Daniel Julio Dominguez v. State of Florida

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2024-1250

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DANIEL JULIO DOMINGUEZ,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

Peter K. Sieg, Judge.

March 18, 2026

ROWE, J.

Daniel Julio Dominguez filmed a video of himself holding

what appeared to be an AR-15 style rifle and a handgun, while

making statements about targeting a nearby middle school. He

then posted the video to social media and to his personal website.

After a viewer reported the video to police, Dominguez was charged

with making a written or electronic threat to kill, do bodily injury,

or conduct a mass shooting or act of terrorism. After a jury trial,

Dominguez was convicted and sentenced on those charges. He now

argues that the trial court reversibly erred when it (1) denied his

motion for judgment of acquittal, (2) limited his questioning of the

jury panel, and (3) failed to instruct the jury on the specific violent

crime Dominguez threatened to commit. We affirm and write only

to address the ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal.

I.

On October 19, 2023, Dominguez posted an approximately

four-minute video titled “Suicide Note #1” to his public Instagram

account and to his personal website. The video depicted

Dominguez sitting on the floor with what appears to be an AR-15

style rifle on one side of him and a handgun on the other.

Dominguez made the following statement on the video:

Hello there. My name is Daniel. I’m 31. I was born in

North Central Florida. And I have been an American

citizen my whole life. In my time here I have watched as

other people have a tremendous amount more

opportunities than me not based on their merit, but just

based off of the distribution of resources or their status,

wealth, that kind of thing.

I’ve done my best to play the game. And despite

having a significant amount of my childhood stolen from,

despite having my mother being chronically underpaid

and overworked, despite the fact that I’ve been told my

whole life that I am smart and special and capable and

I’m going to go on to do great things, America has only

insisted that I struggle.

When I was 27 and I did finally achieve middle class

status and became a professional, my starting salary was

equal to that of my mother’s who has been working her

whole life. I was also in the professional sphere with

$64,000 in student debt. My mother’s an immigrant, a

refugee from another country who put herself through

school and who lived under student debt and whose

student debt I lived under.

And so given that the conditions are so bad and that

the conditions even for social reproduction aren’t really

there, I’ve decided that my mind is better applied to doing

something useful than it is being a tool for the State and

an unhappy and atomized and lonely tool of them.

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I’ve decided to take up arms and attack [the] State. I

intend to target a middle school, particularly the middle

school I went to. It’s just right down the street there and

it’s convenient. I know the layout. I will be going on a

Saturday or a Sunday when no children are there. And

will m—with the intention of getting off as many NATO

5.56 rounds from my AR-l5 at the building. I will start by

shooting at the concrete walls that—that flank the

building and then I’ll finish by taking out the windowed

front office area.

I hope and expect the police to arrive on scene and to

shoot me at this point. However, should that I am able to

get off all the rounds from my rifle, I will not point the

rifle at the police because I have no intention of harming

anyone. But I do have this fake BB pistol Beretta that I

intend to point at them to provoke them to hopefully kill

me and send me to Valhalla or whatever.

What is there to say? This is the—product of what

this country is creating. The messages tell me that I feel

this way and that I should attack my brother. I hear that

loud and clear. However, I refuse. I acknowledge that the

enemy here is laid squarely at how wealth is distributed

and allocated within society and how that affects our lives

until the day we die. And so I’m a very real version of

that.

Thank you for listening. Life’s tough. Good luck to all

of you out there. I’m wishing you many moments of love,

rest, and laughter in the coming years. Bye.

Dominguez included the following disclaimer, which appeared

to the right of him on the video when viewed on a computer and

beneath him when viewed on a smartphone:

THIS IS AN ART PIECE. A WORK OF FICTION. I AM

NOT SUICIDAL, NOR AM I CONSIDERING ANY

ILLEGAL ACTIVITY. NEITHER AM I MAKING

THREATS. ART, THIS IS ART, IT FEELS STRONGLY

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BECAUSE THAT IS THE INTENTION. IT IS CLEARLY

INDICATED AT THE CLOSE.

So I like writing love letters, but then it occurred to

me that I should also like to write suicide notes. I,

personally, am not suicidal, but suicide notes are

powerful and honest and beautiful and sad and all those

interesting things. I like the video format, and while this

is just the first one, I hope to make more with different

scripting, edits, and reasons. Something about the

absurdity and resolve of people in this format is beautiful

and terrifying. It’s plenty of grist for the mind mill.

