William Fulp Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Finishline Trucking, L.L.C.

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with

the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-753

Filed 18 March 2026

Davie County, No. 19CVS000220-290

WILLIAM FULP WRECKER SERVICE, INC., Plaintiff,

v.

FINISHLINE TRUCKING, L.L.C., Defendant.

Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 8 February 2024 by Judge Joseph

N. Crosswhite in Davie County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20

March 2025.

Batten McLamb Smith PLLC, by Jaye E. Bingham-Hinch, and Finger Roemer

Brown & Mariani, L.L.P., by Andrew G. Brown, for plaintiff-appellant.

Pinto, Coates, Kyre & Bowers, PLLC, by Britney M. Millisor, Richard L. Pinto,

and Lyn K. Broom, for defendant-appellee.

GORE, Judge.

This case arises from a dispute over diesel oil cleanup costs following the

overturn of defendant’s tractor-trailer in Davie County, North Carolina. Plaintiff

performed the cleanup at the request of the Fire Marshal and later invoiced

defendant for $289,707.00, alleging unjust enrichment. Defendant denies liability,

WILLIAM FULP WRECKER SERV., INC. V. FINISHLINE TRUCKING, L.L.C.

Opinion of the Court

asserting it never requested or agreed to the services and that statutory law, not

equitable principles, governs cleanup costs. The trial court granted summary

judgment for defendant, finding no genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff appeals,

arguing that sufficient evidence supports its claim. Jurisdiction is proper under

N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(1) as a final judgment of the trial court. Upon review, we affirm.

I.

On 22 August 2017, a tractor-trailer owned by defendant Finishline Trucking,

L.L.C., overturned in Davie County, North Carolina, resulting in a fire and the

release of diesel fuel and other automotive fluids. Emergency responders, including

the Davie County Fire Marshal’s Office and Emergency Management Services

(“EMS”), arrived at the scene. Fire Marshal Jerry Myers determined a cleanup was

necessary and contacted plaintiff William Fulp Wrecker Service, Inc. to assist in

containing and remediating the spill. Plaintiff’s work spanned nine days, involving

personnel, equipment, and oversight from the North Carolina Department of

Environmental Quality (“NCDEQ”) and a geologist who conducted soil and water

testing.

Plaintiff contends defendant was aware of and accepted the benefit of the

cleanup, citing communications between Kent Fulp, plaintiff’s vice president, and an

individual he believed to be Edward Garcia, Finishline’s owner. Plaintiff further

states defendant’s representative provided insurance details, indicating an

expectation that coverage would apply. Plaintiff sent defendant an invoice for

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Opinion of the Court

$289,707.00 on 14 September 2017 but received no payment.

Defendant, however, denies authorizing, agreeing to pay for, or assuming

responsibility for plaintiff’s services. Defendant argues the cleanup was arranged

solely by Fire Marshal Myers, and it was not involved in the decision-making process

regarding the scope or cost of the remediation. The trial court granted summary

judgment in favor of defendant, concluding that no genuine issue of material fact

existed regarding defendant’s liability. Plaintiff appeals that ruling.

II.

“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such

judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that ‘there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”

In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573 (2008) (citation omitted). “A ‘genuine issue’ is

one that can be maintained by substantial evidence. The showing required for

summary judgment may be accomplished by proving an essential element of the

opposing party’s claim does not exist, cannot be proven at trial, or would be barred by

an affirmative defense.” Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83 (2000) (internal citations

omitted).

Unjust enrichment is “a claim in quasi contract or a contract implied in law.”

Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567, 570 (1988). A prima facie claim for unjust enrichment

requires proof of five elements: (1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the

defendant; (2) the benefit was not conferred officiously, meaning it was not imposed

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through unjustified interference; (3) the benefit was not gratuitous; (4) the benefit is

measurable; and (5) the defendant consciously accepted the benefit. JPMorgan Chase

Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Browning, 230 N.C. App. 537, 541–42 (2013). To establish

liability, a plaintiff must show that property or benefits were conferred on the

defendant under circumstances that create a legal or equitable obligation to

compensate for those benefits, but that the defendant has failed to make restitution.

Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 140 N.C. App. 390, 417 (2000).

In this case, the State, not defendant, directly benefited from the cleanup.

North Carolina law authorizes agencies like NCDEQ and local emergency

management to oversee and direct hazardous material spill remediation to protect

public health and the environment. See § 143-215.84(b). Here, these agencies took

control of the cleanup process, coordinating and directing the response.

