police arrived on the
scene and arrested Ford. Other witnesses described Ford as speaking in
“garbl[ed]” language and yelling incoherently as he walked down the street
prior to the incident. The jury found Ford guilty of making criminal threats
and found the sentencing circumstances true. The second count was
dismissed at trial.
Neither party filed a sentencing memorandum and only an abbreviated
probation report was filed because Ford had already served the maximum
2 All undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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available sentence and the court wanted to sentence him as soon as possible
so that he could be released under parole supervision.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that, along with the
mitigating factor that Ford had no prior record of significant criminal conduct
(rule 4.423(b)(1)), he was also “suffering from [a] mental or physical condition
that significantly reduced culpability for the crime” (rule 4.423(b)(2)), he had
“experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including but not
limited to . . . abuse, neglect, exploitation [a]nd that was a factor in the
offense” (rule 4.423(b)(3)), and he was a military veteran. Other than quoting
the language of the rule, counsel did not cite or discuss any evidence in
support of the factors.
Before imposing sentence, the court identified as a factor in
aggravation “that the crime involved acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness as found true by the jury” and added: “I’m also
considering the following factors in mitigation pursuant to Penal Codes—I
mean, in Rule of Court 4.423 that the defendant has no prior record or has an
insignificant record of criminal conduct. [¶] And, two, that the defendant was
suffering from a mental or physical condition that at least may have been a
factor in the commission of the crime. [¶] I also note Mr. Ford’s service in the
military as a veteran is a[n] additional factor under Rule of Court 4.423(b).”
The court imposed the middle term, explaining that it “based the
middle term on the aggravating factor that I just referred to that was found
by the jury to be true, unanimously, and beyond a reasonable doubt. But I
have also stated the mitigating factors in my tentative rulings that I also
considered, and I reincorporate them now.”
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DISCUSSION
Under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), “unless the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the
court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has
experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not
limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.”
The lower term presumption is triggered only if “the record and/or
arguments are sufficient to put a trial court on notice that a defendant’s
[qualifying condition] may have been a contributing factor in [the]
commission of the underlying offense.” (People v. Fredrickson (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 984, 994; see People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 426,
fn. 5 [noting that the Attorney General conceded that “there is at least an
affirmative indication in the record that Salazar may have suffered a
qualifying trauma and that such qualifying trauma may have been a
contributing factor to the offense”].) “The remedy for a sentence imposed
without consideration of this provision is remand for resentencing.” (People
v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1044.) On appeal, Ford suggests “it
appears that the court was unaware of the law and its presumption that the
low term should be ordered where a defendant’s psychological problems were
a factor in the offense.”
Here, the record clearly establishes that Ford was suffering from
symptoms of a diagnosed mental illness at the time of the offense. The trial
court agreed and expressly took into consideration that Ford’s “mental or
physical condition . . . may have been a factor in the commission of the
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crime.”3 Ford’s mental illness alone, however, is not enough to trigger
application of the lower term presumption under section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6)(A). (People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 777; People v. Banner
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 241.) In Banner, the court concluded that
“psychological trauma based on mental illness may be a circumstance
qualifying for the lower term presumption in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),”
but clarified that “mental illness alone” does not “qualif[y] for the lower term
presumption. Psychological trauma must attend the illness, and that trauma
must contribute to the crime under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).” (Banner,
at p. 241.)
Ford’s briefing fails to address this distinction and, without argument
on the point, simply treats mental illness as equivalent to psychological
trauma. “[T]he entire offense,” he writes, “appears to be a psychotic episode”
and “the record is replete with evidence of the interrelation of Ford’s mental
health issues with the incident.” This description fails to identify a condition
that would qualify Ford for the lower term presumption.
Under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) “psychological trauma” is
something experienced by the defendant akin to “abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence.” The American Psychological Association Dictionary of
Psychology defines trauma as “any disturbing experience that results in
significant fear, helplessness, dissociation, confusion, or other disruptive
3 Although unclear, it appears that the court may have combined
language from the first part of rule 4.423(b)(2) with language from the second
part of rule 4.423(b)(3). Rule 4.423(b)(2) reads, “The defendant was suffering
from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced culpability for
the crime.” Rule 4.423(b)(3) reads, “The defendant experienced psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect,
exploitation, or sexual violence and it was a factor in the commission of the
crime.”
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feelings intense enough to have a long-lasting negative effect on a person’s
attitudes, behavior, and other aspects of functioning.”
(<https://dictionary.apa.org/trauma> [as of 3/19/2026], italics added; see also
<https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/trauma> [as of 3/19/2026]
[Psychological trauma is a person’s experience of emotional distress resulting
from an event—a one-time occurrence or a series of occurrences—that
overwhelms the capacity to emotionally digest it].) Noting that “the statute’s
plain language states trauma is ‘not limited to abuse, neglect, exploitation, or
sexual violence,’ ” the court in Banner rejected the People’s argument that the
statute applies only “to ‘experiences’ other than mental illness.” (Banner,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 241.) Nonetheless, as set forth above, the court
confirmed that the statute requires a showing that the defendant suffered
psychological trauma as a result of his mental illness before the lower term
presumption is triggered. (Ibid.)
Notwithstanding Ford’s failure to address the issue, we have conducted
our own review of the limited record before the trial court and have found
nothing to show that he experienced psychological trauma based on his
mental illness. The record undoubtedly shows that Ford was experiencing
symptoms as a result of his mental illness at the time of the offense that may
have been a factor in the commission of the crime. The court properly
considered that mitigating factor. Because the lower term presumption was
not triggered, however, the court did not err in failing to apply it.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, Acting P. J.
MOORMAN, J. *
*Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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