Anyway, I’m fine, everyone and everything is safe

and sound! Please don’t call the police or report my

account. I would like to enjoy my freedom of movement,

and to not go to jail for art. The video is also hosted on my

site, jic [just in case].

Sherri Estes, the principal of Kanapaha Middle School, saw

the Instagram post. She concluded that the school described in the

video was Kanapaha, and then immediately contacted the police.

Dominguez, who lived just down the street from Kanapaha, was

arrested and charged under section 836.10, Florida Statutes

(2023), with making a written or electronic threat to kill, do bodily

injury, or conduct a mass shooting or act of terrorism. Dominguez

rejected a plea offer, and the case went to trial.

At trial, Estes testified that she saw Dominguez’s video the

night it was posted. Based on the description of the school and the

front office area, she believed that Dominguez was talking about

her school. She later learned that Dominguez was a former

student. Estes explained that over one thousand students attended

Kanapaha. The campus was open to the public on the weekends,

and some buildings were rented out each weekend. On the

weekend after Dominguez made the video, the school was reserved

for a children’s sports group.

The State then presented testimony on Dominguez’s unusual

encounter with law enforcement a few months before he posted the

video and shortly after he bought the semi-automatic rifle

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displayed in the video. Detective Summer Harrison testified that

Dominguez was riding a moped when he flagged her down. He told

her that he “wanted to let [the Detective] know that he’d just

bought an AR.” He provided Harrison with the model number of

the rifle and told her where he bought it. He made a point to tell

her that the rifle was not on his person and that he did not plan to

bring it to his workplace at a nearby university.

After his arrest, Dominguez told police that the rifle was at

his father’s home. Police searched that home and found a Ruger

AR-556 semi-automatic rifle and a replica Baretta handgun—the

guns depicted in the video. The police also found a fully functioning

Glock 43 handgun, ammunition, and a rifle scope.

Investigators recovered text messages from Dominguez’s cell

phone. The texts showed that Dominguez knew that his video

would cause problems. He told one friend, “Instagram is not going

to like my latest video,” and he said that his account might get

“nuked.”

Dominguez also maintained a personal webpage. There,

Dominguez advised others that a disclaimer should be placed

before or after writings to avoid any future legal issues. He advised

visitors to his webpage:

I use the following disclaimer so that fiction stays

fiction and doesn’t become evidence.

This is adult content for 13+ audience. I am not a

writer. This is a work of fiction. Names, characters,

business, events and incidents are the product of

imagination. Any resemblance to actual persons living or

dead or actual events is coincidental.

At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for

judgment of acquittal. Defense counsel argued that the State failed

to show that Dominguez made a threat or that he intended any

threat he made to be a true threat. The jury found Dominguez

guilty as charged, and the court sentenced him to three years in

prison followed by ten years of probation. This timely appeal

follows.

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II.

Dominguez argues that the trial court erred when it denied

his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was not

sufficient to show that he intended to commit violence against

another person, conduct a mass shooting, or conduct an act of

terrorism. He also argues that any threat made in the video was

not intended as a true threat.

Our review is de novo, and we will affirm the trial court’s

ruling if it is supported by competent, substantial evidence.

Johnson v. State, 238 So. 3d 726, 739 (Fla. 2018). Before a trial

court may grant a judgment of acquittal, “the evidence presented

by the State must have been so wanting ‘that no view which the

jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite party can be

sustained under the law.’” Fogarty v. State, 403 So. 3d 1026, 1031

(Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (quoting Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla.

1974)). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the

State and consider whether the trier of fact could find the elements

of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. McInnis v.

State, 408 So. 3d 882, 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

The State charged Dominguez, under section 836.10(2),

Florida Statutes, with making a written or electronic threat to kill,

do bodily injury, or conduct a mass shooting or act of terrorism. To

prove the offense, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt these four elements:

1. Dominguez made a threat to kill or do bodily harm

to another person or conduct a mass shooting or conduct

an act of terrorism in a writing or other record;

2. Dominguez sent, posted, or transmitted that

writing or other record;

3. Dominguez did so in a manner in which it may be

viewed by another person; and

4. Dominguez intended the threat to be a true threat.

§ 836.10(2), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 8.22.

Dominguez argued below that the State failed to prove the

first and fourth elements. His focus in the trial court and on appeal

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is that his disclaimers—that he would not hurt anyone and that

the video was art—show that he did not (1) make a threat to harm

anyone or to conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism; and

(2) intend any threat made in the video as a true threat.