The forecast of evidence does not indicate defendant requested, approved, or

exercised any control over the remediation, nor did it determine its scope or cost. The

benefit conferred was to the State and the public. Under the statutory framework,

cost recovery is pursued through State enforcement mechanisms, further indicating

the State—not defendant—was the intended beneficiary of the remediation efforts.

Because unjust enrichment requires a party to have “consciously accepted the

benefit[,]” Booe, 322 N.C. at 570, defendant cannot be held directly liable to plaintiff

for cleanup costs merely due to its involvement in the underlying spill. Without

evidence that defendant requested, controlled, or otherwise knowingly accepted the

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benefit, the unjust enrichment claim against defendant fails as a matter of law.

Plaintiff argues the North Carolina Fire Code, specifically §§ 2701 and 2703,

imposes financial responsibility on defendant by requiring parties who store, handle,

or transport hazardous materials to cover cleanup costs. However, § 101.2 states the

Fire Code regulates “structures, processes, premises, and safeguards,” but does not

govern the discharge of diesel oil onto land or into waters. Because the Fire Code

does not establish liability or cost recovery procedures for such discharges, it does not

apply to this claim.

In contrast, defendant argues the Oil Pollution and Hazardous Substances

Control Act of 1978, codified in N.C.G.S. § 143-215.75 et seq., governs liability and

cost recovery for hazardous material spills in North Carolina. This statutory

framework establishes a comprehensive regulatory scheme for state agencies to

recover cleanup costs. Because the Act provides a specific enforcement mechanism,

defendant contends it preempts plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, making the

State—not a private entity—the proper party to seek reimbursement. We agree.

Under N.C.G.S. § 143-215.84(a), any person responsible for an unlawful

discharge of oil or hazardous substances must immediately clean up the spill and

restore the affected area. This provision establishes a clear duty for responsible

parties to mitigate environmental damage. However, § 143-215.84(b) grants the

Department of Environmental Quality authority to intervene when necessary,

allowing it to deploy state resources, collaborate with local agencies, or hire

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Opinion of the Court

contractors to investigate and remediate contamination.

Additionally, N.C.G.S. § 143-215.88 provides a structured reimbursement

process for state-incurred cleanup costs. Once remediation is complete, participating

state or local agencies submit expenses to the Department, which then disburses

funds from the Oil or Other Hazardous Substances Pollution Protection Fund. The

Secretary must seek reimbursement from the responsible party, and if payment is

not made, the Attorney General is authorized to initiate legal action to recover costs

on behalf of the State. § 143-215.88. This process makes clear that liability for

cleanup costs lies with the responsible party, but only the State—not private

entities—can enforce payment through statutory means.

In this case, Fire Marshal and Emergency Management Director Jerry Myers

authorized plaintiff to conduct diesel oil containment, mitigation, cleanup, and

remediation. NCDEQ conducted an on-site assessment with Davie County

Emergency Management, a geologist from GeoScience & Technology, and plaintiff’s

site managers to discuss cleanup procedures and establish daily stream monitoring.

Defendant was not involved in this process. The agreement for remediation was

between Fire Marshal Myers and plaintiff, yet plaintiff now attempts to bind

defendant—a third party—to that agreement despite no evidence that defendant

requested or authorized that work.

Plaintiff argues Davie County Ordinance § 51.63 imposes strict liability on

defendant for cleanup costs, asserting it applies to transporters of hazardous

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Opinion of the Court

materials in Davie County and requires reimbursement for emergency response and

remediation. Plaintiff relies on § 51.63(d) to claim that defendant, as the transporter

of the spilled materials, is financially responsible for the cleanup and contends that

this ordinance, along with state environmental laws, supports an unjust enrichment

claim by establishing a legal obligation for defendant to cover the costs incurred.

However, N.C.G.S. § 153A-136(a) only authorizes counties to regulate

“nonhazardous solid waste,” explicitly excluding hazardous waste under § 153A-

136(d). Because § 51.63 attempts to impose liability for hazardous material spills

from transportation accidents, it exceeds the county’s regulatory authority. Since

diesel fuel and automotive fluids do not qualify as nonhazardous solid waste, the

ordinance does not apply, making plaintiff’s reliance on it misplaced.

III.

Plaintiff performed the remediation at the direction of government agencies,

and the evidence does not indicate defendant requested, authorized, or knowingly

accepted the benefit. Since unjust enrichment requires conscious acceptance of a

benefit, Booe, 322 N.C. at 570, plaintiff has failed to establish an essential element of

its claim. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment

in favor of defendant.

AFFIRMED.

Judges HAMPSON and MURRY concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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