Scales

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

BOBBIE SCALES, CASE NO. 3:26 CV 92

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES,

LLC, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

On December 2, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Bobbie Scales filed this action in the Lucas County

Court of Common Pleas alleging, violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”),

Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), as well as state statutory and common law causes of action.

(Doc. 1-1, at 2-11). She sues Defendants Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC; Weltman, Weinberg

& Reis Co., LPA; Attorney Ted M. Traut; and John Does 1-10. Id. at 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint

asserts facts related to debt collection activity, alleging Defendants have and are attempting to

collect on a debt that they do not own. See id. Defendants removed the case to this Court. (Doc.

1).

Plaintiff’s claims arise, at least in part, out of a state court debt collection action. See

Portfolio Recovery Associates v. Scales, No. CVF2502389 (Sandusky Cnty. Mun. Ct.); Doc. 13-

1.1 Plaintiff Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC is the Plaintiff in that case, and Defendants

Attorney Ted M. Traud and the law firm of Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co, LPA are its attorneys.

1. This Court may take judicial notice of the state court proceedings. See Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d

327, 333 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Granader v. Pub. Bank, 417 F.2d 75, 82-83 (6th Cir. 1969)

(collecting cases).).

See id. That suit was filed on October 20, 2025. On December 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to

Dismiss and Counterclaim in that action. The same day she filed the now-removed Complaint in

the Erie County Court of Common Pleas against Defendants.

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

(“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff states she seeks “to preserve the status quo

pending adjudication of threshold issues.” Id. at 1. As to irreparable harm, Plaintiff states: “Absent

interim relief, Plaintiff faces continued litigation and collection pressure based on disputed

ownership and damages. These harms are not fully compensable by money damages.” Id. at 2. In

an attached Declaration, Plaintiff states that “[w]ithout interim injunctive relief, [she] face[s]

ongoing harm that cannot be fully remedied later, including continued credit damage and ongoing

collection and litigation pressure while threshold proof of ownership and amount remains

unresolved.” (Doc. 8-1, at 1). Defendants oppose the motion, arguing (1) the Federal Anti-

Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and abstention principles, and (2) Plaintiff has not demonstrated

the requirements for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. See Docs. 13, 14.

Plaintiff replies. (Doc. 16).

The Court finds Plaintiff has not demonstrated entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of

a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Although pro se pleadings are entitled to

liberal construction and held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings prepared by lawyers,

Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), pro se litigants in federal court must still

adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

A TRO is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” and should “only be awarded upon a clear

showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” S. Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great

Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 848–49 (6th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Pursuant to Federal

Civil Rule 65(b)(1)(A), a court may issue a TRO without written or oral notice to the adverse party

or its attorney only if the plaintiff shows “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint

clearly show[ing] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant.”

Courts consider four factors in determining whether to grant or deny a temporary restraining order:

(1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable

injury without an injunction; (3) whether granting the injunction would cause substantial harm to

others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by granting the injunction. McNeilly v.

Land, 684 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 2012).2 Plaintiff “bears the burden of justifying such relief,

including showing irreparable harm and likelihood of success.” Id.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of a TRO. The Court

cannot conclude on the basis of Plaintiff’s allegations alone that she is likely to succeed on the

merits of her claims. Nor does the Court find Plaintiff has alleged an injury that is irreparable. To

demonstrate irreparable harm for purposes of a TRO or preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must

allege harm that is both certain and immediate, rather than speculative or theoretical. Economic

losses that can be cured with money damages do not constitute irreparable harm. See, e.g.,

Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[B]ecause any damages would be

economic in nature and fully compensable monetarily, we find no potential for irreparable harm.”);

Dayton Area Chamber of Com. v. Becerra, 696 F. Supp. 3d 440, 458-59 (S.D. Ohio 2023). The

Motion’s only cited support for irreparable injury is Plaintiff’s own conclusory statement of such.

(Doc. 1, at 2, 5). But both the Motion and Complaint describe only economic harm, which Plaintiff

2. The same standard generally applies to temporary restraining orders and preliminary

injunctions. Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 543 F.3d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2008); Northeast Ohio

Coal. for Homeless & Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1199 v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th

Cir. 2006).

has not persuasively demonstrated cannot be cured with monetary damages should she prove

Defendants violated the law. See, e.g., Evans v. City of Ann Arbor, 2021 WL 1405171, at *2 (E.D.

Mich.) (“Plaintiffs do not explain how having a lower credit score will result in immediate and

irreparable harm. . . . Economic damages such as lost revenue are generally insufficient to support

emergency injunctive relief.”); Silva v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 2025 WL 819076, at *2

(C.D. Cal.) (“Harms to Plaintiff’s credit score and finances more broadly are fundamentally

economic harms, unsuitable for a temporary restraining order.” (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube

Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 595 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“A plaintiff is not entitled

to an injunction if money damages would fairly compensate him for any wrong he may have

suffered.”)). Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegation regarding litigation pressures does not constitute

irreparable harm. See, e.g., In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 12591692, at *4

(N.D. Ohio) (“A showing of irreparable harm requires more than a reference to litigation costs

associated with continued district court proceedings, or to settlement pressures.”). The Court

finds the absence of allegations sufficient to establish any irreparable harm is fatal to Plaintiff’s

request for emergency injunctive relief.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunction (Doc. 8) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 3, 2026