A.

As to the first element, the State had to prove that Dominguez

made a threat in writing or other record to do one of three things:

(1) kill or do bodily harm to another person; (2) conduct a mass

shooting; or (3) conduct an act of terrorism. § 836.10(2), Fla. Stat.

The State argued that Dominguez’s posting of the video to social

media qualified as a threat to conduct an act of terrorism.

Dominguez countered that he did not make a threat, pointing to

the disclaimers and his statements that he did not plan to harm

anyone other than himself. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence from which a

rational jury could conclude that Dominguez threatened to conduct

an act of terrorism.

Terrorism has two elements: (1) “a violent act or an act

dangerous to human life which is a violation of the criminal laws

of this state or of the United States,” and (2) “is intended to

intimidate, injure, or coerce a civilian population; influence the

policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or affect the

conduct of government through destruction of property,

assassination, murder, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy.” § 775.30(1),

Fla. Stat. (2023) (quotation modified); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.)

8.22.

There is no dispute that there was sufficient evidence to

establish the first element of terrorism. Firing multiple rounds—

as many as Dominguez “could”—from a semi-automatic rifle into a

school building is violent and dangerous to human life. And doing

so is clearly illegal, even when the building is unoccupied. See

790.19, Fla. Stat. (prohibiting a person from shooting into a public

building regardless of whether the building is occupied). As to the

second element, Dominguez declared in the video that he would

“take up arms and attack the State.” He also threatened to destroy

school property by shooting at the concrete walls around the

building and “taking out the windowed front office area.”

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Dominguez complained about “how wealth is distributed and

allocated within society and how that affects our lives until the day

we die.” Taking reasonable inferences in favor of the State, this

and other statements Dominguez made in the video, along with his

display of a fully operational semi-automatic rifle, directed toward

a real, nearby school, demonstrated that Dominguez made a threat

to conduct an act of terrorism.

B.

Turning to the fourth element of the charged offense,

Dominguez argued below that the State failed to show that he

intended the video to be a true threat, pointing to the disclaimer

asserting that the video was a work of fiction.

Section 836.10 requires that the defendant intended the

threat to be a true threat. To prove this element of the offense, the

State must prove two things. First, there must be a true threat.

Second, the defendant must have intended to make a true threat.

We address both requirements in turn.

First, we address the true threat requirement of the statute.

The government is generally prohibited from restricting speech

based on “its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”

Romero v. State, 314 So. 3d 699, 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (quoting

Ashcroft v. Am. C.L. Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)). Even so, the

government may ban speech when it communicates a “true threat.”

Id. (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)). “True

threats” have been described as “those statements where the

speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent

to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or

group of individuals.” Black, 538 U.S. at 359; see also Fla. Std.

Jury. Instr. (Crim.) 8.22 (“A true threat is a serious expression of

an intent to commit an act of violence.”).

“[P]roof of scienter is necessary to guard against the

impermissible regulation of the lawful exercise of constitutionally

protected speech.” Romero, 314 So. 3d at 705. Otherwise, “remarks

made in jest or mere puffery, political hyperbole, or involuntary

communications could conceivably subject an accused to

prosecution.” Id. The Supreme Court has explained the difference

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between a “true threat” and constitutionally protected expression

such as jests or hyperbole:

The “true” in that term distinguishes what is at issue

from jests, “hyperbole,” or other statements that when

taken in context do not convey a real possibility that

violence will follow (say, “I am going to kill you for

showing up late”). True threats are “serious

expression[s]” conveying that a speaker means to

“commit an act of unlawful violence.”

Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 74 (2023) (citations omitted).

To support a conviction under section 836.10, along with

showing that the defendant made a true threat, the State must

show that the defendant intended that the threat be a true threat.

§ 836.10(1), Fla. Stat. In considering the latter showing, Florida’s

district courts have reached different conclusions on whether

section 836.10 includes a mens rea element. Compare Saidi v.

State, 845 So. 2d 1022, 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that

section 836.10 did not require “the actual intent to do harm or the

ability to carry out the threat”), with T.R.W. v. State, 363 So. 3d

1081, 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (holding that section 836.10 does

include a mens rea element); N.D. v. State, 315 So. 3d 102, 105

(Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (same); Smith v. State, 532 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla.

2d DCA 1988) (same).

The United States Supreme Court has held that to support a

conviction for making a true threat, the government must

establish the mens rea of the defendant. Counterman, 600 U.S. 66

at 75. In Counterman, the Court reviewed a criminal conviction

under Colorado’s true-threat statute. Id. at 70. Counterman sent

hundreds of Facebook messages to C.W. suggesting that he may be

surveilling her, expressing anger, and envisaging harm befalling

her. Id. The Court considered what proof of intent was required

under the Colorado statute, asking whether “the First Amendment

. . . demands that the State in a true-threats case prove that the

defendant was aware in some way of the threatening nature of his

communications.” Id. at 72. The Court described a true threat as

an “historically unprotected category of communications.” Id. at 74

(quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)). Despite their

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unprotected status, the Court reasoned that “the First

Amendment may still demand a subjective mental-state

requirement shielding some true threats from liability.” Id. at 75.

To avoid chilling protected speech, the Court held that a subjective

element is required to support a conviction in a true-threats case.

Id. at 77. The Court went on to discuss the law of mens rea and to

consider which level of intent should apply in a true-threats case:

a conscious desire for a result, knowledge, or recklessness. Id. at

78–79. After considering the standard applied for other permitted

restrictions on the content of speech (laws regarding incitement,

defamation, and obscenity), the Court held that the recklessness

standard applies. “In the threats context, it means that a speaker

is aware that others could regard his statements as threatening

violence and delivers them anyway.” Id. at 79 (citation modified)

(quoting Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 746 (2015) (Alito,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

Several district courts of appeal have considered whether

Florida’s true-threat statute similarly includes a mens rea

element. The Fourth District held that it does. See T.R.W., 363

So. 3d at 1084–85. That court considered several appellate court

decisions interpreting an earlier version of section 836.10. Id. at

1084. But that version of the statute lacked the requirement that

the defendant intended to make a true threat. Id. District courts

construing the earlier version of the statute evaluated whether the

defendant made a true threat based on how the defendant’s

statement impacted the recipient of the alleged threat. Id. at 1084

(citing Smith v. State, 532 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), and Puy

v. State, 294 So. 3d 930, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)). But turning to

the text of the current version of the statute—which expressly

requires an element of intent—the Fourth District reasoned that

“a mens rea element must be read into section 836.10.” T.R.W., 363

So. 3d at 1088. The Fourth District then held that to support a

conviction under the current version of the statute, “[a] defendant

must have intended to make a true threat, namely that he made a

communication with the knowledge that it will be viewed as a

threat.” Id.

Here, the parties both argued at a pretrial hearing that

section 836.10 included a mens rea element. There was no

argument below that the recklessness standard discussed in

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Counterman should apply. And despite their agreement that the

statute includes a mens rea element, the parties never addressed

below the required standard for establishing the defendant’s state

of mind. See U.S. v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403–04 (1980) (explaining

the movement away from the common law dichotomy of intent to

“an alternative analysis of mens rea” that replaces “intent” with a

hierarchy of states of mind in descending order of culpability:

purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence).

On appeal, Dominguez points out that neither party argued

below whether the recklessness standard discussed in Counterman

should be used to establish the intent required under section

836.10. And Dominguez presents no argument on which standard

should apply—specific intent, general intent, or recklessness.

Based on the arguments of the parties below and the issues

raised by Dominguez on appeal, we need not address whether the

statute includes a mens rea element or if it does, what level of

culpability must be proven as to the defendant’s intent. See

Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985) (“In order to be

preserved for further review by a higher court, an issue must be

presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or

ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that

presentation if it is to be considered preserved.”); see also I.R. v.

State, 395 So. 3d 567, 570 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (declining on

preservation grounds to address whether section 836.10 requires

specific intent or general intent).

But whatever level of culpability may be required for the State

to prove whether the defendant intended to make a true threat,

the question of intent is for the jury and not a matter for judgment

of acquittal. See King v. State, 286 So. 3d 850, 856 (Fla. 1st DCA

2019) (explaining that a motion for judgment of acquittal is rarely

granted on the issue of intent); N.H. v. State, 358 So. 3d 477, 483

(Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (“[D]etermining the defendant’s intent is a

question reserved for the trier of fact.”). Rarely can the State

establish intent with direct evidence; the jury must consider the

surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence. See Mooney v.

State, 403 So. 3d 407, 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025) (holding that

circumstantial evidence can prove intent); Toole v. State, 456 So.

2d 1268, 1269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (holding that intent is often

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proven through circumstantial evidence). If the jury could

reasonably infer from the evidence presented at trial that

Dominguez intended his threat to be a true threat, the trial court

did not err when it denied the motion for judgment of acquittal and

allowed the jury to determine whether Dominguez had the

requisite intent.

We hold that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for

the jury to reasonably infer that Dominguez intended the

statements in the video to be a true threat. He chose to select and

identify in the video a real-world, plausible, and proximate target.

He stated, “I intend to target a middle school, particularly the

middle school I went to, just down the street.” Dominguez then

conveyed his desire “to take up arms and attack the State.” And he

described his plan of attack, including the time and precise

location. He stated that he knew “the layout” and that he would be

“going on a Saturday or a Sunday” with “the intention of getting

as many [ ] rounds from my AR at the building.” He would start by

“shooting at the concrete walls that flank the building” and then

he would “finish by taking out the windowed front office area.”

Dominguez hoped the police would arrive on the scene so he could

point his fake Baretta at the police “to provoke them to kill [him]

and send [him] to hell.” The video was referenced with tags

including “AR15,” “schoolshooter,” and “suicide.” Throughout the

video, titled “Suicide Note 1,” Dominguez conspicuously

displayed—not a fake gun—but a fully operable semi-automatic

rifle that he had recently purchased.

Dominguez does not dispute that he made these statements

in the video. But he maintains that his disclaimers show that he

lacked the intent required to make a true threat. But mere

disclaimers will not shield a person from prosecution. See Helms v.

State, 38 So. 3d 182, 184–86 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). In Helms, this

court considered whether a disclaimer made by a defendant in a

prosecution for prostitution negated intent. Id. Helms was charged

with deriving support from the proceeds of prostitution and

transporting another individual for the purposes of prostitution.

Id. at 183. Advertisements for Helms’ escort service depicted

scantily clad women stating that “[m]oney exchanged is for time,

companionship, and legal services such as nude modeling, erotic

dancing, []body rub[.]”, etc.” Id. But Helms included a disclaimer

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stating that, “Anything else that may occur is between two

consenting adults and has not been promised or contracted for!” Id.

After he was convicted of prostitution, Helms argued that the State

failed to prove that he knew or had reasonable cause to believe that

prostitution would occur. Id. at 184. He argued that the disclaimer

proved he lacked the requisite intent to commit prostitution and

that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment

of acquittal. This court rejected Helms’ argument because the jury

was not required to accept the disclaimer at face value. Id. at 185.

Instead, the court explained that the jury could have relied on the

disclaimer as proof that the escort service’s primary purpose was

prostitution or designed to be a defense if the defendant was ever

arrested. Id. If a defendant could rely on a disclaimer to rebut any

claim of intent as a matter of law, then “any defendant, by

planning ahead, could avoid a conviction for any crime requiring

proof of a certain state of mind.” Id. at 186.

As in Helms, the jury here could have viewed the disclaimers

Dominguez made in the video as a veiled attempt to hide his true

motives—to target his former middle school and then die at the

hands of a police officer. Moreover, the evidence that Dominquez

previously advised others through his webpage to use disclaimers

to avoid their writings becoming evidence also supports the

conclusion that the disclaimer on the video was no more than an

effort to avoid prosecution.

Dominguez’s conduct and statements before he recorded the

video also undermine his disclaimers. After buying the rifle

depicted in the video, he had an unusual encounter with a

detective where he flagged her down and told her he bought the

rifle. Dominguez’s text messages with friends showed that they

were concerned about his purchase of the rifle. Dominguez even

characterized their response: “everyone lost their minds.” And

after he recorded the video, but before he was taken into custody,

Dominguez sent a text message, “Instagram is not going to like my

latest video.”

The central question in this case was whether Dominguez

intended the threat he made in the video to be a true threat.

Although there was evidence to support the defense’s theory, there

was legally sufficient evidence to support the State’s argument and

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for the jury to reasonably infer that Dominguez intended to make

a true threat. Thus, the question was one for the jury to decide.

And the trial court did not err when it denied the motion for

judgment of acquittal. The judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED.

M.K. THOMAS, J., concurs; KELSEY, J., concurs in result.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

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Robert Ralph Berry, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Julian Markham,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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